INTEGRATION OUTLOOK FOR EX-SOVIETS
By Andrey Boradaevskiy
Japan Times
Oct 6 2011
Japan
MOSCOW - It is well known that, in the political field, the 20th
century brought about a strong and, as it turned out, omnipresent
trend toward disintegration of former empires and the formation in
their place of nation-states all over the crumbling colonial world.
In the realm of economy, however, the development went in the opposite
direction - toward internationalization of economic life and further
- toward a higher and specific form of economic integration. Such
integration first emerged in its classic - regional or "neighborly"-
form, like the European Union or the comprehensive North American
Free Trade Agreement.
But with the dawn of the new millennium, economic integration
began to take a new shape involving the "twinning" of economies of
some countries belonging to different continents and to different
social-economic models. The highly unusual pair of the United States
and China offers the most striking example of such a rapidly emerging
"Siamese connection."
The two just-mentioned mighty trends, though opposite to each other,
were somehow interconnected and often developed simultaneously or
with only a short time lag. The world began to take on a new shape -
with the global economic system becoming characterized by many poles
of development or by many enclaves of an integrative nature in all
major directions of economic exchange.
Among the former Soviet empire "fragments," the processes of change
proceeded in contradictory ways.
With the three Baltic states, which have spent half a century under
the aegis of Communist Moscow and are ethnically and culturally rather
alien to Russian tradition and political practices, the situation is
unequivocal: All have become "little brothers"in the growing European
"family" and are now quite happy with the status quo. Their destiny
leaves no grounds for concern, while the future of the Russian
population still living in these former Soviet territories will
probably be secured on a geo-economic basis.
Actually, ethnic Russians in "Baltia" and elsewhere are, as a rule,
well-educated people prepared to work in modern production systems -
a quality which can be in high demand during the next historical period
characterized by the trend toward further all-European "twinning."
It looks as if Ukraine will share the Baltic experience, though with
a lag. However, it does not exclude a revival of full-scale fruitful
cooperation with Russia sooner or later - in a historic perspective,
also a quite realistic scenario. For one, there are objective
preconditions to rebuild the common aerospace complex of the two
countries, which for decades has served as an example of effective
"twinning a la Sovietique" on a sectoral basis.
As for Belarus and Moldova, both are characterized by rather whimsical
combinations of geopolitical and geo-economic factors, and that makes
their future obscure and difficult to predict.
Yet, it can be expected that at the end of day, Belarus will share
the historical destiny of Russia - in contrast to Moldova, or at least
to its "Roman" part, which may make the choice in favor of the united
Europe (with an eventual transformation of the Russian-speaking region
Pridnestrovye into a self-dependent subject of international law in
the Kosovo manner).
In the Caucasus, we find all three former Soviet republics looking
for good fortune on rather different paths.
Armenia stands traditionally close to Russia and is a full-fledged
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, though it seems
premature to speak of anything like economic integration (or
"twinning") in this case - just as in the case of Kazakhstan, by
the way.
This evaluation is also valid for Azerbaijan, with a certain
reservation connected with the fact that this oil-producing Islamic
state has another alternative - that of a wider international
orientation. Its mutual relations with Armenia are aggravated by the
very painful problem of Karabakh, but it seems that nothing can be
done here - until good will and geo-economic interests will outweigh
the traditional geopolitical strife.
As for Russia's close historical partner Georgia, today the course
of its leadership is tightly attached to what is happening on Capitol
Hill and what supranational Brussels expects of it. It applies both to
military-strategic issues and to geo-economic considerations regarding
the prospect of gaining EU membership.
The acute confrontation with Russia is a transient matter which does
not deserve any excessive attention, but as it seems, nor is there
any hope for a quick improvement in Russo-Georgian relations soon.
To this may be added that, judging by the geography of the recent
"domestic" suicide attacks and the ethnic origins of the terrorists,
there are hints that some parts of Russia's North Caucasus will try
to secede and establish a kind of independent status as soon as the
opportunity presents itself.
Kazakhstan and the newborn states of Central Asia cannot be regarded as
neglected in any way. The first is actively cooperating with Russia -
something quite natural and useful to both sides. Not-so-few schemes of
an integrative nature encompassing this vast region remain on paper -
with the possible exception of the Eurasian Economic Community. This
decade-old grouping includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan
and Tajikistan, and it might pretty soon develop into a genuine
customs union.
It seems that all of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia
have been taking a wait-and-see position - in part, thanks to the
considerable interest Europe and America have been showing in their
natural riches. All, including Uzbekistan, are members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, a geopolitical entity with a big geo-economic
potential as well.
Thus, a drift toward the "elder Chinese brother" will probably develop
in the region - though not so much with the help of geo-economic
mechanisms as on the basis of traditional geopolitical choice.
Analyzing the also quite young Russian Federation - Russia proper -
and trying to forecast its future, we must keep in mind exactly the
historic retrospective: first of all, the well-known fact that it is
not an ordinary nation-state but a former metropolis of a vast empire
inhabited by more than 120 peoples culturally glued together by the
Russian language.
For centuries, Moscow and St. Petersburg ruled with a powerful hand
the scarcely populated vast territories. The colonial character
of relations between the European core and mostly Asian periphery
predestined especially strong disintegrative forces within the
Communist empire.
Since 1991 the world has observed a sharp turn of almost all former
Soviet republics away from Moscow and toward capitalist Europe
and the industrial West in general. The disintegration has borne a
strong geopolitical imprint. As for the times ahead, there might be
an equally strong impact of geo-economic interests and considerations
on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the former imperial area.
With the new/old - empire-minded - president that Russia is going to
get in 2012 ("re-elect" doesn't quite fit), integrative efforts in
the post-Soviet area may grow in strength and embrace new directions.
Russian professor Andrey Borodaevskiy, with half a century of research
and teaching experience in the world economy and international
economic relations, is co-author of the recent monograph "Russia in
the Diversity of Civilizations." His e-mail address is [email protected]
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20111006ab.html
By Andrey Boradaevskiy
Japan Times
Oct 6 2011
Japan
MOSCOW - It is well known that, in the political field, the 20th
century brought about a strong and, as it turned out, omnipresent
trend toward disintegration of former empires and the formation in
their place of nation-states all over the crumbling colonial world.
In the realm of economy, however, the development went in the opposite
direction - toward internationalization of economic life and further
- toward a higher and specific form of economic integration. Such
integration first emerged in its classic - regional or "neighborly"-
form, like the European Union or the comprehensive North American
Free Trade Agreement.
But with the dawn of the new millennium, economic integration
began to take a new shape involving the "twinning" of economies of
some countries belonging to different continents and to different
social-economic models. The highly unusual pair of the United States
and China offers the most striking example of such a rapidly emerging
"Siamese connection."
The two just-mentioned mighty trends, though opposite to each other,
were somehow interconnected and often developed simultaneously or
with only a short time lag. The world began to take on a new shape -
with the global economic system becoming characterized by many poles
of development or by many enclaves of an integrative nature in all
major directions of economic exchange.
Among the former Soviet empire "fragments," the processes of change
proceeded in contradictory ways.
With the three Baltic states, which have spent half a century under
the aegis of Communist Moscow and are ethnically and culturally rather
alien to Russian tradition and political practices, the situation is
unequivocal: All have become "little brothers"in the growing European
"family" and are now quite happy with the status quo. Their destiny
leaves no grounds for concern, while the future of the Russian
population still living in these former Soviet territories will
probably be secured on a geo-economic basis.
Actually, ethnic Russians in "Baltia" and elsewhere are, as a rule,
well-educated people prepared to work in modern production systems -
a quality which can be in high demand during the next historical period
characterized by the trend toward further all-European "twinning."
It looks as if Ukraine will share the Baltic experience, though with
a lag. However, it does not exclude a revival of full-scale fruitful
cooperation with Russia sooner or later - in a historic perspective,
also a quite realistic scenario. For one, there are objective
preconditions to rebuild the common aerospace complex of the two
countries, which for decades has served as an example of effective
"twinning a la Sovietique" on a sectoral basis.
As for Belarus and Moldova, both are characterized by rather whimsical
combinations of geopolitical and geo-economic factors, and that makes
their future obscure and difficult to predict.
Yet, it can be expected that at the end of day, Belarus will share
the historical destiny of Russia - in contrast to Moldova, or at least
to its "Roman" part, which may make the choice in favor of the united
Europe (with an eventual transformation of the Russian-speaking region
Pridnestrovye into a self-dependent subject of international law in
the Kosovo manner).
In the Caucasus, we find all three former Soviet republics looking
for good fortune on rather different paths.
Armenia stands traditionally close to Russia and is a full-fledged
member of the Commonwealth of Independent States, though it seems
premature to speak of anything like economic integration (or
"twinning") in this case - just as in the case of Kazakhstan, by
the way.
This evaluation is also valid for Azerbaijan, with a certain
reservation connected with the fact that this oil-producing Islamic
state has another alternative - that of a wider international
orientation. Its mutual relations with Armenia are aggravated by the
very painful problem of Karabakh, but it seems that nothing can be
done here - until good will and geo-economic interests will outweigh
the traditional geopolitical strife.
As for Russia's close historical partner Georgia, today the course
of its leadership is tightly attached to what is happening on Capitol
Hill and what supranational Brussels expects of it. It applies both to
military-strategic issues and to geo-economic considerations regarding
the prospect of gaining EU membership.
The acute confrontation with Russia is a transient matter which does
not deserve any excessive attention, but as it seems, nor is there
any hope for a quick improvement in Russo-Georgian relations soon.
To this may be added that, judging by the geography of the recent
"domestic" suicide attacks and the ethnic origins of the terrorists,
there are hints that some parts of Russia's North Caucasus will try
to secede and establish a kind of independent status as soon as the
opportunity presents itself.
Kazakhstan and the newborn states of Central Asia cannot be regarded as
neglected in any way. The first is actively cooperating with Russia -
something quite natural and useful to both sides. Not-so-few schemes of
an integrative nature encompassing this vast region remain on paper -
with the possible exception of the Eurasian Economic Community. This
decade-old grouping includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgyzstan
and Tajikistan, and it might pretty soon develop into a genuine
customs union.
It seems that all of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia
have been taking a wait-and-see position - in part, thanks to the
considerable interest Europe and America have been showing in their
natural riches. All, including Uzbekistan, are members of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, a geopolitical entity with a big geo-economic
potential as well.
Thus, a drift toward the "elder Chinese brother" will probably develop
in the region - though not so much with the help of geo-economic
mechanisms as on the basis of traditional geopolitical choice.
Analyzing the also quite young Russian Federation - Russia proper -
and trying to forecast its future, we must keep in mind exactly the
historic retrospective: first of all, the well-known fact that it is
not an ordinary nation-state but a former metropolis of a vast empire
inhabited by more than 120 peoples culturally glued together by the
Russian language.
For centuries, Moscow and St. Petersburg ruled with a powerful hand
the scarcely populated vast territories. The colonial character
of relations between the European core and mostly Asian periphery
predestined especially strong disintegrative forces within the
Communist empire.
Since 1991 the world has observed a sharp turn of almost all former
Soviet republics away from Moscow and toward capitalist Europe
and the industrial West in general. The disintegration has borne a
strong geopolitical imprint. As for the times ahead, there might be
an equally strong impact of geo-economic interests and considerations
on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the former imperial area.
With the new/old - empire-minded - president that Russia is going to
get in 2012 ("re-elect" doesn't quite fit), integrative efforts in
the post-Soviet area may grow in strength and embrace new directions.
Russian professor Andrey Borodaevskiy, with half a century of research
and teaching experience in the world economy and international
economic relations, is co-author of the recent monograph "Russia in
the Diversity of Civilizations." His e-mail address is [email protected]
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20111006ab.html