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ARMENIA AT THE INTERSECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL BLOCKS
Sergey Sargsyan
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5983
05.09.2011
Deputy Head of the Center for the Political Studies, "Noravank"
Foundation
The declaration of the intentions to intensify the works on NATO's
renovated Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) sounded during the
visit of a new NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the
Caucasus and Central Asia James Appathurai made against the background
of carrying over the announced CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces'
maneuvers in Armenia on 2012, has stirred up the discussion about the
possibilities and restrictions of cooperation of Yerevan with those
different in composition and having mostly distinct goals military
and political blocks.
Among four countries neighbouring Armenia Turkey is NATO member,
and Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia, are parts of NATO
programmes directed to the further development of cooperation with
this organization. We believe that the established opinion that NATO
simply filled the vacuum of power which emerged in the region after
the "retirement" from the stage, on different reasons, of Russia,
does not correctly reflect the situation. The shift of Georgia and
Azerbaijan towards NATO-oriented security system was conditioned by
their inability to resolve such problems as, first of all, protection
of their territorial integrity and implementation of the ambitious
economic projects within the framework of the security system
functioning after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Generally, the dynamics of signing documents and shifting to new
programmes and levels of cooperation of the countries of the South
Caucasus with NATO is rather revealing as both conclusion of frame
agreements on joining Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and
presentation of IPAP proceeded in the same sequence - first came
Georgia, then Azerbaijan, and in several months Armenia. This sequence,
though symbolically, reflects the level of interest and expectations
of those countries from setting and broadening cooperation with the
North Atlantic structures.
Georgia was and still remains the most motivated country as for
becoming NATO member, and one of the main reasons would seem to be
the lack of alternatives of the acceptable choice. In two of three
unsettled conflicts in the South Caucasus, i.e. Georgian-Abkhazian
and Georgian-South Ossetian, unrecognized republics received (and now
receive) obvious and distinct support of Russia. That is why in the
Moscow-oriented security system the prospects of their settlement in
the way acceptable for Tbilisi were zero.
Though in NATO-oriented security system those chances are rather
delusive either but, however, there are some anyway. But in the end,
unreasonably high hopes of Tbilisi connected with the cooperation of
Georgia with the Alliance brought to a Five Days War in August 2008,
after which Tbilisi, in fact lost the possibility of maneuvering in
their foreign policy. This has radically affected the military and
political situation in the whole region.
The third conflict - Nagorno-Karabakh - does not fully fall into the
pattern. Without going into the details of peculiarities of Russia's
attitude towards this conflict, one can state that its official
stance, in fact, coincides with the de facto policy carried out by
it in regard to the conflict which can be resolved in: "arrange it
yourselves". Though Moscow is clearly aware that staying one-to-one
the parties to the conflict would not solve anything and thus the
existing status quo will be prolonged.
But both Armenia and Azerbaijan still hope to turn the preferences
of Russia to their accounts. Armenia tries to do it through the
broad military and political and military and technical partnership
and economic cooperation, relying on energy and energy intensive
metallurgy in prospect.
Azerbaijan in its turn tries to effect the desired results through:
*military and technical cooperation; *taking advantage of rather
big Russian community in the country; *an entire complex of issues
round the Caspian Sea - from ecology and its status, prospects of
construction of Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines, functioning
of the North-South transport corridor to non-admission of Navies
of non-Caspian states to its water area and militarization of the
Caspian Sea in general.
Such a broad list of economic and military and political points
of contact, which sustain a high level of interest of Russia in
Azerbaijan, stimulates Armenia to balance its "pro-Russian" foreign
policy by "pro-Western" one. But if there is no disaccord in Armenia
on mutually beneficial cooperation and integration in European
political and economic structures, quite different picture can be
observed concerning the issue of profound cooperation with NATO and
its prospects of becoming NATO-member.
The results of public opinion polls carried out by different
organizations invariably show that the number of those who support
the idea of becoming a member of NATO and those who are against has
remained almost the same over the recent years - 30-35% each. And
against this background 60-70% supports the idea of entering the EU.
However the reasons of such an ambiguous attitude towards NATO
are clear.
Firstly, the availability of 30-40% of pollees who have not decided
yet on their attitude towards North Atlantic Alliance speaks about
the problems in information policy of both supporters and opponents
of the rapprochement with NATO and this is when the NATO Information
Office has been working in Yerevan since October 2006.
Secondly, in Armenia NATO is associated with Turkey. There is logic
in this as Armenia is contiguous with NATO through Turkey; Turkey is
a curator and lobbyist of Georgia and Azerbaijan in North Atlantic
programmes and projects; in future the military-transport schemes of
Georgia and Azerbaijan will be closed up in Turkey and etc. Additional
concern is caused by stirring up of military and political component
in the foreign policy of Ankara, including a peacemaking, which can
be considered as a kind of compensation to the generalship of the
Turkish Republic for the reduction of its weight in domestic policy.
Thirdly, another factor of negative perception of NATO in Armenia is
the attempts of Azerbaijan and Turkey on involving Allience, in one
way or another, into the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
That was especially topical before the stirring up of Russia in the
negotiation process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after the war in
South Ossetia. Thus, if in October 2005 the Secretary General of NATO
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that their organization did not tend to be
directly involved in the settlement of Karabakh conflict", in May 2006
the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Pierre Lellouche,
while speaking about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, mentioned
that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly exerted efforts to resolve that
conflict and they intended to search for the ways for its settlement.
Generally, stirring up of Moscow in the process of the settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict can be welcomed but its effectiveness is
getting more questionable due to the appearance of several alerting
nuances in its motivation.
Firstly, peacemaking activity of Moscow after August 8, 2008 looks like
"compensation" for use of force in regard to Georgia and it looks to
be more directed to improving its image in the eyes of the West.
Secondly, sometimes it takes the shape of "activity for the sake of
activity" under the circumstances when announced expectations of a
"breakthrough" does not correspond to real expert forecasts which in
the end brings to (and in case if such an approach is preserved it
will continue bringing to) a discomfiture like the one in Kazan.
Thirdly, attempts to consolidate urgently its positions in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan and alongside to disturb the West's plans
by one successful and decisive "swoop" in the resolution of such a
multi-dimensional and old conflict as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
are doomed.
So if we proceed from the analysis of the situation ad absurdum, it
would have been advantageous for Armenia to be a part of a military
and political block in which
*Azerbaijan and Turkey are not involved; *Bilateral Armenian-Russian
relation would have been substituted by multi-lateral.
At the first sight such structures are the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in which
Armenia has correspondingly a status of full member and observer. But
here there are some problems either.
Firstly, in both organizations the role of the leader is taken by
Russia (in CSTO unconditional leader).
Secondly, in both organizations Kazakhstan is involved, the economic
success of which, especially in oil sphere, brought to the situation
when it can be regarded as a new leader of the Central Asia. But due
to pragmatic reasons, first of all of economic character, Kazakhstan
is a lobbyist of the Azerbaijani interests on many issues.
Thirdly, the Caucasian direction of the CSTO activity, as well as a
block of the economic programmes on Armenia for EurAsEC is secondary
as compared to the Central Asia.
All those factors had a great impact on building the policy of Armenia
on the cooperation with the regional military and political blocks
based on the principles of complimentarity. Such a directive implies
parallel sustaining of the relations with all the active actors in
the region on the same level.
No special problems should be expected in economic aspect. The main
problems will come forward in military and political sphere. How
and to what extent can the participation of Armenia in CSTO and
implementation of the IPAP with NATIO by it be combined?
On some items it is difficult but still possible to combine the
implementation of the undertaken liabilities, e.g. on exchange of
the intelligence information on "Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism", drafting and sending additional unit of peacekeepers to the
"hotspots", training of the Armenian militaries in NATO collages and
military institutions in Russia, arranging joint military maneuvers.
But it seems impossible to combine to the full extent, e.g. a long-term
programme on reforming a command-control communications which implies
shifting to the NATO standard communication systems, navigation
and identification. Though there are no definite restrictions on a
quantity and terms of implementation of the IPAP, anyway this phase
of cooperation with NATO cannot last forever without going to a higher
level of cooperation.
Besides the capability of Armenia to sustain balanced foreign political
course can be affected even more radically and fast than the worsening
of Russian-Georgian relations (the climax of which was the Five Day
War) by the following factors:
*Escalation of military confrontation between the US an Iran; *The
growth of the antagonistic contradictions between Russia and US
or even wider - between Shanghai Cooperation Organization and NATO
*Resumption of the military actions in Karabakh.
At least two of the aforementioned factors directly depend on the
stance and weight of the SCO despite the fact that for it the South
Caucasus is still a periphery.
Armenia is not directly involved in Shanghai Organization and their
relations are mediated:
*though such structures widely presented in the SCO as CSTO and
EurAsEC, the weight and significance of which has considerably grown
with stirring up of the SCO; *through the bilateral relations with
Russia which is a strategic partner of Armenia; *through the influence
of the SCO on other systems of regional security formed or being
formed in the South Caucasus.
But if in case with the CSTO Armenia, due to its geographic detachment
emphasize military and political and military-technical cooperation,
after acquiring by Iran a status of observer in the SCO in July 2005,
interest of Yerevan and not only, may be focused on the economic
component of relations with the SCO member countries.
The further growth of the weight of the SCO will inevitably bring to
the widening of the zone of its responsibility for the stability and
security and involving of the South Caucasus. But the SCO can achieve
greatest efficiency in this region only in two cases:
*if Iran becomes a full member of that organization which is hardly
probable due to the current tension between Washington and Tehran
(and formally imposing on Iran sanction by the UN) but still possible,
especially in case if the SCO shifts to the confrontation model in
relations with NATO, or *in case of broadening of the rights and
liabilities of the countries which has a status of observers in the
SCO, more eager involvement of those countries in the implementation
of different projects within the framework of general policy of
that organization.
In both cases it means the consolidation of the positions of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in this region.
For Armenia which has closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, the
availability of functioning corridor through Georgia and Iran is of
vital importance. But when under the limitedness of maneuvering in
foreign policy of Tbilisi Baku does not even conceal that building
up its economic impact on Georgia (according to the Director of
Center for Strategic Planning Ahmed Shirinov "today Georgia exists
only thanks to Azerbaijan and Turkey) will be projected on a further
isolation of Armenia, Yerevan, besides diplomatic means of suppression
of such plans, must secure itself by southern, Iranian direction. In
case when both Armenian and Iran will be members (even though with
different formats of participation) of such a powerful in economic
aspect organization as, e.g. CSO, it would be easies for Yerevan to
attach to all the aspects of bilateral relations with Tehran standing
most-favoured-mode thus minimizing its liability to momentary,
timeserving fluctuations.
Another factor of formation of the attitude of Yerevan to the SCO may
be the growth of the interest of Ankara to that organization. It once
and again offers itself as a kind of bridge, this time between the SCO
and EU and SCO and NATO. Stirring up of Turkey in this direction can
be explained by the availability of a Turkic component in its foreign
policy, as most of the Turkic states are a part of the SCO. From this
point of view it is advantageous for Armenia to stir up sharply its
contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and try to become
its full member, at least before Turkey will make it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
*SHALE GAS GHOST[08.02.2011] *GAS FROM IRAQI KURDISTAN FOR NABUCCO:
TURKISH INTEREST [15.12.2010] *AZERBAIJAN: SEARCHING NEW FOREIGN
POLICY BALANCE[27.10.2010] *TWO 'STREAMS' FROM RUSSIA: BREAKING DOWN
THE OLD GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES[21.06.2010] *MILITARY AND POLITICAL
RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS[04.06.2010]
Sergey Sargsyan
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=5983
05.09.2011
Deputy Head of the Center for the Political Studies, "Noravank"
Foundation
The declaration of the intentions to intensify the works on NATO's
renovated Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) sounded during the
visit of a new NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the
Caucasus and Central Asia James Appathurai made against the background
of carrying over the announced CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces'
maneuvers in Armenia on 2012, has stirred up the discussion about the
possibilities and restrictions of cooperation of Yerevan with those
different in composition and having mostly distinct goals military
and political blocks.
Among four countries neighbouring Armenia Turkey is NATO member,
and Georgia and Azerbaijan, as well as Armenia, are parts of NATO
programmes directed to the further development of cooperation with
this organization. We believe that the established opinion that NATO
simply filled the vacuum of power which emerged in the region after
the "retirement" from the stage, on different reasons, of Russia,
does not correctly reflect the situation. The shift of Georgia and
Azerbaijan towards NATO-oriented security system was conditioned by
their inability to resolve such problems as, first of all, protection
of their territorial integrity and implementation of the ambitious
economic projects within the framework of the security system
functioning after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Generally, the dynamics of signing documents and shifting to new
programmes and levels of cooperation of the countries of the South
Caucasus with NATO is rather revealing as both conclusion of frame
agreements on joining Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme and
presentation of IPAP proceeded in the same sequence - first came
Georgia, then Azerbaijan, and in several months Armenia. This sequence,
though symbolically, reflects the level of interest and expectations
of those countries from setting and broadening cooperation with the
North Atlantic structures.
Georgia was and still remains the most motivated country as for
becoming NATO member, and one of the main reasons would seem to be
the lack of alternatives of the acceptable choice. In two of three
unsettled conflicts in the South Caucasus, i.e. Georgian-Abkhazian
and Georgian-South Ossetian, unrecognized republics received (and now
receive) obvious and distinct support of Russia. That is why in the
Moscow-oriented security system the prospects of their settlement in
the way acceptable for Tbilisi were zero.
Though in NATO-oriented security system those chances are rather
delusive either but, however, there are some anyway. But in the end,
unreasonably high hopes of Tbilisi connected with the cooperation of
Georgia with the Alliance brought to a Five Days War in August 2008,
after which Tbilisi, in fact lost the possibility of maneuvering in
their foreign policy. This has radically affected the military and
political situation in the whole region.
The third conflict - Nagorno-Karabakh - does not fully fall into the
pattern. Without going into the details of peculiarities of Russia's
attitude towards this conflict, one can state that its official
stance, in fact, coincides with the de facto policy carried out by
it in regard to the conflict which can be resolved in: "arrange it
yourselves". Though Moscow is clearly aware that staying one-to-one
the parties to the conflict would not solve anything and thus the
existing status quo will be prolonged.
But both Armenia and Azerbaijan still hope to turn the preferences
of Russia to their accounts. Armenia tries to do it through the
broad military and political and military and technical partnership
and economic cooperation, relying on energy and energy intensive
metallurgy in prospect.
Azerbaijan in its turn tries to effect the desired results through:
*military and technical cooperation; *taking advantage of rather
big Russian community in the country; *an entire complex of issues
round the Caspian Sea - from ecology and its status, prospects of
construction of Trans-Caspian oil and gas pipelines, functioning
of the North-South transport corridor to non-admission of Navies
of non-Caspian states to its water area and militarization of the
Caspian Sea in general.
Such a broad list of economic and military and political points
of contact, which sustain a high level of interest of Russia in
Azerbaijan, stimulates Armenia to balance its "pro-Russian" foreign
policy by "pro-Western" one. But if there is no disaccord in Armenia
on mutually beneficial cooperation and integration in European
political and economic structures, quite different picture can be
observed concerning the issue of profound cooperation with NATO and
its prospects of becoming NATO-member.
The results of public opinion polls carried out by different
organizations invariably show that the number of those who support
the idea of becoming a member of NATO and those who are against has
remained almost the same over the recent years - 30-35% each. And
against this background 60-70% supports the idea of entering the EU.
However the reasons of such an ambiguous attitude towards NATO
are clear.
Firstly, the availability of 30-40% of pollees who have not decided
yet on their attitude towards North Atlantic Alliance speaks about
the problems in information policy of both supporters and opponents
of the rapprochement with NATO and this is when the NATO Information
Office has been working in Yerevan since October 2006.
Secondly, in Armenia NATO is associated with Turkey. There is logic
in this as Armenia is contiguous with NATO through Turkey; Turkey is
a curator and lobbyist of Georgia and Azerbaijan in North Atlantic
programmes and projects; in future the military-transport schemes of
Georgia and Azerbaijan will be closed up in Turkey and etc. Additional
concern is caused by stirring up of military and political component
in the foreign policy of Ankara, including a peacemaking, which can
be considered as a kind of compensation to the generalship of the
Turkish Republic for the reduction of its weight in domestic policy.
Thirdly, another factor of negative perception of NATO in Armenia is
the attempts of Azerbaijan and Turkey on involving Allience, in one
way or another, into the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
That was especially topical before the stirring up of Russia in the
negotiation process on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict after the war in
South Ossetia. Thus, if in October 2005 the Secretary General of NATO
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stated that their organization did not tend to be
directly involved in the settlement of Karabakh conflict", in May 2006
the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Pierre Lellouche,
while speaking about the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, mentioned
that the NATO Parliamentary Assembly exerted efforts to resolve that
conflict and they intended to search for the ways for its settlement.
Generally, stirring up of Moscow in the process of the settlement of
the Nagorno-Karabkh conflict can be welcomed but its effectiveness is
getting more questionable due to the appearance of several alerting
nuances in its motivation.
Firstly, peacemaking activity of Moscow after August 8, 2008 looks like
"compensation" for use of force in regard to Georgia and it looks to
be more directed to improving its image in the eyes of the West.
Secondly, sometimes it takes the shape of "activity for the sake of
activity" under the circumstances when announced expectations of a
"breakthrough" does not correspond to real expert forecasts which in
the end brings to (and in case if such an approach is preserved it
will continue bringing to) a discomfiture like the one in Kazan.
Thirdly, attempts to consolidate urgently its positions in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan and alongside to disturb the West's plans
by one successful and decisive "swoop" in the resolution of such a
multi-dimensional and old conflict as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
are doomed.
So if we proceed from the analysis of the situation ad absurdum, it
would have been advantageous for Armenia to be a part of a military
and political block in which
*Azerbaijan and Turkey are not involved; *Bilateral Armenian-Russian
relation would have been substituted by multi-lateral.
At the first sight such structures are the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) in which
Armenia has correspondingly a status of full member and observer. But
here there are some problems either.
Firstly, in both organizations the role of the leader is taken by
Russia (in CSTO unconditional leader).
Secondly, in both organizations Kazakhstan is involved, the economic
success of which, especially in oil sphere, brought to the situation
when it can be regarded as a new leader of the Central Asia. But due
to pragmatic reasons, first of all of economic character, Kazakhstan
is a lobbyist of the Azerbaijani interests on many issues.
Thirdly, the Caucasian direction of the CSTO activity, as well as a
block of the economic programmes on Armenia for EurAsEC is secondary
as compared to the Central Asia.
All those factors had a great impact on building the policy of Armenia
on the cooperation with the regional military and political blocks
based on the principles of complimentarity. Such a directive implies
parallel sustaining of the relations with all the active actors in
the region on the same level.
No special problems should be expected in economic aspect. The main
problems will come forward in military and political sphere. How
and to what extent can the participation of Armenia in CSTO and
implementation of the IPAP with NATIO by it be combined?
On some items it is difficult but still possible to combine the
implementation of the undertaken liabilities, e.g. on exchange of
the intelligence information on "Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism", drafting and sending additional unit of peacekeepers to the
"hotspots", training of the Armenian militaries in NATO collages and
military institutions in Russia, arranging joint military maneuvers.
But it seems impossible to combine to the full extent, e.g. a long-term
programme on reforming a command-control communications which implies
shifting to the NATO standard communication systems, navigation
and identification. Though there are no definite restrictions on a
quantity and terms of implementation of the IPAP, anyway this phase
of cooperation with NATO cannot last forever without going to a higher
level of cooperation.
Besides the capability of Armenia to sustain balanced foreign political
course can be affected even more radically and fast than the worsening
of Russian-Georgian relations (the climax of which was the Five Day
War) by the following factors:
*Escalation of military confrontation between the US an Iran; *The
growth of the antagonistic contradictions between Russia and US
or even wider - between Shanghai Cooperation Organization and NATO
*Resumption of the military actions in Karabakh.
At least two of the aforementioned factors directly depend on the
stance and weight of the SCO despite the fact that for it the South
Caucasus is still a periphery.
Armenia is not directly involved in Shanghai Organization and their
relations are mediated:
*though such structures widely presented in the SCO as CSTO and
EurAsEC, the weight and significance of which has considerably grown
with stirring up of the SCO; *through the bilateral relations with
Russia which is a strategic partner of Armenia; *through the influence
of the SCO on other systems of regional security formed or being
formed in the South Caucasus.
But if in case with the CSTO Armenia, due to its geographic detachment
emphasize military and political and military-technical cooperation,
after acquiring by Iran a status of observer in the SCO in July 2005,
interest of Yerevan and not only, may be focused on the economic
component of relations with the SCO member countries.
The further growth of the weight of the SCO will inevitably bring to
the widening of the zone of its responsibility for the stability and
security and involving of the South Caucasus. But the SCO can achieve
greatest efficiency in this region only in two cases:
*if Iran becomes a full member of that organization which is hardly
probable due to the current tension between Washington and Tehran
(and formally imposing on Iran sanction by the UN) but still possible,
especially in case if the SCO shifts to the confrontation model in
relations with NATO, or *in case of broadening of the rights and
liabilities of the countries which has a status of observers in the
SCO, more eager involvement of those countries in the implementation
of different projects within the framework of general policy of
that organization.
In both cases it means the consolidation of the positions of the
Islamic Republic of Iran in this region.
For Armenia which has closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan, the
availability of functioning corridor through Georgia and Iran is of
vital importance. But when under the limitedness of maneuvering in
foreign policy of Tbilisi Baku does not even conceal that building
up its economic impact on Georgia (according to the Director of
Center for Strategic Planning Ahmed Shirinov "today Georgia exists
only thanks to Azerbaijan and Turkey) will be projected on a further
isolation of Armenia, Yerevan, besides diplomatic means of suppression
of such plans, must secure itself by southern, Iranian direction. In
case when both Armenian and Iran will be members (even though with
different formats of participation) of such a powerful in economic
aspect organization as, e.g. CSO, it would be easies for Yerevan to
attach to all the aspects of bilateral relations with Tehran standing
most-favoured-mode thus minimizing its liability to momentary,
timeserving fluctuations.
Another factor of formation of the attitude of Yerevan to the SCO may
be the growth of the interest of Ankara to that organization. It once
and again offers itself as a kind of bridge, this time between the SCO
and EU and SCO and NATO. Stirring up of Turkey in this direction can
be explained by the availability of a Turkic component in its foreign
policy, as most of the Turkic states are a part of the SCO. From this
point of view it is advantageous for Armenia to stir up sharply its
contacts with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and try to become
its full member, at least before Turkey will make it.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
*SHALE GAS GHOST[08.02.2011] *GAS FROM IRAQI KURDISTAN FOR NABUCCO:
TURKISH INTEREST [15.12.2010] *AZERBAIJAN: SEARCHING NEW FOREIGN
POLICY BALANCE[27.10.2010] *TWO 'STREAMS' FROM RUSSIA: BREAKING DOWN
THE OLD GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURES[21.06.2010] *MILITARY AND POLITICAL
RISKS OF TRANSCASPIAN PROJECTS[04.06.2010]