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  • Turkey In The US Missile Defence System: Primary Assessment And Poss

    TURKEY IN THE US MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM: PRIMARY ASSESSMENT AND POSSIBLE PROSPECTS
    Sergey Sargsyan

    http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6051
    13.10.2011

    Deputy Head of the Center for Political Studies, "Noravank" Foundation

    The US signed a memorandum with Romania and Turkey (on September 13
    and 14 correspondingly) on SM-3 (Standard Missile-3) ABM systems
    deployment at the Deveselu air base in Romania and deployment of
    AN/TPY-2 radar (old name FBR-T - Forward Based Radar -Transportable),
    which acquires, identifies and tracks ballistic missiles in the active
    phase of their flight, on Turkish territory. The radar will submit
    data to the US ships equipped with "Aegis" combat system, which will
    effect interception of ballistic missiles. According to the Russian
    experts, one of the main aims of that radar, which acquires targets
    at the range up to 2000km, will also be the surveillance and control
    of the air area of the South Caucasus, a part of the territory of the
    Central Asia as well as the south of Russia, and in particular tracking
    the experimental launches of the Russian missiles at the test ranges1.

    Besides, on September 15 the base agreement on deployment of the US
    missile defence in Poland concluded in August 2008 in Washington and
    its annex (of 2010) on deployment of SM-3 missiles on its territory
    came into operation.

    This is the evidence of not only a breakdown in the negotiations on
    the AMB defence between the US and Russia, but it also impacts the
    military and political situation in the Middle East, Black Sea and
    Caspian Region and Eastern Europe.

    Moreover, as the deployment of the radar in Turkey and the ABM system
    base in Romania are just the first stage of implementation of the
    Adapted plan on the Deployment of the ABM defence in Europe, which
    was approved by the president Barak Obama in 2009, it is more likely
    to stir up the processes on further large-scale and deep revision
    of the current system of bilateral and multi-lateral treaties in the
    sphere of the control of arms.

    This system was formed in 70-90s of the last century under the
    uncompromising confrontation between two ideologies and under its
    influence all the states were involved in a bipolar model of the
    division of the spheres of influence. After the confrontation was over
    there was only one super-power, some of those treaties were annexed and
    brought into accord with new geopolitical realities. But later, when
    new leading global actors came forward, regional powers got stronger,
    gradually a multi polar world has been formed; new challenges and
    radical change of the balance of power sooner or later had to bring
    to the acknowledgment of a large-scale reconsideration of the base
    treaties in the sphere of arms.

    The main bilateral and international treaties which has been regulating
    the relations of the states in the sphere of the control of arms and
    are called to support the balance of powers acceptable for all the
    participants are:

    â~@¢The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; â~@¢The 1987 The
    Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) ; â~@¢The 1990 Treaty
    on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE); The 1999 Agreement
    on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe;
    â~@¢The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1); â~@¢The 1993
    Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-2); â~@¢The 2002 Strategic
    Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT); â~@¢Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
    (START-3), which came into operation on February 5, 2011.

    A high level of complimentarity and interconnection of those treaties
    in fact means that termination of one will bring to a situation when
    for preserving the existing balance of powers it will be necessary
    at least to change or more probably to terminate and substitute other
    treaties either.

    Unbalancing current system of treaties in the sphere of control of arms
    began after the withdrawal of the US from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
    Treaty in December 2001. The fact that Russia took it rather calmly
    caused astonishment of the West connected with Moscow's violent and
    strict reaction on concrete steps of Washington taken for the planned
    deployment of the so-called "third district" of the ABM system in
    Europe, i.e. the deployment of the radar in the Czech Republic and
    10 missiles in Poland.

    But such a reaction is not an accidental; it is well considered
    and caused by a number of objective reasons and is a consequence of
    changes which took place in Russia and in the whole world.

    Of course, a greater degree of confidence of Moscow in its powers
    has been caused by a rapid economic upsurge of the country which
    is in its turn conditioned by the growth of prices for the energy
    carriers. But, first of all, it has been caused by the accession to
    power of a new - more competent and active - leadership which has been
    building (including usage of the authoritarian methods) the working
    and efficient line of command and increasing the centralization and
    manageability of the state.

    Formation of new Russian-American relations has been essentially
    influenced by such factors as the upsurge of the economic, political
    and military potential of China, character of the military operations
    of the US and their allies in Afghanistan and Iraq.

    Under such conditions the plans of the US connected with the deployment
    of radar in Czech Rep. and 10 missiles in Poland, which, according to
    Washington, have to protect Europe and US from the ballistic missiles
    of the Islamic Republic of Iran2, gave occasion to Russia to embark
    on a campaign of reconsideration of the treaties and provisions of
    the treaties which are, in their opinion, of discriminative character
    and are consequences of inequitable approach, and can be unilaterally
    breached or ambiguously interpreted and were concluded in the times
    of Gorbachev and Yeltsin weakness and lack of will.

    First of all it regarded the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
    in Europe which was suspended by Russia in July 2007. Currently,
    especially after coming into effect of the START-3, the main
    contradictions are concentrated on the approaches of the parties to
    the ABM defence issue.

    The main idea of the ABM Treaty was that remaining open for the
    strike back of the enemy3 the parties realized lack of any prospects
    of nuclear potentials build-up because of the unacceptable level of
    mutual damage4.

    At the same time building of the efficient system of the national
    missile defence by one of the parties may attach them a belief in
    their impunity and tempt them to deliver the first disarming strike.

    That is why for all the seeming exclusively defencive character of
    the anti-missile shield, its presence can change the balance of powers
    and can cause nuclear war.

    Global ABM defence, which is drafted by the US today, can be
    characterized as integrated high-tech system with the complex
    application of various systems of arms and target destruction
    principles. In future the components, which would allow counteracting
    the ballistic missiles of the potential enemy on all the phases of
    the ballistic missile trajectory, are planned to be included in the
    deployed system of the US ABM defence.

    Back in 1996 the programme of the US National Missile Defence
    (NMD) creation shifted its status from "technology development" to
    "deplorability of the arms system", and after the adoption of the
    National Missile Defense Act of 1999 by the US Congress the works on
    it has been stirred up.

    For today systems of midcourse and terminal phases are the most
    tactically efficient ones.

    The G. Bush administration considered the option of starting the
    deployment of the European district of the US Missile Defense from the
    deployment of three-stage solid fuel GBI (Ground Based Interceptor)
    in Poland and XBR (X-Band Radar) in Czech Rep. Its goal would have
    been the acquiring, tracking targets and counter missiles guiding.

    But after Barak Obama's coming to the White House those plans -
    and first of all the terms of their deployment - were reviewed. In
    particular, this was conditioned by unwillingness to strain relations
    with Moscow, which sounded the possibility of cutting back cooperation
    in a number of programmes essential for Washington as counter
    measures. Particularly, it regarded organization of supply support
    of the coalition forces in Afghanistan through the territory of Russia.

    But the most important is that Moscow seriously considered the
    possibility of deployment of theatre ballistic missile systems
    "Iskander-M" in Kaliningrad Oblast, and in this case the ABM defence
    base in Poland would appear in its missile engagement zone. Generally,
    reconsideration of Washington's plans regarding Czech Rep. and Poland
    can be considered as a tactical success of Moscow in the talks on
    missile defence.

    As a result, the US adopted a new plan of deployment of ABM defence
    in Europe. It consists of four stages:

    1. Before 2012: â~@¢Arranging of combat alert duty of three
    Aegis-equipped US Navy ships with SM-3 Block IA missiles which will
    be capable to destroy theatre ballistic missiles at an altitude
    up to 140km and at the range up to 800km; â~@¢Deployment of mobile
    AN/TPY-2 radars.

    2. From 2015

    â~@¢Re-equipment of "Aegis" system with more efficient SM-3 Block
    IB counter-missiles, which will allow intercepting medium-range
    missiles; â~@¢Deployment of a ground based analogues of sea based
    "Aegis" system; â~@¢Getting 249 SM-3 missiles.

    3. By 201:

    â~@¢Improvement of target acquisition and target indication systems
    â~@¢Further modification of SM-3 missiles - SM-3 Block IIA 4. By 2020:

    â~@¢Additional armament of "Aegis" system by SM-3 Block IIB, which
    will be capable to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles.

    It is necessary to mention that the concerns of Russia are caused
    rather by the improvement of the entire system of missile defence by
    Washington, which gradually takes the shape of a global one, than
    by the establishment of the 3rd district of the US ABM defence. In
    order to avoid such a development Russia, taking advantage of the
    "window of opportunities", i.e. till the moment of real deployment
    of the warlike equipment, came forward with a number of proposals,
    particularly, on a joint running of Gabala radar station and sectoral
    forming of joint European ABM(together with NATO).

    Russia's proposal on joint running of "Daryal" Radar system nearby
    village of Gabala in Azerbaijan instead of ABM base deployment in
    Poland and radar in Czech Rep. pursued several goals:

    Firstly, it confirmed its readiness to cooperate with the US; its
    real manifestation is just an organizational and technical matter.

    Secondly, it put itself in a favourable light in the eyes of the global
    community - readiness to make available its military object5 for the
    US in order to avoid building of a new military bases in Europe and
    a new round of the race of armaments.

    Thirdly, it opened a gate for a broad discussion of tactical and
    technical characteristics of a future European component of the US
    ABM defence.

    At the same time, it is necessary to mention that by its military
    characteristics Gabala radar station, just like "Voronej" radar system
    nearby the town of Armavir in Krasnodar region (North Caucasus), is
    a tracking station and not a targeting one and it could be used only
    as a supplement for the radar in Czech Rep., but not instead. Gabala
    radar is more appropriate as an alternative to AN/TPY-2 radar the
    United States plans to deploy in Turkey and integrate into a general
    ABM defence system in December 2011 (in test mode).

    In case if the US agree, the prospects of joint running of the radar
    station would allow Russia to intensify using of the Gabala radar
    station which is now being used with some restrictions, because of the
    stance of Baku; among the reasons the concerns of its environmental
    safety are mentioned. At the same time it would take the issue of
    prolonging the terms of its rent (which expires in 2012) off the
    table. Though radar in Armavir, which is alternative to the Gabala
    radar, was put into exploitation back in 2009, Russia is interested
    in continuing military and technical cooperation with Azerbaijan due
    to not only military and technical aspects but also out of military
    and political reasoning.

    In case of refusal of the US (which is in fact confirmed by the
    conclusion of the agreement with Turkey), deployment of the radar
    station in the proximity of the Iranian borders automatically brings
    to the aggravation of the relations between Tehran and Ankara which
    will be used by Moscow in its interests.

    But it should be mentioned that, besides purely technical issues of
    the combinability of the Gabala radar station with the existing US
    and NATO radar systems, participation of Russia in the US ABM defence
    system is unacceptable for Washington in the organizational plane
    either. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia S.

    Lavrov: "Our partners from NATO say that they have liabilities on
    mutual defence - Article 5 of Washington Treaty - and those liabilities
    cannot be delegated to anyone" 6.

    As a result, the proposal of Moscow concerning the creation of joint
    ABM defence system based on territorial (i.e. sectoral) principle
    of allocation of responsibility of separate countries or groups of
    countries for detention and destruction of the missiles in a definite
    sector of defence, was in fact voted down.

    Under such conditions, besides symmetrical response, such as, for
    example, merging of antiaircraft defence and ballistic missile defence
    in one system of aerospace defence, which will have to increase its
    efficiency, Russia also considers a number of asymmetric responses
    of military-technical and organizational character, such as:

    â~@¢Shift to equipping of all the modifications of "Topol" missiles by
    multiple unit warheads; â~@¢Extension of a programme of rearmament of
    the navy with modern nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines;
    â~@¢Enhancement of maneuverability and survivability of missile
    systems of Strategic Missile Forces; â~@¢Elaboration of a new systems
    of ballistic and cruise missiles penetration and the improvement of
    the ones in the inventory; â~@¢Elaboration of measures on suppression
    or destruction of a new US ABM defence bases in Turkey and Europe in
    case of necessity.

    Another option is the withdrawal from the the Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces Treaty (according to which Russia liquidated an entire
    class of the armaments capable to bear nuclear warheads) with further
    deployment of the missiles.

    The missile standoff in the late 70s and early 90s developed according
    to the similar scenario. In response to the deployment of the missiles
    in Europe by the USSR, the US deployed 572 middle range missiles
    "Pershing-2". But if then the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies potential
    in armour, aviation and artillery systems can be compared with NATO,
    today the quantitative lag in more than 3 times does not allow Russia
    response symmetrically (including economic aspect).

    Another argument for withdrawal of Russia from the Intermediate-Range
    Nuclear Forces Treaty is the fact that many countries, including its
    neigbours has either acquired such missiles or eagerly augment and
    qualitatively develop their potentials.

    In this situation, according to some Russian experts the deployment
    of the intermediate-range missiles may become a deterrent for the
    non-nuclear or restricted nuclear conflicts in both European and Far
    East directions.

    1.Changes in geopolitical situation caused a situation when both
    the US and Russia, due to different reasons, are now interested in
    changing system of the current bilateral and multi-lateral treaties
    in the sphere of control of arms.

    2.Today the composition, structure, system of management and funding
    of the ABM defence in Europe and Middle East allow characterizing them
    as rather a European component of the US ballistic missile defence
    than NATO ABM defence or EuroABM defence.

    3.While building a new system of relations in the military and
    political spheres each of the parties will protect exclusively its own
    interests. But a new system of treaties must take into consideration
    both new balance of powers in the sphere of different types of arms and
    coming forward of new global and regional actors. Regional actors, the
    military and economic potential and advantageous geographic location of
    which may influence some aspects of new military and political balance,
    will try to acquire definite political and economic preferences at the
    stage of structuring that system. For this purpose they will intensify
    their partnership relations with leading global power centers - US,
    EU, Russia and China.

    4.In the system of relations between Azerbaijan and US Baku will first
    of all try to enlist non-critical attitude of Washington concerning the
    issues of domestic policy (authoritarian regime, violation of human
    rights, total control over the mass media, corruption scandals in
    ruling political elite and etc.), support on Nagorno-Karabakh issue,
    further intensification of the bilateral military and technical
    partnership.

    5.In the system of relations between Turkey and the US, Ankara will
    attempt to acquire or intensify the support of its stance on the
    issue of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, carrying out
    large-scale operations in the north of Iraq, on Kurdish issue as
    well as intensification its foreign political and military-political
    activity in the Middle East and South Caucasus.

    6.On the other hand inclusion of the ship based "Aegis" systems in the
    US ABM defence system in Europe in the Black Sea water area, as well
    as possible deployment of intermediate range missiles in Black Sea
    and Caspian region, will increase the meaning of direct negotiations
    between Moscow and Ankara (Russia and Turkey take similar stances
    on the issue of presence of navies of non-Black Sea states in that
    water area on a continuing basis).

    7.Deployment of the counter-missiles in Poland, withdrawal of
    Russia from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe , as
    well as possible strengthening of the military units in Kaliningrad
    Special Military District and particularly deployment of "Iskander-M"
    systems there (not to speak of intermediate range missiles in case of
    withdrawal from INF treaty) will become an additional catalyst for the
    European states to develop more independent European defence policy.

    8.Russia's counter steps as a reaction to the deployment of the
    ABM defence bases in Europe will bring to the usage of the economic
    leverages by Russia, including the export and amount of energy carriers
    supply at least in regard to Poland and Romania (without violation
    of the existing international agreements in this sphere).

    This will bring to the further growth of importance of the alternative
    sources of energy carriers supply, including the Caspian region,
    for both Poland and Europe in general. In this context stirring up
    of the project of launching of Odessa-Brodi-Polotsk oil pipeline can
    be expected (or more broadly some kind of activation of the economic
    activity of GUAM) 7.

    9.Development of the network of all-over radar surveillance
    "Caucasusnet", as well as the appearance of the elements of ABM defence
    system in Turkey and Black Sea area may bring to the strengthening
    of Russian troops in Armenia and Abkhazia.

    10.Involvement of Turkey in the European segment of the US ABM defence
    will: 11.lower the a possibility of implementation of the plans of
    development of military and technical cooperation between Turkey
    and Russia. This will directly affect the results of the tender
    for procurement of the air defence missile systems in which Russia
    participates; â~@¢help to smooth over contradictions between Turkey
    and Israel in the sphere of military-technical and military-political
    cooperation. In spite of the official statement of Ankara concerning
    the impermissibility of passing data from radars in Turkey to
    Jerusalem, the exchange of data between the radar stations of those
    two states will take place as it corresponds to the interests of all
    the states taking part in the US ABM defence, one way or another;
    â~@¢increase the importance of the role of Turkey in the US and Europe
    security provision, and in consequence it increases its military and
    political weight, particularly in the Black Sea and Caspian region.

    â~@¢At the same time, it will once more prove the failure of the
    foreign political course of Ankara directed to having no problems with
    the neighbours, especially taking into consideration tough reaction
    of Tehran on the deployment of the radar on Turkish territory.

    1Radar is planned to be deployed in Kuluncak district of Malatya
    province in south-eastern Turkey.

    2 Here it should be spoken about the principle capability of Iran to
    produce intercontinental ballistic missiles.

    3 When in 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was concluded, the
    parties came to an agreement that each of them would create one
    district covered by the ABM defence. In the US this district was the
    intercontinental ballistic missiles base in California and in the
    USSR - Moscow region.

    4 Conclusion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty in 1972 (SALT-1)
    became possible only after the agreements on limitation of the national
    ABM defence systems.

    5 From judicial point of view - Information-analytical center "Daryal"
    rented from Azerbaijan

    6 Â"РоÑ~AÑ~AийÑ~AкаÑ~O газеÑ~BаÂ", 4 иÑ~NÐ"Ñ~O 2011 г.

    7 GUAM Organization for Democracy and Economic Development - includes
    Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova.

    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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