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DENSE DIPLOMACY
by Vladimir Milov
Gazeta.ru
Sept 5 2011
Russia
The unending Arab protests have once and for all exposed the degree of
degradation of Russian diplomacy and foreign policy. Even as it was,
there was not particularly much to boast of here: from the high-profile
failures of attempts to settle conflicts in the post-Soviet area
(the Dniester Region, Karabakh), to the complete invisibility of
Russia's role in the solution of major international problems (the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the North Korean nuclear problem). But the
inadequacy of Russia's diplomatic response to events in the Arab
world exceeds the worst expectations.
The peculiarity of the situation is that Russia is one of the few
countries that possesses the greatest influence over two of the
two cruelest Arab dictators, who have resolved to suppress protests
with the aid of the Army and heavy weapons - Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and
Bashir al-Asad. Already from the beginning of the protests it was
perfectly clear that the West would come forward with a condemnation
of the cruelties against the civilian population, and that it would
most likely proceed from there to actions. The situation became more
obvious when the Libyan and Syrian dictators began to receive red cards
from influential Islamic neighbours. Such a coincidence in the vector
of perception of events by the Western and Islamic worlds should be
interpreted unequivocally: The prospect, if not of regime change,
then at least of a serious modification of the regime, is not far off.
In this situation, the stupidest thing that can be done is to adopt
a tacit line of supporting the outgoing dictator. Russia has already
been made to look a fool with such an approach more than once. I was
traditionally an opponent of the American invasion of Iraq, but it was
not our war, and the over-aggressive stance taken by Putin against the
United States' operations dealt a painful blow to Russia's interests.
Victory over Saddam was inevitable; as a result of it, we almost lost
important contracts: It was not until six years after the fall of
Saddam that Lukoil managed, through incredible efforts, to win back
the rights to Western Kurna.
Matters stood in a similar position with regard to al-Qadhafi. Yes,
Russia had certain commercial relations with him. But already in the
spring it was clear that al-Qadhafi's prospects were slender, and
that the fall of his regime was only a question of time. What should
absolutely not have been done in this situation was to come out with
hard-hitting rhetoric in defence of al-Qadhafi, and to turn up one's
nose at cooperation with Libya's National Transitional Council [NTC].
Right now, when it is all already over for al-Qadhafi, we have
recognized the NTC after all, but the new Libyan leadership has not
forgotten our behaviour during the conflict. Representatives of the
oil and gas company AGOCO, which is controlled by the insurgents,
have already openly stated that oil and gas companies from Russia and
China will have problems with receiving new contracts in this country
because of their support for al-Qadhafi's regime. That is the price
of the dense policy of supporting a doomed dictator.
We had already fallen into this same trap in Iraq, and have done so
again in Libya. Next in line now is Syria, where Russia is once again
acting according to the old scenario - it is defending the position
of Bashir al-Asad, and threatening to impose a veto on a UN Security
Council resolution on Syria.
Meanwhile, the clouds are gathering above al-Asad's head. The European
Union, the biggest importer of Syrian oil (deliveries of oil to the
EU provide one-third of Syria's export earnings) is introducing an
embargo on its importation. The ambassadors of the Persian Gulf states
were long ago recalled from Damascus, and Syria's most important
neighbours - Turkey and Saudi Arabia - are taking a tough line with
regard to al-Asad's regime. Even Iran has wagged its finger at its
closest ally: At the end of August Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi
unexpectedly called on al-Asad "to listen to the lawful demands of
protesting Syrians."
It is clear that Russia has major contracts with Syria - above all,
arms contracts. It was the same in the case of al-Qadhafi. And, as
in the case of al-Qadhafi, several years ago we wrote off a large sum
of debt (10bn dollars) for oil-producing Syria in exchange for future
arms purchases. And we have the chance, for the second time in a row,
of losing these contracts and completely devaluing the obligations
of Arab countries for which we have written off very large debts.
Naturally, it is necessary to investigate in detail the activity
of the functionaries - Putin, Kudrin, Fradkov, Zubkov - responsible
for inflicting huge losses on Russia (almost 15bn dollars including
al-Qadhafi) through the unjustified writing off of debts in exchange
for the future obligations of regimes whose stability no one properly
calculated.
Right now, no one in the Russian leadership is thinking about how
the situation could develop next. This threatens our country with new
commercial losses in the event that, after al-Qadhafi, al-Asad's regime
in Syria falls as well. The months of Arab protests have made obvious
the simple fact that the Russian diplomatic school has suffered a
total meltdown in this area. The dismissal of the ambassadors to Libya
and Egypt, Chamov and Bogdanov, and also of Deputy Foreign Minister
Saltanov, the president's special representative in the Near East,
is an obvious proof of this. At a time when it was necessary to have
used our knowledge of the Near East to elaborate a flexible policy
during the Arab protests, diplomats were scribbling dispatches to
the Kremlin demanding the defence of dictators who were rapidly
disappearing into oblivion, but with whom, over long years of joint
work, they had coalesced mentally, and perhaps in more ways than that.
The West also turned out to be unprepared for the "Arab Spring," but it
is demonstrating far more flexibility and sharpness of reaction. We
are not doing this. However, in recent months, Dmitriy Medvedev,
conscious of the lameness of the traditional policy in the new
circumstances, has undertaken steps that manifestly run contrary to
the recommendations of traditional diplomats - he gave an instruction
not to impose a veto on March's UN resolution on Libya and issued
statements of concern over what is happening in Syria.
Russia is not capable of saving these regimes, and in order to protect
its own interests after their collapse, another modus operandi is
needed. What kind? For example, using its informal connections with
these dictators, Russia could have given them to understand from
the outset: Guys, things are in a bad way for you; we are prepared
to resolve the issue of your immunity, only stop the bloodshed and
give up power.
If Russia had taken this route, it would have managed to save thousands
of lives and to genuinely raise Russia's international prestige as
a country that is capable of influencing the resolution of global
problems effectively (and not simply speculating with its veto in
the UN Security Council) and defending our interests after the fall
of the corresponding regimes.
But such a policy requires professionalism and an absolutely different
type of thinking - one based on a sober evaluation of the risks and
opportunities, free from totalitarian and anti-Western complexes.
Neither our diplomatic bureaucracy, which is headed by the triumvirate
of Lavrov, Prikhodko, and Ushakov, nor the country's political
leadership - Medvedev, and still less Putin - are capable of this.
At any rate the continuation of Russia's de facto support for Bashir
al-Asad is an extremely unprofitable saga that threatens our country
with losses in the event of his departure from power. How this happens,
we have already seen in the example of Iraq and Libya.
by Vladimir Milov
Gazeta.ru
Sept 5 2011
Russia
The unending Arab protests have once and for all exposed the degree of
degradation of Russian diplomacy and foreign policy. Even as it was,
there was not particularly much to boast of here: from the high-profile
failures of attempts to settle conflicts in the post-Soviet area
(the Dniester Region, Karabakh), to the complete invisibility of
Russia's role in the solution of major international problems (the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the North Korean nuclear problem). But the
inadequacy of Russia's diplomatic response to events in the Arab
world exceeds the worst expectations.
The peculiarity of the situation is that Russia is one of the few
countries that possesses the greatest influence over two of the
two cruelest Arab dictators, who have resolved to suppress protests
with the aid of the Army and heavy weapons - Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and
Bashir al-Asad. Already from the beginning of the protests it was
perfectly clear that the West would come forward with a condemnation
of the cruelties against the civilian population, and that it would
most likely proceed from there to actions. The situation became more
obvious when the Libyan and Syrian dictators began to receive red cards
from influential Islamic neighbours. Such a coincidence in the vector
of perception of events by the Western and Islamic worlds should be
interpreted unequivocally: The prospect, if not of regime change,
then at least of a serious modification of the regime, is not far off.
In this situation, the stupidest thing that can be done is to adopt
a tacit line of supporting the outgoing dictator. Russia has already
been made to look a fool with such an approach more than once. I was
traditionally an opponent of the American invasion of Iraq, but it was
not our war, and the over-aggressive stance taken by Putin against the
United States' operations dealt a painful blow to Russia's interests.
Victory over Saddam was inevitable; as a result of it, we almost lost
important contracts: It was not until six years after the fall of
Saddam that Lukoil managed, through incredible efforts, to win back
the rights to Western Kurna.
Matters stood in a similar position with regard to al-Qadhafi. Yes,
Russia had certain commercial relations with him. But already in the
spring it was clear that al-Qadhafi's prospects were slender, and
that the fall of his regime was only a question of time. What should
absolutely not have been done in this situation was to come out with
hard-hitting rhetoric in defence of al-Qadhafi, and to turn up one's
nose at cooperation with Libya's National Transitional Council [NTC].
Right now, when it is all already over for al-Qadhafi, we have
recognized the NTC after all, but the new Libyan leadership has not
forgotten our behaviour during the conflict. Representatives of the
oil and gas company AGOCO, which is controlled by the insurgents,
have already openly stated that oil and gas companies from Russia and
China will have problems with receiving new contracts in this country
because of their support for al-Qadhafi's regime. That is the price
of the dense policy of supporting a doomed dictator.
We had already fallen into this same trap in Iraq, and have done so
again in Libya. Next in line now is Syria, where Russia is once again
acting according to the old scenario - it is defending the position
of Bashir al-Asad, and threatening to impose a veto on a UN Security
Council resolution on Syria.
Meanwhile, the clouds are gathering above al-Asad's head. The European
Union, the biggest importer of Syrian oil (deliveries of oil to the
EU provide one-third of Syria's export earnings) is introducing an
embargo on its importation. The ambassadors of the Persian Gulf states
were long ago recalled from Damascus, and Syria's most important
neighbours - Turkey and Saudi Arabia - are taking a tough line with
regard to al-Asad's regime. Even Iran has wagged its finger at its
closest ally: At the end of August Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi
unexpectedly called on al-Asad "to listen to the lawful demands of
protesting Syrians."
It is clear that Russia has major contracts with Syria - above all,
arms contracts. It was the same in the case of al-Qadhafi. And, as
in the case of al-Qadhafi, several years ago we wrote off a large sum
of debt (10bn dollars) for oil-producing Syria in exchange for future
arms purchases. And we have the chance, for the second time in a row,
of losing these contracts and completely devaluing the obligations
of Arab countries for which we have written off very large debts.
Naturally, it is necessary to investigate in detail the activity
of the functionaries - Putin, Kudrin, Fradkov, Zubkov - responsible
for inflicting huge losses on Russia (almost 15bn dollars including
al-Qadhafi) through the unjustified writing off of debts in exchange
for the future obligations of regimes whose stability no one properly
calculated.
Right now, no one in the Russian leadership is thinking about how
the situation could develop next. This threatens our country with new
commercial losses in the event that, after al-Qadhafi, al-Asad's regime
in Syria falls as well. The months of Arab protests have made obvious
the simple fact that the Russian diplomatic school has suffered a
total meltdown in this area. The dismissal of the ambassadors to Libya
and Egypt, Chamov and Bogdanov, and also of Deputy Foreign Minister
Saltanov, the president's special representative in the Near East,
is an obvious proof of this. At a time when it was necessary to have
used our knowledge of the Near East to elaborate a flexible policy
during the Arab protests, diplomats were scribbling dispatches to
the Kremlin demanding the defence of dictators who were rapidly
disappearing into oblivion, but with whom, over long years of joint
work, they had coalesced mentally, and perhaps in more ways than that.
The West also turned out to be unprepared for the "Arab Spring," but it
is demonstrating far more flexibility and sharpness of reaction. We
are not doing this. However, in recent months, Dmitriy Medvedev,
conscious of the lameness of the traditional policy in the new
circumstances, has undertaken steps that manifestly run contrary to
the recommendations of traditional diplomats - he gave an instruction
not to impose a veto on March's UN resolution on Libya and issued
statements of concern over what is happening in Syria.
Russia is not capable of saving these regimes, and in order to protect
its own interests after their collapse, another modus operandi is
needed. What kind? For example, using its informal connections with
these dictators, Russia could have given them to understand from
the outset: Guys, things are in a bad way for you; we are prepared
to resolve the issue of your immunity, only stop the bloodshed and
give up power.
If Russia had taken this route, it would have managed to save thousands
of lives and to genuinely raise Russia's international prestige as
a country that is capable of influencing the resolution of global
problems effectively (and not simply speculating with its veto in
the UN Security Council) and defending our interests after the fall
of the corresponding regimes.
But such a policy requires professionalism and an absolutely different
type of thinking - one based on a sober evaluation of the risks and
opportunities, free from totalitarian and anti-Western complexes.
Neither our diplomatic bureaucracy, which is headed by the triumvirate
of Lavrov, Prikhodko, and Ushakov, nor the country's political
leadership - Medvedev, and still less Putin - are capable of this.
At any rate the continuation of Russia's de facto support for Bashir
al-Asad is an extremely unprofitable saga that threatens our country
with losses in the event of his departure from power. How this happens,
we have already seen in the example of Iraq and Libya.