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NEW INITIATIVES ON KARABAKH CONFLICT LESS LIKELY IN COMING MONTHS
news.az, Azerbaijan
Sept 9 2011
News.Az interviews Alexander Karavayev, deputy general director of
Moscow State University's Information and Analytical Centre.
Russian leadership says there is a need to apply common approaches
to resolution of conflicts in the post Soviet area. Is it worth to
fear that Russia may recognize independence of Nagorno-Karabakh from
Azerbaijan and Transnistria from Moldova as Moscow did it in case of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia?
If we try to recover the root of the expression "common approach", we
will find that this postulate has received different interpretations
in Russian leadership.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Moscow focused on public
diplomacy in principle of territorial integrity. The coloring of the
statement "common approach" changed on the eve of the recognition of
Kosovo's independence by the U.S. and EU.
In late 2007, Vladimir Putin reiterated that it was undesirable to
change borders in Europe in the context of recognition of Kosovo's
independence. His thesis of a "common approach" intended to preserve
the integrity of Serbia.
As is known, Russia still considers the decision on Kosovo to be
wrong. Then, following recognition of Kosovo in early 2008, the thesis
of a "common approach" began to be used in relation to conflicts caused
by the Soviet collapse in a sense that if West violated recognized
balance in case of Kosovo, then Russia finally gets a moral right to
decide the separatist conflicts in the CIS in its sole discretion.
But we must bear in mind that no practice on this rhetoric followed.
The only time when Moscow took advantage of this system of arguments
happened after the war with Georgia and subsequent recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
President Medvedev has clearly spoken about this: the case of Georgia
does not apply to other conflicts. Now,statements about the "common
approach" remains at the level of foreign ministry speakers and are
heard less and less. In practice, Russia seeks to solve Transnistria
problem without intentions to recognize it, on the contrary, to
settle this issue in close cooperation with Chisinau, Brussels and
other mediators.
And this is clearly visible. Actions around the Karabakh problem are
less noticeable, but we can not say that Russia is "lobbying" the
interests of Armenia, seeking to bring the case to the recognition of
Karabakh. This is not the case. Moscow is trying to promote dialogue
between Baku and Yerevan.
Can we expect Russia to engage in active mediation to resolve the
Karabakh conflict again even after the presidents failed to sign a
document on basic principles of conflict resolution at a Kazan meeting?
High or low activity is a very subjective assessment. Of course,
it is unlikely we will hear new initiatives in the coming months,
but the dialogue is going and work on a variety of proposals
continues. Russia is too closely linked to the conflict to pass it
"on the relay." At the same time, other members of OSCE Minsk Group,
as well as other intermediaries, should be able to voice their options
to keep dialogue alive. Russia may respond to them. Cooperation with
Turkey can serve as an example.
Russia acts as major mediator in the Karabakh conflict resolution at
present. May this status of Russia change depending on who will be
elected next Russian president in 2012?
No one will risk to answer this question. Whoever becomes president
in 2012, one thing is clear that Putin will not lose and will remain
in power.
Accordingly, his influence in Russia's policy will prevail. The
experience of Medvedev's presidential term shows that Russia can be
very active, but it has brought no tangible results. However, indirect
consequence of this activity was certain shifts in public opinion
in Armenia. Now they clearly see that Moscow will not unequivocally
support Yerevan on the Karabakh issue.
In general, if we look at diplomacy around the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, it is obvious that clues to this problem have not been
picked up.
The solution will emerge from certain behind-the-scenes agreements,
partial concessions from Baku, serious political retreat from Yerevan
by gaining some compensation and guarantees, and finally, building
civil dialogue will be a critical component.
Once there was a format of "Caucasus quartet" in which parliamentarians
from the three South Caucasus countries and Russia discussed peace
and cooperation in the region. In wake of the Georgia-Russia war this
format is unlikely to be resumed.
It is not about Russia-Georgia conflict. The role of parliaments is
drastically understated in the former Soviet Union in general. They
decide very few things even inside the countries. The other thing is
public and political dialogue between the states. There is great scope
for activities, discussions and comparisons of different positions.
Therefore, I favor resumption of this format. The role of parliaments
may intensify over time and we will have a more efficient platform.
news.az, Azerbaijan
Sept 9 2011
News.Az interviews Alexander Karavayev, deputy general director of
Moscow State University's Information and Analytical Centre.
Russian leadership says there is a need to apply common approaches
to resolution of conflicts in the post Soviet area. Is it worth to
fear that Russia may recognize independence of Nagorno-Karabakh from
Azerbaijan and Transnistria from Moldova as Moscow did it in case of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia?
If we try to recover the root of the expression "common approach", we
will find that this postulate has received different interpretations
in Russian leadership.
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, Moscow focused on public
diplomacy in principle of territorial integrity. The coloring of the
statement "common approach" changed on the eve of the recognition of
Kosovo's independence by the U.S. and EU.
In late 2007, Vladimir Putin reiterated that it was undesirable to
change borders in Europe in the context of recognition of Kosovo's
independence. His thesis of a "common approach" intended to preserve
the integrity of Serbia.
As is known, Russia still considers the decision on Kosovo to be
wrong. Then, following recognition of Kosovo in early 2008, the thesis
of a "common approach" began to be used in relation to conflicts caused
by the Soviet collapse in a sense that if West violated recognized
balance in case of Kosovo, then Russia finally gets a moral right to
decide the separatist conflicts in the CIS in its sole discretion.
But we must bear in mind that no practice on this rhetoric followed.
The only time when Moscow took advantage of this system of arguments
happened after the war with Georgia and subsequent recognition of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states.
President Medvedev has clearly spoken about this: the case of Georgia
does not apply to other conflicts. Now,statements about the "common
approach" remains at the level of foreign ministry speakers and are
heard less and less. In practice, Russia seeks to solve Transnistria
problem without intentions to recognize it, on the contrary, to
settle this issue in close cooperation with Chisinau, Brussels and
other mediators.
And this is clearly visible. Actions around the Karabakh problem are
less noticeable, but we can not say that Russia is "lobbying" the
interests of Armenia, seeking to bring the case to the recognition of
Karabakh. This is not the case. Moscow is trying to promote dialogue
between Baku and Yerevan.
Can we expect Russia to engage in active mediation to resolve the
Karabakh conflict again even after the presidents failed to sign a
document on basic principles of conflict resolution at a Kazan meeting?
High or low activity is a very subjective assessment. Of course,
it is unlikely we will hear new initiatives in the coming months,
but the dialogue is going and work on a variety of proposals
continues. Russia is too closely linked to the conflict to pass it
"on the relay." At the same time, other members of OSCE Minsk Group,
as well as other intermediaries, should be able to voice their options
to keep dialogue alive. Russia may respond to them. Cooperation with
Turkey can serve as an example.
Russia acts as major mediator in the Karabakh conflict resolution at
present. May this status of Russia change depending on who will be
elected next Russian president in 2012?
No one will risk to answer this question. Whoever becomes president
in 2012, one thing is clear that Putin will not lose and will remain
in power.
Accordingly, his influence in Russia's policy will prevail. The
experience of Medvedev's presidential term shows that Russia can be
very active, but it has brought no tangible results. However, indirect
consequence of this activity was certain shifts in public opinion
in Armenia. Now they clearly see that Moscow will not unequivocally
support Yerevan on the Karabakh issue.
In general, if we look at diplomacy around the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, it is obvious that clues to this problem have not been
picked up.
The solution will emerge from certain behind-the-scenes agreements,
partial concessions from Baku, serious political retreat from Yerevan
by gaining some compensation and guarantees, and finally, building
civil dialogue will be a critical component.
Once there was a format of "Caucasus quartet" in which parliamentarians
from the three South Caucasus countries and Russia discussed peace
and cooperation in the region. In wake of the Georgia-Russia war this
format is unlikely to be resumed.
It is not about Russia-Georgia conflict. The role of parliaments is
drastically understated in the former Soviet Union in general. They
decide very few things even inside the countries. The other thing is
public and political dialogue between the states. There is great scope
for activities, discussions and comparisons of different positions.
Therefore, I favor resumption of this format. The role of parliaments
may intensify over time and we will have a more efficient platform.