Tweet
THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
By Kerim Balci
Today's Zaman
Sept 7 2011
Turkey
Turkish-Israeli relations cannot be isolated from the general framework
of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's self-perception (used here as
the English translation of Husserl's concept of "Selbstverstandnis")
as the mediator par excellence of the Middle East.
Within this framework, Israel is not only an "other" but also a
"third side." That means as long as Turkey has diplomatic relations
with any other actor in the Middle East, it will have to have some
kind of relationship with Israel also. The cessation of relations
with Israel altogether would not only affect Turkey and Israel but
would also bring about a multidimensional change in Turkey's foreign
policy paradigm. Turkey is either a soft power adhering to its "zero
problems with neighbors" policy, and thereby remains in communication
with Tel Aviv, or it becomes a hard power with a greater naval presence
in the eastern Mediterranean basin, ends its relations with Israel
and retains its problems with its neighbors.
This is not a critique of Turkey's recent strategy of sanctions against
the state of Israel. This is a wakeup call about the changing dynamics
of Turkish foreign policy. This should worry the Turks and the Israelis
as well as the Syrians, Greek Cypriots, Iranians, Armenians and other
neighbors of Turkey. With its rejectionist policies, Israel managed
to push Turkey to the limits of its patience and cause it to abandon
its well-considered and orchestrated new foreign policy.
I assume Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is most disturbed by
Israel's imposition on Turkey of a self-perception as a hard power. I
am sure he is lamenting the loss of the hopes of tranquility and
peace in Turkey's relations with its neighbors. From now on, every new
decision made in Ankara on foreign policy will carry a whiff of this
new reality: Ankara's increasingly harsh criticism of the Syrian regime
is not unrelated to what has happened between Turkey and Israel. We
won't find the Turkish Foreign Ministry willing to run to the rescue of
Iran in an international crisis, and we won't find Turkish diplomats
willing to engage in productive conversation with their Armenian
counterparts within the framework of this new self-perception. We
will find the Turkish Air Forces more willing to bomb the Kandil
Mountains in cases of terrorist attacks perpetrated within Turkey,
and we will certainly find Turkey more threatening towards Greek
Cypriot ambitions of establishing oil drilling facilities within
the international waters around Cyprus. But Turkey is not the one to
blame here. The Israeli government caused Ankara to become this way.
This is not to say that the transition from soft power to hard power
is a one-way metamorphosis. Turkey can, and hopefully will, turn back
to its early Davutoglu-era foreign policy principles. This would, of
course, be contingent upon Israel's decision to accede to Turkey's
demands related to the Gaza aid flotilla incident. Put in frank
and straight terms: By not apologizing and not paying compensation
to the families of the victims, and by manipulating the reports of
international bodies via its lobbying machine Israel is not losing
only one ally, it is causing the entire Middle East to lose a good
mechanism for mediation.
That early Davutoglu-era Turkish foreign policy paradigm is necessary
for the newly emerging participatory democracies of the Arab Middle
East. If 10 years from now we still find Egypt, Syria, Tunisia,
Libya and Yemen stuck in a quagmire of self-renewing dictatorships,
this will, to a certain extent, be due to Israel's unwillingness to
keep Turkey on track as an emerging soft power.
By Kerim Balci
Today's Zaman
Sept 7 2011
Turkey
Turkish-Israeli relations cannot be isolated from the general framework
of Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's self-perception (used here as
the English translation of Husserl's concept of "Selbstverstandnis")
as the mediator par excellence of the Middle East.
Within this framework, Israel is not only an "other" but also a
"third side." That means as long as Turkey has diplomatic relations
with any other actor in the Middle East, it will have to have some
kind of relationship with Israel also. The cessation of relations
with Israel altogether would not only affect Turkey and Israel but
would also bring about a multidimensional change in Turkey's foreign
policy paradigm. Turkey is either a soft power adhering to its "zero
problems with neighbors" policy, and thereby remains in communication
with Tel Aviv, or it becomes a hard power with a greater naval presence
in the eastern Mediterranean basin, ends its relations with Israel
and retains its problems with its neighbors.
This is not a critique of Turkey's recent strategy of sanctions against
the state of Israel. This is a wakeup call about the changing dynamics
of Turkish foreign policy. This should worry the Turks and the Israelis
as well as the Syrians, Greek Cypriots, Iranians, Armenians and other
neighbors of Turkey. With its rejectionist policies, Israel managed
to push Turkey to the limits of its patience and cause it to abandon
its well-considered and orchestrated new foreign policy.
I assume Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is most disturbed by
Israel's imposition on Turkey of a self-perception as a hard power. I
am sure he is lamenting the loss of the hopes of tranquility and
peace in Turkey's relations with its neighbors. From now on, every new
decision made in Ankara on foreign policy will carry a whiff of this
new reality: Ankara's increasingly harsh criticism of the Syrian regime
is not unrelated to what has happened between Turkey and Israel. We
won't find the Turkish Foreign Ministry willing to run to the rescue of
Iran in an international crisis, and we won't find Turkish diplomats
willing to engage in productive conversation with their Armenian
counterparts within the framework of this new self-perception. We
will find the Turkish Air Forces more willing to bomb the Kandil
Mountains in cases of terrorist attacks perpetrated within Turkey,
and we will certainly find Turkey more threatening towards Greek
Cypriot ambitions of establishing oil drilling facilities within
the international waters around Cyprus. But Turkey is not the one to
blame here. The Israeli government caused Ankara to become this way.
This is not to say that the transition from soft power to hard power
is a one-way metamorphosis. Turkey can, and hopefully will, turn back
to its early Davutoglu-era foreign policy principles. This would, of
course, be contingent upon Israel's decision to accede to Turkey's
demands related to the Gaza aid flotilla incident. Put in frank
and straight terms: By not apologizing and not paying compensation
to the families of the victims, and by manipulating the reports of
international bodies via its lobbying machine Israel is not losing
only one ally, it is causing the entire Middle East to lose a good
mechanism for mediation.
That early Davutoglu-era Turkish foreign policy paradigm is necessary
for the newly emerging participatory democracies of the Arab Middle
East. If 10 years from now we still find Egypt, Syria, Tunisia,
Libya and Yemen stuck in a quagmire of self-renewing dictatorships,
this will, to a certain extent, be due to Israel's unwillingness to
keep Turkey on track as an emerging soft power.