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TURKEY WOULD BE BETTER NEIGHBOR FOR ARMENIA IN STRAITJACKET OF EU - INTERVIEW
By Aram Gareginyan
news.am
Sept 5 2011
Armenia
Talks of Turkey and the EU over membership are still pending -
but for Armenia it might as well be better otherwise. EU admission,
long sought by Turkey, may impose certain guidelines in political
behavior - particularly treating the Genocide issue. In an interview
to Armenian News - NEWS.am, political analyst, head of the Center for
Regional Studies, Richard Giragosyan, gives another possible scenario
of Genocide recognition process - involvement of the Israeli lobby
in Congress, in response to the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador
to Ankara.
Do you think that the recent agreement between Turkey and the US on
stationing NATO's missile defense radar in the country could have
repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Iran?
It could, but more interesting are the repercussions on the relations
between Turkey and Russia. They have been moving closer together
over energy, diplomacy, geopolitics for several years. Even on the
Protocols Russia was generally supportive. This is the first time
Turkey is doing something that Russia does not like. And for me it's
most interesting and significant because it is the first real test to
see how deep and how strong the relationship between Russia and Turkey
is. And we're not sure what Russia will do. Because this is, in fact,
the same missile defense plan involving Poland and Czech Republic,
that Russia was so strongly against. From the Turkish perspective it's
interesting too, because despite the negative reaction from Russia,
Turkey has decided to go further with this in order to bolster its
own role in the region. Over the past two years Turkey was not acting
in the interest of the United States - on Iran, in a deal with Brazil.
Even with Armenia on the Protocols in was not an American plan. They
didn't brief the Americans, and the Americans were upset. Now this
is the second time Turkey is moving in the direction of being an
American ally again. The first one was Syria: Hilary Clinton went to
Turkey, the Turkish foreign minister went to Syria. The interesting
thing from the Turkish perspective is what price the Americans had to
pay to get Turkey to agree. That we don't know. It could be American
cooperation, or abstaining from criticizing Turkey's military attacks
against Kurdish villages and positions in Northern Iraq.
So Iran is merely a pretext, and the move is directed against Russia?
Not in military terms, but politically - yes. Or it may be Turkey's
attempt to show Russia that Turkey is strong and important and may
deserve more from Russia. That could be Turkey's style of gamble.
Regarding Iran, whether or not these defensive systems are in Turkey
is less important, because Iran has no alternative but to try to use
Turkey as a mediator or a broker, having limited options. What's
interesting from the Armenian perspective is there's no statement
or reaction. What Armenia should do is go to the European Union
and say - we have good relations with Iran: let us help and advise
you on European policy toward Iran or to be a neutral platform. In
other words, Armenian foreign policy in this case shows more missed
opportunities, because there's no energy and no creativity in the
Foreign Ministry.
Do you think the EU could heed to Armenian recommendations?
Definitely. In terms of either the Eastern partnership, or the
EU foreign ministerial initiative. Armenia is the only country in
the bigger region, in the whole Black sea region, that can play a
constructive role. It's the only country in the region that has good
relations with Iran and the West. Turkey, for its own purposes, is
playing a role. But Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, is the
only neighbor of Iran that can be a messenger, or mediator.
Do you think that Russia possesses enough leverage to influence the
political behavior of Turkey?
I think not too much of leverage. In many ways the relationship
between Turkey and Russia in my opinion is a bad marriage; it's not
bound to last very long. They are historical and regional rivals. And
there will come a point when Turkey and Russia begin to clash. The
other thing that's interesting is Turkey trying to promote itself
as a bigger regional power, which also directly threatens Russian
interests and power in the South Caucasus. In Armenian perspective
this is probably a positive development, because the more problems
between Russia and Turkey, the better for Armenia, in this context.
Do you regard the current signs of Islamisation of Turkish policy as
a lasting trend?
Lasting as far as the AKP government is in power. Yes, it is an
Islamist oriented government, but this is not just about Islam. This
is about who wants to be stronger in the Middle East. The reason
that Turkish-Israeli relations have declined so much, is that Turkey
doesn't see a need for Israel any more. And Turkey wants to win
over the Arab masses, especially after the change of governments in
Tunisia/Egypt, now possibly Libya/Syria. Now Turkey wants to emerge as
the leader. Which is ironic, because, even under the Ottoman Empire,
most of the Arabs in the region hated the Turks. They remember
the Ottoman Empire, and the Genocide. But what's interesting,
is by being anti-Israeli, Turkey is being very populist in the
Middle East. The other interesting thing is that Turkish government
is using its problems with Israel as a way to weaken the Turkish
military by cutting off military ties between the Turkish military
and one of its key supporter, the Israelis. So it's also about
internal Turkish politics as well. From the Armenian perspective this
greatly strengthens the Genocide issue. For many years the Israelis,
because of the relationship with Turkey, have helped to sabotage or
damage Genocide recognition efforts. Now the Israeli lobby in the
United States and in Europe may actually turn around and support the
Genocide issue to get revenge against Turkey. So in terms of Genocide
recognition, this is a big change and a much more powerful development
against Turkey and for Genocide recognition.
Do you think that the Genocide bill will finally get underway in
Knesset?
It could, but my point is not just the Knesset, but the Congress. You
will see the Genocide bill being seen no longer just an Armenian
issue, but a convenient way for many of the Jewish lobby to use it
as a stick to beat up Turkey. It's not exactly a good reason for us
pursuing Genocide recognition, but it will strengthen the campaign.
Do you view the Islamisation of Turkey just as an imitational move,
or the government does plan to make the society more Islam-oriented?
It's worth consideration. We don't know yet whether it's the AKP
government, Islamist at its core, that is leading the Islamisation of
Turkey, or it's the population becoming more Islamic, and therefore the
government is playing on that in terms of getting more power. In other
words, the trend of Islamisation in Turkey could be from the bottom up,
not necessarily top down. But it also changes the meaning of Islamic
government. The trend of Turkey is not like the trend of Iran. This
isn't about establishing an Islamic state. This is about finding a way
to be less secular and more democratic. But we're not sure if Turkey
will succeed. The other thing from an interesting Armenian perspective,
since Turkey is on the border: the military, the secular reaction, the
Ataturk camp against the Islamic government of Turkey. They haven't
lost yet. They may still be a powerful counter-reaction or even
counterrevolution against the Turkish trend of Islamic politics. And
Armenia should actually consider the different scenarios, and plan
for the outcome of the battle for the future of Turkey. And I don't
think this has been thought of enough.
Do you think that moving off its secular policy may freeze talks of
Turkey with EU over membership?
Perhaps I'm wrong, but over the past year and a half, even after
meeting with Turkish officials in Turkey, my opinion is that the
Turkish strategy has changed. It's no longer begging to join the
European Union. It's much more now about making Turkey stronger, so
that the European Union will need Turkey more than Turkey needs the
European Union. That's the danger, and that's a new strategy. From
the Armenian perspective, in the future, I would personally like
to see Turkey in the European Union. Mainly because Turkey would be
better as a neighbor and less dangerous within the straight jacket
of the European Union. Because after joining the EU, Turkey would
be much more accountable in treating Armenian issues, addressing
the Genocide, historical legacies, property restitution. But most
importantly, Turkey would also have to reduce is military, no longer
be as aggressive or threatening either to Armenia or the Kurds,
would have to play a different game with Azerbaijan. This would leave
Turkey less room to maneuver to be a hostile neighbor. For that reason,
Turkey within the European Union, and within a bigger European Union,
may be a better neighbor to Armenia. This would also bring the EU
borders to the Armenian border.
Military cooperation of US and Turkey has been uneven over the last
decade. Why do you think the US still seek partnership?
What we see is for years or decades it was always the Pentagon, the
US military that defended Turkey even when they shouldn't have to,
regarding the Genocide or relations with Armenia. And it was the State
department who was pushing Turkey. Now it's the opposite, it's actually
the Pentagon that is still upset with Turkey, and still no longer
sees the need for Turkey. Now that the Americans are in Afghanistan,
in Iraq, have a different role in the Middle East, they need Turkish
military assistance much less than before. And even Turkey as a NATO
member is a different Turkey. It sees the Black Sea not within the
angle of NATO or cooperation with the US, but much more a Turkish sea,
or in cooperation with Russia. So I think the military relation has
changed dynamically, probably will never recover to what it was. And
I think this is probably good for the region. Because for too long
Turkey has been seen as a loyal NATO ally. But it wasn't really loyal,
and it wasn't much of an ally, if we really analyze it.
What could you say of Turkey' efforts to get a foothold at Balkans,
manifested in recent statements of support to Bosnia by Davutoglu on
his Balkan tour?
In fact, in general Turkish foreign policy, especially with Davutoglu,
has prioritized the Balkans and the Turks rom the Balkans. But
what's interesting is the problem it demonstrates. In my opinion, the
weakness of Turkish foreign policy is it's over-extended. It doesn't
prioritize. It wants to be active in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Bosnia,
Cyprus, Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Russia, Brazil and Iran, Sudan, North
Korea - do all these things at once. And it's much over-confident and
over-extended. And this will be the downfall. If Turkey is trying all
these initiatives in foreign policy, if it doesn't give a 100 percent,
it will fail in many attempts, rather than succeeding in fewer ones.
This may actually bring Turkey back to the Armenian issue, because,
according to many Turkish foreign ministry officials, they may return
to the Armenian-Turkish border opening and diplomatic relations, the
essence of the Protocols, because they are failing in other areas of
foreign policy. And this one is maybe smaller and easier for them to
accomplish, according to their thinking.
Do you think that the Protocols would be raised again in Turkish
Parliament?
No. According to what I'm seeing as an analyst, the Protocols are dead,
and will never come back. Not in Turkey, not in Armenia. What's going
on now in my opinion, is diplomacy of a much more limited nature to try
to reach an agreement on the terms of the Protocols - border opening,
diplomatic relations. But not on the Protocols themselves.
Because Turkey realizes it made a strategic mistake with the Protocols
in underestimating the Azerbaijan's reaction. So I don't think it will
go back to them. From the Armenian side, it doesn't make sense trying
to resurrect the Protocols. Regarding the historical sub-commission
issue, what's good about the current situation, is it's only about
border opening and diplomatic relations first. There's no more talk
from the Turkish side, if you notice, about any sub-commission on the
historical issues. So there's less of danger of weakening or selling
out Armenia's defense of the Genocide issue.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
By Aram Gareginyan
news.am
Sept 5 2011
Armenia
Talks of Turkey and the EU over membership are still pending -
but for Armenia it might as well be better otherwise. EU admission,
long sought by Turkey, may impose certain guidelines in political
behavior - particularly treating the Genocide issue. In an interview
to Armenian News - NEWS.am, political analyst, head of the Center for
Regional Studies, Richard Giragosyan, gives another possible scenario
of Genocide recognition process - involvement of the Israeli lobby
in Congress, in response to the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador
to Ankara.
Do you think that the recent agreement between Turkey and the US on
stationing NATO's missile defense radar in the country could have
repercussions on the relations between Turkey and Iran?
It could, but more interesting are the repercussions on the relations
between Turkey and Russia. They have been moving closer together
over energy, diplomacy, geopolitics for several years. Even on the
Protocols Russia was generally supportive. This is the first time
Turkey is doing something that Russia does not like. And for me it's
most interesting and significant because it is the first real test to
see how deep and how strong the relationship between Russia and Turkey
is. And we're not sure what Russia will do. Because this is, in fact,
the same missile defense plan involving Poland and Czech Republic,
that Russia was so strongly against. From the Turkish perspective it's
interesting too, because despite the negative reaction from Russia,
Turkey has decided to go further with this in order to bolster its
own role in the region. Over the past two years Turkey was not acting
in the interest of the United States - on Iran, in a deal with Brazil.
Even with Armenia on the Protocols in was not an American plan. They
didn't brief the Americans, and the Americans were upset. Now this
is the second time Turkey is moving in the direction of being an
American ally again. The first one was Syria: Hilary Clinton went to
Turkey, the Turkish foreign minister went to Syria. The interesting
thing from the Turkish perspective is what price the Americans had to
pay to get Turkey to agree. That we don't know. It could be American
cooperation, or abstaining from criticizing Turkey's military attacks
against Kurdish villages and positions in Northern Iraq.
So Iran is merely a pretext, and the move is directed against Russia?
Not in military terms, but politically - yes. Or it may be Turkey's
attempt to show Russia that Turkey is strong and important and may
deserve more from Russia. That could be Turkey's style of gamble.
Regarding Iran, whether or not these defensive systems are in Turkey
is less important, because Iran has no alternative but to try to use
Turkey as a mediator or a broker, having limited options. What's
interesting from the Armenian perspective is there's no statement
or reaction. What Armenia should do is go to the European Union
and say - we have good relations with Iran: let us help and advise
you on European policy toward Iran or to be a neutral platform. In
other words, Armenian foreign policy in this case shows more missed
opportunities, because there's no energy and no creativity in the
Foreign Ministry.
Do you think the EU could heed to Armenian recommendations?
Definitely. In terms of either the Eastern partnership, or the
EU foreign ministerial initiative. Armenia is the only country in
the bigger region, in the whole Black sea region, that can play a
constructive role. It's the only country in the region that has good
relations with Iran and the West. Turkey, for its own purposes, is
playing a role. But Armenia, unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, is the
only neighbor of Iran that can be a messenger, or mediator.
Do you think that Russia possesses enough leverage to influence the
political behavior of Turkey?
I think not too much of leverage. In many ways the relationship
between Turkey and Russia in my opinion is a bad marriage; it's not
bound to last very long. They are historical and regional rivals. And
there will come a point when Turkey and Russia begin to clash. The
other thing that's interesting is Turkey trying to promote itself
as a bigger regional power, which also directly threatens Russian
interests and power in the South Caucasus. In Armenian perspective
this is probably a positive development, because the more problems
between Russia and Turkey, the better for Armenia, in this context.
Do you regard the current signs of Islamisation of Turkish policy as
a lasting trend?
Lasting as far as the AKP government is in power. Yes, it is an
Islamist oriented government, but this is not just about Islam. This
is about who wants to be stronger in the Middle East. The reason
that Turkish-Israeli relations have declined so much, is that Turkey
doesn't see a need for Israel any more. And Turkey wants to win
over the Arab masses, especially after the change of governments in
Tunisia/Egypt, now possibly Libya/Syria. Now Turkey wants to emerge as
the leader. Which is ironic, because, even under the Ottoman Empire,
most of the Arabs in the region hated the Turks. They remember
the Ottoman Empire, and the Genocide. But what's interesting,
is by being anti-Israeli, Turkey is being very populist in the
Middle East. The other interesting thing is that Turkish government
is using its problems with Israel as a way to weaken the Turkish
military by cutting off military ties between the Turkish military
and one of its key supporter, the Israelis. So it's also about
internal Turkish politics as well. From the Armenian perspective this
greatly strengthens the Genocide issue. For many years the Israelis,
because of the relationship with Turkey, have helped to sabotage or
damage Genocide recognition efforts. Now the Israeli lobby in the
United States and in Europe may actually turn around and support the
Genocide issue to get revenge against Turkey. So in terms of Genocide
recognition, this is a big change and a much more powerful development
against Turkey and for Genocide recognition.
Do you think that the Genocide bill will finally get underway in
Knesset?
It could, but my point is not just the Knesset, but the Congress. You
will see the Genocide bill being seen no longer just an Armenian
issue, but a convenient way for many of the Jewish lobby to use it
as a stick to beat up Turkey. It's not exactly a good reason for us
pursuing Genocide recognition, but it will strengthen the campaign.
Do you view the Islamisation of Turkey just as an imitational move,
or the government does plan to make the society more Islam-oriented?
It's worth consideration. We don't know yet whether it's the AKP
government, Islamist at its core, that is leading the Islamisation of
Turkey, or it's the population becoming more Islamic, and therefore the
government is playing on that in terms of getting more power. In other
words, the trend of Islamisation in Turkey could be from the bottom up,
not necessarily top down. But it also changes the meaning of Islamic
government. The trend of Turkey is not like the trend of Iran. This
isn't about establishing an Islamic state. This is about finding a way
to be less secular and more democratic. But we're not sure if Turkey
will succeed. The other thing from an interesting Armenian perspective,
since Turkey is on the border: the military, the secular reaction, the
Ataturk camp against the Islamic government of Turkey. They haven't
lost yet. They may still be a powerful counter-reaction or even
counterrevolution against the Turkish trend of Islamic politics. And
Armenia should actually consider the different scenarios, and plan
for the outcome of the battle for the future of Turkey. And I don't
think this has been thought of enough.
Do you think that moving off its secular policy may freeze talks of
Turkey with EU over membership?
Perhaps I'm wrong, but over the past year and a half, even after
meeting with Turkish officials in Turkey, my opinion is that the
Turkish strategy has changed. It's no longer begging to join the
European Union. It's much more now about making Turkey stronger, so
that the European Union will need Turkey more than Turkey needs the
European Union. That's the danger, and that's a new strategy. From
the Armenian perspective, in the future, I would personally like
to see Turkey in the European Union. Mainly because Turkey would be
better as a neighbor and less dangerous within the straight jacket
of the European Union. Because after joining the EU, Turkey would
be much more accountable in treating Armenian issues, addressing
the Genocide, historical legacies, property restitution. But most
importantly, Turkey would also have to reduce is military, no longer
be as aggressive or threatening either to Armenia or the Kurds,
would have to play a different game with Azerbaijan. This would leave
Turkey less room to maneuver to be a hostile neighbor. For that reason,
Turkey within the European Union, and within a bigger European Union,
may be a better neighbor to Armenia. This would also bring the EU
borders to the Armenian border.
Military cooperation of US and Turkey has been uneven over the last
decade. Why do you think the US still seek partnership?
What we see is for years or decades it was always the Pentagon, the
US military that defended Turkey even when they shouldn't have to,
regarding the Genocide or relations with Armenia. And it was the State
department who was pushing Turkey. Now it's the opposite, it's actually
the Pentagon that is still upset with Turkey, and still no longer
sees the need for Turkey. Now that the Americans are in Afghanistan,
in Iraq, have a different role in the Middle East, they need Turkish
military assistance much less than before. And even Turkey as a NATO
member is a different Turkey. It sees the Black Sea not within the
angle of NATO or cooperation with the US, but much more a Turkish sea,
or in cooperation with Russia. So I think the military relation has
changed dynamically, probably will never recover to what it was. And
I think this is probably good for the region. Because for too long
Turkey has been seen as a loyal NATO ally. But it wasn't really loyal,
and it wasn't much of an ally, if we really analyze it.
What could you say of Turkey' efforts to get a foothold at Balkans,
manifested in recent statements of support to Bosnia by Davutoglu on
his Balkan tour?
In fact, in general Turkish foreign policy, especially with Davutoglu,
has prioritized the Balkans and the Turks rom the Balkans. But
what's interesting is the problem it demonstrates. In my opinion, the
weakness of Turkish foreign policy is it's over-extended. It doesn't
prioritize. It wants to be active in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Bosnia,
Cyprus, Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Russia, Brazil and Iran, Sudan, North
Korea - do all these things at once. And it's much over-confident and
over-extended. And this will be the downfall. If Turkey is trying all
these initiatives in foreign policy, if it doesn't give a 100 percent,
it will fail in many attempts, rather than succeeding in fewer ones.
This may actually bring Turkey back to the Armenian issue, because,
according to many Turkish foreign ministry officials, they may return
to the Armenian-Turkish border opening and diplomatic relations, the
essence of the Protocols, because they are failing in other areas of
foreign policy. And this one is maybe smaller and easier for them to
accomplish, according to their thinking.
Do you think that the Protocols would be raised again in Turkish
Parliament?
No. According to what I'm seeing as an analyst, the Protocols are dead,
and will never come back. Not in Turkey, not in Armenia. What's going
on now in my opinion, is diplomacy of a much more limited nature to try
to reach an agreement on the terms of the Protocols - border opening,
diplomatic relations. But not on the Protocols themselves.
Because Turkey realizes it made a strategic mistake with the Protocols
in underestimating the Azerbaijan's reaction. So I don't think it will
go back to them. From the Armenian side, it doesn't make sense trying
to resurrect the Protocols. Regarding the historical sub-commission
issue, what's good about the current situation, is it's only about
border opening and diplomatic relations first. There's no more talk
from the Turkish side, if you notice, about any sub-commission on the
historical issues. So there's less of danger of weakening or selling
out Armenia's defense of the Genocide issue.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress