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CROSS-BORDER ROADS ARE PERILOUS
by Kadri Gursel
Milliyet, Turkey
Oct 24 2011
Last Friday [21 October] when the General Staff refuted news in the
Turkish media that an extensive cross-border operation was being
carried out on Iraqi soil, by a quirk of fate US President Obama
announced that US forces in Iraq would have withdrawn completely by
the end of 2011.
Even though it may be a coincidence that both these situations were
announced on the same day, there is a connection that is not at all
coincidental between the Turkish army being lured, or not, by the
PKK into Iraq and the United States pulling out of Iraq.
Given the agreement that went into effect in the last days of 2008,
it was already known that the American units in Iraq were going to be
pulled out completely by the end of this year. In the end, the entire
complement of US servicemen in Iraq on 1 Jan 2012 will consist of a
few hundred US Marines guarding the US Embassy in Baghdad.
The upshot is that with this withdrawal of forces the American tutelage
and influence in Iraq will be considerably less than it has been come
1 Jan 2012.
Disingenuous Overtures
The "Kurdish Overture" that was cooked up in 2008 and served in 2009
was aimed at preserving stability in Iraq in this respect.
Back then a stabilizing role for Turkey had been envisaged in order
to prevent the Arabs and the Kurds fighting one another after the
US forces had pulled out; a fight that would result in the complete
fragmentation of the country. In order to play this role Turkey
needed to normalize its relations with the Iraqi Kurds. In order for
this to happen, the Kurd problem in Turkey needed to be put on track
for a solution so that the Turkish army would not have to enter Iraq
all the time when provoked by the PKK. The Kurdish administration's
authority was not to be threatened, which would upset the stability
in the region.
And so the "Kurdish overture" was a window of opportunity for Turkey
opened from the outside.
The AKP [Justice and Development Party] administration in 2009 found
quite unexpectedly before it the "Kurdish Overture" in the conditions
of the power struggle that had brought it up against the military,
and it made use of this. Naturally, they made it through the 2009-2010
period by making seemingly possible overtures such as the "Armenian
Overture." The outside political and moral support it received in
exchange for this helped bring the military tutelage to its knees. The
AKP administration strangled the former central media behind the
so-called overture screen. The screams made during this surgery were
muffled by this "sound proofing" and not heard clearly in the West.
As the AKP government used these overtures in order to fix its own
problems, the overtures have actually made the real problems -the
Kurd and Armenian problems -even more convoluted today.
This is the reality that underpins the plan behind the situation
compelling the Turkish army to enter Iraq a little or a lot for the
umpteenth time.
Even If You Say, "Ah, the 1990s..."
Still, the conditions are not very conducive for the military option,
when compared to the 1990s. Back then the Iraqi Kurds owed Turkey
for their existence despite Saddam's forces because Turkey was host
to Hammer Force/Northern Watch, and the Turkish army was able to go
into Iraq in pursuit of the PKK whenever it wanted to. Parliament's
rejection of the Authorization Bill of 1 March 2003 effectively
removed Turkey from the Iraq equation. Since that time Turkey has
not been able to mount strategic cross-border operations. All the
same, Turkey is able to enter northern Iraq for long periods of time,
but it can only do this at the risk of paying an unpredictably high
diplomatic, political and moral price.
In the meantime, if a Kurdish-Arab conflict breaks out in 2012 or later
and if Turkey takes the Iraqi Kurds under its wing then conditions
similar to the 1990s may well emerge again.
Back in the 1990s Turkey used Israel to balance out Syria and Iran,
which were supporting the PKK at various levels. But now none of them
can balance each other out because Turkey is in deep conflict with
all three. And all three of them are open to using the PKK. This is
why our prime minister, just like his predecessors, is giving speeches
implying that the PKK is acting as a catspaw for hostile neighbours.
Back in the 1990s Turkey was a "hard power" country that barely
recognized human rights. If Turkey today returns to the 1990s in
terms of ignoring human rights and liberties in its fight against
the PKK it stands to lose a great deal on the world stage.
The solution lies not across the border but behind it. Let us look
for that solution not in the 1990s but in the present.
[translated from Turkish]
by Kadri Gursel
Milliyet, Turkey
Oct 24 2011
Last Friday [21 October] when the General Staff refuted news in the
Turkish media that an extensive cross-border operation was being
carried out on Iraqi soil, by a quirk of fate US President Obama
announced that US forces in Iraq would have withdrawn completely by
the end of 2011.
Even though it may be a coincidence that both these situations were
announced on the same day, there is a connection that is not at all
coincidental between the Turkish army being lured, or not, by the
PKK into Iraq and the United States pulling out of Iraq.
Given the agreement that went into effect in the last days of 2008,
it was already known that the American units in Iraq were going to be
pulled out completely by the end of this year. In the end, the entire
complement of US servicemen in Iraq on 1 Jan 2012 will consist of a
few hundred US Marines guarding the US Embassy in Baghdad.
The upshot is that with this withdrawal of forces the American tutelage
and influence in Iraq will be considerably less than it has been come
1 Jan 2012.
Disingenuous Overtures
The "Kurdish Overture" that was cooked up in 2008 and served in 2009
was aimed at preserving stability in Iraq in this respect.
Back then a stabilizing role for Turkey had been envisaged in order
to prevent the Arabs and the Kurds fighting one another after the
US forces had pulled out; a fight that would result in the complete
fragmentation of the country. In order to play this role Turkey
needed to normalize its relations with the Iraqi Kurds. In order for
this to happen, the Kurd problem in Turkey needed to be put on track
for a solution so that the Turkish army would not have to enter Iraq
all the time when provoked by the PKK. The Kurdish administration's
authority was not to be threatened, which would upset the stability
in the region.
And so the "Kurdish overture" was a window of opportunity for Turkey
opened from the outside.
The AKP [Justice and Development Party] administration in 2009 found
quite unexpectedly before it the "Kurdish Overture" in the conditions
of the power struggle that had brought it up against the military,
and it made use of this. Naturally, they made it through the 2009-2010
period by making seemingly possible overtures such as the "Armenian
Overture." The outside political and moral support it received in
exchange for this helped bring the military tutelage to its knees. The
AKP administration strangled the former central media behind the
so-called overture screen. The screams made during this surgery were
muffled by this "sound proofing" and not heard clearly in the West.
As the AKP government used these overtures in order to fix its own
problems, the overtures have actually made the real problems -the
Kurd and Armenian problems -even more convoluted today.
This is the reality that underpins the plan behind the situation
compelling the Turkish army to enter Iraq a little or a lot for the
umpteenth time.
Even If You Say, "Ah, the 1990s..."
Still, the conditions are not very conducive for the military option,
when compared to the 1990s. Back then the Iraqi Kurds owed Turkey
for their existence despite Saddam's forces because Turkey was host
to Hammer Force/Northern Watch, and the Turkish army was able to go
into Iraq in pursuit of the PKK whenever it wanted to. Parliament's
rejection of the Authorization Bill of 1 March 2003 effectively
removed Turkey from the Iraq equation. Since that time Turkey has
not been able to mount strategic cross-border operations. All the
same, Turkey is able to enter northern Iraq for long periods of time,
but it can only do this at the risk of paying an unpredictably high
diplomatic, political and moral price.
In the meantime, if a Kurdish-Arab conflict breaks out in 2012 or later
and if Turkey takes the Iraqi Kurds under its wing then conditions
similar to the 1990s may well emerge again.
Back in the 1990s Turkey used Israel to balance out Syria and Iran,
which were supporting the PKK at various levels. But now none of them
can balance each other out because Turkey is in deep conflict with
all three. And all three of them are open to using the PKK. This is
why our prime minister, just like his predecessors, is giving speeches
implying that the PKK is acting as a catspaw for hostile neighbours.
Back in the 1990s Turkey was a "hard power" country that barely
recognized human rights. If Turkey today returns to the 1990s in
terms of ignoring human rights and liberties in its fight against
the PKK it stands to lose a great deal on the world stage.
The solution lies not across the border but behind it. Let us look
for that solution not in the 1990s but in the present.
[translated from Turkish]