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RUSSIA NEEDS TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO IN KARABAKH CONFLICT AT THIS STAGE
news.az
Sept 8 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Yevgeni Negrov, Russian political expert.
Election campaign due to the upcoming 4 December 2011 elections to
the State Duma of Russia is going to start in Russia soon. This will
be followed by presidential elections in 2012. May Russia change or
correct its foreign policy towards its nearest neighbors, particularly,
South Caucasus countries?
I believe that there is weak a correlation between electoral processes
in Russia. It only technically reinforces existing consensus of elites
and real politics. This mainly concerns international politics and
everything related to it. So, I believe neither December 2011 nor
March 2012 will influence South Caucasus policies of Russia.
Nevertheless, there are factors able to change or correct this policy.
The most important among themis a domestic situation in South Caucasus
states, condition of world economy (financial crisis, energy prices,
diversification of their supplies, political stability in the Middle
East, etc.), a need to intensify efforts (economic ones, first
and foremost) in some direction and tasks of the Russian domestic
propaganda (again, with no direct links with elections).
So, the change is possible (there is already more moderate (less
pro-Armenian) intentions in relation to the Karabakh problem), but
this will not be linked with election campaigns.
According to estimations, more than three million Azerbaijanis live
in Russia. What opportunities they can use to influence formation of
Russia's policies?
As strange as it may sound, the capabilities of various pressure groups
in Russia are very significant. Feeling lack of real legitimacy,
the political elite has to respond to various signals from outside
to create the illusion of public consensus and well-being.
Another thing is that these efforts are aim ed primarily at creating
visibility of reaching an agreement (the case with Khimki forest,
army reform or education reform) than to satisfy them as meeting
aspirations of one interest group almost always leads to denial of
objectives of another group.
Given various diasporas (including Armenian and Azerbaijani)
in Russia, the ability to influence (both public - information
campaigns, public statements of leaders and non-public (lobbying
through representatives in the government)) will be implemented only
under the described scenario.
Are South Caucasus countries, in particular, Azerbaija able to draw
Russia's attention to solution of its strategic problems including
territorial dispute?
No doubt, if any country in the region intensifies efforts to solve
its problems, this will draw a reaction from Russia. Russia will in
this case try to preserve the status quo acting as mediator in the
process. In his recent interview with Ekho Moscow radio station and
First Caucasus Channel, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev unambiguously
said that scenario of the Russian-Georgian conflict of the summer of
2008 is impossible to happen once again and even uttered the surnames
of presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in this regard.
Are conflicts in Caucasus just ethnic problems or conflict between
elites of these states?
It is obvious that a wide range of factors influence problems in the
Caucasus, in particular, land disputes in the South Caucasus. There are
problems caused by national contradiction, those with centuries-long
history and those which started with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and problems of consolidation of national elites that are largely
built on ideology of conflict with neighbors.
In this regard, it is appropriate to say not conflict between, in fact,
elites, but their internal problems which need presence of external
even conflicting factors.
Do the policies pursued by he Kremlin towards the South Caucasus
today effective enough for Russia to provide its security?
All arguments available to this effect are to some extent speculations
as there are no immediate security threats. At this stage, maintaining
the conflict in a frozen state is the most important for Russia,
since it plays an important role in terms of image and economy,
and Russian diplomacy somehow copes with this problem.
news.az
Sept 8 2011
Azerbaijan
News.Az interviews Yevgeni Negrov, Russian political expert.
Election campaign due to the upcoming 4 December 2011 elections to
the State Duma of Russia is going to start in Russia soon. This will
be followed by presidential elections in 2012. May Russia change or
correct its foreign policy towards its nearest neighbors, particularly,
South Caucasus countries?
I believe that there is weak a correlation between electoral processes
in Russia. It only technically reinforces existing consensus of elites
and real politics. This mainly concerns international politics and
everything related to it. So, I believe neither December 2011 nor
March 2012 will influence South Caucasus policies of Russia.
Nevertheless, there are factors able to change or correct this policy.
The most important among themis a domestic situation in South Caucasus
states, condition of world economy (financial crisis, energy prices,
diversification of their supplies, political stability in the Middle
East, etc.), a need to intensify efforts (economic ones, first
and foremost) in some direction and tasks of the Russian domestic
propaganda (again, with no direct links with elections).
So, the change is possible (there is already more moderate (less
pro-Armenian) intentions in relation to the Karabakh problem), but
this will not be linked with election campaigns.
According to estimations, more than three million Azerbaijanis live
in Russia. What opportunities they can use to influence formation of
Russia's policies?
As strange as it may sound, the capabilities of various pressure groups
in Russia are very significant. Feeling lack of real legitimacy,
the political elite has to respond to various signals from outside
to create the illusion of public consensus and well-being.
Another thing is that these efforts are aim ed primarily at creating
visibility of reaching an agreement (the case with Khimki forest,
army reform or education reform) than to satisfy them as meeting
aspirations of one interest group almost always leads to denial of
objectives of another group.
Given various diasporas (including Armenian and Azerbaijani)
in Russia, the ability to influence (both public - information
campaigns, public statements of leaders and non-public (lobbying
through representatives in the government)) will be implemented only
under the described scenario.
Are South Caucasus countries, in particular, Azerbaija able to draw
Russia's attention to solution of its strategic problems including
territorial dispute?
No doubt, if any country in the region intensifies efforts to solve
its problems, this will draw a reaction from Russia. Russia will in
this case try to preserve the status quo acting as mediator in the
process. In his recent interview with Ekho Moscow radio station and
First Caucasus Channel, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev unambiguously
said that scenario of the Russian-Georgian conflict of the summer of
2008 is impossible to happen once again and even uttered the surnames
of presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in this regard.
Are conflicts in Caucasus just ethnic problems or conflict between
elites of these states?
It is obvious that a wide range of factors influence problems in the
Caucasus, in particular, land disputes in the South Caucasus. There are
problems caused by national contradiction, those with centuries-long
history and those which started with the collapse of the Soviet Union
and problems of consolidation of national elites that are largely
built on ideology of conflict with neighbors.
In this regard, it is appropriate to say not conflict between, in fact,
elites, but their internal problems which need presence of external
even conflicting factors.
Do the policies pursued by he Kremlin towards the South Caucasus
today effective enough for Russia to provide its security?
All arguments available to this effect are to some extent speculations
as there are no immediate security threats. At this stage, maintaining
the conflict in a frozen state is the most important for Russia,
since it plays an important role in terms of image and economy,
and Russian diplomacy somehow copes with this problem.