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Politkom.ru , Russia
Aug 14 2011
Dmitriy Medvedev's status-quo and public opinion in the conflict countries
by Aleksandr Karavayev
[translated from Russian]
As we know, many questions of Karabakh regulation relate to acutely
debatable politological topics which not only do not have a synonymous
answer, but even a clearly unambiguous interpretation. This is what
happens when, instead of facts, observers are forced to operate with
mass media leaks and persistent public opinions, both in regard to the
positions of the parties, and to the sponsors of the regulation. For
example, in recent times, many have begun to share the opinion that
Dmitriy Medvedev has a different view of the role of Russia in the
Karabakh process than does Vladimir Putin. The author has also
repeatedly spoken out in favour of this view. Recently, such an
opinion - already in sublimated form - was heard from Baku. Our Ekho
Moskvy journalist brought back the statements of a local political
analyst, who believes that Putin is consciously blocking Medvedev's
initiatives that are advantageous to Azerbaijan. But if the Russian
president had managed to bring the matter to signing of a peace
treaty, he could aspire to the Novel Peace Prize.
In principle, such political anecdotes become typical for many
long-drawn out conflicts. It is enough to read the Israeli press, for
example. But in fact, the discussion of the sympathies of the leaders
involved in the negotiations in essence becomes the only topic,
considering the rather closed nature of the negotiations. Commentators
deal only with mass media "leaks" and private discussions with
diplomats. Public opinion, in turn, tries to lay out this information
"on the shelves": In whose favour the process is going. Thus, for
example, Moskovskiye Novosti reported on the eve of the Sochi meeting
on 9 August that Dmitriy Medvedev had agreed with a number of
revisions to the principles of regulation that had previously been
presented by Ilkham Aliyev. However, the public in Baku, on the whole
appraising the practice of Russian policy over the past 15 years,
looks at other facts and comes to the conclusion that Moscow is
speaking out "slightly" in favour of Armenia. The picture has been
formed of various elements. For example, Baku recalls the unlawful
arms deliveries to Armenia, sanctioned by the Russian Federation
Minoborona [Ministry of Defence] in 1993-1994. At one time, a
parliamentary investigation by General Lev Rokhlin shed light on the
impressive scope of these unlawful corrupt deals, as compared with the
low level of technical provision of Russian troops in the North
Caucasus. Another topic is the difference in the Russian and English
text of the G8 statement of 2010. The Russian version of the document
leaves out the word, "occupied," as applied to the regions around
Nagornyy Karabakh (in Yereven, these territories are generally called
the "NKR security belt," or even "liberated"), despite the fact that
they have an international-legal definition specifically as occupied,
which was reflected in the English language original of the document.
It is hard to say whether these facts are the result of a conscious
effort to play up to Armenia on the part of a number of high-level
officials in Moscow. But to the outside observer, and not only in
Azerbaijan, the result is clear.
Let us look at what specifically has changed in the policy of the
Russian leaders? We should remember the well-known "professional"
sympathy, established between Vladimir Putin and Geydar Aliyev from
the very first meetings of the two leaders. This made it possible not
simply to normalize Russian-Azerbaijani relations, but also to open a
new page in them. But, on the other hand, the trusting relations of
these figures practically had no effect on the dynamics of the
Karabakh process, and did not tangibly increase Moscow's pressure on
Yerevan, or Baku. What is happening today? Dmitriy Medvedev is
demonstrating a sincere predisposition to the Azerbaijani president.
We will note that the support of Baku on the part of the incumbent
Russian president in the Karabakh negotiations publicly appears much
more emphatic, than that of Putin. Medvedev is deeply submerged in the
situation and, aside from that, Russian-Azerbaijani relations have
reached a new level and have become more multi-layered, despite
various foreign crises. But what has been the result? There are
practically no substantial changes in the Karabakh process, just as
there were none 5-7 years ago.
Moreover, we cannot say that Moscow does not have an intelligible
programme regarding the Karabakh process. The trilateral discussions
rest on the "Madrid principles" as the basic platform for regulation.
Moscow is still placing the main stake on internationally coordinated
actions (we may recall the statements of the OSCE MG [Minsk Group] and
G8 summits), and this is in a certain degree synchronized with the
position of Moscow in the Dniester process, where a similar attempt at
coordinated actions with Brussels may be seen. But here too, an
invisible barrier arises. If we judge by the unofficial statements of
high-level advisers on the staff of the Russian leadership, in the
corridors of the White House and the Kremlin they have a sceptical
attitude towards these projects. And this position is growing
stronger. It is believed that the only valuable achievement in
Karabakh regulation from 1994 to the present day has been the
suspension of combat actions. After a series of attempts by Medvedev
to "pump through" the negotiations with new impetus, the achieved
state of so-called status-quo is once again becoming a goal in itself
in Moscow policy. We are wandering in a circle. Moscow cannot invest
too much effort and energy into promoting the strategy of peaceful
regulation. At the same time, observing and fearing an exacerbation in
the negotiations, it is returning the course of negotiations to the
previous round, preserving its main achievement - keeping the
situation in a peaceful channel. This conclusion is confirmed also in
Medvedev's symbolic interview, devoted to the anniversary of the
Russian-Georgian conflict. In it, the Russian president mentions the
reaction of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the conflict
that occurred.
"You know, when this happened, both leaders (both President Aliyev and
President Sargsyan) came here, to Sochi. Do you know what they told
me? They said: 'It is too bad, of course, that all this happened. This
is a hard thing for the Caucasus.' I said: 'Very bad.' But you know,
for us this is a certain lesson, that it is better to conduct endless
negotiations on what the fate of Nagornyy Karabach will be, whether
there will ever be a referendum there, how we should prepare the peace
treaty, than to spend these five days in war." This was a very serious
lesson for them. It seems to me that this is a very indicative thing.
Why? Because, if we return to what happened then, if our Georgian
colleague had had even a little bit more sense, perhaps we too would
be meeting in exactly this way in Sochi, in Kazan, or somewhere else,
and thinking about how we can seek a compromise in mutual relations
between the parts of what was once a single state, but what is now
Georgia and the parts that have split away."
Strictly speaking, it is hard to declare "endless negotiations" as a
positive strategy. This is sooner manoeuvring, preservation of the
tactical balance. Therefore, Dmitriy Medvedev's activity in this
direction may be welcomed, but we must also understand that it does
not stem from some other "new" understanding of the situation.
Medvedev's style lies in the greater amplitude of public actions,
unlike Putin's. Medvedev has breathed new life into the trilateral
format of negotiations. He has given Armenia guarantees of security by
agreeing to prolong the discussion about the Russian base until 2044.
He has strengthened the multi-level -including military-tactical
-relations with Azerbaijan. But Moscow is not trying to "tie in" the
results of this process of drawing Armenia and Azerbaijan closer
together with the tasks of Karabakh regulation. In this plane,
Medvedev has not surpassed Putin, although he had perhaps tried to do
something.
Thus, in the strategic plane, the position of the Kremlin-White House
remains essentially unchanged. The public reaction to the topical
fluctuations of the Moscow pendulum is changing in the conflict
countries themselves. The public sentiment in Azerbaijan is sensing a
certain stagnation, and this leads to the increased level of
scepticism regarding the Russian president's initiative. Naturally,
ultimately Yerevan will perceive this with a plus sign, even though it
understands the impossibility of getting the desired result by
remaining in a suspended state. The data of a Gallup poll confirm this
picture. According to polls conducted in 104 world countries in 2010,
Armenia holds fifth place on the list of the most pro-Russian
countries: 75 per cent of its citizens support the Russian course (7
per cent of the residents of Armenia have a negative attitude towards
the policies of the Russian leadership, and 17 per cent refused to
answer the posed question). In Azerbaijan, only 54 per cent of the
population has pro-Russian sympathies, but this is also a high level
of support, despite the fact that 19 per cent have a negative attitude
towards Moscow's policy.
A uniquely paradoxical picture has been formed. The results of the
poll show that, on the whole, the volume of Russian sympathies in
Azerbaijan and in Armenia is rather high (compare with 6 per cent
support of Moscow in Georgia), and the local elites are also closely
tied to Russia by their interests. Therefore, Moscow may play the game
of "endless negotiations" for a long time, utilizing the resources of
pro-Russian sympathies, without doing any particular harm to its
prestige. Which is actually what is happening in practice.
From: Baghdasarian
Aug 14 2011
Dmitriy Medvedev's status-quo and public opinion in the conflict countries
by Aleksandr Karavayev
[translated from Russian]
As we know, many questions of Karabakh regulation relate to acutely
debatable politological topics which not only do not have a synonymous
answer, but even a clearly unambiguous interpretation. This is what
happens when, instead of facts, observers are forced to operate with
mass media leaks and persistent public opinions, both in regard to the
positions of the parties, and to the sponsors of the regulation. For
example, in recent times, many have begun to share the opinion that
Dmitriy Medvedev has a different view of the role of Russia in the
Karabakh process than does Vladimir Putin. The author has also
repeatedly spoken out in favour of this view. Recently, such an
opinion - already in sublimated form - was heard from Baku. Our Ekho
Moskvy journalist brought back the statements of a local political
analyst, who believes that Putin is consciously blocking Medvedev's
initiatives that are advantageous to Azerbaijan. But if the Russian
president had managed to bring the matter to signing of a peace
treaty, he could aspire to the Novel Peace Prize.
In principle, such political anecdotes become typical for many
long-drawn out conflicts. It is enough to read the Israeli press, for
example. But in fact, the discussion of the sympathies of the leaders
involved in the negotiations in essence becomes the only topic,
considering the rather closed nature of the negotiations. Commentators
deal only with mass media "leaks" and private discussions with
diplomats. Public opinion, in turn, tries to lay out this information
"on the shelves": In whose favour the process is going. Thus, for
example, Moskovskiye Novosti reported on the eve of the Sochi meeting
on 9 August that Dmitriy Medvedev had agreed with a number of
revisions to the principles of regulation that had previously been
presented by Ilkham Aliyev. However, the public in Baku, on the whole
appraising the practice of Russian policy over the past 15 years,
looks at other facts and comes to the conclusion that Moscow is
speaking out "slightly" in favour of Armenia. The picture has been
formed of various elements. For example, Baku recalls the unlawful
arms deliveries to Armenia, sanctioned by the Russian Federation
Minoborona [Ministry of Defence] in 1993-1994. At one time, a
parliamentary investigation by General Lev Rokhlin shed light on the
impressive scope of these unlawful corrupt deals, as compared with the
low level of technical provision of Russian troops in the North
Caucasus. Another topic is the difference in the Russian and English
text of the G8 statement of 2010. The Russian version of the document
leaves out the word, "occupied," as applied to the regions around
Nagornyy Karabakh (in Yereven, these territories are generally called
the "NKR security belt," or even "liberated"), despite the fact that
they have an international-legal definition specifically as occupied,
which was reflected in the English language original of the document.
It is hard to say whether these facts are the result of a conscious
effort to play up to Armenia on the part of a number of high-level
officials in Moscow. But to the outside observer, and not only in
Azerbaijan, the result is clear.
Let us look at what specifically has changed in the policy of the
Russian leaders? We should remember the well-known "professional"
sympathy, established between Vladimir Putin and Geydar Aliyev from
the very first meetings of the two leaders. This made it possible not
simply to normalize Russian-Azerbaijani relations, but also to open a
new page in them. But, on the other hand, the trusting relations of
these figures practically had no effect on the dynamics of the
Karabakh process, and did not tangibly increase Moscow's pressure on
Yerevan, or Baku. What is happening today? Dmitriy Medvedev is
demonstrating a sincere predisposition to the Azerbaijani president.
We will note that the support of Baku on the part of the incumbent
Russian president in the Karabakh negotiations publicly appears much
more emphatic, than that of Putin. Medvedev is deeply submerged in the
situation and, aside from that, Russian-Azerbaijani relations have
reached a new level and have become more multi-layered, despite
various foreign crises. But what has been the result? There are
practically no substantial changes in the Karabakh process, just as
there were none 5-7 years ago.
Moreover, we cannot say that Moscow does not have an intelligible
programme regarding the Karabakh process. The trilateral discussions
rest on the "Madrid principles" as the basic platform for regulation.
Moscow is still placing the main stake on internationally coordinated
actions (we may recall the statements of the OSCE MG [Minsk Group] and
G8 summits), and this is in a certain degree synchronized with the
position of Moscow in the Dniester process, where a similar attempt at
coordinated actions with Brussels may be seen. But here too, an
invisible barrier arises. If we judge by the unofficial statements of
high-level advisers on the staff of the Russian leadership, in the
corridors of the White House and the Kremlin they have a sceptical
attitude towards these projects. And this position is growing
stronger. It is believed that the only valuable achievement in
Karabakh regulation from 1994 to the present day has been the
suspension of combat actions. After a series of attempts by Medvedev
to "pump through" the negotiations with new impetus, the achieved
state of so-called status-quo is once again becoming a goal in itself
in Moscow policy. We are wandering in a circle. Moscow cannot invest
too much effort and energy into promoting the strategy of peaceful
regulation. At the same time, observing and fearing an exacerbation in
the negotiations, it is returning the course of negotiations to the
previous round, preserving its main achievement - keeping the
situation in a peaceful channel. This conclusion is confirmed also in
Medvedev's symbolic interview, devoted to the anniversary of the
Russian-Georgian conflict. In it, the Russian president mentions the
reaction of the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the conflict
that occurred.
"You know, when this happened, both leaders (both President Aliyev and
President Sargsyan) came here, to Sochi. Do you know what they told
me? They said: 'It is too bad, of course, that all this happened. This
is a hard thing for the Caucasus.' I said: 'Very bad.' But you know,
for us this is a certain lesson, that it is better to conduct endless
negotiations on what the fate of Nagornyy Karabach will be, whether
there will ever be a referendum there, how we should prepare the peace
treaty, than to spend these five days in war." This was a very serious
lesson for them. It seems to me that this is a very indicative thing.
Why? Because, if we return to what happened then, if our Georgian
colleague had had even a little bit more sense, perhaps we too would
be meeting in exactly this way in Sochi, in Kazan, or somewhere else,
and thinking about how we can seek a compromise in mutual relations
between the parts of what was once a single state, but what is now
Georgia and the parts that have split away."
Strictly speaking, it is hard to declare "endless negotiations" as a
positive strategy. This is sooner manoeuvring, preservation of the
tactical balance. Therefore, Dmitriy Medvedev's activity in this
direction may be welcomed, but we must also understand that it does
not stem from some other "new" understanding of the situation.
Medvedev's style lies in the greater amplitude of public actions,
unlike Putin's. Medvedev has breathed new life into the trilateral
format of negotiations. He has given Armenia guarantees of security by
agreeing to prolong the discussion about the Russian base until 2044.
He has strengthened the multi-level -including military-tactical
-relations with Azerbaijan. But Moscow is not trying to "tie in" the
results of this process of drawing Armenia and Azerbaijan closer
together with the tasks of Karabakh regulation. In this plane,
Medvedev has not surpassed Putin, although he had perhaps tried to do
something.
Thus, in the strategic plane, the position of the Kremlin-White House
remains essentially unchanged. The public reaction to the topical
fluctuations of the Moscow pendulum is changing in the conflict
countries themselves. The public sentiment in Azerbaijan is sensing a
certain stagnation, and this leads to the increased level of
scepticism regarding the Russian president's initiative. Naturally,
ultimately Yerevan will perceive this with a plus sign, even though it
understands the impossibility of getting the desired result by
remaining in a suspended state. The data of a Gallup poll confirm this
picture. According to polls conducted in 104 world countries in 2010,
Armenia holds fifth place on the list of the most pro-Russian
countries: 75 per cent of its citizens support the Russian course (7
per cent of the residents of Armenia have a negative attitude towards
the policies of the Russian leadership, and 17 per cent refused to
answer the posed question). In Azerbaijan, only 54 per cent of the
population has pro-Russian sympathies, but this is also a high level
of support, despite the fact that 19 per cent have a negative attitude
towards Moscow's policy.
A uniquely paradoxical picture has been formed. The results of the
poll show that, on the whole, the volume of Russian sympathies in
Azerbaijan and in Armenia is rather high (compare with 6 per cent
support of Moscow in Georgia), and the local elites are also closely
tied to Russia by their interests. Therefore, Moscow may play the game
of "endless negotiations" for a long time, utilizing the resources of
pro-Russian sympathies, without doing any particular harm to its
prestige. Which is actually what is happening in practice.
From: Baghdasarian