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MINSK GROUP'S 'DIVERGENT INTERESTS' AND NAGORNO-KARABAKH
news.az, Azerbaijan
Oct 11 2011
News.Az reprints from Il Nodo di Gordio an article by Andrea
Marcigliano.
The substantive failure of the so called "Minsk Group" to find a
diplomatic solution to the continuing dispute between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh seems already proven. The failure is
attributable to the too divergent interests of the three countries,
the United States, Russia and France, that assume collectively the
chairmanship of the Minsk Group and that in fact determine, or at
least should determine, the guidelines.
Particularly ambiguous is the position of Washington, which has been
suspended for long years since the Clinton administration between
Congress where pro-Armenian positions prevail - so much so that the US
has repeatedly committed significant funds as "aid" to the Armenian
administration of Nagorno-Karabakh - and the White House, where
initially Clinton and later George W. Bush always tried to mediate
with Baku, above all, in order to maintain essential relationships
able to ensure US oil interests in the Caucasus.
The situation became further complicated with the election of Barack
Obama, whose uncertainties and ambiguity in foreign policy are now
dramatically clear. In the Caucasus, then, it seems that the current US
administration lacks any strategy, beyond the now rooted preferential
relationship with Georgia. In essence it seems increasingly clear that
Congress's position in favour of Armenian demands will prevail, if
the current uncertainty from the present commander in chief continues.
No less ambiguous in many respects is the position of Moscow. Even
if it's an ambiguity that does not originate from the indecision of
the Kremlin - it would be paradoxical to accuse Putin and Medvedev
of ambiguity - but from the complicated geopolitical web that Russia
is weaving. In fact, in the recent past Moscow has strongly supported
the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, helping Armenia in
every way, above all by putting it in a position to compete militarily
with the much better equipped Azeri army.
This policy contradicts or, better still, has displaced the policy
of the long Soviet era, when the Red Tsars of the Kremlin always
supported this restless province's affiliation to the Azerbaijan
Republic. This also has the function of a geopolitical strategy
aimed at building bridges with Turkey, a bridge which consists of
Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan with its territorial integrity and includes
the critical juncture of Nagorno-Karabakh. The policy of the early
post-Soviet years has been abandoned, when the pro-Armenian option
seemed to prevail in Moscow (by virtue of religious ties, too - the
common sense of belonging to Orthodoxy) and when the containment
of Georgian influence was a factor. Anyway today, the Kremlin's
Caucasian policy might be about to experience a new evolution. In
fact, the birth of the Eurasian Economic Community has of necessity
brought Moscow closer to the Turkic-speaking Central Asian countries -
notably Kazakhstan, which is the second pillar of this new reality -
and is opening it up to a closer dialogue with Ankara.
Turkey is, in fact, in turn interested in the new Eurasian Common
Market, for two reasons: first because it is irritated by the doors
repeatedly closed by the EU and, second, because entry into the
euro-zone now appears much less interesting. So Russian-Turkish
dialogue, or dialogue between the Eurasian Common Market and
Turkey, opens up new scenarios for the Caucasus and, in particular,
Nagorno-Karabakh. Constantly evolving scenarios mean that on the
one hand Moscow seems less committed to pro-Armenian positions and
more willing to have dialogue with Baku, while Ankara on the other
hand has tried to reopen channels of communication with Armenia by
softening its support for the Azeris. This has led to a stalemate,
which, in future, could be the harbinger of an attempt to resolve
the Azeri-Armenian crisis in the broader context of a common Eurasian
market. A fascinating prospect which is still a long way off.
Lastly, France, which should represent common European interests within
the Minsk Group, appears as usual to determine its position by its
own "special" interests as well as domestic issues - first of all,
electoral concerns, since Paris has always been very sensitive to the
pressure of the Armenian lobby in France. Therefore, the suspicion
with which Baku looks at the Minsk Group and its latest initiatives
is perfectly understandable; it is a suspicion that originates mainly
from the awareness of the underlying imbalance.
In fact, the positions of Armenia have always been much better
represented and defended, especially with the effective work of the
lobby in Moscow, Washington and Paris. The exercise of this kind of
"soft power" has so far overshadowed the historical and cultural
claims of the Azeris and, above all, downplayed an objective fact. The
continuation of Armenian control - or occupation, as the Azeris call
it - of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding provinces
has a negative impact on the economic development of not only that
region but of the Caucasus as a whole.
The impact is also felt on global geo-economic scenarios, and is
severe for Western Europe in particular, which should begin to
look at the issue more carefully and stop leaving it to Paris'
short-sighted policy.
Andrea Marcigliano writes on history and political philosophy for a
number of Italian newspapers.
This article was translated by Ermanno Visintainer of the Vox Populi
Study Centre and copy-edited by News.Az.
The article was published in Il Nodo di Gordio.
http://www.news.az/articles/politics/46295
From: A. Papazian
news.az, Azerbaijan
Oct 11 2011
News.Az reprints from Il Nodo di Gordio an article by Andrea
Marcigliano.
The substantive failure of the so called "Minsk Group" to find a
diplomatic solution to the continuing dispute between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh seems already proven. The failure is
attributable to the too divergent interests of the three countries,
the United States, Russia and France, that assume collectively the
chairmanship of the Minsk Group and that in fact determine, or at
least should determine, the guidelines.
Particularly ambiguous is the position of Washington, which has been
suspended for long years since the Clinton administration between
Congress where pro-Armenian positions prevail - so much so that the US
has repeatedly committed significant funds as "aid" to the Armenian
administration of Nagorno-Karabakh - and the White House, where
initially Clinton and later George W. Bush always tried to mediate
with Baku, above all, in order to maintain essential relationships
able to ensure US oil interests in the Caucasus.
The situation became further complicated with the election of Barack
Obama, whose uncertainties and ambiguity in foreign policy are now
dramatically clear. In the Caucasus, then, it seems that the current US
administration lacks any strategy, beyond the now rooted preferential
relationship with Georgia. In essence it seems increasingly clear that
Congress's position in favour of Armenian demands will prevail, if
the current uncertainty from the present commander in chief continues.
No less ambiguous in many respects is the position of Moscow. Even
if it's an ambiguity that does not originate from the indecision of
the Kremlin - it would be paradoxical to accuse Putin and Medvedev
of ambiguity - but from the complicated geopolitical web that Russia
is weaving. In fact, in the recent past Moscow has strongly supported
the secession of Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan, helping Armenia in
every way, above all by putting it in a position to compete militarily
with the much better equipped Azeri army.
This policy contradicts or, better still, has displaced the policy
of the long Soviet era, when the Red Tsars of the Kremlin always
supported this restless province's affiliation to the Azerbaijan
Republic. This also has the function of a geopolitical strategy
aimed at building bridges with Turkey, a bridge which consists of
Turkic-speaking Azerbaijan with its territorial integrity and includes
the critical juncture of Nagorno-Karabakh. The policy of the early
post-Soviet years has been abandoned, when the pro-Armenian option
seemed to prevail in Moscow (by virtue of religious ties, too - the
common sense of belonging to Orthodoxy) and when the containment
of Georgian influence was a factor. Anyway today, the Kremlin's
Caucasian policy might be about to experience a new evolution. In
fact, the birth of the Eurasian Economic Community has of necessity
brought Moscow closer to the Turkic-speaking Central Asian countries -
notably Kazakhstan, which is the second pillar of this new reality -
and is opening it up to a closer dialogue with Ankara.
Turkey is, in fact, in turn interested in the new Eurasian Common
Market, for two reasons: first because it is irritated by the doors
repeatedly closed by the EU and, second, because entry into the
euro-zone now appears much less interesting. So Russian-Turkish
dialogue, or dialogue between the Eurasian Common Market and
Turkey, opens up new scenarios for the Caucasus and, in particular,
Nagorno-Karabakh. Constantly evolving scenarios mean that on the
one hand Moscow seems less committed to pro-Armenian positions and
more willing to have dialogue with Baku, while Ankara on the other
hand has tried to reopen channels of communication with Armenia by
softening its support for the Azeris. This has led to a stalemate,
which, in future, could be the harbinger of an attempt to resolve
the Azeri-Armenian crisis in the broader context of a common Eurasian
market. A fascinating prospect which is still a long way off.
Lastly, France, which should represent common European interests within
the Minsk Group, appears as usual to determine its position by its
own "special" interests as well as domestic issues - first of all,
electoral concerns, since Paris has always been very sensitive to the
pressure of the Armenian lobby in France. Therefore, the suspicion
with which Baku looks at the Minsk Group and its latest initiatives
is perfectly understandable; it is a suspicion that originates mainly
from the awareness of the underlying imbalance.
In fact, the positions of Armenia have always been much better
represented and defended, especially with the effective work of the
lobby in Moscow, Washington and Paris. The exercise of this kind of
"soft power" has so far overshadowed the historical and cultural
claims of the Azeris and, above all, downplayed an objective fact. The
continuation of Armenian control - or occupation, as the Azeris call
it - of the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding provinces
has a negative impact on the economic development of not only that
region but of the Caucasus as a whole.
The impact is also felt on global geo-economic scenarios, and is
severe for Western Europe in particular, which should begin to
look at the issue more carefully and stop leaving it to Paris'
short-sighted policy.
Andrea Marcigliano writes on history and political philosophy for a
number of Italian newspapers.
This article was translated by Ermanno Visintainer of the Vox Populi
Study Centre and copy-edited by News.Az.
The article was published in Il Nodo di Gordio.
http://www.news.az/articles/politics/46295
From: A. Papazian