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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Oct 2 2011
Diplomacy between Turkey and Israel
by Mehmet Kalyoncu*
02 October 2011, Sunday / ,
`Constructive ambiguity' is probably the most useful diplomatic tool
that enables the states to move forward in their relationships with
their counterparts, no matter what kind of crisis they may have
experienced.
But it looks like it has long been kicked out of the Turkish
diplomatic lexicon. Technically, the constructive ambiguity is defined
as a deliberate vagueness in one's statements or position in
negotiations with a view to expand the realm of maneuvering in order
to advance particular political objectives.
Optimistically, the constructive ambiguity can be interpreted, as an
assurance given by the parties prior or during the crisis that they
are willing to revise their respective positions in order to overcome
the crisis situation without losing face before their own
constituencies or the international community. Both Turkish and
Israeli governments have spoken with vivid clarity, however, with
respect to their respective positions on the Mavi Marmara incident,
where Israeli soldiers killed eight Turkish citizens and one American.
Ankara has insisted that Turkish-Israeli relations would never go back
to normal unless Israel apologizes from Turkey, pays compensations to
the families of the victims, and lifts the unlawful Israeli blockade
on Gaza. In response, Turkey has stressed that Israel would never
apologize from Turkey for what Israeli soldiers did aboard the Mavi
Marmara. In a way, Turkey and Israel have locked themselves up into a
non-solution. After all, once announcing not only to Israel, but also
to the whole world its conditions for normalization so clearly, how
can the AK Party government possibly seem to be settling for anything
less, or compromising to advance Turkey's long-term interests? As for
the Netanyahu government; it should apologize, but hardly would do so,
because doing so would be tantamount to the admission of guilt, and
create a precedent, which would oblige Israel not only to apologize
for its countless crimes past, present and future, but also to meet
its concomitant legal obligations. Moreover, given the addition, as a
third condition, of the lifting of the Gaza blockade, which is not
immediately related to the Turkish-Israeli relations, the skeptics may
suggest that the AK Party government is not interested in a rapid
normalization anyway.
At the end of the day, the present stalemate in the Turkish-Israeli
relations is a result of the political decisions made by both the AK
Party government and the Netanyahu government throughout a tumultuous
process, which was caused by an irresponsible act of an NGO based in
Ä°stanbul, as well as by even more irresponsible act of the Israeli
armed forces. Nor this type of downgrading of the two states'
relations is something abnormal. It has happened before, it may happen
in the future, and as such, it is something normal.
However, the ramifications of the ensuing crisis are not confined to
the diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two
states only. The continued hostility between the Turkish and Israeli
governments, coupled with the provocations by the zealots on both
sides, are likely to instigate the emotions even further, thereby
leading to irreparable damages. Therefore, the stakeholders other than
the two governments such as the Turkish and Israeli peoples as well as
their respective diasporas, especially in the United States, should
work together to contain the potential damages of the crisis. In so
doing, the onus is more on the shoulders of the American Jewish
community who prioritizes the well being of the State of Israel,
because relatively speaking it has far greater capability, compared to
the other three, to make things much more complicated.
Spill over effect
The heat in Turkish-Israeli relations continues to increase due to the
two governments' exchange of warnings and threats of sanctions. PM
Erdogan announced that the Turkish warships would more frequently
appear in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to ensure the safety of
navigation, which Israel interpreted as a measure against the Israeli
naval blockade on Gaza. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
uttered that Israel would implement four faceted sanctions against
Turkey, which includes a comprehensive travel boycott, cooperation
with the Armenian diaspora, support to the terrorist Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK), and portrayal of Turkey in the international fora as an
oppressor of its minorities. Not surprisingly, what two prominent
American political scientists, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt
described as the Israel Lobby has rushed to mobilize each and every
resource available to it within the American polity as well with the
hope of punishing Turkey for going harsh on Israel. Recently, seven US
senators penned a joined letter to President Barack Obama, asking the
latter to `mount a diplomatic offensive' against Turkey. Similarly,
Daniel Pipes and the right-wing extremist pundits alike have begun to
propagate the false image of Turkey being the most dangerous country
in the Middle East along with Iran. In line with this reflex, the
black propaganda of the Israel Lobby against Turkey is likely to
intensify in the months to come, especially during that time of the
year when the US Congress is traditionally hijacked with allegations
of the so-called Armenian genocide.
However, it seems like the anti-AK Party network in the US has
recently diversified its targets, and now attacking Fethullah Gülen
and the educational-cultural initiatives he has inspired as well. As
Michael Shank of George Mason University reminds in his Huffington
Post article titled `Islamophobia Network Targets Top Performing
American Schools', the Center for American Progress (CAP)'s recently
published an Islamophobia report that reveals the extend of such a
defamation campaign. The CAP report, which is titled `Fear Inc: The
Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America', demonstrates that the
Eagle Forum, a so-called pro-family movement, and other members of the
Islamophobia network have deliberately propagated an alleged Turkish
threat to America: the so-called Muslim Gülen schools, which would
allegedly "educate American children through the lens of Islam and
teach them to hate Americans'. Moreover, beside many blogosphere
commentaries suffering from intellectual deficit but equally adamant
in trying to defame Gülen, a recent Newsweek piece titled `ErdoÄ?an 1,
Ataturk 0' referred to Gülen as `Erdogan's friend and mentor' and to
the civil society movement he has inspired as the `AKP's own `deep
state' ally, a wealthy and powerful Islamist movement directed from
luxurious self-exile in the US'.
Given such allegations, one is compelled to infer that the anti-AK
Party network in the US is targeting Gülen and the people involved
with the civil society initiatives he has inspired, probably because
its members assume that Gülen is the real force behind the AK Party
government, and hence can be utilized to tone down its stance towards
Israel. While such an assumption lacks credible evidence and remain as
a mere speculation, it fails to recognize the fact that it was Gülen
himself who criticized the so-called Freedom Flotilla project, which
lies at the heart of the unfolding crisis between Turkey and Israel.
In his interview to the Wall Street Journal during the days following
the infamous Mavi Marmara incident, and when the entire Turkey was
overwhelmed with heightened nationalistic sentiments after the Israeli
murder of eightTurks and one Turkish American citizen, Gülen expressed
his doubts about the true intentions behind the flotilla project, and
remarked that the organizers should have consulted with the
authorities if the purpose was to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. One
can hardly argue that Gülen is a source of inspiration for the AK
Party government, especially when it comes to foreign policy.
Track II diplomacy
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the current political crisis between
Turkey and Israel bears negative implications on the non-political and
totally unrelated civil society and educational initiatives.
Therefore, it may be prudent to explore ways in order to prevent its
further exacerbation, and contain its ramifications in form of
creating anti-Turkish sentiments, or at least making the atmosphere
conducive for the proliferation of such negative sentiments. In this
context, the Track II diplomacy figures as a viable tool to compensate
for the absence of optimistically utilized-constructive ambiguity in
the Turkish-Israeli relations. Defined as a kind of informal diplomacy
undertaken through exchanges between non-officials such as scholars,
public intellectuals, journalists, retired officials, public figures
or social activists, the Track II diplomacy is a foreign policy tool
used in order to prevent further escalation of tensions, and better
yet to help the parties resolve their conflict. In this regard, the
non-official interactions between the Turks and the Israelis as well
as between their respective diasporas in the joint initiatives such as
conferences, workshops, mutual delegation visits, public declarations,
and sportive or art events can be useful to increase popular demand
for solution, overcome the impasse and move forward in a more
constructive way.
Turks should not perceive such a civic engagement with Israelis as an
acceptance of defeat in the face of the Netanyahu government's
resistance to apologize from Turkey, or as a sell out of the victims
of the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara. Similarly, Israelis or
their fellow Jews in the diaspora should not consider Turks'
willingness to engage with them despite the continuing political
crisis as a concession out of despair, but as an indication of their
inherent constructivism. The opposite is to continue the business as
usual. In that case, Turkey and Turkish-Americans would continue to be
demonized. It may not be that bad after all to be demonized by such
right-wing groups and fundamentalist figures as Daniel Pipes, David
Yerushalmi, Robert Spencer, Frank Gaffney, Steven Emerson, Bridgette
Gabriel, and Rachel Sharon-Krespin as the vast majority of Americans
already know who they are, and why they do what they do. However, the
situation may not be so positive for the Jewish-Americans, if the
demonization of the Turks is to continue. In an America, where the
criticism of Israel and the Israel Lobby reaches an unprecedented
level, where high-ranking officials publicly describe Israel as an
ungrateful ally and strategic liability for the US, and where
according to the Anti-Defamation League figures the anti-Semitism is
rampant, it is the Jewish-Americans who should be trying to avoid any
action that would perpetuate or escalade the crisis between Turkey and
Israel, let alone attacking those Turks who could be their only ally
if the anti-Semitism gets out of control.
Finally, those Turks who do not look at the crisis between Turkey and
Israel from an eschatological perspective, and hence are not beguiled
with the dreams of righting all wrongs overnight with lofty speeches
backed only by mediocre power would wish that the problem between the
two was solved without prolonging and spilling over. Similarly,
looking towards future, they may wonder if Ankara's intent to take the
issue of Israeli blockade on Gaza to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) is strategically wise one. There is no doubt that Turkey
has every moral right to do so. However, there is a risk associated
with this move. Technically, the ICJ can consider and rule on the case
only if both Turkey and Israel agree to refer it to the ICJ. Otherwise
it can deliver a non-binding advisory opinion if the UN General
Assembly's simple majority votes for such referral. It is clear that
the first condition would never materialize. In the latter case, the
advisory opinion would just add to many other UN resolutions and
reports manifesting unlawful practices of Israel, but hardly have any
enforcement effect. Even if in the ideal circumstance, the ICJ
considers the case, and convicts Israel, which is in reality unlikely
to happen; then the Security Council's permanent members have right to
stop the enforcement of the ICJ verdict. It is all too obvious which
permanent member that would be.
Besides, given the black propaganda power of Turkey's opponents, which
does not necessarily refer to the Netanyahu government and the
right-wing extremist members of the Israel Lobby only, Turkey's such a
legitimate endeavor can be portrayed as an attempt to steal leadership
role from those Arab countries, who have traditionally appeared as the
advocates of the Palestine cause. Worse, Turkey in general, and
Turkish foreign minister in particular may be unfairly accused of
embarking on yet another foreign policy objective, which is to bring
Israel to justice, and leaving it unfulfilled. As such, Turkey may all
of a sudden come to face the limits of its power both soft and hard in
front of the international community. As Hans Morgenthau suggested,
"the prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That
reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the minds of the
observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself". By the
same token, an abrupt exposure of the limits of its power can ruin a
nation's prestige. Of course, the policy makers in Ankara would know
the best, but it may be better to not stretch further thinner, and
instead just remember that some meals taste best when served cold.
Turkey would be better off if it allocates its energy and resources to
strengthen its democracy and economy inside, and continue to forge new
partnerships outside, in line with its `zero problem with neighbors'
policy. After all, only powerful Turkey can have zero problems with
its neighbors, and can help the ones having problems solve theirs.
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an independent political analyst.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Oct 2 2011
Diplomacy between Turkey and Israel
by Mehmet Kalyoncu*
02 October 2011, Sunday / ,
`Constructive ambiguity' is probably the most useful diplomatic tool
that enables the states to move forward in their relationships with
their counterparts, no matter what kind of crisis they may have
experienced.
But it looks like it has long been kicked out of the Turkish
diplomatic lexicon. Technically, the constructive ambiguity is defined
as a deliberate vagueness in one's statements or position in
negotiations with a view to expand the realm of maneuvering in order
to advance particular political objectives.
Optimistically, the constructive ambiguity can be interpreted, as an
assurance given by the parties prior or during the crisis that they
are willing to revise their respective positions in order to overcome
the crisis situation without losing face before their own
constituencies or the international community. Both Turkish and
Israeli governments have spoken with vivid clarity, however, with
respect to their respective positions on the Mavi Marmara incident,
where Israeli soldiers killed eight Turkish citizens and one American.
Ankara has insisted that Turkish-Israeli relations would never go back
to normal unless Israel apologizes from Turkey, pays compensations to
the families of the victims, and lifts the unlawful Israeli blockade
on Gaza. In response, Turkey has stressed that Israel would never
apologize from Turkey for what Israeli soldiers did aboard the Mavi
Marmara. In a way, Turkey and Israel have locked themselves up into a
non-solution. After all, once announcing not only to Israel, but also
to the whole world its conditions for normalization so clearly, how
can the AK Party government possibly seem to be settling for anything
less, or compromising to advance Turkey's long-term interests? As for
the Netanyahu government; it should apologize, but hardly would do so,
because doing so would be tantamount to the admission of guilt, and
create a precedent, which would oblige Israel not only to apologize
for its countless crimes past, present and future, but also to meet
its concomitant legal obligations. Moreover, given the addition, as a
third condition, of the lifting of the Gaza blockade, which is not
immediately related to the Turkish-Israeli relations, the skeptics may
suggest that the AK Party government is not interested in a rapid
normalization anyway.
At the end of the day, the present stalemate in the Turkish-Israeli
relations is a result of the political decisions made by both the AK
Party government and the Netanyahu government throughout a tumultuous
process, which was caused by an irresponsible act of an NGO based in
Ä°stanbul, as well as by even more irresponsible act of the Israeli
armed forces. Nor this type of downgrading of the two states'
relations is something abnormal. It has happened before, it may happen
in the future, and as such, it is something normal.
However, the ramifications of the ensuing crisis are not confined to
the diplomatic, political and economic relations between the two
states only. The continued hostility between the Turkish and Israeli
governments, coupled with the provocations by the zealots on both
sides, are likely to instigate the emotions even further, thereby
leading to irreparable damages. Therefore, the stakeholders other than
the two governments such as the Turkish and Israeli peoples as well as
their respective diasporas, especially in the United States, should
work together to contain the potential damages of the crisis. In so
doing, the onus is more on the shoulders of the American Jewish
community who prioritizes the well being of the State of Israel,
because relatively speaking it has far greater capability, compared to
the other three, to make things much more complicated.
Spill over effect
The heat in Turkish-Israeli relations continues to increase due to the
two governments' exchange of warnings and threats of sanctions. PM
Erdogan announced that the Turkish warships would more frequently
appear in the Eastern Mediterranean in order to ensure the safety of
navigation, which Israel interpreted as a measure against the Israeli
naval blockade on Gaza. Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman
uttered that Israel would implement four faceted sanctions against
Turkey, which includes a comprehensive travel boycott, cooperation
with the Armenian diaspora, support to the terrorist Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK), and portrayal of Turkey in the international fora as an
oppressor of its minorities. Not surprisingly, what two prominent
American political scientists, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt
described as the Israel Lobby has rushed to mobilize each and every
resource available to it within the American polity as well with the
hope of punishing Turkey for going harsh on Israel. Recently, seven US
senators penned a joined letter to President Barack Obama, asking the
latter to `mount a diplomatic offensive' against Turkey. Similarly,
Daniel Pipes and the right-wing extremist pundits alike have begun to
propagate the false image of Turkey being the most dangerous country
in the Middle East along with Iran. In line with this reflex, the
black propaganda of the Israel Lobby against Turkey is likely to
intensify in the months to come, especially during that time of the
year when the US Congress is traditionally hijacked with allegations
of the so-called Armenian genocide.
However, it seems like the anti-AK Party network in the US has
recently diversified its targets, and now attacking Fethullah Gülen
and the educational-cultural initiatives he has inspired as well. As
Michael Shank of George Mason University reminds in his Huffington
Post article titled `Islamophobia Network Targets Top Performing
American Schools', the Center for American Progress (CAP)'s recently
published an Islamophobia report that reveals the extend of such a
defamation campaign. The CAP report, which is titled `Fear Inc: The
Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America', demonstrates that the
Eagle Forum, a so-called pro-family movement, and other members of the
Islamophobia network have deliberately propagated an alleged Turkish
threat to America: the so-called Muslim Gülen schools, which would
allegedly "educate American children through the lens of Islam and
teach them to hate Americans'. Moreover, beside many blogosphere
commentaries suffering from intellectual deficit but equally adamant
in trying to defame Gülen, a recent Newsweek piece titled `ErdoÄ?an 1,
Ataturk 0' referred to Gülen as `Erdogan's friend and mentor' and to
the civil society movement he has inspired as the `AKP's own `deep
state' ally, a wealthy and powerful Islamist movement directed from
luxurious self-exile in the US'.
Given such allegations, one is compelled to infer that the anti-AK
Party network in the US is targeting Gülen and the people involved
with the civil society initiatives he has inspired, probably because
its members assume that Gülen is the real force behind the AK Party
government, and hence can be utilized to tone down its stance towards
Israel. While such an assumption lacks credible evidence and remain as
a mere speculation, it fails to recognize the fact that it was Gülen
himself who criticized the so-called Freedom Flotilla project, which
lies at the heart of the unfolding crisis between Turkey and Israel.
In his interview to the Wall Street Journal during the days following
the infamous Mavi Marmara incident, and when the entire Turkey was
overwhelmed with heightened nationalistic sentiments after the Israeli
murder of eightTurks and one Turkish American citizen, Gülen expressed
his doubts about the true intentions behind the flotilla project, and
remarked that the organizers should have consulted with the
authorities if the purpose was to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. One
can hardly argue that Gülen is a source of inspiration for the AK
Party government, especially when it comes to foreign policy.
Track II diplomacy
Nevertheless, it is obvious that the current political crisis between
Turkey and Israel bears negative implications on the non-political and
totally unrelated civil society and educational initiatives.
Therefore, it may be prudent to explore ways in order to prevent its
further exacerbation, and contain its ramifications in form of
creating anti-Turkish sentiments, or at least making the atmosphere
conducive for the proliferation of such negative sentiments. In this
context, the Track II diplomacy figures as a viable tool to compensate
for the absence of optimistically utilized-constructive ambiguity in
the Turkish-Israeli relations. Defined as a kind of informal diplomacy
undertaken through exchanges between non-officials such as scholars,
public intellectuals, journalists, retired officials, public figures
or social activists, the Track II diplomacy is a foreign policy tool
used in order to prevent further escalation of tensions, and better
yet to help the parties resolve their conflict. In this regard, the
non-official interactions between the Turks and the Israelis as well
as between their respective diasporas in the joint initiatives such as
conferences, workshops, mutual delegation visits, public declarations,
and sportive or art events can be useful to increase popular demand
for solution, overcome the impasse and move forward in a more
constructive way.
Turks should not perceive such a civic engagement with Israelis as an
acceptance of defeat in the face of the Netanyahu government's
resistance to apologize from Turkey, or as a sell out of the victims
of the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara. Similarly, Israelis or
their fellow Jews in the diaspora should not consider Turks'
willingness to engage with them despite the continuing political
crisis as a concession out of despair, but as an indication of their
inherent constructivism. The opposite is to continue the business as
usual. In that case, Turkey and Turkish-Americans would continue to be
demonized. It may not be that bad after all to be demonized by such
right-wing groups and fundamentalist figures as Daniel Pipes, David
Yerushalmi, Robert Spencer, Frank Gaffney, Steven Emerson, Bridgette
Gabriel, and Rachel Sharon-Krespin as the vast majority of Americans
already know who they are, and why they do what they do. However, the
situation may not be so positive for the Jewish-Americans, if the
demonization of the Turks is to continue. In an America, where the
criticism of Israel and the Israel Lobby reaches an unprecedented
level, where high-ranking officials publicly describe Israel as an
ungrateful ally and strategic liability for the US, and where
according to the Anti-Defamation League figures the anti-Semitism is
rampant, it is the Jewish-Americans who should be trying to avoid any
action that would perpetuate or escalade the crisis between Turkey and
Israel, let alone attacking those Turks who could be their only ally
if the anti-Semitism gets out of control.
Finally, those Turks who do not look at the crisis between Turkey and
Israel from an eschatological perspective, and hence are not beguiled
with the dreams of righting all wrongs overnight with lofty speeches
backed only by mediocre power would wish that the problem between the
two was solved without prolonging and spilling over. Similarly,
looking towards future, they may wonder if Ankara's intent to take the
issue of Israeli blockade on Gaza to the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) is strategically wise one. There is no doubt that Turkey
has every moral right to do so. However, there is a risk associated
with this move. Technically, the ICJ can consider and rule on the case
only if both Turkey and Israel agree to refer it to the ICJ. Otherwise
it can deliver a non-binding advisory opinion if the UN General
Assembly's simple majority votes for such referral. It is clear that
the first condition would never materialize. In the latter case, the
advisory opinion would just add to many other UN resolutions and
reports manifesting unlawful practices of Israel, but hardly have any
enforcement effect. Even if in the ideal circumstance, the ICJ
considers the case, and convicts Israel, which is in reality unlikely
to happen; then the Security Council's permanent members have right to
stop the enforcement of the ICJ verdict. It is all too obvious which
permanent member that would be.
Besides, given the black propaganda power of Turkey's opponents, which
does not necessarily refer to the Netanyahu government and the
right-wing extremist members of the Israel Lobby only, Turkey's such a
legitimate endeavor can be portrayed as an attempt to steal leadership
role from those Arab countries, who have traditionally appeared as the
advocates of the Palestine cause. Worse, Turkey in general, and
Turkish foreign minister in particular may be unfairly accused of
embarking on yet another foreign policy objective, which is to bring
Israel to justice, and leaving it unfulfilled. As such, Turkey may all
of a sudden come to face the limits of its power both soft and hard in
front of the international community. As Hans Morgenthau suggested,
"the prestige of a nation is its reputation for power. That
reputation, the reflection of the reality of power in the minds of the
observers, can be as important as the reality of power itself". By the
same token, an abrupt exposure of the limits of its power can ruin a
nation's prestige. Of course, the policy makers in Ankara would know
the best, but it may be better to not stretch further thinner, and
instead just remember that some meals taste best when served cold.
Turkey would be better off if it allocates its energy and resources to
strengthen its democracy and economy inside, and continue to forge new
partnerships outside, in line with its `zero problem with neighbors'
policy. After all, only powerful Turkey can have zero problems with
its neighbors, and can help the ones having problems solve theirs.
*Mehmet Kalyoncu is an independent political analyst.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress