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RUSSIAN ROULETTE IN THE ARMY
HAKOB BADALYAN
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments23286.html
Published: 13:48:23 - 09/09/2011
The situation in the Armenian army is similar to the "Russian roulette"
when nobody knows in which cycle the bullet will shoot.
Similarly, it is not known which military unit will toll violence
and murder. And the military units with such a "tragic" potential
are too many.
The reasons have been discussed enough recently. The army is now the
hot topic of public debates, discussions, debates and even arguments.
Unfortunately, the reason that triggered public discussions is not
the concept note of the government to launch reforms in the army but
rather the tragic incidents in the army which shift the focus of the
society on the plight in the army.
In these discussions, however, an important factor does not get
sufficient consideration. It is the factor of the commanders who
fought in the war. Most military units in Armenia are headed by these
people. Here we deal with a controversial situation. The people who
went through war, especially that not a long time has passed since
the war, live with a different psychology at peace time. What may be
unacceptable to a civilian may seem natural and even necessary for
a person who has gone through war.
More exactly, whatever appears to a civilian citizen as violence
or something leading to violence, for man of war it is a method of
bringing up men. It is clear that these descriptions are general
and have numerous aspects but in most military units we deal with
this controversy. Most commanders who went through war, with their
psychology and outlook, are unable and unsuitable for organizing
military service at peace. Moreover, most of them were not so suitable
for this task even before the war.
The controversy is that the behavior of these people has natural
and objective grounds, considering their war biography. It is not an
argument meant to justify their inaction or criminal activities.
Simply the issue requires an urgent solution to reduce violence in
the army. The point is that these people should have been removed
from the organizational positions of the army and command of military
units a long time ago.
It is clear that the army needs most of them, and if suddenly war
starts, these people will be the first to carry this weight. Moreover,
most of them are carrying the weight of maintaining peace and often
travel to the positions, participate in necessary defense actions.
Let them have an honorary regiment where they will receive public
honors and privileges, they will be glorified, they will regularly
visit military units and hold exercises for servicemen, deliver
lectures, teach them to fight, but not deal with the organization
and management of the routine of the military personnel because they
are not ready psychologically. Not everyone is meant, of course,
because there are exceptions. But these exceptions emphasize the rule.
In addition, the issue is urgent for both the army and civilian and
political life. This phenomenon referred to as the Vietnamese syndrome
was not overcome in Armenia. Moreover, immediately after the ceasefire,
the factor of the veterans was used for political aims. The society
and the state tasted its bitterness in both civilian life and the
army. In addition, those who throw the "boomerang" from time to time
often taste its bitterness themselves because it eventually flies
back and hits them.
This boomerang first hits the external enemy, if there is an external
enemy, if the external enemy is peaceful, the boomerang hits here and
there inside the country, and if nobody tries to return the boomerang
to its place to ensure everyone's security, as well as to prevent
the defamation of the boomerang by its own fruitless and criminal use.
HAKOB BADALYAN
Story from Lragir.am News:
http://www.lragir.am/engsrc/comments23286.html
Published: 13:48:23 - 09/09/2011
The situation in the Armenian army is similar to the "Russian roulette"
when nobody knows in which cycle the bullet will shoot.
Similarly, it is not known which military unit will toll violence
and murder. And the military units with such a "tragic" potential
are too many.
The reasons have been discussed enough recently. The army is now the
hot topic of public debates, discussions, debates and even arguments.
Unfortunately, the reason that triggered public discussions is not
the concept note of the government to launch reforms in the army but
rather the tragic incidents in the army which shift the focus of the
society on the plight in the army.
In these discussions, however, an important factor does not get
sufficient consideration. It is the factor of the commanders who
fought in the war. Most military units in Armenia are headed by these
people. Here we deal with a controversial situation. The people who
went through war, especially that not a long time has passed since
the war, live with a different psychology at peace time. What may be
unacceptable to a civilian may seem natural and even necessary for
a person who has gone through war.
More exactly, whatever appears to a civilian citizen as violence
or something leading to violence, for man of war it is a method of
bringing up men. It is clear that these descriptions are general
and have numerous aspects but in most military units we deal with
this controversy. Most commanders who went through war, with their
psychology and outlook, are unable and unsuitable for organizing
military service at peace. Moreover, most of them were not so suitable
for this task even before the war.
The controversy is that the behavior of these people has natural
and objective grounds, considering their war biography. It is not an
argument meant to justify their inaction or criminal activities.
Simply the issue requires an urgent solution to reduce violence in
the army. The point is that these people should have been removed
from the organizational positions of the army and command of military
units a long time ago.
It is clear that the army needs most of them, and if suddenly war
starts, these people will be the first to carry this weight. Moreover,
most of them are carrying the weight of maintaining peace and often
travel to the positions, participate in necessary defense actions.
Let them have an honorary regiment where they will receive public
honors and privileges, they will be glorified, they will regularly
visit military units and hold exercises for servicemen, deliver
lectures, teach them to fight, but not deal with the organization
and management of the routine of the military personnel because they
are not ready psychologically. Not everyone is meant, of course,
because there are exceptions. But these exceptions emphasize the rule.
In addition, the issue is urgent for both the army and civilian and
political life. This phenomenon referred to as the Vietnamese syndrome
was not overcome in Armenia. Moreover, immediately after the ceasefire,
the factor of the veterans was used for political aims. The society
and the state tasted its bitterness in both civilian life and the
army. In addition, those who throw the "boomerang" from time to time
often taste its bitterness themselves because it eventually flies
back and hits them.
This boomerang first hits the external enemy, if there is an external
enemy, if the external enemy is peaceful, the boomerang hits here and
there inside the country, and if nobody tries to return the boomerang
to its place to ensure everyone's security, as well as to prevent
the defamation of the boomerang by its own fruitless and criminal use.