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CENTRAL ASIA, THE CAUCASUS, AND 21ST-CENTURY SECURITY
Ross Wilson
Hurriyet
Sept 2 2011
Turkey
Great conflicts and security challenges of the 20th century took
place in Europe and Asia. Since 2001, Afghanistan and Iraq have been
leading preoccupations for foreign policy and security planners in
both the East and the West. But other states in the region where
Eurasia abuts South Asia and the Middle East - especially Central
Asia and the Caucasus - look vulnerable. No state in this region
is really succeeding. They are variously burdened by inadequate and
often authoritarian governance, immense economic problems, corruption,
environmental, social, security and other challenges. Interstate and
interethnic conflicts abound. Connections with the outside world remain
limited aside from the energy ties that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
have forged. Relations among regional states are limited as well,
and not just because of interstate issues. It is not unfair to say
that long-term stability remains a goal, not a state of being for the
Caucasus and Central Asia. This region could be a global nightmare,
if not flashpoint, in 10, 20 or 30 years' time.
To address this region's failings and ensure that future world leaders
do not find themselves obsessed with instabilities and conflicts in
these out-of-the-way places - or, worse, find themselves drawn into
them - greater engagement, cooperation and collaboration with and
among these countries is urgently needed.
The break up of the Soviet bloc 20 years ago was the 20th century's
last cataclysm of global scope, and completely new state systems had
to be created out of nothing.
Twenty years on, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia seem to
have accomplished a lot - and, at the same time, only a little. New
governing institutions were created; seeds of economic success were
planted, some countries being more successful at this than others. New
militaries were created, and countries gained a measure of control
over their borders.
Despite these and other achievements, it would be highly misleading
to consider Central Asia and the Caucasus broadly successful. Many
countries combine low-quality governance with authoritarianism or
worse; poverty, poor climates for doing business, corruption and
autarky, especially vis-a-vis neighbors, are the norm. Kyrgyzstan,
meanwhile, was savaged in 2010 by violence to overthrow a corrupt
and tyrannical government.
~U Tajikistan's most dysfunctional period took place during the 1990s
civil war, but extensive poverty, weak governance, corruption, drug
trafficking, terrorist violence and other issues make the country's
prognosis highly questionable.
~U Turkmenistan survived the cult of personality established by
its last Soviet-era leader and first president, Saparmurat Niyazov
Turkmenbashi. Its features included sometimes bizarre governance,
hermit-like isolationism, and deep dependence on Russia for the
export of natural gas, the country's most saleable export. Following
Turkmenbashi's death in 2006, backroom deals engineered a transfer
of power to the country's current leader, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov.
Stranger excesses of the Niyazov era have been trimmed back. Perhaps
somewhat more than others throughout the region, Turkmenistan looks
stable largely in a pre-2011 Tunisian way: It could last a long time,
but might not.
So does Uzbekistan. This country never had its neighbor's bizarre
attributes, but an outstanding trait seems, in some eyes, to be the
absence of genuine political change since the Soviet era. The country's
first and only president, Islam Karimov, turns 74 in January 2012. No
model for or experience in transition exists.
~U Kazakhstan is relatively prosperous for Central Asia. Oil wealth
has given Astana's leaders choices others did not have; Kazakhstan has
a larger circle of foreign investors than elsewhere in Central Asia,
but the economy's commanding heights remain in the hands of the state
or those who lead it.
~U Like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has similarly benefitted from energy
riches and similarly suffered from authoritarianism. The conflict with
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh limits the country's economic potential,
distorts its politics, and saps public morale.
~U Armenia faces the same problems of poverty, a difficult and corrupt
business climate, weak, but authoritarian governance, and the lack
of a culture of freedom. Armenia's prospects are compromised by
the militarization and isolation that flow from the unresolved
Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
~U Georgia's foreign policy and military failures with the Abkhaz,
South Ossetians and Russia constitute its big tar babies. An improved
business climate and a strong campaign against corruption hold promise
for leading the country in a better direction, but the Russia problem
and the state of Georgia's interethnic problems remain deep, almost
impossible problems.
A startling lack of cooperation further comprises the region and
its states' futures. That they did not want to work together upon
achieving independence was to some extent understandable. So is the
lack of cooperation between, for example, Azerbaijan and Armenia. But
little-developed cooperation between Georgia and Armenia or between
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is harder to justify. As these countries
head into their third decade of modern independence, strategies that
disregard one's neighbors and the region no longer make sense.
Trade and investment ties among the Caucasus/Central Asian countries
are minimal - security cooperation is limited as well.
Fashioning a more successful future for Central Asia and the Caucasus
involves many things, but two issues stand out.
One is that the countries need to find ways to work together; multiple
efforts need to be made to bring regional business leaders together in
ways that will lead them to see more opportunity than competition,
develop a sense of common purpose on issues of shared interest,
and influence government policy in pro-trade ways on a national and
collective/regional basis.
A second key issue is the work that outsiders do in Central Asia and
the Caucasus. Any effort to create a condominium of outside powers
would be as unwise as the old Great Game, but exchanges of views and
cooperation among the world's leading powers can help lead the area's
states in more positive directions.
*Ross Wilson is the director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at
the Atlantic Council of the United States and former U.S. ambassador
to Turkey. The original version of this article was published in
the Summer 2011 issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly, or TPQ. This is
an abbreviated version of the article. For more information, please
visit; www.turkishpolicy.com.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Ross Wilson
Hurriyet
Sept 2 2011
Turkey
Great conflicts and security challenges of the 20th century took
place in Europe and Asia. Since 2001, Afghanistan and Iraq have been
leading preoccupations for foreign policy and security planners in
both the East and the West. But other states in the region where
Eurasia abuts South Asia and the Middle East - especially Central
Asia and the Caucasus - look vulnerable. No state in this region
is really succeeding. They are variously burdened by inadequate and
often authoritarian governance, immense economic problems, corruption,
environmental, social, security and other challenges. Interstate and
interethnic conflicts abound. Connections with the outside world remain
limited aside from the energy ties that Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
have forged. Relations among regional states are limited as well,
and not just because of interstate issues. It is not unfair to say
that long-term stability remains a goal, not a state of being for the
Caucasus and Central Asia. This region could be a global nightmare,
if not flashpoint, in 10, 20 or 30 years' time.
To address this region's failings and ensure that future world leaders
do not find themselves obsessed with instabilities and conflicts in
these out-of-the-way places - or, worse, find themselves drawn into
them - greater engagement, cooperation and collaboration with and
among these countries is urgently needed.
The break up of the Soviet bloc 20 years ago was the 20th century's
last cataclysm of global scope, and completely new state systems had
to be created out of nothing.
Twenty years on, the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia seem to
have accomplished a lot - and, at the same time, only a little. New
governing institutions were created; seeds of economic success were
planted, some countries being more successful at this than others. New
militaries were created, and countries gained a measure of control
over their borders.
Despite these and other achievements, it would be highly misleading
to consider Central Asia and the Caucasus broadly successful. Many
countries combine low-quality governance with authoritarianism or
worse; poverty, poor climates for doing business, corruption and
autarky, especially vis-a-vis neighbors, are the norm. Kyrgyzstan,
meanwhile, was savaged in 2010 by violence to overthrow a corrupt
and tyrannical government.
~U Tajikistan's most dysfunctional period took place during the 1990s
civil war, but extensive poverty, weak governance, corruption, drug
trafficking, terrorist violence and other issues make the country's
prognosis highly questionable.
~U Turkmenistan survived the cult of personality established by
its last Soviet-era leader and first president, Saparmurat Niyazov
Turkmenbashi. Its features included sometimes bizarre governance,
hermit-like isolationism, and deep dependence on Russia for the
export of natural gas, the country's most saleable export. Following
Turkmenbashi's death in 2006, backroom deals engineered a transfer
of power to the country's current leader, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov.
Stranger excesses of the Niyazov era have been trimmed back. Perhaps
somewhat more than others throughout the region, Turkmenistan looks
stable largely in a pre-2011 Tunisian way: It could last a long time,
but might not.
So does Uzbekistan. This country never had its neighbor's bizarre
attributes, but an outstanding trait seems, in some eyes, to be the
absence of genuine political change since the Soviet era. The country's
first and only president, Islam Karimov, turns 74 in January 2012. No
model for or experience in transition exists.
~U Kazakhstan is relatively prosperous for Central Asia. Oil wealth
has given Astana's leaders choices others did not have; Kazakhstan has
a larger circle of foreign investors than elsewhere in Central Asia,
but the economy's commanding heights remain in the hands of the state
or those who lead it.
~U Like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan has similarly benefitted from energy
riches and similarly suffered from authoritarianism. The conflict with
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh limits the country's economic potential,
distorts its politics, and saps public morale.
~U Armenia faces the same problems of poverty, a difficult and corrupt
business climate, weak, but authoritarian governance, and the lack
of a culture of freedom. Armenia's prospects are compromised by
the militarization and isolation that flow from the unresolved
Nagorno-Karabakh problem.
~U Georgia's foreign policy and military failures with the Abkhaz,
South Ossetians and Russia constitute its big tar babies. An improved
business climate and a strong campaign against corruption hold promise
for leading the country in a better direction, but the Russia problem
and the state of Georgia's interethnic problems remain deep, almost
impossible problems.
A startling lack of cooperation further comprises the region and
its states' futures. That they did not want to work together upon
achieving independence was to some extent understandable. So is the
lack of cooperation between, for example, Azerbaijan and Armenia. But
little-developed cooperation between Georgia and Armenia or between
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is harder to justify. As these countries
head into their third decade of modern independence, strategies that
disregard one's neighbors and the region no longer make sense.
Trade and investment ties among the Caucasus/Central Asian countries
are minimal - security cooperation is limited as well.
Fashioning a more successful future for Central Asia and the Caucasus
involves many things, but two issues stand out.
One is that the countries need to find ways to work together; multiple
efforts need to be made to bring regional business leaders together in
ways that will lead them to see more opportunity than competition,
develop a sense of common purpose on issues of shared interest,
and influence government policy in pro-trade ways on a national and
collective/regional basis.
A second key issue is the work that outsiders do in Central Asia and
the Caucasus. Any effort to create a condominium of outside powers
would be as unwise as the old Great Game, but exchanges of views and
cooperation among the world's leading powers can help lead the area's
states in more positive directions.
*Ross Wilson is the director of the Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center at
the Atlantic Council of the United States and former U.S. ambassador
to Turkey. The original version of this article was published in
the Summer 2011 issue of Turkish Policy Quarterly, or TPQ. This is
an abbreviated version of the article. For more information, please
visit; www.turkishpolicy.com.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress