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Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkish-Armenian relations: Which should be solved first?
12:19 - 04.09.11
(By Armen Grigoryan, Caucasus Edition)
Before the June 2011 parliamentary elections in Turkey there was some
hope that Turkish-Armenian relations might improve in the short-term.
It seemed that after the elections Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's AKP party would not be under the threat of instantly losing
the support of voters due to opposition criticism, so its leadership
could ratify the protocols signed in 2009. Such a move, followed by
opening the Turkish-Armenian border, would have changed the regional
situation radically, opening the way for the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional cooperation in the South
Caucasus.
The Turkish opposition and Azerbaijan's government, which have been
opposing the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, do not
believe that Armenia may become more willing to make concessions if
the Turkish-Armenian border is opened. Such thinking does not take
into account that Armenia's excessive dependence on Russia is the main
issue requiring a solution.
The possibility of transportation across Turkish territory would have
reduced Armenia's dependence on Russia. Furthermore, an opened border
would have relieved the economic hardship that Armenia's population is
experiencing; thus, mutual trust would have been promoted. An improved
economic situation resulting in reduced internal political tension in
Armenia, together with an opportunity to maneuver more independently
from Russia, could have stimulated President Serzh Sargsyan and the
ruling coalition to be more flexible on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Such a scenario seems quite realistic, as strong internal opposition
questioning Sargsyan's legitimacy already persuaded him to seek
international support and financial assistance. In 2008-2009, during
the period of rapprochement with Turkey, Sargsyan enjoyed the image of
a politician trying to overcome a decades-long enmity. Quite
significantly, although ratification of the protocols by Armenia's
National Assembly was suspended in 2010, Sargsyan has not withdrawn
his signature despite the opposition urging him to do so.
At the same time, it would be very naive to consider Sargsyan a
politician with truly progressive views. His approach is rather
opportunistic; the readiness to make some concessions showed
previously was aimed mainly at getting international support. As there
has been no progress in relations with Turkey (instead, failed
negotiations in Kazan, new militaristic threats made by Azerbaijani
officials, and Erdogan's harsh reaction to Sargsyan's remark made at
an Armenian youth camp have only made the situation worse), while the
opposition continues demanding early elections, Sargsyan will be
motivated to use more hardcore nationalist rhetoric.
The 20th anniversary of Armenia's independence in September seems a
convenient starting point for that. It should also be remembered that
sensitive issues such as Turkish-Armenian relations and the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unlikely to progress in pre-election
periods. Campaigning for the May 2012 parliamentary elections will
begin in a few weeks, which will be followed by the presidential
campaign for the February 2013 elections. Political expediency will
also induce both government and opposition to use sentiments in
competition for a more "patriotic" image while moving towards 2015 -
the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide.
Unfortunately, in the near future the global economic crisis may
remain the strongest preventive factor in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. It prompts the US and EU to keep Azerbaijan under pressure,
in order not to permit large-scale fighting that would be followed by
a sharp rise in the price of oil. But in order to break the status quo
and reach an agreement, one of the sides has to make the first
concession, and Armenia may not be persuaded to do so, as Russia
counterbalances any international pressure. As I noted before, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may not be solved by negotiations as long as
the mediators have their different stakes in the issue. That is why
the recent developments have been so depressing, with diminishing
chances to move towards normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.
I foresee the counterargument that Turkey is not a side of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Turkey openly declared its support
for Azerbaijan and mentioned the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution
as a precondition for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
connecting two issues. Therefore, a concession and progress on one of
the issues would help solve the other, and vice versa. Armenia will
not have to make concessions, as long as Russia agrees with that. For
Azerbaijan, making a concession first is too difficult, as control
over parts of its territory is at stake. Turkey faces the least
obstacles for taking the first step and, again, a move strengthening
Armenia's safety and reducing dependence on Russia could change
Armenia's attitude.
However, as hopes for opening the Turkish-Armenian border and other
possibilities of reducing tension in the region seem too idealistic
now, keeping the status quo may be the lesser evil. The possibility of
renewed fighting aside, repeated threats to use force and the
armaments race are enough to provoke the realization that the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional cooperation
in the South Caucasus may be impossible. As the well-informed Russian
military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer recently told RFE/RL, "If Russia
has to station its peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone, that will
be good for Russia - [it] has wanted that since 1994."
Overcoming the traditional way of thinking is necessary for changing
the status quo in the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish triangle. In the
foreseeable future, Turkey will remain the only party involved capable
of making a decisive move, as it is the most democratic, most
developed, and least dependent on foreign powers. The next few months
will show whether there is still room for hope, or if closed borders
and dividing lines may remain in the region, perhaps for decades.
Tert.am
12:19 - 04.09.11
(By Armen Grigoryan, Caucasus Edition)
Before the June 2011 parliamentary elections in Turkey there was some
hope that Turkish-Armenian relations might improve in the short-term.
It seemed that after the elections Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan's AKP party would not be under the threat of instantly losing
the support of voters due to opposition criticism, so its leadership
could ratify the protocols signed in 2009. Such a move, followed by
opening the Turkish-Armenian border, would have changed the regional
situation radically, opening the way for the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional cooperation in the South
Caucasus.
The Turkish opposition and Azerbaijan's government, which have been
opposing the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, do not
believe that Armenia may become more willing to make concessions if
the Turkish-Armenian border is opened. Such thinking does not take
into account that Armenia's excessive dependence on Russia is the main
issue requiring a solution.
The possibility of transportation across Turkish territory would have
reduced Armenia's dependence on Russia. Furthermore, an opened border
would have relieved the economic hardship that Armenia's population is
experiencing; thus, mutual trust would have been promoted. An improved
economic situation resulting in reduced internal political tension in
Armenia, together with an opportunity to maneuver more independently
from Russia, could have stimulated President Serzh Sargsyan and the
ruling coalition to be more flexible on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Such a scenario seems quite realistic, as strong internal opposition
questioning Sargsyan's legitimacy already persuaded him to seek
international support and financial assistance. In 2008-2009, during
the period of rapprochement with Turkey, Sargsyan enjoyed the image of
a politician trying to overcome a decades-long enmity. Quite
significantly, although ratification of the protocols by Armenia's
National Assembly was suspended in 2010, Sargsyan has not withdrawn
his signature despite the opposition urging him to do so.
At the same time, it would be very naive to consider Sargsyan a
politician with truly progressive views. His approach is rather
opportunistic; the readiness to make some concessions showed
previously was aimed mainly at getting international support. As there
has been no progress in relations with Turkey (instead, failed
negotiations in Kazan, new militaristic threats made by Azerbaijani
officials, and Erdogan's harsh reaction to Sargsyan's remark made at
an Armenian youth camp have only made the situation worse), while the
opposition continues demanding early elections, Sargsyan will be
motivated to use more hardcore nationalist rhetoric.
The 20th anniversary of Armenia's independence in September seems a
convenient starting point for that. It should also be remembered that
sensitive issues such as Turkish-Armenian relations and the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are unlikely to progress in pre-election
periods. Campaigning for the May 2012 parliamentary elections will
begin in a few weeks, which will be followed by the presidential
campaign for the February 2013 elections. Political expediency will
also induce both government and opposition to use sentiments in
competition for a more "patriotic" image while moving towards 2015 -
the 100th anniversary of the Armenian Genocide.
Unfortunately, in the near future the global economic crisis may
remain the strongest preventive factor in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. It prompts the US and EU to keep Azerbaijan under pressure,
in order not to permit large-scale fighting that would be followed by
a sharp rise in the price of oil. But in order to break the status quo
and reach an agreement, one of the sides has to make the first
concession, and Armenia may not be persuaded to do so, as Russia
counterbalances any international pressure. As I noted before, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may not be solved by negotiations as long as
the mediators have their different stakes in the issue. That is why
the recent developments have been so depressing, with diminishing
chances to move towards normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.
I foresee the counterargument that Turkey is not a side of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Turkey openly declared its support
for Azerbaijan and mentioned the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution
as a precondition for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
connecting two issues. Therefore, a concession and progress on one of
the issues would help solve the other, and vice versa. Armenia will
not have to make concessions, as long as Russia agrees with that. For
Azerbaijan, making a concession first is too difficult, as control
over parts of its territory is at stake. Turkey faces the least
obstacles for taking the first step and, again, a move strengthening
Armenia's safety and reducing dependence on Russia could change
Armenia's attitude.
However, as hopes for opening the Turkish-Armenian border and other
possibilities of reducing tension in the region seem too idealistic
now, keeping the status quo may be the lesser evil. The possibility of
renewed fighting aside, repeated threats to use force and the
armaments race are enough to provoke the realization that the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and regional cooperation
in the South Caucasus may be impossible. As the well-informed Russian
military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer recently told RFE/RL, "If Russia
has to station its peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone, that will
be good for Russia - [it] has wanted that since 1994."
Overcoming the traditional way of thinking is necessary for changing
the status quo in the Armenian-Azerbaijani-Turkish triangle. In the
foreseeable future, Turkey will remain the only party involved capable
of making a decisive move, as it is the most democratic, most
developed, and least dependent on foreign powers. The next few months
will show whether there is still room for hope, or if closed borders
and dividing lines may remain in the region, perhaps for decades.
Tert.am