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AZERBAIJAN TOLD U.S. IT WANTS "FULL MEMBERSHIP" IN NATO
by Joshua Kucera
EurasiaNet.org
Sept 5 2011
NY
Azerbaijan's defense minister told U.S. officials that the country was
interested in "active cooperation with NATO up to full membership" but
couldn't say so publicly, according to a diplomatic cable recently
released by Wikileaks. The cable recounts a 2007 meeting between
Defense Minister Safar Abiyev and a U.S. delegation from the Pentagon
and State Department headed by then-Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Peter Rodman:
Abiyev said that Azerbaijan's cooperation with NATO had a goal
in mind. He said that this goal "could not be announced, for
certain reasons" at present, but that Azerbaijan sought "active
cooperation with NATO up to full membership". He said that the ongoing
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the only inhibitor of Azerbaijan moving
even more quickly with NATO: "It is time for more serious, more active
steps by the US in Minsk Group. Our cooperation with the US and NATO
would be more open and more decisive in this case."
There is ample reason for suspicion here. It's not clear what the
"certain reasons" for Baku's reticence were, perhaps the fear of a bad
Iranian or Russian reaction, an issue that's frequently cited in the
cables from Baku. There is reason to doubt the sincerity of that fear
(see below). But even if you take the Azerbaijanis at their word,
if you can't even announce publicly that you want to join NATO,
the obstacles are so daunting as to make any such wish meaningless.
The last part of that quote suggests (though the cable writer doesn't
say this) that Azerbaijan wanted to dangle NATO cooperation as a
carrot to get the U.S. to take its side in the Nagorno Karabakh
negotiations, or perhaps to get the U.S. Congressional restrictions
on arms provisions to Azerbaijan overturned. Perhaps there has been
a shift in attitude in Baku since 2007, but as my colleague Shahin
Abbasov reported earlier this summer, what little Azerbaijan-NATO
cooperation had existed seems to be declining.
But that hasn't stopped the U.S. from continuing to push more forms of
military cooperation. Another cable, from 2009, discussed the visit of
the commanding general of U.S. Air Forces Europe General Roger Brady
to the airfield at Nasosnaya, near Baku, which the U.S. was inspecting
as a potential replacement for the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan. The
airport had already been renovated with U.S. money, and Azerbaijani
officials brought up the possibility of further renovations, with the
costs shared by the U.S. and Azerbaijan. "There may well be potential
at Nasosnaya, particularly if Manas' future was again in doubt,"
the cable's author wrote.
Another cable discusses Azerbaijan's contributions to the
transportation of U.S. military cargo overland to Afghanistan on the
Northern Distribution Network. It contains a remarkable statistic:
as of 2009, when the cable was written, fully 96 percent of the
container traffic through Baku's sea terminal was NDN-related.
And the cable again presents Azerbaijan as a willing partner behind the
scenes, but unwilling to make its desire for a closer alliance public.
Baku would also be very sensitive to pressure from Russia and Iran
if it consented to lethal transit within the NDN framework. The
Azerbaijanis' reaction when the idea of NATO AWACS overflight was
floated in Brussels in late August 2009, as well as the skittishness
of the Foreign Ministry in April 2009 over approval of the REGIONAL
RESPONSE 09 military exercise, and the ongoing example of the MFA's
stubborn resistance to a train-and-equip program linked to an expanded
deployment all suggest that Azerbaijan's enthusiasm for overt signs
of increasing closeness to the United States is waning.
Yet, the cables from Baku frequently describe Baku's repeated attempts
to get arms provisions from the U.S. It doesn't get too much more
"overt," to use the U.S. Embassy's word, than weapons sales. Why
aren't they afraid of Iran and Russia's reaction if they were to buy
American weapons? It seems like they profess to be worried about that
reaction when the U.S. wants something from them, but when they want
something from the U.S., it's not such a big deal.
by Joshua Kucera
EurasiaNet.org
Sept 5 2011
NY
Azerbaijan's defense minister told U.S. officials that the country was
interested in "active cooperation with NATO up to full membership" but
couldn't say so publicly, according to a diplomatic cable recently
released by Wikileaks. The cable recounts a 2007 meeting between
Defense Minister Safar Abiyev and a U.S. delegation from the Pentagon
and State Department headed by then-Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Peter Rodman:
Abiyev said that Azerbaijan's cooperation with NATO had a goal
in mind. He said that this goal "could not be announced, for
certain reasons" at present, but that Azerbaijan sought "active
cooperation with NATO up to full membership". He said that the ongoing
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was the only inhibitor of Azerbaijan moving
even more quickly with NATO: "It is time for more serious, more active
steps by the US in Minsk Group. Our cooperation with the US and NATO
would be more open and more decisive in this case."
There is ample reason for suspicion here. It's not clear what the
"certain reasons" for Baku's reticence were, perhaps the fear of a bad
Iranian or Russian reaction, an issue that's frequently cited in the
cables from Baku. There is reason to doubt the sincerity of that fear
(see below). But even if you take the Azerbaijanis at their word,
if you can't even announce publicly that you want to join NATO,
the obstacles are so daunting as to make any such wish meaningless.
The last part of that quote suggests (though the cable writer doesn't
say this) that Azerbaijan wanted to dangle NATO cooperation as a
carrot to get the U.S. to take its side in the Nagorno Karabakh
negotiations, or perhaps to get the U.S. Congressional restrictions
on arms provisions to Azerbaijan overturned. Perhaps there has been
a shift in attitude in Baku since 2007, but as my colleague Shahin
Abbasov reported earlier this summer, what little Azerbaijan-NATO
cooperation had existed seems to be declining.
But that hasn't stopped the U.S. from continuing to push more forms of
military cooperation. Another cable, from 2009, discussed the visit of
the commanding general of U.S. Air Forces Europe General Roger Brady
to the airfield at Nasosnaya, near Baku, which the U.S. was inspecting
as a potential replacement for the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan. The
airport had already been renovated with U.S. money, and Azerbaijani
officials brought up the possibility of further renovations, with the
costs shared by the U.S. and Azerbaijan. "There may well be potential
at Nasosnaya, particularly if Manas' future was again in doubt,"
the cable's author wrote.
Another cable discusses Azerbaijan's contributions to the
transportation of U.S. military cargo overland to Afghanistan on the
Northern Distribution Network. It contains a remarkable statistic:
as of 2009, when the cable was written, fully 96 percent of the
container traffic through Baku's sea terminal was NDN-related.
And the cable again presents Azerbaijan as a willing partner behind the
scenes, but unwilling to make its desire for a closer alliance public.
Baku would also be very sensitive to pressure from Russia and Iran
if it consented to lethal transit within the NDN framework. The
Azerbaijanis' reaction when the idea of NATO AWACS overflight was
floated in Brussels in late August 2009, as well as the skittishness
of the Foreign Ministry in April 2009 over approval of the REGIONAL
RESPONSE 09 military exercise, and the ongoing example of the MFA's
stubborn resistance to a train-and-equip program linked to an expanded
deployment all suggest that Azerbaijan's enthusiasm for overt signs
of increasing closeness to the United States is waning.
Yet, the cables from Baku frequently describe Baku's repeated attempts
to get arms provisions from the U.S. It doesn't get too much more
"overt," to use the U.S. Embassy's word, than weapons sales. Why
aren't they afraid of Iran and Russia's reaction if they were to buy
American weapons? It seems like they profess to be worried about that
reaction when the U.S. wants something from them, but when they want
something from the U.S., it's not such a big deal.