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NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT: ARMENIA'S VICTORY OR NIGHTMARE?
by Galib Mammadov
Foreign Policy Journal
Oct 13 2011
Introduction
Relations between two countries worsened after Armenia occupied
Azerbaijani territories between the years of 1988 and 1994. Since
1994, the Karabakh conflict remains frozen even after international
mediation. This article aims to explore whether Armenia is truly on
the winning side, as well as showing Azerbaijan's major advantage in
this conflict. Research and analysis shows that Armenia experienced
economic, demographic, and political crises after the conflict,
putting the country in an undesirable situation, while ongoing
conflict prevents Armenia from solving its economic and demographic
problems. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is doing well with the help of
its oil reserves, experiencing an oil boom at the end of the twentieth
century. This helped to improve country's economy by decreasing both
unemployment and the poverty rate. As Armenia has no such resources,
it must rely on expanded trade to improve its economy. Moreover,
Turkey and Azerbaijan closed their borders with Armenia a result of
the conflict. Closed borders with two of four neighbor countries
prevents Armenia from expanding trade and receiving investment,
thus harming its economy and leading to demographic problems as more
and more people leave the country every year in search of economic
opportunity. The continuing occupation of Azerbaijani territories by
Armenia puts the latter in a disadvantageous position.
Brief Background
Azerbaijan, as a most powerful and resource-rich country in the
South Caucasus region, uses its power and resources to increase its
importance in the region and pressure countries like Armenia to abandon
offensive politics against Azerbaijan. It is important to note that
Armenia occupied more than 16 percent of Azerbaijani territories as
a result of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, displacing approximately
800,000 Azerbaijanis from their territories. Additionally, the United
Nations recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan Republic and
has four resolutions that call on withdrawal of Armenian forces from
occupied districts of Azerbaijan.[1] However, the Armenian side does
not want to comply with the UN resolutions. Poor relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia pressure the latter to change its offensive
policy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, keeping Armenia away
from the region's important oil projects. Azerbaijan, as an owner
of the oil resources in South Caucasus region, does not agree with
the participation of Armenia in such projects so long as the region
remains occupied. This decreases Armenia's importance in the region,
undermining its relations with the West and with Turkey.
Analysis
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia gained independence
along with countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. Armenia needed
a strong ally for security, and thus it reinforced relations with
the United States using its lobby. Azerbaijan's former president,
Heydar Aliyev, was successful in showing the importance of the
Azerbaijani-US cooperation for both countries. He showed his
willingness to collaborate with the US government and helped to
increase US-Azerbaijani bilateral relations.[2] Heydar Aliyev was
successful in showing the significance of Azerbaijan as a reliable
strategic partner, changing the political picture in the region as the
US interest in Armenia decreased alongside increasing Azerbaijani-US
bilateral relations. While the US-Azerbaijani cooperation in the
energy sector and in others sectors were increasing, the Armenian-US
relations began to weaken.
The good relations with Turkey could return the Western interest to
Armenia because Turkey's geopolitical position helps the country to
create a bridge between the West and the South Caucasus countries. But
Armenian-Turkish relations worsened due to the Armenian occupation of
Azerbaijani territories. Turkish officials expressed a strong reaction
to the Armenian offense against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity,
closing the border with Armenia in 1993 to pressure Armenia to withdraw
from the occupied lands.[3] We see that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
destroyed Armenian Turkish relations.
All three South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia
signed the Tashkent agreement to enter the CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States).[4] Russia used conflicts like Nagorno Karabakh,
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia to keep all three countries dependent.[5]
Given that Turkish officials supported Azerbaijani side in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia was vulnerable in terms of security
because its relations were strained with two of its neighbors.
Armenian officials had to guarantee the country's security, which
is why they signed an agreement in 1992 with Russia, allowing the
Russian forces to protect the Armenian borders with Turkey. Unlike
Armenians, Azerbaijani officials showed their position by refusing
to allow the placing Russian military bases in the country.[6]
Meanwhile, the Turkish reaction against Armenia broke the attempted
bridge between Armenia and the West. While the U.S. was establishing
military cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia,[7] Russia was
placing its forces in Armenia, making it more dependent.
Excepting kinship and close relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey,
one of the main sources of Turkish pressure on Armenia was its energy
interest in Azerbaijan. In 1993, the Azerbaijani president signed
an agreement with Turkey regarding the construction of a pipeline
between Baku and Ceyhan. This pipeline was to transport Azerbaijani
oil to European markets, giving Turkey the chance to play a key role
in the region.[8] Turkey was ready to expend diligent effort to keep
the Baku-Ceyhan project alive.[9] This guaranteed the continuing
Turkish support for Azerbaijan in Karabakh conflict.
Azerbaijan's policy not only influenced Turkey, but it also made
the US pressure Armenia. The United States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan
prepared a proposal for Armenia, entitled "Armenian withdrawal from
the occupied territories and recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty
over Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for the passage of the Baku Ceyhan
pipeline through Armenia."[10] This proposal was mentioned in 1995 by
the former Turkish president, Suleyman Demirel, and in 1997 by Heydar
Aliyev. The Armenian side rejected the proposal by responding that
the "two issues should not be linked."[11] The president of Armenia
argued that "Armenia should not be bypassed as a transit country".[12]
Azerbaijan responded to the Armenian decision by showing support for
the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan course, and Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey
signed an agreement in 1999.[13] If Armenia withdraws from the occupied
areas, the pipeline would flow through Armenian soil. Armenia would
benefit from transit fees and develop its weak economy.
Participation in the project would also increase the country's
importance in the region. The differing policies of Armenia and
Georgia determined their presence in the BTC project. Georgia's good
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia's poor relations with
the same nations created a winner in the case of Georgia and a loser
in the case of Armenia in a zero sum game. Poor relations with Turkey
and Azerbaijan led Armenia to establish close relations with Russia,
making it more dependent.
Armenia's weak economy not only prevents development of the country,
but it also creates demographic problems. According to Forbes's newest
ranking, Armenia has the second worst economy after Madagascar.[14]
Such an economy decreases the population of the country because
citizens often opt to leave the country in search of better life. This
also will put Armenia in a disadvantageous position in the Karabakh
conflict. It means that time works in favor of Azerbaijan more than,
it does for Armenia. Depopulation of Armenia has increased with the
Russian "Compatriots program" since 2009. This program was established
to bring Russian speaking people from CIS countries into 24 Russian
regions. According to statistics 2,000 Armenian citizens participated
in the program in 2010. The majority of Armenian people think that this
deepens a demographic problem. It is important to mention that after
independence in 1991, 1.1 million Armenians left their motherland to
achieve better quality life.[15] According to CIA data for the year of
2011, the Armenian population is 2,967,975.[16] 1.1 million citizens
is a tragic loss for the remaining 3 million Armenians. The president
of Armenia, Serj Sargisian, sees a solution for decrease emigration
in creating better economic opportunities for Armenian people.[17]
Realistically, with the second worst economy in the world and with
limited trade and investment opportunities, it is not likely that
this plan will be successful. The only solution for Armenia is the
liberation of the internationally recognized Azerbaijani lands. Only
after that can Armenia benefit from trade with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Armenia can also get a chance to participate in future projects in
the region which would be beneficial for its economy and increase
its importance in the region.
Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan experienced fast GDP growth after receiving
a tremendous amount of investment to its oil sector. Between 2002
and 2006, per capita GDP growth rate per year increased from 7.3%
to 30.6%. The country experienced falling GDP growth between the
years of 2006 and 2008 to 15.7 %. However, if we look at GDP growth
between the years of 2002 and 2008, we see two times increase.[18]
The rate of the poverty declined from 49% to 40% between the years
of 2001 and 2004.[19] The year of 2009 sees considerable changes as
poverty decreased to 11%,[20] and the inflation rate decreased from
20.8% to 1.5% between the years of 2008 and 2009.[21] We see that oil
exports in Azerbaijan help to improve its economy and quality of life
for its people.
If Armenia had good relations with Azerbaijan, it would enjoy
the benefits of being a transit country for oil exports to the
Western markets. This would increase the West's strategic interest
in the country, and Armenia would also benefit from the trade with
Turkey. It is important to note that Armenia has borders with the four
countries of Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran, but borders with
two of these neighbors are closed. This leads Armenia to reinforce
relations with Russia and Iran and increases Armenia's dependence on
these countries preventing its integration to the West. In order to
get access to the major oil projects in the region and benefit from
the trade with all of its neighbors, the Armenian government should
change its politics regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.[22] Even the former
President of Armenia, Ter-Petrosian, believed that Armenia should
come to some agreement about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue because the
remaining conflict undermines Armenian prosperity and sovereignty. He
told the Armenian people that they must choose between Nagorno-Karabakh
and development.[23]
The last meeting held in Kazan with the mediation of Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev shows that the two sides still cannot come
to agreement. An expert on Caucasus and editor of the book "Black
Garden", Thomas De Waal argued after the meeting that disagreements in
the Kazan meeting could bring the negotiations to dangerous point. He
said that if the two sides do not agree on the base principles accepted
in Madrid Summit, war could become inevitable.[24] The modified Madrid
Principles are following:
1. The return of occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh
to Azerbaijani control.
2. A land corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh through
Lachin district
3. An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing its security
and self-governance
4. Final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a legally
binding referendum
5. The right of return for all internally displaced persons and
refugees
War is an undesirable solution for both sides, but it is Armenia that
is more vulnerable. If we compare two countries' military capacity we
can see an increasing gap as oil revenues help Azerbaijan to build
up its military. The Azerbaijani president has noted many times
in media that they will use military force if necessary to reclaim
occupied lands.[25]
Conclusion
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict has had unpleasant results for two
countries. Azerbaijan has had 16 percent of its territories occupied
and 800,000 of its people displaced. On the other side, Armenia still
cannot improve its weak economy. As a result, Armenia is the world's
second worst economy, and poor economy itself created demographic
problems in the country as more and more people are willing to leave
every year. Armenia lost its significance in the region and its
relations with West and Turkey has been undermined. Its dependence
on Russia is increasing as Armenia allows Russian troops to enter
their lands for security reasons. Also, Armenia was bypassed as
a transit country in the BTC project because officials refused to
withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territories. All facts show that
Armenian officials need to change their policy regarding the Nagorno
Karabakth conflict if they want prosperity for their nation. If they
do not withdraw from occupied lands, which would be the only possible
solution, their economy will get even worse and the demographic crisis
will deepen. The increased poverty rate and unemployment will cause
internal conflict which will undermine stability in the country.
Armenian officials and people need to understand that there are two
options: prosperity without Karabakh or poverty with Karabakh.
Notes
[1] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm
[2] A Jaffe and M. Olcott. (2000). The Geopolitics of Caspian Energy.
In Y. Kalyuzhnova and D. Lynch, The Euro-AsianWorld. London: Macmillan
Distribution Ltd.p84
[3] Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian (1999). Armenia at the
crossroads. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association. pp 103-120
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid. 106
[6] Ibid. 105
[7]Inessa Baban & Zaur Shiriyev. The U.S. South Caucasus Strategy
and Azerbaijan. Turkish Policy Quaterly, Vol 9, No 2 , pp 93-103.
[8] Hale, W. (2000). Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000. Oregon :
Frank Cass Publishers. p 272
[9] Robert Ebel, Rajan Menon. (2000). Energy and Conflict in Central
Asia and Caucasus. Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.p 10
[10] Ibid. 106
[11] Ibid.
[12] Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian (1999). Armenia at the
crossroads. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association. P 126
[13] Tuncay Bayatli. The Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline Project. Winter 2005. p 12
[14] Forbes Report: The World's Worst Economies.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/07/05/the-worlds-worst-economies/
[15] Marianna Grigorian (March 25, 2001).Armenia: Russian Guest Worker
Program Highlights Population Drain
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63157
[16]CIA Factbook.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html
[17]Marianna Grigorian (March 25, 2001).Armenia:
Russian Guest Worker Program Highlights Population Drain
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63157
[18] Kalyuzhnova, Yelena. Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth.
New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.p 11
[19] Kalyuzhnova, Yelena. Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth.
New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.p 11
[20] CIA Factbook 2010
[21] Ibid.
[22] Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian (1999). Armenia at the
crossroads. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association. P 126
[23] Ibid.
[24] The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2001).
Strategic Comments: Medvedyev Momentum Falters in Nagorno Karabakh.
Vol 17
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/august/medvedev-momentum-falters-in-nagorno-karabakh/
[25] Cheterian, V. (2008). War and Peace in the Caucasus. Ney York:
Colombia University Press.pp 367-379
Galib Mammadov is an independent researcher/writer. He also does
a research for Karabakh Foundation. Qalib got his Law degree from
Baku State University. He also holds Master of Arts from Washington
University in St Louis. Specific issues of interest are Unresolved
Conflicts and Political Economy of the Multinational Corporations.
Read more articles by Galib Mammadov.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/13/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-armenias-victory-or-nightmare-2/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Galib Mammadov
Foreign Policy Journal
Oct 13 2011
Introduction
Relations between two countries worsened after Armenia occupied
Azerbaijani territories between the years of 1988 and 1994. Since
1994, the Karabakh conflict remains frozen even after international
mediation. This article aims to explore whether Armenia is truly on
the winning side, as well as showing Azerbaijan's major advantage in
this conflict. Research and analysis shows that Armenia experienced
economic, demographic, and political crises after the conflict,
putting the country in an undesirable situation, while ongoing
conflict prevents Armenia from solving its economic and demographic
problems. Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is doing well with the help of
its oil reserves, experiencing an oil boom at the end of the twentieth
century. This helped to improve country's economy by decreasing both
unemployment and the poverty rate. As Armenia has no such resources,
it must rely on expanded trade to improve its economy. Moreover,
Turkey and Azerbaijan closed their borders with Armenia a result of
the conflict. Closed borders with two of four neighbor countries
prevents Armenia from expanding trade and receiving investment,
thus harming its economy and leading to demographic problems as more
and more people leave the country every year in search of economic
opportunity. The continuing occupation of Azerbaijani territories by
Armenia puts the latter in a disadvantageous position.
Brief Background
Azerbaijan, as a most powerful and resource-rich country in the
South Caucasus region, uses its power and resources to increase its
importance in the region and pressure countries like Armenia to abandon
offensive politics against Azerbaijan. It is important to note that
Armenia occupied more than 16 percent of Azerbaijani territories as
a result of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, displacing approximately
800,000 Azerbaijanis from their territories. Additionally, the United
Nations recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan Republic and
has four resolutions that call on withdrawal of Armenian forces from
occupied districts of Azerbaijan.[1] However, the Armenian side does
not want to comply with the UN resolutions. Poor relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia pressure the latter to change its offensive
policy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, keeping Armenia away
from the region's important oil projects. Azerbaijan, as an owner
of the oil resources in South Caucasus region, does not agree with
the participation of Armenia in such projects so long as the region
remains occupied. This decreases Armenia's importance in the region,
undermining its relations with the West and with Turkey.
Analysis
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia gained independence
along with countries such as Azerbaijan and Georgia. Armenia needed
a strong ally for security, and thus it reinforced relations with
the United States using its lobby. Azerbaijan's former president,
Heydar Aliyev, was successful in showing the importance of the
Azerbaijani-US cooperation for both countries. He showed his
willingness to collaborate with the US government and helped to
increase US-Azerbaijani bilateral relations.[2] Heydar Aliyev was
successful in showing the significance of Azerbaijan as a reliable
strategic partner, changing the political picture in the region as the
US interest in Armenia decreased alongside increasing Azerbaijani-US
bilateral relations. While the US-Azerbaijani cooperation in the
energy sector and in others sectors were increasing, the Armenian-US
relations began to weaken.
The good relations with Turkey could return the Western interest to
Armenia because Turkey's geopolitical position helps the country to
create a bridge between the West and the South Caucasus countries. But
Armenian-Turkish relations worsened due to the Armenian occupation of
Azerbaijani territories. Turkish officials expressed a strong reaction
to the Armenian offense against Azerbaijan's territorial integrity,
closing the border with Armenia in 1993 to pressure Armenia to withdraw
from the occupied lands.[3] We see that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
destroyed Armenian Turkish relations.
All three South Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia
signed the Tashkent agreement to enter the CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States).[4] Russia used conflicts like Nagorno Karabakh,
South Ossetia, and Abkhazia to keep all three countries dependent.[5]
Given that Turkish officials supported Azerbaijani side in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia was vulnerable in terms of security
because its relations were strained with two of its neighbors.
Armenian officials had to guarantee the country's security, which
is why they signed an agreement in 1992 with Russia, allowing the
Russian forces to protect the Armenian borders with Turkey. Unlike
Armenians, Azerbaijani officials showed their position by refusing
to allow the placing Russian military bases in the country.[6]
Meanwhile, the Turkish reaction against Armenia broke the attempted
bridge between Armenia and the West. While the U.S. was establishing
military cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia,[7] Russia was
placing its forces in Armenia, making it more dependent.
Excepting kinship and close relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey,
one of the main sources of Turkish pressure on Armenia was its energy
interest in Azerbaijan. In 1993, the Azerbaijani president signed
an agreement with Turkey regarding the construction of a pipeline
between Baku and Ceyhan. This pipeline was to transport Azerbaijani
oil to European markets, giving Turkey the chance to play a key role
in the region.[8] Turkey was ready to expend diligent effort to keep
the Baku-Ceyhan project alive.[9] This guaranteed the continuing
Turkish support for Azerbaijan in Karabakh conflict.
Azerbaijan's policy not only influenced Turkey, but it also made
the US pressure Armenia. The United States, Turkey, and Azerbaijan
prepared a proposal for Armenia, entitled "Armenian withdrawal from
the occupied territories and recognition of Azerbaijani sovereignty
over Nagorno-Karabakh in exchange for the passage of the Baku Ceyhan
pipeline through Armenia."[10] This proposal was mentioned in 1995 by
the former Turkish president, Suleyman Demirel, and in 1997 by Heydar
Aliyev. The Armenian side rejected the proposal by responding that
the "two issues should not be linked."[11] The president of Armenia
argued that "Armenia should not be bypassed as a transit country".[12]
Azerbaijan responded to the Armenian decision by showing support for
the Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan course, and Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey
signed an agreement in 1999.[13] If Armenia withdraws from the occupied
areas, the pipeline would flow through Armenian soil. Armenia would
benefit from transit fees and develop its weak economy.
Participation in the project would also increase the country's
importance in the region. The differing policies of Armenia and
Georgia determined their presence in the BTC project. Georgia's good
relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, Armenia's poor relations with
the same nations created a winner in the case of Georgia and a loser
in the case of Armenia in a zero sum game. Poor relations with Turkey
and Azerbaijan led Armenia to establish close relations with Russia,
making it more dependent.
Armenia's weak economy not only prevents development of the country,
but it also creates demographic problems. According to Forbes's newest
ranking, Armenia has the second worst economy after Madagascar.[14]
Such an economy decreases the population of the country because
citizens often opt to leave the country in search of better life. This
also will put Armenia in a disadvantageous position in the Karabakh
conflict. It means that time works in favor of Azerbaijan more than,
it does for Armenia. Depopulation of Armenia has increased with the
Russian "Compatriots program" since 2009. This program was established
to bring Russian speaking people from CIS countries into 24 Russian
regions. According to statistics 2,000 Armenian citizens participated
in the program in 2010. The majority of Armenian people think that this
deepens a demographic problem. It is important to mention that after
independence in 1991, 1.1 million Armenians left their motherland to
achieve better quality life.[15] According to CIA data for the year of
2011, the Armenian population is 2,967,975.[16] 1.1 million citizens
is a tragic loss for the remaining 3 million Armenians. The president
of Armenia, Serj Sargisian, sees a solution for decrease emigration
in creating better economic opportunities for Armenian people.[17]
Realistically, with the second worst economy in the world and with
limited trade and investment opportunities, it is not likely that
this plan will be successful. The only solution for Armenia is the
liberation of the internationally recognized Azerbaijani lands. Only
after that can Armenia benefit from trade with Turkey and Azerbaijan.
Armenia can also get a chance to participate in future projects in
the region which would be beneficial for its economy and increase
its importance in the region.
Unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan experienced fast GDP growth after receiving
a tremendous amount of investment to its oil sector. Between 2002
and 2006, per capita GDP growth rate per year increased from 7.3%
to 30.6%. The country experienced falling GDP growth between the
years of 2006 and 2008 to 15.7 %. However, if we look at GDP growth
between the years of 2002 and 2008, we see two times increase.[18]
The rate of the poverty declined from 49% to 40% between the years
of 2001 and 2004.[19] The year of 2009 sees considerable changes as
poverty decreased to 11%,[20] and the inflation rate decreased from
20.8% to 1.5% between the years of 2008 and 2009.[21] We see that oil
exports in Azerbaijan help to improve its economy and quality of life
for its people.
If Armenia had good relations with Azerbaijan, it would enjoy
the benefits of being a transit country for oil exports to the
Western markets. This would increase the West's strategic interest
in the country, and Armenia would also benefit from the trade with
Turkey. It is important to note that Armenia has borders with the four
countries of Georgia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Iran, but borders with
two of these neighbors are closed. This leads Armenia to reinforce
relations with Russia and Iran and increases Armenia's dependence on
these countries preventing its integration to the West. In order to
get access to the major oil projects in the region and benefit from
the trade with all of its neighbors, the Armenian government should
change its politics regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.[22] Even the former
President of Armenia, Ter-Petrosian, believed that Armenia should
come to some agreement about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue because the
remaining conflict undermines Armenian prosperity and sovereignty. He
told the Armenian people that they must choose between Nagorno-Karabakh
and development.[23]
The last meeting held in Kazan with the mediation of Russian
president Dmitry Medvedev shows that the two sides still cannot come
to agreement. An expert on Caucasus and editor of the book "Black
Garden", Thomas De Waal argued after the meeting that disagreements in
the Kazan meeting could bring the negotiations to dangerous point. He
said that if the two sides do not agree on the base principles accepted
in Madrid Summit, war could become inevitable.[24] The modified Madrid
Principles are following:
1. The return of occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh
to Azerbaijani control.
2. A land corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh through
Lachin district
3. An interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh guaranteeing its security
and self-governance
4. Final status of Nagorno-Karabakh to be determined by a legally
binding referendum
5. The right of return for all internally displaced persons and
refugees
War is an undesirable solution for both sides, but it is Armenia that
is more vulnerable. If we compare two countries' military capacity we
can see an increasing gap as oil revenues help Azerbaijan to build
up its military. The Azerbaijani president has noted many times
in media that they will use military force if necessary to reclaim
occupied lands.[25]
Conclusion
The Nagorno Karabakh conflict has had unpleasant results for two
countries. Azerbaijan has had 16 percent of its territories occupied
and 800,000 of its people displaced. On the other side, Armenia still
cannot improve its weak economy. As a result, Armenia is the world's
second worst economy, and poor economy itself created demographic
problems in the country as more and more people are willing to leave
every year. Armenia lost its significance in the region and its
relations with West and Turkey has been undermined. Its dependence
on Russia is increasing as Armenia allows Russian troops to enter
their lands for security reasons. Also, Armenia was bypassed as
a transit country in the BTC project because officials refused to
withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territories. All facts show that
Armenian officials need to change their policy regarding the Nagorno
Karabakth conflict if they want prosperity for their nation. If they
do not withdraw from occupied lands, which would be the only possible
solution, their economy will get even worse and the demographic crisis
will deepen. The increased poverty rate and unemployment will cause
internal conflict which will undermine stability in the country.
Armenian officials and people need to understand that there are two
options: prosperity without Karabakh or poverty with Karabakh.
Notes
[1] http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/ga10693.doc.htm
[2] A Jaffe and M. Olcott. (2000). The Geopolitics of Caspian Energy.
In Y. Kalyuzhnova and D. Lynch, The Euro-AsianWorld. London: Macmillan
Distribution Ltd.p84
[3] Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian (1999). Armenia at the
crossroads. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association. pp 103-120
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid. 106
[6] Ibid. 105
[7]Inessa Baban & Zaur Shiriyev. The U.S. South Caucasus Strategy
and Azerbaijan. Turkish Policy Quaterly, Vol 9, No 2 , pp 93-103.
[8] Hale, W. (2000). Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000. Oregon :
Frank Cass Publishers. p 272
[9] Robert Ebel, Rajan Menon. (2000). Energy and Conflict in Central
Asia and Caucasus. Maryland : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.p 10
[10] Ibid. 106
[11] Ibid.
[12] Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian (1999). Armenia at the
crossroads. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association. P 126
[13] Tuncay Bayatli. The Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil
pipeline Project. Winter 2005. p 12
[14] Forbes Report: The World's Worst Economies.
http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2011/07/05/the-worlds-worst-economies/
[15] Marianna Grigorian (March 25, 2001).Armenia: Russian Guest Worker
Program Highlights Population Drain
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63157
[16]CIA Factbook.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/am.html
[17]Marianna Grigorian (March 25, 2001).Armenia:
Russian Guest Worker Program Highlights Population Drain
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63157
[18] Kalyuzhnova, Yelena. Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth.
New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.p 11
[19] Kalyuzhnova, Yelena. Economics of the Caspian Oil and Gas Wealth.
New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.p 11
[20] CIA Factbook 2010
[21] Ibid.
[22] Joseph R. Masih, and Robert O. Krikorian (1999). Armenia at the
crossroads. Amsterdam: Overseas Publishers Association. P 126
[23] Ibid.
[24] The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2001).
Strategic Comments: Medvedyev Momentum Falters in Nagorno Karabakh.
Vol 17
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/past-issues/volume-17-2011/august/medvedev-momentum-falters-in-nagorno-karabakh/
[25] Cheterian, V. (2008). War and Peace in the Caucasus. Ney York:
Colombia University Press.pp 367-379
Galib Mammadov is an independent researcher/writer. He also does
a research for Karabakh Foundation. Qalib got his Law degree from
Baku State University. He also holds Master of Arts from Washington
University in St Louis. Specific issues of interest are Unresolved
Conflicts and Political Economy of the Multinational Corporations.
Read more articles by Galib Mammadov.
http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/10/13/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-armenias-victory-or-nightmare-2/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress