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WIKILEAKS: GEORGIA IGNORED ARMENIA
Lragir.am News
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics23215.html
10:42:11 - 05/09/2011
Created: 2008-08-15 12:58
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Source: US Embassy
SUBJECT: TFGG01: ARMENIAN FRUSTRATION MOUNTS OVER PERCEIVED GEORGIAN
SNUBS, IN THE FACE OF SINCERE ARMENIAN AIMS TO BE HELPFUL REF:
YEREVAN 649 Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Top Armenian officials are growing increasingly
offended by Georgians's non-responsiveness to Armenian efforts to
reach out. The most discourteous, perhaps, was the Georgian FM's
refusal even to meet FM Nalbandian for a few minutes in Yerevan
airport, as she passed through en route overland to Georgia in the
early morning of August 15. President Sargsian is starting to take
domestic criticism for his presumed 'failure' to call Saakashvili,
after he did call President Medvedev. Armenians feel their good
intentions have been met with an undeserved cold shoulder. Both the
president and foreign minister remain new enough in their jobs for
such perceived slights to sting more than perhaps would be the case
of more seasoned hands. END SUMMARY>
2. (C) AN ATTEMPT AT BALANCE: Armenian officials are growing
increasingly agitated, in private meetings with CDA, about the
continuing refusal of their Georgian counterparts to take their calls,
whether at the presidential, prime minister, or foreign minister
level. A key presidential aide confided to CDA that President
Sargsian had wanted to call Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev on
the same day, so as to avoid any appearance of Armenian bias between
the two sides, but that when Medvedev took the call and Saakashvili
did not, the appearance of pro-Russian preference was created. After
repeated attempts to get a call through, Sargsian finally just sent
a letter to Saakashvili, in a substitute effort to show support
for the Georgian side. Local opposition newspapers have already
sharply criticized President Sargsian for calling Medvedev and not
phoning Saakashvili, and have accused him of sacrificing Armenia's
national interests in a misguided effort to cozy up to Russia. This
is galling to Sargsian after his efforts to get Saakashvili on the
telephone to offer condolences and assistance. The Prime Minister,
likewise, was frustrated (reftel) by his inability to reach his
Georgian counterpart to discuss trade and transportation issues
which are of critical importance to the Armenian economy. Meanwhile,
Armenian officials have kept their public statements about Georgia
determinedly positive, even as their private exasperation mounts,
though they have begun to suggest that they will take a sharper public
tone if the cold shoulder from Tbilisi continues much longer.
3. (C) FM'S PIQUE: The Foreign Minister called in CDA August 15 for a
one on one meeting, in which he vented his own simmering frustration,
over what he termed Georgia's 'hostile attitude.' Visibly agitated,
FM Nalbandian noted that Armenia is trying to help Georgia by taking
in more than 4,000 refugees and offering to serve as a humanitarian
corridor for international relief efforts. He stressed that Armenia
needs a good relationship with Georgia not only for economic reasons,
but also for its contribution to regional stability. Nalbandian added
that the GOAM had meticulously avoided any statements that could
be construed as siding with the Russians. Despite these efforts,
Nalbandian fumed, Saakashvili has refused to return repeated calls
from President Sargsian, an the Georgian PM has ignored calls from
his Armenian counterpart 'for more than a week.' The final indignity,
according to the FM, was when FM Tkeshelashvili arrived at Yerevan
airport at 4:00am on August 15 en route overland to Tbilisi and
declined Nalbandian's proposal for a short airport meeting at that
hour. Tkeshelashvili said she was 'under instructions' to return to
Tbilisi immediately. 'What more do they want from us?' Nalbandian asked
rhetorically. He said that the GOAM is 'avoiding any negative public
statements about Georgia,' and warned that were such a statement to
be issued, the reaction of ethnic Armenians in Javakheti would be
'very dangerous' for Georgia. Despite the obvious threat behind his
words, Nalbandian insisted that 'this is not a card we could play'
with Georgia, but 'just a reality.'
4. (C) GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR TRYING: CDA spoke briefly with the
Georgian Ambassador August 15, after signing the embassy condolence
book. When CDA gave a brief synopsis of the meeting with Nalbandian,
the Georgian ambassador said he had been working the phones with
Tbilisi for several days to try to set up a Saakashvili-Sargsian call,
but to no avail. Although he expressed frustration at Tbilisi's lack
of responsiveness, he attributed the failure to the exigencies of the
current emergency rather than to any desire to slight the Armenians.
The Ambassador added that he would inform Saakashvili's office in
his next communication that the American Charge had been called in
by Nalbandian about this issue.
5. (C) MEDIATION IDEA UNANSWERED: Polchief spoke several YEREVAN
00000653 002 OF 002 times this week with Major General Hayk Kotanjian,
a strongly pro-Western thinker in the MOD, who retains close ties to
President Sargsian from the latter's long tenure as defense minister.
Kotanjian was eager to position President Sargsian as a potential U.S.
and Georgian back-channel to PM Putin to help defuse the conflict,
noting that Sargsian has good access to Putin and other senior Russian
leaders. Kotanjian said he had spoken to President Sargsian, and the
president was primed and ready to act in this capacity. Post conveyed
this offer to Embassy Tbilisi by classified e-mail.
6. (C) COMMENT: Armenian leaders initially accepted the (very valid)
arguments of Georgian preoccupation with urgent crisis management, but
are beginning to suspect that the GOG is snubbing the GOAM on purpose.
This hypothesis is only fueled by the still-unexplained temporary
hold-up of Armenian goods at Poti and Sadakhlo, while at the same time,
Armenians insist, Azerbaijani cargo passed through unimpeded.
While we consistently try to soothe Armenian pique and point out that
Georgia is in severe crisis mode, receptivity to this explanation
has waned. The suspicion is that the Georgians are taking out their
anti-Russian rage on neighboring Armenia, counting Armenia a close
friend of Russia, and one that can be more easily snubbed. This is
particularly upsetting to Armenians because they believe they have
bent over backward to be even-handed, to reach out in good faith to
Georgian leaders, to insist that Russia not use Armenian-based forces
in Georgia, to welcome Georgian refugees with open arms (waiving
passport and document requirements, dispatching the Migration Agency
chief to the border to smooth every difficulty), and to facilitate
any kind of humanitarian aid shipment to Georgia via Yerevan. In
truth, Armenian leaders do not want to be purely dependent on Russia,
and see Armenia's strong strategic interest in maintaining strong,
good-neighbor relations with Georgia. If Georgia's cold shoulder
treatment continues, Armenian leaders may start to complain publicly
in the press, partly out of anger and partly out of political
self-defense, to head off opposition criticism. Another aggravating
factor in the Armenian reaction, we suspect, is that top Armenian
officials are all new in their jobs, still taking their first steps
on the world stage, and not yet feeling fully comfortable or secure
in their new roles. Perceived slights are probably being felt more
keenly than would be the case with more seasoned officials. PENNINGTON
From: Baghdasarian
Lragir.am News
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/politics23215.html
10:42:11 - 05/09/2011
Created: 2008-08-15 12:58
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Source: US Embassy
SUBJECT: TFGG01: ARMENIAN FRUSTRATION MOUNTS OVER PERCEIVED GEORGIAN
SNUBS, IN THE FACE OF SINCERE ARMENIAN AIMS TO BE HELPFUL REF:
YEREVAN 649 Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Top Armenian officials are growing increasingly
offended by Georgians's non-responsiveness to Armenian efforts to
reach out. The most discourteous, perhaps, was the Georgian FM's
refusal even to meet FM Nalbandian for a few minutes in Yerevan
airport, as she passed through en route overland to Georgia in the
early morning of August 15. President Sargsian is starting to take
domestic criticism for his presumed 'failure' to call Saakashvili,
after he did call President Medvedev. Armenians feel their good
intentions have been met with an undeserved cold shoulder. Both the
president and foreign minister remain new enough in their jobs for
such perceived slights to sting more than perhaps would be the case
of more seasoned hands. END SUMMARY>
2. (C) AN ATTEMPT AT BALANCE: Armenian officials are growing
increasingly agitated, in private meetings with CDA, about the
continuing refusal of their Georgian counterparts to take their calls,
whether at the presidential, prime minister, or foreign minister
level. A key presidential aide confided to CDA that President
Sargsian had wanted to call Presidents Saakashvili and Medvedev on
the same day, so as to avoid any appearance of Armenian bias between
the two sides, but that when Medvedev took the call and Saakashvili
did not, the appearance of pro-Russian preference was created. After
repeated attempts to get a call through, Sargsian finally just sent
a letter to Saakashvili, in a substitute effort to show support
for the Georgian side. Local opposition newspapers have already
sharply criticized President Sargsian for calling Medvedev and not
phoning Saakashvili, and have accused him of sacrificing Armenia's
national interests in a misguided effort to cozy up to Russia. This
is galling to Sargsian after his efforts to get Saakashvili on the
telephone to offer condolences and assistance. The Prime Minister,
likewise, was frustrated (reftel) by his inability to reach his
Georgian counterpart to discuss trade and transportation issues
which are of critical importance to the Armenian economy. Meanwhile,
Armenian officials have kept their public statements about Georgia
determinedly positive, even as their private exasperation mounts,
though they have begun to suggest that they will take a sharper public
tone if the cold shoulder from Tbilisi continues much longer.
3. (C) FM'S PIQUE: The Foreign Minister called in CDA August 15 for a
one on one meeting, in which he vented his own simmering frustration,
over what he termed Georgia's 'hostile attitude.' Visibly agitated,
FM Nalbandian noted that Armenia is trying to help Georgia by taking
in more than 4,000 refugees and offering to serve as a humanitarian
corridor for international relief efforts. He stressed that Armenia
needs a good relationship with Georgia not only for economic reasons,
but also for its contribution to regional stability. Nalbandian added
that the GOAM had meticulously avoided any statements that could
be construed as siding with the Russians. Despite these efforts,
Nalbandian fumed, Saakashvili has refused to return repeated calls
from President Sargsian, an the Georgian PM has ignored calls from
his Armenian counterpart 'for more than a week.' The final indignity,
according to the FM, was when FM Tkeshelashvili arrived at Yerevan
airport at 4:00am on August 15 en route overland to Tbilisi and
declined Nalbandian's proposal for a short airport meeting at that
hour. Tkeshelashvili said she was 'under instructions' to return to
Tbilisi immediately. 'What more do they want from us?' Nalbandian asked
rhetorically. He said that the GOAM is 'avoiding any negative public
statements about Georgia,' and warned that were such a statement to
be issued, the reaction of ethnic Armenians in Javakheti would be
'very dangerous' for Georgia. Despite the obvious threat behind his
words, Nalbandian insisted that 'this is not a card we could play'
with Georgia, but 'just a reality.'
4. (C) GEORGIAN AMBASSADOR TRYING: CDA spoke briefly with the
Georgian Ambassador August 15, after signing the embassy condolence
book. When CDA gave a brief synopsis of the meeting with Nalbandian,
the Georgian ambassador said he had been working the phones with
Tbilisi for several days to try to set up a Saakashvili-Sargsian call,
but to no avail. Although he expressed frustration at Tbilisi's lack
of responsiveness, he attributed the failure to the exigencies of the
current emergency rather than to any desire to slight the Armenians.
The Ambassador added that he would inform Saakashvili's office in
his next communication that the American Charge had been called in
by Nalbandian about this issue.
5. (C) MEDIATION IDEA UNANSWERED: Polchief spoke several YEREVAN
00000653 002 OF 002 times this week with Major General Hayk Kotanjian,
a strongly pro-Western thinker in the MOD, who retains close ties to
President Sargsian from the latter's long tenure as defense minister.
Kotanjian was eager to position President Sargsian as a potential U.S.
and Georgian back-channel to PM Putin to help defuse the conflict,
noting that Sargsian has good access to Putin and other senior Russian
leaders. Kotanjian said he had spoken to President Sargsian, and the
president was primed and ready to act in this capacity. Post conveyed
this offer to Embassy Tbilisi by classified e-mail.
6. (C) COMMENT: Armenian leaders initially accepted the (very valid)
arguments of Georgian preoccupation with urgent crisis management, but
are beginning to suspect that the GOG is snubbing the GOAM on purpose.
This hypothesis is only fueled by the still-unexplained temporary
hold-up of Armenian goods at Poti and Sadakhlo, while at the same time,
Armenians insist, Azerbaijani cargo passed through unimpeded.
While we consistently try to soothe Armenian pique and point out that
Georgia is in severe crisis mode, receptivity to this explanation
has waned. The suspicion is that the Georgians are taking out their
anti-Russian rage on neighboring Armenia, counting Armenia a close
friend of Russia, and one that can be more easily snubbed. This is
particularly upsetting to Armenians because they believe they have
bent over backward to be even-handed, to reach out in good faith to
Georgian leaders, to insist that Russia not use Armenian-based forces
in Georgia, to welcome Georgian refugees with open arms (waiving
passport and document requirements, dispatching the Migration Agency
chief to the border to smooth every difficulty), and to facilitate
any kind of humanitarian aid shipment to Georgia via Yerevan. In
truth, Armenian leaders do not want to be purely dependent on Russia,
and see Armenia's strong strategic interest in maintaining strong,
good-neighbor relations with Georgia. If Georgia's cold shoulder
treatment continues, Armenian leaders may start to complain publicly
in the press, partly out of anger and partly out of political
self-defense, to head off opposition criticism. Another aggravating
factor in the Armenian reaction, we suspect, is that top Armenian
officials are all new in their jobs, still taking their first steps
on the world stage, and not yet feeling fully comfortable or secure
in their new roles. Perceived slights are probably being felt more
keenly than would be the case with more seasoned officials. PENNINGTON
From: Baghdasarian