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Turkey's `Zero Problems' Problem
` November 18, 2011
Sinan Ã`lgen
Project Syndicate
http://www.armenianlife.com/2011/11/18/turkey%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9czero-problems%e2%80%9d-problem/
It was good while it lasted. Designed by Turkey's newly elected
government in 2002, the country's `zero problems with neighbors'
policy helped it to climb into the league of influential regional
powers. The policy's goal ` to build strong economic, political, and
social ties with the country's immediate neighbors while decreasing
its dependency on the United States ` seemed to be within sight. But
the Arab Spring exposed the policy's vulnerabilities, and Turkey must
now seek a new guiding principle for regional engagement.
Until the onset of the Arab uprisings, `zero problems with neighbors'
meant zero problems with the Middle East's established autocratic
regimes. But, when Arab political opposition began to gain traction
this year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an's government faced an
unavoidable choice: whether to maintain its policy of engagement with
authoritarian Arab leaders, or acknowledge that their countries'
citizens were not having `zero problems.'
The revolt in Libya provided the first concrete challenge to Turkey's
policy. Though Turkey's Western partners swiftly broke with Libyan
leader Muammar el-Qaddafi in support of the opposition, the `zero
problems' principle dictated that the Turkish government maintain
relations with the old regime. After initially adopting a neutral
stance, Turkey soon recognized that its indecisiveness was damaging
its image.
Turkey was thus confronted with a fundamental conflict between its
cherished policy of uncritical engagement with regional political
rulers and the imperative to support the Libyan people's democratic
aspirations. Eventually, the government decided to support the latter
over the former, thus effectively ending its `zero problems with
neighbors' policy. Turkey became the last NATO member to give its
backing to the Libyan rebels.
In many ways, Syria was the poster child for the `zero problems with
neighbors' policy. But the Syrian crisis became another nail in the
coffin of Turkey's regional policy. At the end of the 1990's, Syria
and Turkey were on the brink of war, owing to Syria's support of
Kurdish terrorism. But the two governments mended their relationship,
even contemplating the creation of a regional common market.
So, when mass protests erupted in Syria in January, Turkey hoped to
leverage the relationship of mutual trust that the two countries had
presumably developed, actively nudging Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad towards democratic reforms. Faced with Assad's intransigence,
however, ErdoÄ?an's government demonstrated that it had learned from
its Libyan experience: this time, Turkey did not hesitate before
harshly criticizing Assad. In a clear departure from established
Turkish policy, ErdoÄ?an even imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria `
all the more remarkable for a country that has typically condemned
sanctions. Indeed, as recently as last year, Turkey voted against new
sanctions on Iran at the United Nations Security Council.
At the same time, the Turkish government's rhetoric also changed.
Giving their full-fledged support to the Syrian opposition, Turkey's
leaders started to profess their country's duty to protect the
victimized people of the Middle East.
The consequences of this fundamental shift in Turkey's regional
outlook are likely to be profound. After all, Turkey's new outlook
implies that it is intent, for the first time in its history as a
republic, on promoting democratic principles in the region.
A more vocal Turkish policy on issues related to fundamental freedoms
and democratic reform in the region will necessarily alter Turkey's
relations with its less progressive neighbors. Indeed, if Turkey's new
agenda is to become credible, ErdoÄ?an's government cannot continue to
turn a blind eye to the gross human-rights violations in neighboring
Iran, where ErdoÄ?an's government was the first to congratulate
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad following Iran's tainted elections in
2009.
An equally important component of the new policy's credibility will be
Turkey's ability to resolve its own democratic shortcomings,
particularly with regard to freedom of expression, non-interference
with the media, and minority rights. Progress in these areas will be
critical to the success of Turkey's foreign-policy agenda.
Turkey's geopolitical role as a country that is at once European and
Middle Eastern is more complex than ever. For such a country, there is
no such thing as `no problems.' In an environment that is being
reshaped in unpredictable ways by the Arab awakening, Turkey will have
to redefine what it means to be a good neighbor.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
` November 18, 2011
Sinan Ã`lgen
Project Syndicate
http://www.armenianlife.com/2011/11/18/turkey%e2%80%99s-%e2%80%9czero-problems%e2%80%9d-problem/
It was good while it lasted. Designed by Turkey's newly elected
government in 2002, the country's `zero problems with neighbors'
policy helped it to climb into the league of influential regional
powers. The policy's goal ` to build strong economic, political, and
social ties with the country's immediate neighbors while decreasing
its dependency on the United States ` seemed to be within sight. But
the Arab Spring exposed the policy's vulnerabilities, and Turkey must
now seek a new guiding principle for regional engagement.
Until the onset of the Arab uprisings, `zero problems with neighbors'
meant zero problems with the Middle East's established autocratic
regimes. But, when Arab political opposition began to gain traction
this year, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an's government faced an
unavoidable choice: whether to maintain its policy of engagement with
authoritarian Arab leaders, or acknowledge that their countries'
citizens were not having `zero problems.'
The revolt in Libya provided the first concrete challenge to Turkey's
policy. Though Turkey's Western partners swiftly broke with Libyan
leader Muammar el-Qaddafi in support of the opposition, the `zero
problems' principle dictated that the Turkish government maintain
relations with the old regime. After initially adopting a neutral
stance, Turkey soon recognized that its indecisiveness was damaging
its image.
Turkey was thus confronted with a fundamental conflict between its
cherished policy of uncritical engagement with regional political
rulers and the imperative to support the Libyan people's democratic
aspirations. Eventually, the government decided to support the latter
over the former, thus effectively ending its `zero problems with
neighbors' policy. Turkey became the last NATO member to give its
backing to the Libyan rebels.
In many ways, Syria was the poster child for the `zero problems with
neighbors' policy. But the Syrian crisis became another nail in the
coffin of Turkey's regional policy. At the end of the 1990's, Syria
and Turkey were on the brink of war, owing to Syria's support of
Kurdish terrorism. But the two governments mended their relationship,
even contemplating the creation of a regional common market.
So, when mass protests erupted in Syria in January, Turkey hoped to
leverage the relationship of mutual trust that the two countries had
presumably developed, actively nudging Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad towards democratic reforms. Faced with Assad's intransigence,
however, ErdoÄ?an's government demonstrated that it had learned from
its Libyan experience: this time, Turkey did not hesitate before
harshly criticizing Assad. In a clear departure from established
Turkish policy, ErdoÄ?an even imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria `
all the more remarkable for a country that has typically condemned
sanctions. Indeed, as recently as last year, Turkey voted against new
sanctions on Iran at the United Nations Security Council.
At the same time, the Turkish government's rhetoric also changed.
Giving their full-fledged support to the Syrian opposition, Turkey's
leaders started to profess their country's duty to protect the
victimized people of the Middle East.
The consequences of this fundamental shift in Turkey's regional
outlook are likely to be profound. After all, Turkey's new outlook
implies that it is intent, for the first time in its history as a
republic, on promoting democratic principles in the region.
A more vocal Turkish policy on issues related to fundamental freedoms
and democratic reform in the region will necessarily alter Turkey's
relations with its less progressive neighbors. Indeed, if Turkey's new
agenda is to become credible, ErdoÄ?an's government cannot continue to
turn a blind eye to the gross human-rights violations in neighboring
Iran, where ErdoÄ?an's government was the first to congratulate
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad following Iran's tainted elections in
2009.
An equally important component of the new policy's credibility will be
Turkey's ability to resolve its own democratic shortcomings,
particularly with regard to freedom of expression, non-interference
with the media, and minority rights. Progress in these areas will be
critical to the success of Turkey's foreign-policy agenda.
Turkey's geopolitical role as a country that is at once European and
Middle Eastern is more complex than ever. For such a country, there is
no such thing as `no problems.' In an environment that is being
reshaped in unpredictable ways by the Arab awakening, Turkey will have
to redefine what it means to be a good neighbor.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress