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TEST OF SINCERITY IN TURKEY-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS - ANALYSIS
By Hasan Selim Ozertem
Eurasia Review
http://www.eurasiareview.com/18102011-test-of-sincerity-in-turkey-azerbaijan-relations-analysis/
Oct 18 2011
Although Ankara had to give up a lot of dreams beyond the Caspian Sea
due to regional geopolitics and geographical reasons, it succeeded
in developing a complex relationship with Azerbaijan.
Twenty years ago, the Soviet Union was divided into fifteen republics.
The resulting picture necessitated Turkey returning to a geography
in which it was alienated as a result of the controlling policies of
the Soviets. In the reconstruction process of five Turkic states,
four in Central Asia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, Turkey did
not hesitate to take the initiative. If we look back, we can say
that Turkey could not realize its dreams beyond the Caspian Sea due
to regional geopolitics and geographical reasons, but succeeded in
establishing a complex ties with Azerbaijan.
Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations Located west of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan
has experienced various problems in integrating into the international
system after seventy years of Soviet administration. The first of them
was the outbreak of war in Karabakh in 1988, which emerged as the
biggest obstacle to experiencing a normal transition period for the
country. Until the ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, the country
had serious troubles in the areas of security and economics, but after
Heydar Aliyev's coming to power, it entered a rapid recovery process.
In that period, Turkey sided with Azerbaijan and closed its border
with Armenia in 1993, in response to Armenia's occupation of the
territory of Azerbaijan and human rights violations. This step opened
the way for Turkey to share a common fatewith Azerbaijan, but in the
long run paved the way for the narrowing of its maneuvering area.
Baku's Flirting with Moscow The entering into service of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline in 2006 and the delivering of
gas via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line the next year were important
turning points for Azerbaijan. Because from 2006 to the end of 2008,
when the global financial crisis occurred, Azerbaijan has grown by
over 20 % and thus had a chance to recover from its economic problems
and modernize its military. The completion of these projects creates
an important success story for Turkey, but Ankara, having difficulties
reaching beyond the Caspian Sea, could not take its current relations
beyond the level they were in the 1990s. Even at certain points,
it was seen that the existence of Ankara was relatively weakened by
the gradual growth of Russia in the region. It should be noted that
the Georgia-Russia war which erupted in 2008 played an important role
in that issue.
The Kremlin, taking an aggressive stance in its backyard starting in
the 2000s, sent important messages to both countries of the region
and to the West with this war. Looking at Turkey-Azerbaijan relations,
two important factors gain clarity. The first factor was the need for
Baku to redefine its relations with Russia, which until 2008 Baku had
always tried to keep balanced. The first reflection of that was the
Kremlin's monopolization of the Karabakh problem's solution process
since it wants to be the primary actor in solving the problems in
its backyard. The second reflection was the symbolic but politically
significant natural gas treaties signed between Azerbaijan and Russia.
The second important factor was the normalization process of
Turkey-Armenia relations. In Baku, a pro-Russian clique close to
the administration used the normalization process as a propaganda
tool and that played a catalytic role in the rapprochement between
Azerbaijan and Russia. In that process, which turned into a test of
sincerity, some conflicts between Turkey and Azerbaijan entered the
political scene. The closure of Sehitlik Mosque which was built in
Azerbaijan by Diyanet, hauling down of Turkish flags in the country,
assumption of a rigid attitude on the mutual abolition of visas,
and adoption of a strong language toward Turkey were reflections of
the tensions that occurred in that process. Yet, examples of Baku's
attitude seen in Wikileaks documents were quite interesting. Aliyev
did not refrain from using expressions that underestimate Turkey in
the meetings with American authorities.
Azerbaijan's search for exercising power over Turkey While we see
acceleration in Baku-Moscow flirtations after 2008, it became apparent
that Azerbaijan did not choose to completely cut its relations with
Turkey. Inthat period, Baku a fortiori preferred to exercise power
over Ankara. A positive public perception of Turkey in Azerbaijan
was effective in İlham Aliyev's not extravagating in that partly
successful policy. As a consequence, Baku, taking public response
into account, continued to exercise power over Ankara while managing
the perceptions of the public.
On the other hand, Turkey did not take a stance that will raise
tension against such steps, on the contrary; it took concrete steps
to normalize strained relations. Prime Minister Erdogan did not
abstain from sending clear messages in the Azerbaijani parliament
after the signing of protocols. That initiative weakened the hand
of Turkey in relations with Armenia but helped Erdogan regain power
in Baku. In other words, while not being able to take a step back
from the decision taken in the 1990s to close the borders, an era
in which relations with Azerbaijan are defined in terms of policies
toward Armenia has started. As a result of this, Turkey is faced with
a question that asks how to turn the equation in a zero-sum game in
its favor. This equation has not yet been solved.
At this point, we cannot say bilateral relations are at a specific
level they had been in 1990s, but it is a fact that Turkey's current
position maintains its critical importance in Azerbaijan's westward
expansion. In this respect, Turkey is still seen as an important ally
that is not dispensable in Baku. For Turkey, the situation is not
so different. After the June 12 elections, PM Erdogan's first visit
abroad after Cyprus was to Baku, and that illustrates Azerbaijan's
importance in Turkish foreign policy.
Nevertheless, in order to bring current relations to a more robust
structure for the next twenty years, more than diplomatic jests are
needed. Strengthening its economic and strategic position in the
Caucasus is very important for a Turkey that wants to be a regional
power, and for the turning of perception in Azerbaijan in favor
of Turkey. But, Ankara, having to amend the paradigm with Armenia
toward 2015, has to find ways to avoid a crisis in its relations
with Azerbaijan.
Hasan Selim Ozertem, USAK Center for Energy Studies.
This article was translated by Nihal Cizmecioglu.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Hasan Selim Ozertem
Eurasia Review
http://www.eurasiareview.com/18102011-test-of-sincerity-in-turkey-azerbaijan-relations-analysis/
Oct 18 2011
Although Ankara had to give up a lot of dreams beyond the Caspian Sea
due to regional geopolitics and geographical reasons, it succeeded
in developing a complex relationship with Azerbaijan.
Twenty years ago, the Soviet Union was divided into fifteen republics.
The resulting picture necessitated Turkey returning to a geography
in which it was alienated as a result of the controlling policies of
the Soviets. In the reconstruction process of five Turkic states,
four in Central Asia, and Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, Turkey did
not hesitate to take the initiative. If we look back, we can say
that Turkey could not realize its dreams beyond the Caspian Sea due
to regional geopolitics and geographical reasons, but succeeded in
establishing a complex ties with Azerbaijan.
Turkey-Azerbaijan Relations Located west of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan
has experienced various problems in integrating into the international
system after seventy years of Soviet administration. The first of them
was the outbreak of war in Karabakh in 1988, which emerged as the
biggest obstacle to experiencing a normal transition period for the
country. Until the ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, the country
had serious troubles in the areas of security and economics, but after
Heydar Aliyev's coming to power, it entered a rapid recovery process.
In that period, Turkey sided with Azerbaijan and closed its border
with Armenia in 1993, in response to Armenia's occupation of the
territory of Azerbaijan and human rights violations. This step opened
the way for Turkey to share a common fatewith Azerbaijan, but in the
long run paved the way for the narrowing of its maneuvering area.
Baku's Flirting with Moscow The entering into service of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline in 2006 and the delivering of
gas via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum line the next year were important
turning points for Azerbaijan. Because from 2006 to the end of 2008,
when the global financial crisis occurred, Azerbaijan has grown by
over 20 % and thus had a chance to recover from its economic problems
and modernize its military. The completion of these projects creates
an important success story for Turkey, but Ankara, having difficulties
reaching beyond the Caspian Sea, could not take its current relations
beyond the level they were in the 1990s. Even at certain points,
it was seen that the existence of Ankara was relatively weakened by
the gradual growth of Russia in the region. It should be noted that
the Georgia-Russia war which erupted in 2008 played an important role
in that issue.
The Kremlin, taking an aggressive stance in its backyard starting in
the 2000s, sent important messages to both countries of the region
and to the West with this war. Looking at Turkey-Azerbaijan relations,
two important factors gain clarity. The first factor was the need for
Baku to redefine its relations with Russia, which until 2008 Baku had
always tried to keep balanced. The first reflection of that was the
Kremlin's monopolization of the Karabakh problem's solution process
since it wants to be the primary actor in solving the problems in
its backyard. The second reflection was the symbolic but politically
significant natural gas treaties signed between Azerbaijan and Russia.
The second important factor was the normalization process of
Turkey-Armenia relations. In Baku, a pro-Russian clique close to
the administration used the normalization process as a propaganda
tool and that played a catalytic role in the rapprochement between
Azerbaijan and Russia. In that process, which turned into a test of
sincerity, some conflicts between Turkey and Azerbaijan entered the
political scene. The closure of Sehitlik Mosque which was built in
Azerbaijan by Diyanet, hauling down of Turkish flags in the country,
assumption of a rigid attitude on the mutual abolition of visas,
and adoption of a strong language toward Turkey were reflections of
the tensions that occurred in that process. Yet, examples of Baku's
attitude seen in Wikileaks documents were quite interesting. Aliyev
did not refrain from using expressions that underestimate Turkey in
the meetings with American authorities.
Azerbaijan's search for exercising power over Turkey While we see
acceleration in Baku-Moscow flirtations after 2008, it became apparent
that Azerbaijan did not choose to completely cut its relations with
Turkey. Inthat period, Baku a fortiori preferred to exercise power
over Ankara. A positive public perception of Turkey in Azerbaijan
was effective in İlham Aliyev's not extravagating in that partly
successful policy. As a consequence, Baku, taking public response
into account, continued to exercise power over Ankara while managing
the perceptions of the public.
On the other hand, Turkey did not take a stance that will raise
tension against such steps, on the contrary; it took concrete steps
to normalize strained relations. Prime Minister Erdogan did not
abstain from sending clear messages in the Azerbaijani parliament
after the signing of protocols. That initiative weakened the hand
of Turkey in relations with Armenia but helped Erdogan regain power
in Baku. In other words, while not being able to take a step back
from the decision taken in the 1990s to close the borders, an era
in which relations with Azerbaijan are defined in terms of policies
toward Armenia has started. As a result of this, Turkey is faced with
a question that asks how to turn the equation in a zero-sum game in
its favor. This equation has not yet been solved.
At this point, we cannot say bilateral relations are at a specific
level they had been in 1990s, but it is a fact that Turkey's current
position maintains its critical importance in Azerbaijan's westward
expansion. In this respect, Turkey is still seen as an important ally
that is not dispensable in Baku. For Turkey, the situation is not
so different. After the June 12 elections, PM Erdogan's first visit
abroad after Cyprus was to Baku, and that illustrates Azerbaijan's
importance in Turkish foreign policy.
Nevertheless, in order to bring current relations to a more robust
structure for the next twenty years, more than diplomatic jests are
needed. Strengthening its economic and strategic position in the
Caucasus is very important for a Turkey that wants to be a regional
power, and for the turning of perception in Azerbaijan in favor
of Turkey. But, Ankara, having to amend the paradigm with Armenia
toward 2015, has to find ways to avoid a crisis in its relations
with Azerbaijan.
Hasan Selim Ozertem, USAK Center for Energy Studies.
This article was translated by Nihal Cizmecioglu.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress