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IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM: THE VIEW FROM THE CAUCASUS
by ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
Nov 22 2011
Turkey
Iran is the main foreign-policy challenge for both the US and Israel,
and is the focal point for anxiety in the Middle East.
The central aim of Western policy in the MENA region is to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to neutralize its strategic
political significance. At the moment, Iran is countering the US and
Israel in the MENA region with regard to Syria -- nothing would weaken
Tehran's position more than losing Syria. However, the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) recent report presented intelligence
indicating that Iran has undertaken research and experiments geared to
developing nuclear weapons capability, news which stoked international
tensions and prompted the Arab League's decision to threaten Syria
with the suspension of its membership and to call upon member states
to withdraw their ambassadors from Damascus -- both of which would
weaken Tehran.
As tensions increase in the Middle East and Western powers express
concern over Iran, the South Caucasus countries that share borders with
Iran are primarily concerned with the possible consequences of military
intervention and the potential impact of such hostility. The primary
concerns across the Caucasus region are related to the potentially
catastrophic consequences of military intervention against Iran, which
could create thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which
would in turn be disastrous for its border countries. In addition,
Georgia and Azerbaijan have for the past several years been anxious
about drug trafficking in the region, an issue that only seems to
be getting worse. The US International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report says the route begins in Afghanistan and that drugs are
transited through Iran. From the perspective of Azerbaijan, the
132-kilometer part of the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, which
is under the occupation of Armenia, is a danger zone. According to
Azerbaijani security services, the border area is actively used for the
production, transit and trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings,
money laundering and other international crimes.
A further concern is Iran's deployment of Tehran clericals to support
radical religious movements in the Caucasus -- particularly Muslim
Azerbaijan. Tehran's official strategy is to remain fairly quiet on
the matter, but the mullahs have publicly demonstrated "solidarity"
with fundamentalists. And while constantly talking about "brotherhood
and solidarity" with Azerbaijan, the Iranian government is depriving
millions of Azerbaijanis of the opportunity to be educated in their
native language and to have cultural autonomy. The most serious
problem today in north Iran (southern Azerbaijan) concerns Lake Urmia,
which has lost 60 percent of its water and is rapidly drying up. The
Iranian government claims that this problem has natural causes,
but some experts believe that this is the result of artificial
interventions.
With regard to Iran's nuclear capacity, both the question and
its answers paralyze the South Caucasus. Georgia has chosen not to
officially declare its position; the central motivation of Tbilisi's
foreign policy is "not to have bad relations with anyone." This policy
does reap some rewards, as demonstrated by the numbers of Iranian
tourists streaming into Georgia: During the first 10 months of 2011,
Iranian tourists ranked 6th among all foreign visitors to Georgia.
There have also been rumors of Tbilisi's role in protecting the US from
possible Iranian missile strikes. In fact, on Feb. 3 of this year,
four Republican senators called for the consideration of Georgia as
an alternative site for locating a NATO missile defense system-related
radar, for protection against possible missile attacks from Iran.
In relation to this concern, Azerbaijan for several years has been
cooperating with the US on WMD. The government signed an agreement in
September 1999, pledging its cooperation in the counter-proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and related materials.
Azerbaijan's official position on the resolution of the Iranian
nuclear problem is to support diplomatic negotiations. However,
Azerbaijan accepts the use of nuclear power as a military threat, as
seen in its Military Doctrine, which details the danger of "separate
states, organizations and terrorist groups obtaining nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and
dissemination of new technologies in military production." Reshad
Karimov, a military expert, gives insight into Azerbaijan's difficult
position with regard to Iranian nuclear capacity. According to him:
"Azerbaijan, as a newly elected member of the UNSC [United Nations
Security Council] with the rotating chairmanship, now actually needs
to state its position on Iranian sanctions, not just comply with
their implementation. Our possible support for further sanctions will
endanger the existing balance."
Armenian leaders have made clear Iran's broader geopolitical
significance for their landlocked country, and have emphasized
what they have long described as Tehran's "balanced" position
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Therefore, critiques of Iran's
nuclear capability have come only from a few experts. Nonetheless,
Armenia-Iran relations have an indirect impact on the nuclear issue.
Recently, in an interview with the Armenian A+1 Agency, Metsamor NPP's
chief engineer Movses Vardanyan said that "over the recent years,
about 20 people have left the Armenian NPP due to low salaries, and
have found jobs at the Bushehr NPP in Iran," as reported by Armenia
Today's Oct. 29 edition. Furthermore, WikiLeaks cables revealed that
Iran's "Bank Mellat" transferred millions of dollars to Iran from the
bank's branch office in Yerevan. The cables also allege that rockets
and machine guns purchased by Iran from Armenia were used by two
Shia militants in an attack in Iraq -- a United States soldier was
killed and six others were injured in these attacks. Officially these
stories were denied, but given the political context, many believe
them to be true.
In the short term, the developments will lead to increased sanctions
towards Iran, whereby the ruling clique will feel besieged and under
threat, which could give new impetus to the counter power in Iran.
Moreover, this fragility creates yet more mistrust, misperceptions
and geopolitical paranoia. Iran's dilemma over losing its "balance"
in the Middle East is intensifying, and at the same time its position
in the Caucasus is weakening.
by ZAUR SHIRIYEV
Today's Zaman
Nov 22 2011
Turkey
Iran is the main foreign-policy challenge for both the US and Israel,
and is the focal point for anxiety in the Middle East.
The central aim of Western policy in the MENA region is to prevent
Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to neutralize its strategic
political significance. At the moment, Iran is countering the US and
Israel in the MENA region with regard to Syria -- nothing would weaken
Tehran's position more than losing Syria. However, the International
Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) recent report presented intelligence
indicating that Iran has undertaken research and experiments geared to
developing nuclear weapons capability, news which stoked international
tensions and prompted the Arab League's decision to threaten Syria
with the suspension of its membership and to call upon member states
to withdraw their ambassadors from Damascus -- both of which would
weaken Tehran.
As tensions increase in the Middle East and Western powers express
concern over Iran, the South Caucasus countries that share borders with
Iran are primarily concerned with the possible consequences of military
intervention and the potential impact of such hostility. The primary
concerns across the Caucasus region are related to the potentially
catastrophic consequences of military intervention against Iran, which
could create thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs), which
would in turn be disastrous for its border countries. In addition,
Georgia and Azerbaijan have for the past several years been anxious
about drug trafficking in the region, an issue that only seems to
be getting worse. The US International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report says the route begins in Afghanistan and that drugs are
transited through Iran. From the perspective of Azerbaijan, the
132-kilometer part of the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, which
is under the occupation of Armenia, is a danger zone. According to
Azerbaijani security services, the border area is actively used for the
production, transit and trafficking of drugs, arms and human beings,
money laundering and other international crimes.
A further concern is Iran's deployment of Tehran clericals to support
radical religious movements in the Caucasus -- particularly Muslim
Azerbaijan. Tehran's official strategy is to remain fairly quiet on
the matter, but the mullahs have publicly demonstrated "solidarity"
with fundamentalists. And while constantly talking about "brotherhood
and solidarity" with Azerbaijan, the Iranian government is depriving
millions of Azerbaijanis of the opportunity to be educated in their
native language and to have cultural autonomy. The most serious
problem today in north Iran (southern Azerbaijan) concerns Lake Urmia,
which has lost 60 percent of its water and is rapidly drying up. The
Iranian government claims that this problem has natural causes,
but some experts believe that this is the result of artificial
interventions.
With regard to Iran's nuclear capacity, both the question and
its answers paralyze the South Caucasus. Georgia has chosen not to
officially declare its position; the central motivation of Tbilisi's
foreign policy is "not to have bad relations with anyone." This policy
does reap some rewards, as demonstrated by the numbers of Iranian
tourists streaming into Georgia: During the first 10 months of 2011,
Iranian tourists ranked 6th among all foreign visitors to Georgia.
There have also been rumors of Tbilisi's role in protecting the US from
possible Iranian missile strikes. In fact, on Feb. 3 of this year,
four Republican senators called for the consideration of Georgia as
an alternative site for locating a NATO missile defense system-related
radar, for protection against possible missile attacks from Iran.
In relation to this concern, Azerbaijan for several years has been
cooperating with the US on WMD. The government signed an agreement in
September 1999, pledging its cooperation in the counter-proliferation
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and related materials.
Azerbaijan's official position on the resolution of the Iranian
nuclear problem is to support diplomatic negotiations. However,
Azerbaijan accepts the use of nuclear power as a military threat, as
seen in its Military Doctrine, which details the danger of "separate
states, organizations and terrorist groups obtaining nuclear and
other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and
dissemination of new technologies in military production." Reshad
Karimov, a military expert, gives insight into Azerbaijan's difficult
position with regard to Iranian nuclear capacity. According to him:
"Azerbaijan, as a newly elected member of the UNSC [United Nations
Security Council] with the rotating chairmanship, now actually needs
to state its position on Iranian sanctions, not just comply with
their implementation. Our possible support for further sanctions will
endanger the existing balance."
Armenian leaders have made clear Iran's broader geopolitical
significance for their landlocked country, and have emphasized
what they have long described as Tehran's "balanced" position
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Therefore, critiques of Iran's
nuclear capability have come only from a few experts. Nonetheless,
Armenia-Iran relations have an indirect impact on the nuclear issue.
Recently, in an interview with the Armenian A+1 Agency, Metsamor NPP's
chief engineer Movses Vardanyan said that "over the recent years,
about 20 people have left the Armenian NPP due to low salaries, and
have found jobs at the Bushehr NPP in Iran," as reported by Armenia
Today's Oct. 29 edition. Furthermore, WikiLeaks cables revealed that
Iran's "Bank Mellat" transferred millions of dollars to Iran from the
bank's branch office in Yerevan. The cables also allege that rockets
and machine guns purchased by Iran from Armenia were used by two
Shia militants in an attack in Iraq -- a United States soldier was
killed and six others were injured in these attacks. Officially these
stories were denied, but given the political context, many believe
them to be true.
In the short term, the developments will lead to increased sanctions
towards Iran, whereby the ruling clique will feel besieged and under
threat, which could give new impetus to the counter power in Iran.
Moreover, this fragility creates yet more mistrust, misperceptions
and geopolitical paranoia. Iran's dilemma over losing its "balance"
in the Middle East is intensifying, and at the same time its position
in the Caucasus is weakening.