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SERGEI MARKEDONOV ON 20 YEARS OF ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE DANGER OF PHOBIAS, FEARS, SUSPICIONS AND UNCERTAINTIES.
by Sergei Markedonov
arminfo
Monday, October 3, 21:17
20 years ago, on 21 September 1991, Armenia held a referendum on
self-determination and status of the republic. 94,99% of voters
participated in voting, with 99% of votes cast in favour of Armenia
leaving the Soviet Union. Two days later, based on the results of
the voting, a Declaration of State Independence of Armenia was adopted.
Thus, a new nation state was born in the South Caucasus.
The process of transforming the former Armenian SSR into an independent
state differed essentially from similar situations in the neighboring
republics (Georgia and Azerbaijan), as well as in other formations
of the once united Soviet Union. It began not as much because of a
conflict between the central authorities and a national movement in the
republic, but rather because of a formally external reason. This is, of
course, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast, which was
subject to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijani SSR. Protests of Karabakh
Armenians catalyzed ethno-political mobilization in Armenia. The
first President of independent Armenia, just like the members of his
first team, went through the "school" of the Karabakh committee and
its experience of confrontation with the central authorities of the
Soviet Union. The second and third Presidents of Armenia used to be
the most active participants and leaders of the movement of Karabakh
Armenians. The Karabakh issue by large predetermined independent
Armenia's agenda.
The republic managed to overcome the political and psychological
problems of the beginning of the XX century. A military victory
for the land, which Armenian national elite would consider its own,
was achieved. But this success also predetermined Armenia's current
regional insularity (two of its four borders remain closed), its
economic detachment from its neighbors and its critical dependence
on Russia.
On 21 September 2011, to honor the anniversary of national
independence, a military parade was held in Yerevan, where troops of
102nd military base in Gyumri took part, as well as border-guards,
who secure protection of the external perimeter of republic's border
jointly with Armenian colleagues. Officials and numerous experts
welcomed this, speaking of Russia as a reliable guarantor and ally.
Today Armenia is by default considered Russia's key ally in the
Caucasus, its outpost.
Indeed, the dynamics of bilateral relations today (especially against
the background of Russia's relations with other CIS countries) is
impressive. Over 1,000 Russian enterprises operate in Armenia. Russian
business is present in strategically important areas, such as
railway and energy. Over 70 Russian oblasts and republics cooperate
with Armenia. Trade turnover is increasing. Armenia is a member of
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which they like to call
"the post-Soviet NATO" in Moscow, and participant in EurAsEc.
However, to disregard the problematic points existing in relations
between Moscow and Yerevan, would oversimplify things. On the eve of
Independence Day a vote was held on the Facebook social network to
identify the attitude of residents of Armenia to the participation of
Russian troops and border-guards in the military parade. 1,250 people
voted, of whom only 147 assessed this positively. By comparison,
485 said this is "highly negative", and 437 - "normal". So what is
the problem, shrouded by buoyant rhetoric by both sides?
In the first place, Moscow is not very happy over Yerevan's position
on Georgia. The Russian leadership counted on Armenia's ability to
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And it is
possible that it will hold an even harder stance on the situation in
Javakheti (Armenian-populated region in Georgia). In the meantime,
relations between Tbilisi and Yerevan in the period of 2008-2011
demonstrate signs of improvement, and not of deterioration. Leaders
of both countries visited each other. Those visits were accompanied
by awards and words about Armenian-Georgian friendship. Russian
authorities are also irritated about Armenia's partnership with NATO,
which did not stop in 2008. On the contrary, Yerevan tries to maintain
an acceptable level of relations with the North-Atlantic alliance.
Secondly, Yerevan has certain dissatisfaction (or lack of
understanding) with regard to some Russian actions. At least,
there is lack of understanding of Moscow's reasons. This relates
to issues like development of Russian-Azerbaijani partnership
(including military) and Russian-Turkish relations (which were
recently named "strategic" in Ankara). It would probably be fair
to reproach the Armenian society for irrational attitude to Turkey
and possible Russian-Turkish agreements. But any politician, who
works in the Caucasus and in Eurasia in general, should consider
the factor of asymmetry of perception. What is seen as a necessary
part of foreign policy PR in Moscow, in Yerevan (simply because of
its complex geographical and geopolitical disposition) is seen as a
serious challenge. As for the Armenian opposition, it is seriously
worried over the huge activity of Russian business in Armenia, not
particularly about the activity itself, but rather over the lack of
transparency around important deals and agreements.
All these phobias and discontents did not come up over the last year
or two.. But it is not possible to ignore the fact that the five-day
war of 2008 strengthened them. Fears stirred up regarding possible
exchange of Karabakh to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
>From our point of view, the key problem in the development of bilateral
Russian-Armenian relations is the disproportion in perception of
each-other's policy. For Yerevan, the Moscow's hyper-ball role
in the post-Soviet area is peculiar. This is where discussion of
possible Russian concessions on Karabakh stems from despite the
fact that it is obvious that one can only concede something it has
possession of. Russia's influence on NKR is not as high (and in
fact hardly comparable at all) with its influence on Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. NKR in turn traditionally distanced itself from the
so-called alliance CIS-2, preferring to view itself in the same context
as Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, highlighting
the interconnection of its problem with the European cases of ethnic
self-determination and cutting itself from Eurasian (post-Soviet)
topics. Therefore, it hardly makes practical sense to overestimate
Moscow's hand in Karabakh. The year of 1988 has long gone., The
Kremlin's interests in this region have pragmatic basis. And this
basis hardly trespasses the limits of the status-quo, which found
its concrete expression in the Moscow Declaration of 2 November 2008
and in the subsequent (Russian) mediation work on the resolution of
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
For Russia, which plays not only regional geopolitical games, but also
"a Great Game" with the West (at least, attempts are made to present
the current events in this fashion), problems in relations with its
strategic ally are underestimated. Here confidence in the Soviet
momentum, which allows Moscow to preserve its leading role without
any predicament, plays its role. Besides, there is a belief that
all the merits (in this case without any irony, this is about real
merits of Russia, including development of mobile network, railroad
and security guarantees) automatically entitles the big state to
somehow disregard the opinion of its smaller strategic ally. In truth,
Russia would have lost nothing, if it had held public consultations
with its allies, including Armenia, regarding its actions in South
Ossetia, not in September CSTO summit in Moscow, but during the hot
August? Most likely, the Kremlin would not have been unanimously
supported in everything, but some choice of words, satisfying the
Kremlin, would have been found. With that an impression of a working
partnership would have been created, which would not consider only the
Metropolitan view. . The same goes to Russia's business domination in
Armenia. There is no doubt that Russian business brings in investment
into the country, incomparable with investment flow from other
countries. But lack of transparency around the activity of Russian
companies, the under-hand nature of those deals, on which some light
could have been shed, (particularly if they touch strategically
important sectors of economy), cause problems. Relations between
allies also require a radically different approach to the Armenian
community in Russia. And here we are coming back to the problem of
asymmetry of perception. For big Russia expressions of this or that
politician or a journalist (and equally xenophobic publications and
statements in media) do not play the role they do for small Armenia,
where they are being exaggerated and are viewed highly emotionally.
In the conditions of forming a new status-quo in the Greater Caucasus
both Moscow and Yerevan should exercise more realism in assessment of
each others' motives, desist from inflated expectations in order to
avoid tantalizing frustrations in the future. Today one has to admit
that as a matter of fact, Moscow does not recognize the independence
of NKR, nor does Yerevan recognize that of the two former Georgian
autonomies. The Kremlin will not reject cooperation with Baku, and
will not make an ultimate choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But
Yerevan also will not refuse cooperating with the West, nor with
Georgia, via whose territory two-thirds of Armenia's foreign trade
is conducted. And after all, you do not choose your geographical
location.. In the current state of land blockade by Turkey and
Azerbaijan for Armenia Georgia and Iran are the only windows to the
world. In this respect the US approach is significant, as they in
fact close their eyes on Armenia's cooperation with Iran.
Consequently, the super task for diplomats of both countries could be
to shed light during complicated moments, rejecting mutual phobias,
fears, suspicions and uncertainties.
Sergei Markedonov has a Doctorate in History and is currently Visiting
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC, USA. He is a regular blogger on commonspace.eu
Russian edition.
by Sergei Markedonov
arminfo
Monday, October 3, 21:17
20 years ago, on 21 September 1991, Armenia held a referendum on
self-determination and status of the republic. 94,99% of voters
participated in voting, with 99% of votes cast in favour of Armenia
leaving the Soviet Union. Two days later, based on the results of
the voting, a Declaration of State Independence of Armenia was adopted.
Thus, a new nation state was born in the South Caucasus.
The process of transforming the former Armenian SSR into an independent
state differed essentially from similar situations in the neighboring
republics (Georgia and Azerbaijan), as well as in other formations
of the once united Soviet Union. It began not as much because of a
conflict between the central authorities and a national movement in the
republic, but rather because of a formally external reason. This is, of
course, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast, which was
subject to the jurisdiction of Azerbaijani SSR. Protests of Karabakh
Armenians catalyzed ethno-political mobilization in Armenia. The
first President of independent Armenia, just like the members of his
first team, went through the "school" of the Karabakh committee and
its experience of confrontation with the central authorities of the
Soviet Union. The second and third Presidents of Armenia used to be
the most active participants and leaders of the movement of Karabakh
Armenians. The Karabakh issue by large predetermined independent
Armenia's agenda.
The republic managed to overcome the political and psychological
problems of the beginning of the XX century. A military victory
for the land, which Armenian national elite would consider its own,
was achieved. But this success also predetermined Armenia's current
regional insularity (two of its four borders remain closed), its
economic detachment from its neighbors and its critical dependence
on Russia.
On 21 September 2011, to honor the anniversary of national
independence, a military parade was held in Yerevan, where troops of
102nd military base in Gyumri took part, as well as border-guards,
who secure protection of the external perimeter of republic's border
jointly with Armenian colleagues. Officials and numerous experts
welcomed this, speaking of Russia as a reliable guarantor and ally.
Today Armenia is by default considered Russia's key ally in the
Caucasus, its outpost.
Indeed, the dynamics of bilateral relations today (especially against
the background of Russia's relations with other CIS countries) is
impressive. Over 1,000 Russian enterprises operate in Armenia. Russian
business is present in strategically important areas, such as
railway and energy. Over 70 Russian oblasts and republics cooperate
with Armenia. Trade turnover is increasing. Armenia is a member of
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which they like to call
"the post-Soviet NATO" in Moscow, and participant in EurAsEc.
However, to disregard the problematic points existing in relations
between Moscow and Yerevan, would oversimplify things. On the eve of
Independence Day a vote was held on the Facebook social network to
identify the attitude of residents of Armenia to the participation of
Russian troops and border-guards in the military parade. 1,250 people
voted, of whom only 147 assessed this positively. By comparison,
485 said this is "highly negative", and 437 - "normal". So what is
the problem, shrouded by buoyant rhetoric by both sides?
In the first place, Moscow is not very happy over Yerevan's position
on Georgia. The Russian leadership counted on Armenia's ability to
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And it is
possible that it will hold an even harder stance on the situation in
Javakheti (Armenian-populated region in Georgia). In the meantime,
relations between Tbilisi and Yerevan in the period of 2008-2011
demonstrate signs of improvement, and not of deterioration. Leaders
of both countries visited each other. Those visits were accompanied
by awards and words about Armenian-Georgian friendship. Russian
authorities are also irritated about Armenia's partnership with NATO,
which did not stop in 2008. On the contrary, Yerevan tries to maintain
an acceptable level of relations with the North-Atlantic alliance.
Secondly, Yerevan has certain dissatisfaction (or lack of
understanding) with regard to some Russian actions. At least,
there is lack of understanding of Moscow's reasons. This relates
to issues like development of Russian-Azerbaijani partnership
(including military) and Russian-Turkish relations (which were
recently named "strategic" in Ankara). It would probably be fair
to reproach the Armenian society for irrational attitude to Turkey
and possible Russian-Turkish agreements. But any politician, who
works in the Caucasus and in Eurasia in general, should consider
the factor of asymmetry of perception. What is seen as a necessary
part of foreign policy PR in Moscow, in Yerevan (simply because of
its complex geographical and geopolitical disposition) is seen as a
serious challenge. As for the Armenian opposition, it is seriously
worried over the huge activity of Russian business in Armenia, not
particularly about the activity itself, but rather over the lack of
transparency around important deals and agreements.
All these phobias and discontents did not come up over the last year
or two.. But it is not possible to ignore the fact that the five-day
war of 2008 strengthened them. Fears stirred up regarding possible
exchange of Karabakh to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
>From our point of view, the key problem in the development of bilateral
Russian-Armenian relations is the disproportion in perception of
each-other's policy. For Yerevan, the Moscow's hyper-ball role
in the post-Soviet area is peculiar. This is where discussion of
possible Russian concessions on Karabakh stems from despite the
fact that it is obvious that one can only concede something it has
possession of. Russia's influence on NKR is not as high (and in
fact hardly comparable at all) with its influence on Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. NKR in turn traditionally distanced itself from the
so-called alliance CIS-2, preferring to view itself in the same context
as Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, highlighting
the interconnection of its problem with the European cases of ethnic
self-determination and cutting itself from Eurasian (post-Soviet)
topics. Therefore, it hardly makes practical sense to overestimate
Moscow's hand in Karabakh. The year of 1988 has long gone., The
Kremlin's interests in this region have pragmatic basis. And this
basis hardly trespasses the limits of the status-quo, which found
its concrete expression in the Moscow Declaration of 2 November 2008
and in the subsequent (Russian) mediation work on the resolution of
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
For Russia, which plays not only regional geopolitical games, but also
"a Great Game" with the West (at least, attempts are made to present
the current events in this fashion), problems in relations with its
strategic ally are underestimated. Here confidence in the Soviet
momentum, which allows Moscow to preserve its leading role without
any predicament, plays its role. Besides, there is a belief that
all the merits (in this case without any irony, this is about real
merits of Russia, including development of mobile network, railroad
and security guarantees) automatically entitles the big state to
somehow disregard the opinion of its smaller strategic ally. In truth,
Russia would have lost nothing, if it had held public consultations
with its allies, including Armenia, regarding its actions in South
Ossetia, not in September CSTO summit in Moscow, but during the hot
August? Most likely, the Kremlin would not have been unanimously
supported in everything, but some choice of words, satisfying the
Kremlin, would have been found. With that an impression of a working
partnership would have been created, which would not consider only the
Metropolitan view. . The same goes to Russia's business domination in
Armenia. There is no doubt that Russian business brings in investment
into the country, incomparable with investment flow from other
countries. But lack of transparency around the activity of Russian
companies, the under-hand nature of those deals, on which some light
could have been shed, (particularly if they touch strategically
important sectors of economy), cause problems. Relations between
allies also require a radically different approach to the Armenian
community in Russia. And here we are coming back to the problem of
asymmetry of perception. For big Russia expressions of this or that
politician or a journalist (and equally xenophobic publications and
statements in media) do not play the role they do for small Armenia,
where they are being exaggerated and are viewed highly emotionally.
In the conditions of forming a new status-quo in the Greater Caucasus
both Moscow and Yerevan should exercise more realism in assessment of
each others' motives, desist from inflated expectations in order to
avoid tantalizing frustrations in the future. Today one has to admit
that as a matter of fact, Moscow does not recognize the independence
of NKR, nor does Yerevan recognize that of the two former Georgian
autonomies. The Kremlin will not reject cooperation with Baku, and
will not make an ultimate choice between Armenia and Azerbaijan. But
Yerevan also will not refuse cooperating with the West, nor with
Georgia, via whose territory two-thirds of Armenia's foreign trade
is conducted. And after all, you do not choose your geographical
location.. In the current state of land blockade by Turkey and
Azerbaijan for Armenia Georgia and Iran are the only windows to the
world. In this respect the US approach is significant, as they in
fact close their eyes on Armenia's cooperation with Iran.
Consequently, the super task for diplomats of both countries could be
to shed light during complicated moments, rejecting mutual phobias,
fears, suspicions and uncertainties.
Sergei Markedonov has a Doctorate in History and is currently Visiting
Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC, USA. He is a regular blogger on commonspace.eu
Russian edition.