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  • Turkey Would Be Better Neighbor For Armenia In Straitjacket Of EU -

    TURKEY WOULD BE BETTER NEIGHBOR FOR ARMENIA IN STRAITJACKET OF EU - INTERVIEW
    By Aram Gareginyan

    news.am
    Sept 5 2011
    Armenia

    Talks of Turkey and the EU over membership are still pending -
    but for Armenia it might as well be better otherwise. EU admission,
    long sought by Turkey, may impose certain guidelines in political
    behavior - particularly treating the Genocide issue. In an interview
    to Armenian News - NEWS.am, political analyst, head of the Center for
    Regional Studies, Richard Giragosyan, gives another possible scenario
    of Genocide recognition process - involvement of the Israeli lobby
    in Congress, in response to the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador
    to Ankara.

    Do you think that the recent agreement between Turkey and the US on
    stationing NATO's missile defense radar in the country could have
    repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Iran?

    It could, but more interesting are the repercussions on the relations
    between Turkey and Russia. They have been moving closer together
    over energy, diplomacy, geopolitics for several years. Even on the
    Protocols Russia was generally supportive. This is the first time
    Turkey is doing something that Russia does not like. And for me it's
    most interesting and significant because it is the first real test to
    see how deep and how strong the relationship between Russia and Turkey
    is. And we're not sure what Russia will do. Because this is, in fact,
    the same missile defense plan involving Poland and Czech Republic,
    that Russia was so strongly against. From the Turkish perspective it's
    interesting too, because despite the negative reaction from Russia,
    Turkey has decided to go further with this in order to bolster its
    own role in the region. Over the past two years Turkey was not acting
    in the interest of the United States - on Iran, in a deal with Brazil.

    Even with Armenia on the Protocols in was not an American plan. They
    didn't brief the Americans, and the Americans were upset. Now this
    is the second time Turkey is moving in the direction of being an
    American ally again. The first one was Syria: Hilary Clinton went to
    Turkey, the Turkish foreign minister went to Syria. The interesting
    thing from the Turkish perspective is what price the Americans had to
    pay to get Turkey to agree. That we don't know. It could be American
    cooperation, or abstaining from criticizing Turkey's military attacks
    against Kurdish villages and positions in Northern Iraq.

    So Iran is merely a pretext, and the move is directed against Russia?

    Not in military terms, but politically - yes. Or it may be Turkey's
    attempt to show Russia that Turkey is strong and important and may
    deserve more from Russia. That could be Turkey's style of gamble.

    Regarding Iran, whether or not these defensive systems are in Turkey
    is less important, because Iran has no alternative but to try to use
    Turkey as a mediator or a broker, having limited options. What's
    interesting from the Armenian perspective is there's no statement
    or reaction. What Armenia should do is go to the European Union
    and say - we have good relations with Iran: let us help and advise
    you on European policy toward Iran or to be a neutral platform. In
    other words, Armenian foreign policy in this case shows more missed
    opportunities, because there's no energy and no creativity in the
    Foreign Ministry.

    Do you think the EU could heed to Armenian recommendations?

    Definitely. In terms of either the Eastern partnership, or the
    EU foreign ministerial initiative. Armenia is the only country in
    the bigger region, in the whole Black sea region, that can play a
    constructive role. It's the only country in the region that has good
    relations with Iran and the West. Turkey, for its own purposes, is
    playing a role. But Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, is the
    only neighbor of Iran that can be a messenger, or mediator.

    Do you think that Russia possesses enough leverage to influence the
    political behavior of Turkey?

    I think not too much of leverage. In many ways the relationship
    between Turkey and Russia in my opinion is a bad marriage; it's not
    bound to last very long. They are historical and regional rivals. And
    there will come a point when Turkey and Russia begin to clash. The
    other thing that's interesting is Turkey trying to promote itself
    as a bigger regional power, which also directly threatens Russian
    interests and power in the South Caucasus. In Armenian perspective
    this is probably a positive development, because the more problems
    between Russia and Turkey, the better for Armenia, in this context.

    Do you regard the current signs of Islamisation of Turkish policy as
    a lasting trend?

    Lasting as far as the AKP government is in power. Yes, it is an
    Islamist oriented government, but this is not just about Islam. This
    is about who wants to be stronger in the Middle East. The reason
    that Turkish-Israeli relations have declined so much, is that Turkey
    doesn't see a need for Israel any more. And Turkey wants to win
    over the Arab masses, especially after the change of governments in
    Tunisia/Egypt, now possibly Libya/Syria. Now Turkey wants to emerge as
    the leader. Which is ironic, because, even under the Ottoman Empire,
    most of the Arabs in the region hated the Turks. They remember
    the Ottoman Empire, and the Genocide. But what's interesting,
    is by being anti-Israeli, Turkey is being very populist in the
    Middle East. The other interesting thing is that Turkish government
    is using its problems with Israel as a way to weaken the Turkish
    military by cutting off military ties between the Turkish military
    and one of its key supporter, the Israelis. So it's also about
    internal Turkish politics as well. From the Armenian perspective this
    greatly strengthens the Genocide issue. For many years the Israelis,
    because of the relationship with Turkey, have helped to sabotage or
    damage Genocide recognition efforts. Now the Israeli lobby in the
    United States and in Europe may actually turn around and support the
    Genocide issue to get revenge against Turkey. So in terms of Genocide
    recognition, this is a big change and a much more powerful development
    against Turkey and for Genocide recognition.

    Do you think that the Genocide bill will finally get underway in
    Knesset?

    It could, but my point is not just the Knesset, but the Congress. You
    will see the Genocide bill being seen no longer just an Armenian
    issue, but a convenient way for many of the Jewish lobby to use it
    as a stick to beat up Turkey. It's not exactly a good reason for us
    pursuing Genocide recognition, but it will strengthen the campaign.

    Do you view the Islamisation of Turkey just as an imitational move,
    or the government does plan to make the society more Islam-oriented?

    It's worth consideration. We don't know yet whether it's the AKP
    government, Islamist at its core, that is leading the Islamisation of
    Turkey, or it's the population becoming more Islamic, and therefore the
    government is playing on that in terms of getting more power. In other
    words, the trend of Islamisation in Turkey could be from the bottom up,
    not necessarily top down. But it also changes the meaning of Islamic
    government. The trend of Turkey is not like the trend of Iran. This
    isn't about establishing an Islamic state. This is about finding a way
    to be less secular and more democratic. But we're not sure if Turkey
    will succeed. The other thing from an interesting Armenian perspective,
    since Turkey is on the border: the military, the secular reaction, the
    Ataturk camp against the Islamic government of Turkey. They haven't
    lost yet. They may still be a powerful counter-reaction or even
    counterrevolution against the Turkish trend of Islamic politics. And
    Armenia should actually consider the different scenarios, and plan
    for the outcome of the battle for the future of Turkey. And I don't
    think this has been thought of enough.

    Do you think that moving off its secular policy may freeze talks of
    Turkey with EU over membership?

    Perhaps I'm wrong, but over the past year and a half, even after
    meeting with Turkish officials in Turkey, my opinion is that the
    Turkish strategy has changed. It's no longer begging to join the
    European Union. It's much more now about making Turkey stronger, so
    that the European Union will need Turkey more than Turkey needs the
    European Union. That's the danger, and that's a new strategy. From
    the Armenian perspective, in the future, I would personally like
    to see Turkey in the European Union. Mainly because Turkey would be
    better as a neighbor and less dangerous within the straight jacket
    of the European Union. Because after joining the EU, Turkey would
    be much more accountable in treating Armenian issues, addressing
    the Genocide, historical legacies, property restitution. But most
    importantly, Turkey would also have to reduce is military, no longer
    be as aggressive or threatening either to Armenia or the Kurds,
    would have to play a different game with Azerbaijan. This would leave
    Turkey less room to maneuver to be a hostile neighbor. For that reason,
    Turkey within the European Union, and within a bigger European Union,
    may be a better neighbor to Armenia. This would also bring the EU
    borders to the Armenian border.

    Military cooperation of US and Turkey has been uneven over the last
    decade. Why do you think the US still seek partnership?

    What we see is for years or decades it was always the Pentagon, the
    US military that defended Turkey even when they shouldn't have to,
    regarding the Genocide or relations with Armenia. And it was the State
    department who was pushing Turkey. Now it's the opposite, it's actually
    the Pentagon that is still upset with Turkey, and still no longer
    sees the need for Turkey. Now that the Americans are in Afghanistan,
    in Iraq, have a different role in the Middle East, they need Turkish
    military assistance much less than before. And even Turkey as a NATO
    member is a different Turkey. It sees the Black Sea not within the
    angle of NATO or cooperation with the US, but much more a Turkish sea,
    or in cooperation with Russia. So I think the military relation has
    changed dynamically, probably will never recover to what it was. And
    I think this is probably good for the region. Because for too long
    Turkey has been seen as a loyal NATO ally. But it wasn't really loyal,
    and it wasn't much of an ally, if we really analyze it.

    What could you say of Turkey' efforts to get a foothold at Balkans,
    manifested in recent statements of support to Bosnia by Davutoglu on
    his Balkan tour?

    In fact, in general Turkish foreign policy, especially with Davutoglu,
    has prioritized the Balkans and the Turks rom the Balkans. But
    what's interesting is the problem it demonstrates. In my opinion, the
    weakness of Turkish foreign policy is it's over-extended. It doesn't
    prioritize. It wants to be active in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Bosnia,
    Cyprus, Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Russia, Brazil and Iran, Sudan, North
    Korea - do all these things at once. And it's much over-confident and
    over-extended. And this will be the downfall. If Turkey is trying all
    these initiatives in foreign policy, if it doesn't give a 100 percent,
    it will fail in many attempts, rather than succeeding in fewer ones.

    This may actually bring Turkey back to the Armenian issue, because,
    according to many Turkish foreign ministry officials, they may return
    to the Armenian-Turkish border opening and diplomatic relations, the
    essence of the Protocols, because they are failing in other areas of
    foreign policy. And this one is maybe smaller and easier for them to
    accomplish, according to their thinking.

    Do you think that the Protocols would be raised again in Turkish
    Parliament?

    No. According to what I'm seeing as an analyst, the Protocols are dead,
    and will never come back. Not in Turkey, not in Armenia. What's going
    on now in my opinion, is diplomacy of a much more limited nature to try
    to reach an agreement on the terms of the Protocols - border opening,
    diplomatic relations. But not on the Protocols themselves.

    Because Turkey realizes it made a strategic mistake with the Protocols
    in underestimating the Azerbaijan's reaction. So I don't think it will
    go back to them. From the Armenian side, it doesn't make sense trying
    to resurrect the Protocols. Regarding the historical sub-commission
    issue, what's good about the current situation, is it's only about
    border opening and diplomatic relations first. There's no more talk
    from the Turkish side, if you notice, about any sub-commission on the
    historical issues. So there's less of danger of weakening or selling
    out Armenia's defense of the Genocide issue.



    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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