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Hard Turkey
Shlomo Avineri
2011-10-21
JERUSALEM ` The recent surge in Turkey's military actions against the
Kurds in northern Iraq is an indication that, somewhat surprisingly `
but not entirely unpredictably ` Turkish foreign policy has undergone
a 180-degree turn in less than two years. The Turkish offensive is
also an indication that these changes go beyond the current tensions
between Turkey and Israel, which are just one facet of much deeper
trends.
Just a couple of years ago, after the European Union slammed the door
in Turkey's face (despite some significant military and penal reforms
by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government), Turkey
re-oriented its policy away from Europe towards its immediate region.
Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu's `zero conflicts with neighbors'
approach gave this re-orientation its strategic and theoretical
foundation.
Opening an impressive new page, Turkey reached out to Armenia;
softened its position on Cyprus; tried to draw Iran into a positive
dialogue with the West; convinced Syria to settle the two countries'
simmering border dispute; and, as a crowning achievement, launched
peace talks between Syria and Israel under Turkish mediation.
Yet these good-neighborhood policies did not work out as intended.
Rapprochement with Armenia stalled; no significant progress was made
on Cyprus, especially after a less-accommodating leader was elected in
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (an entity that only Turkey
recognizes); the opening to Iran did not soften the mullahs' position
on nuclear development (and strained relations with the United
States); the Syria-Israel talks failed; and Turkey's participation in
the 2010 flotilla to Gaza, and Israel's brutal response to it,
signaled an end to decades of close Israeli-Turkish cooperation.
To top it all off, Syria's President Bashar al-Assad, ostensibly
Turkey's closest new ally, emerged as the most oppressive and bloody
regional tyrant. Assad has now spent the better part of 2011 killing
his own people as they demonstrate for liberalization and reform.
Notwithstanding these failures, Turkey's strategic stature did not
suffer, partly because the diminution of US engagement under President
Barack Obama enabled Turkey to fill the ensuing regional power vacuum.
The Arab Spring, despite its still-inconclusive outcome, greatly
weakened Egypt's role in regional politics and made it possible for
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an to position Turkey ` and himself `
as the leader of a Muslim bloc and a model of co-existence between
Islam and democracy. Last but not least, the AKP's victory in recent
parliamentary elections has encouraged ErdoÄ?an to embrace Putinesque
ambitions.
All of this exposed the built-in ambivalence in DavutoÄ?lu's `zero
conflict' policy. While initially viewed as pacific and moderate, it
was underpinned by an overarching view of Turkey as the hegemonic
regional power ` as an arbiter of conflicts, but ultimately also as an
enforcer of its own views on lesser players. It may be incorrect to
call Turkey's behavior `neo-Ottoman,' but some neighboring countries,
after expecting a mediator and facilitator, may now feel faced by a
possible bully.
ErdoÄ?an's policy re-orientation vis-Ã-vis Israel can be understood as
an attempt not only to overcome traditional Arab suspicion of Turkey,
given its imperial past, but also to present a more moderate Islamic
alternative to theocratic Iran and its unpredictable president. But
ErdoÄ?an's threat to consider using the Turkish navy as a military
escort for further flotillas to Gaza already borders on saber
rattling, as does his declared willingness to use force to prevent the
Republic of Cyprus from exploring for gas in its continental shelf.
Indeed, ErdoÄ?an's has warned of a diplomatic rupture with the EU if
Cyprus accedes to the Union's rotating presidency in 2012.
At the same time, renewed violent incursions into northern Iraq in
pursuit of alleged guerillas suggest a reversion to hardline
anti-Kurdish policies. The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq only
seems to have encouraged Turkey's will to create a cordon sanitaire on
the Iraqi side of the border ` and possibly to establish a
counterweight to Iran's influence on a Shia-led government in Baghdad.
And, while Turkey's agreement to host NATO anti-missile radar
facilities, and its recent seizure of a Syrian-registered arms ship,
may please the West, here, too, its policies are focused on `hard'
military power.
Similarly, ErdoÄ?an's recent visit to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia brings
out the ambivalence of Turkey's new claim to regional hegemony. While
Egypt's shaky military junta welcomed ErdoÄ?an, many Egyptians were not
happy about his hectoring them ` and other Arabs ` to follow Turkish
policies and to regard Turkey as their Muslim leader. A new sultanate?
ErdoÄ?an as the new Saladin?
Turkey has an enormously important role to play in the region. It
could be a bridge between the West and the East, between Islam and
modernity, and between Israel and the Arabs. But it runs the danger of
succumbing to the arrogance of power, which has corrupted and
sidelined many strong states in the past.
Shlomo Avineri, a professor of political science at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, is a former director-general of Israel's
Foreign Ministry.
www.project-syndicate.org
Shlomo Avineri
2011-10-21
JERUSALEM ` The recent surge in Turkey's military actions against the
Kurds in northern Iraq is an indication that, somewhat surprisingly `
but not entirely unpredictably ` Turkish foreign policy has undergone
a 180-degree turn in less than two years. The Turkish offensive is
also an indication that these changes go beyond the current tensions
between Turkey and Israel, which are just one facet of much deeper
trends.
Just a couple of years ago, after the European Union slammed the door
in Turkey's face (despite some significant military and penal reforms
by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government), Turkey
re-oriented its policy away from Europe towards its immediate region.
Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu's `zero conflicts with neighbors'
approach gave this re-orientation its strategic and theoretical
foundation.
Opening an impressive new page, Turkey reached out to Armenia;
softened its position on Cyprus; tried to draw Iran into a positive
dialogue with the West; convinced Syria to settle the two countries'
simmering border dispute; and, as a crowning achievement, launched
peace talks between Syria and Israel under Turkish mediation.
Yet these good-neighborhood policies did not work out as intended.
Rapprochement with Armenia stalled; no significant progress was made
on Cyprus, especially after a less-accommodating leader was elected in
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (an entity that only Turkey
recognizes); the opening to Iran did not soften the mullahs' position
on nuclear development (and strained relations with the United
States); the Syria-Israel talks failed; and Turkey's participation in
the 2010 flotilla to Gaza, and Israel's brutal response to it,
signaled an end to decades of close Israeli-Turkish cooperation.
To top it all off, Syria's President Bashar al-Assad, ostensibly
Turkey's closest new ally, emerged as the most oppressive and bloody
regional tyrant. Assad has now spent the better part of 2011 killing
his own people as they demonstrate for liberalization and reform.
Notwithstanding these failures, Turkey's strategic stature did not
suffer, partly because the diminution of US engagement under President
Barack Obama enabled Turkey to fill the ensuing regional power vacuum.
The Arab Spring, despite its still-inconclusive outcome, greatly
weakened Egypt's role in regional politics and made it possible for
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an to position Turkey ` and himself `
as the leader of a Muslim bloc and a model of co-existence between
Islam and democracy. Last but not least, the AKP's victory in recent
parliamentary elections has encouraged ErdoÄ?an to embrace Putinesque
ambitions.
All of this exposed the built-in ambivalence in DavutoÄ?lu's `zero
conflict' policy. While initially viewed as pacific and moderate, it
was underpinned by an overarching view of Turkey as the hegemonic
regional power ` as an arbiter of conflicts, but ultimately also as an
enforcer of its own views on lesser players. It may be incorrect to
call Turkey's behavior `neo-Ottoman,' but some neighboring countries,
after expecting a mediator and facilitator, may now feel faced by a
possible bully.
ErdoÄ?an's policy re-orientation vis-Ã-vis Israel can be understood as
an attempt not only to overcome traditional Arab suspicion of Turkey,
given its imperial past, but also to present a more moderate Islamic
alternative to theocratic Iran and its unpredictable president. But
ErdoÄ?an's threat to consider using the Turkish navy as a military
escort for further flotillas to Gaza already borders on saber
rattling, as does his declared willingness to use force to prevent the
Republic of Cyprus from exploring for gas in its continental shelf.
Indeed, ErdoÄ?an's has warned of a diplomatic rupture with the EU if
Cyprus accedes to the Union's rotating presidency in 2012.
At the same time, renewed violent incursions into northern Iraq in
pursuit of alleged guerillas suggest a reversion to hardline
anti-Kurdish policies. The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq only
seems to have encouraged Turkey's will to create a cordon sanitaire on
the Iraqi side of the border ` and possibly to establish a
counterweight to Iran's influence on a Shia-led government in Baghdad.
And, while Turkey's agreement to host NATO anti-missile radar
facilities, and its recent seizure of a Syrian-registered arms ship,
may please the West, here, too, its policies are focused on `hard'
military power.
Similarly, ErdoÄ?an's recent visit to Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia brings
out the ambivalence of Turkey's new claim to regional hegemony. While
Egypt's shaky military junta welcomed ErdoÄ?an, many Egyptians were not
happy about his hectoring them ` and other Arabs ` to follow Turkish
policies and to regard Turkey as their Muslim leader. A new sultanate?
ErdoÄ?an as the new Saladin?
Turkey has an enormously important role to play in the region. It
could be a bridge between the West and the East, between Islam and
modernity, and between Israel and the Arabs. But it runs the danger of
succumbing to the arrogance of power, which has corrupted and
sidelined many strong states in the past.
Shlomo Avineri, a professor of political science at the Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, is a former director-general of Israel's
Foreign Ministry.
www.project-syndicate.org