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THREE PRINCIPLES, SIX GUIDELINES AND "STATUS-QUO" IN THE KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTELEMENT
Mikhail Aghajanyan
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expert
20.10.2011
The process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement is going
through one of the most intensive stages. It is more correct to speak
about the intensification than about stirring up, because stirring
up implies the disposition of all the parties to the conflict
to rapprochement, while intensification is based first of all on
amplification of the external impulses. The stances of the parties,
which are well-known and do not need presentation, has not changed.
The external powers, carrying out mediation attempts, doubled their
efforts and it is mostly prominent in Russia's efforts.
The "dry residue" of the meeting in Kazan is that Armenia once more
demonstrated constructive stand and was ready to sign the document
which was often called a "road map" of the settlement. But it is not
happening for one simple reason: Azerbaijan is fully occupied by the
imitation of readiness to set this "road map", one of the provisions
of which clearly states "the definition of the future legal status
of Nagorno-Karabakh through the will expression of its population
which will have legally biding force".
Besides intensification of the process of settlement, its
confidentiality, which distances this topical process from public, is
emphasized. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the closed nature
of the process and paucity of information about the actual settlement
of the conflict, some theses which spread light on some aspects of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement can be brought forward.
Status, security and territories The international status of
Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state will be founded on the
legally biding force of the will expression of the population
of Nagorno-Karabakh and will be the best guarantee of its
security. Nagorno-Karabakh has already de-facto been formed within its
factual borders, the international recognition and documentary setting
of which are possible after the resolution of the issue of the borders
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Those are the issues, for the
resolution of which, Azerbaijan is not ready, because the resolution
of the later is not possible without involvement of the representatives
of Nagorno-Karabakh, meanwhile Baku opposes to the their involvement.
Azerbaijan is simulating vigorous activity, which comes down to
unacceptability of the current status-quo in the conflict zone, but
in reality it does everything for the current status-quo to remain
unchanged. Nagorno-Karabakh on practice has everything what has been
mentioned above - secure borders, territory of historical Artsakh,
which are under the jurisdiction of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
They only need international recognition of the current de-facto
status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. In this aspect
the stance of the Armenian parties concerning one of the guidelines of
the settlement is in granting Nagorno-Karabakh intermediate status and
it seems rather well-considered and fully founded on today's realities.
The intermediate status for Karabakh "means status-quo plus", i.e. all
we have today, plus international recognition of that status" (thesis
from the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia E.
Nalbandyan at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London on July 13, 2011).
Azerbaijan is simulating the process of settlement due to very simple
reason. In Baku they realize that getting back to the 1988 status and
borders is not possible. The only chance for them is new aggression
against Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani thesis that Nagorno-Karabakh
has never been an independent state is nostalgia for 1988 with a claim
for the second attempt of military revanche for the final resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue according to the scenario tested in 1990.
By the way, this thesis of the Azerbaijani leadership indirectly shows
that Baku is ready to consider the issue of reunion of Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh which found solution in the joint resolution of the
Supreme Soviet of the Arm. SSR and National Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh
of December 1, 1989. In Baku they believe that this will qualitatively
facilitate resolution of such issues as status, security and
territories from the position advantageous for Azerbaijan and it will
present the conflict in quite different light, i.e. in the light of
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan with bringing Nagorno-Karabakh
down to the level of object and not a subject of agreements.
The nostalgia syndrome of 1989 can be seen in the stance of the
Azerbaijani leadership on all the levels. Unlike two other parties
to the conflict and assessment of external actors, Azerbaijan has
got nowhere for the recent 20 years in their desire of "instituting
direct vertical sovereign control over that territory and people living
there. Azerbaijan took a step to the middle of the bridge saying it
was ready to show some flexibility, meaning various models of autonomy
for the population in Karabakh region within Azerbaijan Republic, i.e.
to flexibility within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. We
are ready for that and we took a step to the middle of the bridge"
(from interview of Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
personal envoy of the president of Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh
settlement to "Ekho Moskvi" radio station, 19 July, 20111). The things
called in Baku "flexibility" and "readiness for the compromise"
more remind dictating terms with the elements of despotic caprice
("setting control over people living there") and allegoric clownery
("taking step to the middle of the bridge").
Repeated referendum Agreement to holding repeated referendum for
setting the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is the biggest concession
of the Armenian party on this stage of the process of settlement.
The political and legal retrospective review of the issue of referendum
in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates the sequence of operations of the
Armenian parties and it is connected with defining the will of the
people of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the aspect of political and legal
actions, the actions of Azerbaijan which "won its independence by
deaths of shahids" by means of physical annihilation of the Armenians
in January 1990 and in 1991 it took part in the all-USSR referendum
on preserving the USSR (March 17, 1991) and overwhelming majority
(93.3%) voted for preserving the USSR (87.3% voted for the USSR in
Nakhijevan ASSR). The population of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh did
not take part in that referendum. By the way it is interesting to
mention that according to Russian researchers Transdniestria, which
formally did not separate from Chisinau, as well as Abkhazia and South
Ossetia participated in the referendum and made it demonstrative"2.
Three principles and six guidelines The Armenian parties, most
probably in concord with each other, took an absolutely right stance
on what should be considered principles and guidelines (elements)
of settlement. Only three well-known principles of international law
can be considered as principles in regard to the Karabakh settlement
- non-use of force and threat of force, the right of people to
self-determination, territorial integrity of the states.
The items of the well-known statements by the presidents of the US,
Russia and France (of July 10, 2009 and July 26, 2010) which were
mentioned in Deauville statement on May 26, 2011 are the guidelines
of the settlement (by the way in the last statement those guidelines
are called "elements"). Such an interpretation allows annihilating
Azerbaijani insinuations that if Nagorno-Karabakh is not taking part in
the elaboration and adoption of the "basic principles" of settlement,
it is not a party to the conflict, party at the negotiations and
generally this is Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. In reality, Nagorno-Karabakh is considering only
three aforementioned principles of international law as principles
of settlement. As for the rest, including the guidelines of the
settlement, the signing of which even in this form, by the way,
Azerbaijan avoided in Kazan, Nagorno-Karabakh has its own vision.
The document, which includes "basic principles" of settlement, which
are the subject of negotiation between two of three parties to the
conflict, is characterized as political and it does not have any legal
liabilities for the Armenia and Azerbaijan, which may approve it in
perspective. According to the distinct definition of the Minister
of the Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergei Lavrov "The parties are
working on the assumption that after the basic principles, anyway,
legal document, i.e. peace agreement, should be prepared. Of course
this will demand more attention to details. Nevertheless, the basic
principles as a political document would have a great importance,
as they would demonstrate in political aspect determination for
obtaining the settlement"3.
However, this does not reduce the value of the checked stance of the
Armenian parties which put clear accents in terminology concerning
three principles and six guidelines sounded in the statements
of the presidents of the US, Russia and France. Besides, focusing
attention rather on political than on legally abiding essence of the
"basic principles" is appropriate, particularly, in the light of
the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia in which
reads: "the project of the basic principles is a political and not
legal document which begins with words: "presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan decided to begin work over the Peace Agreement". Then
only the guidelines which we being reconciled now and which will be
included in the peace agreement follow"4.
Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan may decide to begin the work over
the peace agreement but that work makes no sense without participation
of the official representative of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Restoring full-format negotiations It is implied that after the
adoption of the "basic principles" of the settlement on the initial
stage work over the peace agreement on Karabakh conflict settlement,
the chosen representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh will be involved in
the negotiations. Azerbaijan torpedoes this too, making statements
that in this case it is necessary to involve the representatives of
the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh.
It is said a lot about the necessity of a speedy restoration of the
full-format talks with the participation the NKR. It is also said a
lot that there are no examples in modern history of the settlement
of similar conflicts when one of the parties does not take part in
the talks on equal terms. Here we will bring an example from the
Israeli-Palestine conflict which is similar to Karabakh conflict in
its complexity. It is known that the current stage of this inveterate
conflict is in stagnation but it might have had simply inevitable
consequences if Israeli party refused conducting negotiations with
the official representatives of Palestine pleading the fact that
there is no such state and Israel would conduct negotiations only with
internationally recognized Arab country. There is no such thing. Quite
the opposite, there have been statements and actions by Israel
underlining direct talks with the representatives of Palestine. E.g.
words of incumbent prime-minister B. Netanyahu that only his "direct
and proceeding contacts" with the head of the Palestine national
administration M. Abbas might bring to the breakthrough on main
disputable issues5.
External efforts Mediatory component is gradually becoming an
irreplaceable element in the whole process of settlement. The activity
of co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, special mediatory mission of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia has become an integral part
of the process of settlement. According to definition the US, Russia
and France give to the efforts of the Minsk Group - we have one goal
but different interests. Their common goal is not allow sliding down
of the conflict to the stage of military revanche by Azerbaijan. The
difference in interests is of deeper and wider nature, which touches
on an entire layer in approaches of great powers to the issues of
the South Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian regions. The parties can
always come to terms on one goal and they did it concerning preserving
stability in the zone of Karabakh conflict. As for their interests
they will never come to terms because this is the reality of balance of
the internal powers in the region and the layout of the powers outside.
But close cooperation within the mediatory mechanism of the Minsk
group gives all three external actors additional opportunities when
both their goals and interests differ on other regional issues. So,
it can be supposed that for the US, Russia and France the mechanism
of co-chairmanship within the framework of the Minsk Group has turned
into a convenient diplomatic ground allowing to control situation in
one of the most problematic issues in the South Caucasus as well as
to create preconditions for finding convergence points on problematic
issues in other regions.
1 Full text of the interview:
http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/794348-echo/.
2 oерCей ШелEн, oказка о сохраненном oоюзе, "cазета.Ру",
http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2011/03/16_a_3556021.shtml, 16.03.2011.
3 oтеноCрамма Eнтервью мEнEстра Eностранных дел РоссEE o. Лаврова
азербайдOанскEм oМe, Москва, 27 авCуста 2010 Cода, aепартамент
EнформацEE E печатE Мea РоссEE (http://www.mid.ru/).
4 Statement and answers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
S.Lavrov to the mass media during the joint press-conference following
the results of the negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Azerbaijan E. Mamadyarov, Moscow, July 18, 2011. Information
and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
(http://www.mid.ru/).
5 Netanyahu wants nonstop talks with Palestinians,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/2/netanyahu-wants-nonstop-talks-palestinians/,
02.01.2011.
"Globus Energy and Regional Security", Issue 5, 2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
*POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
SETTLEMENT ROADMAP AT CURRENT STAGE[18.02.2011] *RUSSIA-TUKREY
RELATIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT OF THE US AND UN[21.12.2010] *RUSSIA AND
SOME ASPECTS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE BLACK SEA
REGION [08.07.2010] *"BLACK SEA SYNERGY" INITIATIVE AND THE SOUTHERN
CAUCASUS[25.01.2010] *FROM APPLIED TO CONCEPTUAL: POSSIBLE APPROACH
TO THE FORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMATIONAL SECURITY OF ARMENIA
[21.05.2009]
(c) "Noravank" Foundation
Mikhail Aghajanyan
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict expert
20.10.2011
The process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement is going
through one of the most intensive stages. It is more correct to speak
about the intensification than about stirring up, because stirring
up implies the disposition of all the parties to the conflict
to rapprochement, while intensification is based first of all on
amplification of the external impulses. The stances of the parties,
which are well-known and do not need presentation, has not changed.
The external powers, carrying out mediation attempts, doubled their
efforts and it is mostly prominent in Russia's efforts.
The "dry residue" of the meeting in Kazan is that Armenia once more
demonstrated constructive stand and was ready to sign the document
which was often called a "road map" of the settlement. But it is not
happening for one simple reason: Azerbaijan is fully occupied by the
imitation of readiness to set this "road map", one of the provisions
of which clearly states "the definition of the future legal status
of Nagorno-Karabakh through the will expression of its population
which will have legally biding force".
Besides intensification of the process of settlement, its
confidentiality, which distances this topical process from public, is
emphasized. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the closed nature
of the process and paucity of information about the actual settlement
of the conflict, some theses which spread light on some aspects of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement can be brought forward.
Status, security and territories The international status of
Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state will be founded on the
legally biding force of the will expression of the population
of Nagorno-Karabakh and will be the best guarantee of its
security. Nagorno-Karabakh has already de-facto been formed within its
factual borders, the international recognition and documentary setting
of which are possible after the resolution of the issue of the borders
between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Those are the issues, for the
resolution of which, Azerbaijan is not ready, because the resolution
of the later is not possible without involvement of the representatives
of Nagorno-Karabakh, meanwhile Baku opposes to the their involvement.
Azerbaijan is simulating vigorous activity, which comes down to
unacceptability of the current status-quo in the conflict zone, but
in reality it does everything for the current status-quo to remain
unchanged. Nagorno-Karabakh on practice has everything what has been
mentioned above - secure borders, territory of historical Artsakh,
which are under the jurisdiction of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.
They only need international recognition of the current de-facto
status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state. In this aspect
the stance of the Armenian parties concerning one of the guidelines of
the settlement is in granting Nagorno-Karabakh intermediate status and
it seems rather well-considered and fully founded on today's realities.
The intermediate status for Karabakh "means status-quo plus", i.e. all
we have today, plus international recognition of that status" (thesis
from the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia E.
Nalbandyan at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in
London on July 13, 2011).
Azerbaijan is simulating the process of settlement due to very simple
reason. In Baku they realize that getting back to the 1988 status and
borders is not possible. The only chance for them is new aggression
against Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijani thesis that Nagorno-Karabakh
has never been an independent state is nostalgia for 1988 with a claim
for the second attempt of military revanche for the final resolution
of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue according to the scenario tested in 1990.
By the way, this thesis of the Azerbaijani leadership indirectly shows
that Baku is ready to consider the issue of reunion of Armenia and
Nagorno-Karabakh which found solution in the joint resolution of the
Supreme Soviet of the Arm. SSR and National Soviet of Nagorno-Karabakh
of December 1, 1989. In Baku they believe that this will qualitatively
facilitate resolution of such issues as status, security and
territories from the position advantageous for Azerbaijan and it will
present the conflict in quite different light, i.e. in the light of
conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan with bringing Nagorno-Karabakh
down to the level of object and not a subject of agreements.
The nostalgia syndrome of 1989 can be seen in the stance of the
Azerbaijani leadership on all the levels. Unlike two other parties
to the conflict and assessment of external actors, Azerbaijan has
got nowhere for the recent 20 years in their desire of "instituting
direct vertical sovereign control over that territory and people living
there. Azerbaijan took a step to the middle of the bridge saying it
was ready to show some flexibility, meaning various models of autonomy
for the population in Karabakh region within Azerbaijan Republic, i.e.
to flexibility within the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. We
are ready for that and we took a step to the middle of the bridge"
(from interview of Araz Azimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
personal envoy of the president of Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh
settlement to "Ekho Moskvi" radio station, 19 July, 20111). The things
called in Baku "flexibility" and "readiness for the compromise"
more remind dictating terms with the elements of despotic caprice
("setting control over people living there") and allegoric clownery
("taking step to the middle of the bridge").
Repeated referendum Agreement to holding repeated referendum for
setting the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh is the biggest concession
of the Armenian party on this stage of the process of settlement.
The political and legal retrospective review of the issue of referendum
in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrates the sequence of operations of the
Armenian parties and it is connected with defining the will of the
people of Nagorno-Karabakh. In the aspect of political and legal
actions, the actions of Azerbaijan which "won its independence by
deaths of shahids" by means of physical annihilation of the Armenians
in January 1990 and in 1991 it took part in the all-USSR referendum
on preserving the USSR (March 17, 1991) and overwhelming majority
(93.3%) voted for preserving the USSR (87.3% voted for the USSR in
Nakhijevan ASSR). The population of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh did
not take part in that referendum. By the way it is interesting to
mention that according to Russian researchers Transdniestria, which
formally did not separate from Chisinau, as well as Abkhazia and South
Ossetia participated in the referendum and made it demonstrative"2.
Three principles and six guidelines The Armenian parties, most
probably in concord with each other, took an absolutely right stance
on what should be considered principles and guidelines (elements)
of settlement. Only three well-known principles of international law
can be considered as principles in regard to the Karabakh settlement
- non-use of force and threat of force, the right of people to
self-determination, territorial integrity of the states.
The items of the well-known statements by the presidents of the US,
Russia and France (of July 10, 2009 and July 26, 2010) which were
mentioned in Deauville statement on May 26, 2011 are the guidelines
of the settlement (by the way in the last statement those guidelines
are called "elements"). Such an interpretation allows annihilating
Azerbaijani insinuations that if Nagorno-Karabakh is not taking part in
the elaboration and adoption of the "basic principles" of settlement,
it is not a party to the conflict, party at the negotiations and
generally this is Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict between Armenia
and Azerbaijan. In reality, Nagorno-Karabakh is considering only
three aforementioned principles of international law as principles
of settlement. As for the rest, including the guidelines of the
settlement, the signing of which even in this form, by the way,
Azerbaijan avoided in Kazan, Nagorno-Karabakh has its own vision.
The document, which includes "basic principles" of settlement, which
are the subject of negotiation between two of three parties to the
conflict, is characterized as political and it does not have any legal
liabilities for the Armenia and Azerbaijan, which may approve it in
perspective. According to the distinct definition of the Minister
of the Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergei Lavrov "The parties are
working on the assumption that after the basic principles, anyway,
legal document, i.e. peace agreement, should be prepared. Of course
this will demand more attention to details. Nevertheless, the basic
principles as a political document would have a great importance,
as they would demonstrate in political aspect determination for
obtaining the settlement"3.
However, this does not reduce the value of the checked stance of the
Armenian parties which put clear accents in terminology concerning
three principles and six guidelines sounded in the statements
of the presidents of the US, Russia and France. Besides, focusing
attention rather on political than on legally abiding essence of the
"basic principles" is appropriate, particularly, in the light of
the statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia in which
reads: "the project of the basic principles is a political and not
legal document which begins with words: "presidents of Armenia and
Azerbaijan decided to begin work over the Peace Agreement". Then
only the guidelines which we being reconciled now and which will be
included in the peace agreement follow"4.
Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan may decide to begin the work over
the peace agreement but that work makes no sense without participation
of the official representative of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Restoring full-format negotiations It is implied that after the
adoption of the "basic principles" of the settlement on the initial
stage work over the peace agreement on Karabakh conflict settlement,
the chosen representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh will be involved in
the negotiations. Azerbaijan torpedoes this too, making statements
that in this case it is necessary to involve the representatives of
the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh.
It is said a lot about the necessity of a speedy restoration of the
full-format talks with the participation the NKR. It is also said a
lot that there are no examples in modern history of the settlement
of similar conflicts when one of the parties does not take part in
the talks on equal terms. Here we will bring an example from the
Israeli-Palestine conflict which is similar to Karabakh conflict in
its complexity. It is known that the current stage of this inveterate
conflict is in stagnation but it might have had simply inevitable
consequences if Israeli party refused conducting negotiations with
the official representatives of Palestine pleading the fact that
there is no such state and Israel would conduct negotiations only with
internationally recognized Arab country. There is no such thing. Quite
the opposite, there have been statements and actions by Israel
underlining direct talks with the representatives of Palestine. E.g.
words of incumbent prime-minister B. Netanyahu that only his "direct
and proceeding contacts" with the head of the Palestine national
administration M. Abbas might bring to the breakthrough on main
disputable issues5.
External efforts Mediatory component is gradually becoming an
irreplaceable element in the whole process of settlement. The activity
of co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group, special mediatory mission of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia has become an integral part
of the process of settlement. According to definition the US, Russia
and France give to the efforts of the Minsk Group - we have one goal
but different interests. Their common goal is not allow sliding down
of the conflict to the stage of military revanche by Azerbaijan. The
difference in interests is of deeper and wider nature, which touches
on an entire layer in approaches of great powers to the issues of
the South Caucasus, Black Sea and Caspian regions. The parties can
always come to terms on one goal and they did it concerning preserving
stability in the zone of Karabakh conflict. As for their interests
they will never come to terms because this is the reality of balance of
the internal powers in the region and the layout of the powers outside.
But close cooperation within the mediatory mechanism of the Minsk
group gives all three external actors additional opportunities when
both their goals and interests differ on other regional issues. So,
it can be supposed that for the US, Russia and France the mechanism
of co-chairmanship within the framework of the Minsk Group has turned
into a convenient diplomatic ground allowing to control situation in
one of the most problematic issues in the South Caucasus as well as
to create preconditions for finding convergence points on problematic
issues in other regions.
1 Full text of the interview:
http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/794348-echo/.
2 oерCей ШелEн, oказка о сохраненном oоюзе, "cазета.Ру",
http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2011/03/16_a_3556021.shtml, 16.03.2011.
3 oтеноCрамма Eнтервью мEнEстра Eностранных дел РоссEE o. Лаврова
азербайдOанскEм oМe, Москва, 27 авCуста 2010 Cода, aепартамент
EнформацEE E печатE Мea РоссEE (http://www.mid.ru/).
4 Statement and answers of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia
S.Lavrov to the mass media during the joint press-conference following
the results of the negotiations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Azerbaijan E. Mamadyarov, Moscow, July 18, 2011. Information
and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia
(http://www.mid.ru/).
5 Netanyahu wants nonstop talks with Palestinians,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jan/2/netanyahu-wants-nonstop-talks-palestinians/,
02.01.2011.
"Globus Energy and Regional Security", Issue 5, 2011
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
*POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT
SETTLEMENT ROADMAP AT CURRENT STAGE[18.02.2011] *RUSSIA-TUKREY
RELATIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT OF THE US AND UN[21.12.2010] *RUSSIA AND
SOME ASPECTS OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE BLACK SEA
REGION [08.07.2010] *"BLACK SEA SYNERGY" INITIATIVE AND THE SOUTHERN
CAUCASUS[25.01.2010] *FROM APPLIED TO CONCEPTUAL: POSSIBLE APPROACH
TO THE FORMATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF INFORMATIONAL SECURITY OF ARMENIA
[21.05.2009]
(c) "Noravank" Foundation