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Sargsyan Plead for U.S. Congratulation
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics23211.html
Published: 11:49:14 - 03/09/2011
WikiLeaks released on August 30 the U.S. Embassy cable on an informal
talk of Joseph Pennington with Serzh Sargsyan's aides on February 27,
2008, in the aftermath of the Armenian presidential election.
SUBJECT: PM STAFF PLEA FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN CANDID CHAT
1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA and polchief met with two of the PM's closest
advisers over drinks late February 26 to compare notes. PM staff
probed for our political assessment. We expressed concerns over
arrests of opposition politicians, voting infractions we had seen, the
conduct of the recounts, and other flaws -- pointing out that these
problems lent credibility to Levon Ter-Petrossian's (LTP) position and
undermined public trust in the outcome. We said that a heavy-handed
intervention to clear Freedom Square would be another serious blow to
the PM's image. The PM staffers mounted tepid defenses on one or two
points, but quickly backtracked to a second line of defense: these
things were happening outside of the PM's control and against his
interests. They portrayed a stubborn President Kocharian, determined
to impose order, and misguided oligarchs/thugs, whom Sargsian was not
yet strong enough to face down. They pleaded for stronger U.S.
support for the PM's position and legitimacy, which would strengthen
Sargsian's hand in getting those other forces to behave properly. We
replied that it cannot work that way; it is the GOAM's responsibility
to manage its democractic processes cleanly, and the USG would not
give a free pass as a means to an end. END SUMMARY
2. (C) SO...WHAT DO YOU GUYS REALLY THINK?:The prime minister's senior
aide (and son-in-law) Mikhail 'Misha' Minasyan, and staff adviser
Levon Martirosyan requested a casual meeting with CDA and polchief
over drinks at a cafe Minasyan owns. The cordial conversation lasted
over two hours, with lots of give and take all around. Both sides
repeatedly invoked the informal nature of the meeting as an
opportunity to 'speak frankly' and say things neither side would be
prepared to say more officially. It was clear to us that this was the
PM's way of getting a reading on our reactions to the election and
post-election scene, as well as lobby for a U.S. Presidential
congratulations message. The two men seemed genuinely ready to listen
as well as talk, and implicitly conceded the truth of many of our
criticisms. We framed most of these problems as either issues that
harmed PM Sargsian's image and reputation or as elements that gave
credibility to LTP's protests, and said it was imperative for the
government to get itself on the right side of these democratic
legitimacy points in order to alleviate public mistrust and reduce
tension. We emphasized our belief that PM Sargsian won more votes
than any other candidate on February 19, and we looked forward to
working with him as president on numerous fronts once the immediate
crisis has been weathered. We urged the government to put a stop to
'red flag' indicators such as arresting opposition politicians, and
use great care not to drive the protesters violently out of Freedom
Square.
3. (C) THE AIRING OF GRIEVANCES: Over the course of the two hours, we
were able to work a number of specific criticisms into our
conversation. We mentioned voter intimidation
(highlighting the notorious oligarch 'La Fik Samo' and his election
day goon squads in Yerevan's Malatia district as a specific example).
We related having seen minibus-loads of voters gathered at a local
market to receive improperly issued absentee voting permits from party
organizers and subsequently dispatched to polling stations. We noted
that a USG observer had seen blatant vote-count fraud, also in
Malatia. Moreover, the flawed recount process had also been a lost
opportunity to win public confidence. Polchief commented that while
he felt very confident Sargsian won a plurality of votes cast on
February 19, he could not be nearly so confident that the PM
legitimately won a first-round majority, given the narrow margin of
victory and the problems we knew about. We spoke about the unfair
media and the seeming information black-out on television about the
LTP rallies, which we noted only increased public interest in what was
going on at Freedom Square. We commented that Sargsian may have won
on February 19, but he was losing the battle for public opinion since
then. We repeatedly pointed out that rounding up opposition
politicians, searching their offices, and throwing them in jail was
extremely unhelpful to the PM's case for legitimacy. We noted that
any kind of bloody confrontation on Freedom Square between police and
protesters would also be a huge negative. Better to let the protest
drag on and wither away on its own than to provoke a confrontation
that could create martyrs or images of victims for world media to
broadcast. We praised the restraint and professionalism shown by
police so far in avoiding conflict with the demonstrators. Minasyan
replied that every morning PM Sargsian called each of the relevant
police chiefs and told them 'if there's any problem, I hold you
personally responsible, and I won't care who started what.' We also
foreshadowed, non-specifically, that the next ODIHR report is likely
to be more negative than the last statement.
4. (C) THE PM'S SIDE OF THE STORY: The PM's aides fenced with us a
little bit on certain points -- for example, not conceding the recount
had been troubled. Minasyan pointed out (accurately) that we kept
mentioning just a few problematic districts -- such as Malatia,
Abovian, Erebuni, Davitashen -- as the scene of problems, and that
taken all together there are not enough votes to change the
first-round outcome. We acknowledged the point, while noting that
that assumes everything was perfect across the rest of the country,
and that we ignore reports of vote-buying, intimidation, unfair media
access, and abuse of public administrative resources. Minasyan said
that LTP is a professional revolutionary -- having played a big role
in bringing down the Soviet Union. As such, LTP has no incentive to
make reasonable concessions, but will continue to be hard line. He
said that LTP and his core following have become increasingly
radicalized and are not amenable to reasonable compromise. We
conceded that could be true, and pointed out that that the goal must
be to win over the thousands of ordinary citizens who have joined LTP.
The two advisers highlighted the message of inclusive outreach that
was a theme of the PM's rally remarks, and pointed out that the PM was
negotiating with several other parties -- he mentioned the Dashnaks
and Orinats Yerkir -- which he hoped would join in a grand coalition
government. Minasyan said he agreed with us on a number of points
about the appearance problems. Minasyan was sure that sooner of later
LTP would stage a provocation -- such as a protester getting killed in
the square -- which he could use as a spark to whip up public outrage.
The longer things continue as they are, and specifically the longer
the USG waits to congratulate, the more certain it becomes that other
things will go wrong and make the situation worse.
5. (C) BATTLE FOR ARMENIA'S SOUL?: By the end, the key theme was
that the PM had done everything within his own power to promote a fair
and transparent election and post-election process. However,
Kocharian is 'a strong president' and still in charge, and there is a
limit to how much influence Sargsian can have over him. Similarly,
many of the problems we noted in the districts surrounding Yerevan
were the handiwork of powerful oligarchs, who retained substantial
independent power bases and still suffered from an old-think mentality
that on election day what they should do is go out and make things
happen their way. This is partly a misguided desire to be helpful to
the PM, and partly just their own egotistical need to play the local
big shot and remind everyone who's really boss of the neighborhood.
Minasyan said that once in office, Sargsian hopes to impose proper
rule of law and end the impunity of such people. However, this will be
much harder for him to do if he must rely on such men's support during
the current political turmoil. The best way to end the impunity and
abuses is for the West to come out firmly in support of Sargsian now,
so he will be empowered later. Minasyan pointed out his colleague,
Levon Martirosyan, as an example of the young generation of educated,
Western-thinking people who are on the rise within the ruling party.
Who would we rather have Sargsian indebted to, he implied, the old
robber barons or this younger
generation?
6. (C) GEORGIA, GEORGIA, GEORGIA!: Minasyan and Martirosyan also
raised by-now-familiar comparisons to Georgia's January election,
expressing the view that Armenia's election had been at least as good
as Georgia's, but they felt that the USG was taking a more skeptical
stance on Armenia. We replied that we ourselves are not experts on
what happened in Georgia, our mandate is to focus and report to
Washington on Armenia.
7. (C) THE OTHER SHOE DROPS: On February 27, CDA received a summons
to see President Kocharian, who was by now familiar with many of the
election-related criticisms that we had mentioned to the PM's
staffers. Kocharian pushed back more insistently on the facts, arguing
that -- two isolated cases aside -- nothing wrong had taken place
anywhere. Septel will report that conversation fully.
8. (C) COMMENT: The Minasyan/Martirosyan conversation, with its
casual 'we're all just friends talking' format, was highly useful to
both sides. We were able to let down some -- certainly not all -- of
the pretense and shadowboxing inherent in our respective roles, and
really understand where the other was coming from. We appreciated the
chance to give a wider overview of the variety and scope of election
violations that we have learned about, and we got relatively little
pushback on what actually went wrong. It seemed that Minasyan,
especially, was thoughtfully taking on board much of what we had to
say. Equally important, we think we were successful in assuring the
PM's staffers that we are not trying to undermine the president-elect,
that we look forward to working with Sargsian, and we should help each
other by doing everything possible to identify and clean up the
problems related to the election so that Sargsian will emerge a more
legitimate president.
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics23211.html
Published: 11:49:14 - 03/09/2011
WikiLeaks released on August 30 the U.S. Embassy cable on an informal
talk of Joseph Pennington with Serzh Sargsyan's aides on February 27,
2008, in the aftermath of the Armenian presidential election.
SUBJECT: PM STAFF PLEA FOR U.S. SUPPORT IN CANDID CHAT
1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA and polchief met with two of the PM's closest
advisers over drinks late February 26 to compare notes. PM staff
probed for our political assessment. We expressed concerns over
arrests of opposition politicians, voting infractions we had seen, the
conduct of the recounts, and other flaws -- pointing out that these
problems lent credibility to Levon Ter-Petrossian's (LTP) position and
undermined public trust in the outcome. We said that a heavy-handed
intervention to clear Freedom Square would be another serious blow to
the PM's image. The PM staffers mounted tepid defenses on one or two
points, but quickly backtracked to a second line of defense: these
things were happening outside of the PM's control and against his
interests. They portrayed a stubborn President Kocharian, determined
to impose order, and misguided oligarchs/thugs, whom Sargsian was not
yet strong enough to face down. They pleaded for stronger U.S.
support for the PM's position and legitimacy, which would strengthen
Sargsian's hand in getting those other forces to behave properly. We
replied that it cannot work that way; it is the GOAM's responsibility
to manage its democractic processes cleanly, and the USG would not
give a free pass as a means to an end. END SUMMARY
2. (C) SO...WHAT DO YOU GUYS REALLY THINK?:The prime minister's senior
aide (and son-in-law) Mikhail 'Misha' Minasyan, and staff adviser
Levon Martirosyan requested a casual meeting with CDA and polchief
over drinks at a cafe Minasyan owns. The cordial conversation lasted
over two hours, with lots of give and take all around. Both sides
repeatedly invoked the informal nature of the meeting as an
opportunity to 'speak frankly' and say things neither side would be
prepared to say more officially. It was clear to us that this was the
PM's way of getting a reading on our reactions to the election and
post-election scene, as well as lobby for a U.S. Presidential
congratulations message. The two men seemed genuinely ready to listen
as well as talk, and implicitly conceded the truth of many of our
criticisms. We framed most of these problems as either issues that
harmed PM Sargsian's image and reputation or as elements that gave
credibility to LTP's protests, and said it was imperative for the
government to get itself on the right side of these democratic
legitimacy points in order to alleviate public mistrust and reduce
tension. We emphasized our belief that PM Sargsian won more votes
than any other candidate on February 19, and we looked forward to
working with him as president on numerous fronts once the immediate
crisis has been weathered. We urged the government to put a stop to
'red flag' indicators such as arresting opposition politicians, and
use great care not to drive the protesters violently out of Freedom
Square.
3. (C) THE AIRING OF GRIEVANCES: Over the course of the two hours, we
were able to work a number of specific criticisms into our
conversation. We mentioned voter intimidation
(highlighting the notorious oligarch 'La Fik Samo' and his election
day goon squads in Yerevan's Malatia district as a specific example).
We related having seen minibus-loads of voters gathered at a local
market to receive improperly issued absentee voting permits from party
organizers and subsequently dispatched to polling stations. We noted
that a USG observer had seen blatant vote-count fraud, also in
Malatia. Moreover, the flawed recount process had also been a lost
opportunity to win public confidence. Polchief commented that while
he felt very confident Sargsian won a plurality of votes cast on
February 19, he could not be nearly so confident that the PM
legitimately won a first-round majority, given the narrow margin of
victory and the problems we knew about. We spoke about the unfair
media and the seeming information black-out on television about the
LTP rallies, which we noted only increased public interest in what was
going on at Freedom Square. We commented that Sargsian may have won
on February 19, but he was losing the battle for public opinion since
then. We repeatedly pointed out that rounding up opposition
politicians, searching their offices, and throwing them in jail was
extremely unhelpful to the PM's case for legitimacy. We noted that
any kind of bloody confrontation on Freedom Square between police and
protesters would also be a huge negative. Better to let the protest
drag on and wither away on its own than to provoke a confrontation
that could create martyrs or images of victims for world media to
broadcast. We praised the restraint and professionalism shown by
police so far in avoiding conflict with the demonstrators. Minasyan
replied that every morning PM Sargsian called each of the relevant
police chiefs and told them 'if there's any problem, I hold you
personally responsible, and I won't care who started what.' We also
foreshadowed, non-specifically, that the next ODIHR report is likely
to be more negative than the last statement.
4. (C) THE PM'S SIDE OF THE STORY: The PM's aides fenced with us a
little bit on certain points -- for example, not conceding the recount
had been troubled. Minasyan pointed out (accurately) that we kept
mentioning just a few problematic districts -- such as Malatia,
Abovian, Erebuni, Davitashen -- as the scene of problems, and that
taken all together there are not enough votes to change the
first-round outcome. We acknowledged the point, while noting that
that assumes everything was perfect across the rest of the country,
and that we ignore reports of vote-buying, intimidation, unfair media
access, and abuse of public administrative resources. Minasyan said
that LTP is a professional revolutionary -- having played a big role
in bringing down the Soviet Union. As such, LTP has no incentive to
make reasonable concessions, but will continue to be hard line. He
said that LTP and his core following have become increasingly
radicalized and are not amenable to reasonable compromise. We
conceded that could be true, and pointed out that that the goal must
be to win over the thousands of ordinary citizens who have joined LTP.
The two advisers highlighted the message of inclusive outreach that
was a theme of the PM's rally remarks, and pointed out that the PM was
negotiating with several other parties -- he mentioned the Dashnaks
and Orinats Yerkir -- which he hoped would join in a grand coalition
government. Minasyan said he agreed with us on a number of points
about the appearance problems. Minasyan was sure that sooner of later
LTP would stage a provocation -- such as a protester getting killed in
the square -- which he could use as a spark to whip up public outrage.
The longer things continue as they are, and specifically the longer
the USG waits to congratulate, the more certain it becomes that other
things will go wrong and make the situation worse.
5. (C) BATTLE FOR ARMENIA'S SOUL?: By the end, the key theme was
that the PM had done everything within his own power to promote a fair
and transparent election and post-election process. However,
Kocharian is 'a strong president' and still in charge, and there is a
limit to how much influence Sargsian can have over him. Similarly,
many of the problems we noted in the districts surrounding Yerevan
were the handiwork of powerful oligarchs, who retained substantial
independent power bases and still suffered from an old-think mentality
that on election day what they should do is go out and make things
happen their way. This is partly a misguided desire to be helpful to
the PM, and partly just their own egotistical need to play the local
big shot and remind everyone who's really boss of the neighborhood.
Minasyan said that once in office, Sargsian hopes to impose proper
rule of law and end the impunity of such people. However, this will be
much harder for him to do if he must rely on such men's support during
the current political turmoil. The best way to end the impunity and
abuses is for the West to come out firmly in support of Sargsian now,
so he will be empowered later. Minasyan pointed out his colleague,
Levon Martirosyan, as an example of the young generation of educated,
Western-thinking people who are on the rise within the ruling party.
Who would we rather have Sargsian indebted to, he implied, the old
robber barons or this younger
generation?
6. (C) GEORGIA, GEORGIA, GEORGIA!: Minasyan and Martirosyan also
raised by-now-familiar comparisons to Georgia's January election,
expressing the view that Armenia's election had been at least as good
as Georgia's, but they felt that the USG was taking a more skeptical
stance on Armenia. We replied that we ourselves are not experts on
what happened in Georgia, our mandate is to focus and report to
Washington on Armenia.
7. (C) THE OTHER SHOE DROPS: On February 27, CDA received a summons
to see President Kocharian, who was by now familiar with many of the
election-related criticisms that we had mentioned to the PM's
staffers. Kocharian pushed back more insistently on the facts, arguing
that -- two isolated cases aside -- nothing wrong had taken place
anywhere. Septel will report that conversation fully.
8. (C) COMMENT: The Minasyan/Martirosyan conversation, with its
casual 'we're all just friends talking' format, was highly useful to
both sides. We were able to let down some -- certainly not all -- of
the pretense and shadowboxing inherent in our respective roles, and
really understand where the other was coming from. We appreciated the
chance to give a wider overview of the variety and scope of election
violations that we have learned about, and we got relatively little
pushback on what actually went wrong. It seemed that Minasyan,
especially, was thoughtfully taking on board much of what we had to
say. Equally important, we think we were successful in assuring the
PM's staffers that we are not trying to undermine the president-elect,
that we look forward to working with Sargsian, and we should help each
other by doing everything possible to identify and clean up the
problems related to the election so that Sargsian will emerge a more
legitimate president.