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DEFROSTING CONFLICT: ALARMISM OVER RUSSIA'S ROLE IN TRANSDNESTR BELIES THE POTENTIAL OF AN UPCOMING MOSCOW CONFERENCE
Russia Profile
Sept 14 2011
Once again Transdnestr has become the focus of attention among
specialists across the post-Soviet space. On September 9, under the
auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OECD), an international conference was held during which the Moldovan
Prime Minister Vlad Filat met the President of the Unrecognized
Transdnestr Moldovan Republic Igor Smirnov.
Contact between representatives of Tiraspol and Chisinau over the past
ten years has been fitful. In 2001 Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin
was reelected on a ticket of reintegrating the country. He criticized
his predecessors harshly for provincial nationalism and a lack of
flexibility. The Voronin of 2001 was even ready to legally acknowledge
aggression from Chisinau against the left bank of the Dnestr. However,
slogans and real politics do not always coincide. Rejecting a Russian
plan (known as the Dmitry Kozak Plan) to reunite the country on federal
principles, Moldovan leaders in 2003 gave up talks with Transdnestr's
de-facto leadership as lost. It was only at the end of 2008 that the
conflicting sides made timid steps toward each other once again.
But the long-awaited meeting of the leaders of Moldova and Transdnestr
did not make the negotiating process irreversible, especially since
in 2009 the Moldovan political system suffered a crisis. A series of
parliamentary campaigns failed to result in the election of a head
of state (Moldova is a parliamentary republic). In this context, the
peace process was relegated to secondary importance. Since this time
there has been no official attempt to renew the "5 + 2" format, which
envisaged a resolution between the two conflicting sides and five other
interested parties - two guarantor-states - Ukraine and Russia, an
OECD mediator and two observer states - the United States and the EU.
At the latest meeting in Germany, the sides agreed to meet in
Moscow on September 22, 2011, to make provisions for a return to
fully-fledged talks. However, the very fact that Igor Smirnov agreed to
be drawn into the negotiating process (albeit half-heartedly) already
means a lot. Firstly, for many years he was forbidden to travel in
Europe. In September of 2011, this ban was lifted in the hopes that
the Transdnestr leader would take up constructive positions. Secondly,
in December 2011 presidential elections are set to take place in
Transdnestr, and Smirnov is expected to take part in what will be
his fifth election campaign. It is not hard to understand that for
a politician who has counted on separation from Moldova, taking part
in negotiations with Chisinau is not a simple choice.
And as often happens in such cases, experts are looking for "Moscow's
footprint." In reality, not long before the September conference
in Germany, Russian law enforcement agencies showed interest in the
business of certain members of Smirnov's family. And the fact that
Russia is not interested in prolonging the leader's time in power is
no secret. Recent announcements from representatives of the Russian
Consulate have also caused a stir: they have said that inhabitants
of Transdnestr applying for Russian citizenship can no longer do so
in Tiraspol and now have to go to the Moldovan capital. Those who do
not have Moldovan citizenship are also obliged to apply for a Moldovan
residence permit.
It has to be noted, however, that the meeting of Filat and Smirnov,
as well as pressure from Moscow, can be interpreted as an attempt by
Russia to act to resolve an old conflict by diplomatic means. It is
not the first year that Russia has taken part in either relations with
Transdnestr (for example the March 18, 2009 meeting of the presidents
of Russia, Moldova and Transdnestr) or the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process (three-way meetings between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia
have already become a regular occurrence). And although there have
been no obvious breakthroughs, the negotiating process in itself
can be seen as positive. But in the case of Transdnestr, in contrast
with Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow's diplomacy is frequently taken as a
sign of weakness. Recent events led to critical media response in
both Russia and Transdnestr. It is not the first time that this kind
of alarmism has emerged. Two years ago criticism was directed at the
joint statement issued on March 18, 2009, which stated that Russia was
ready to transform the current peace process to a "peace-guaranteeing
process." This position was then described as a practical defeat for
Russian diplomacy, although Moscow only started talking about such a
transformation after achieving a compromise between the conflicting
factions, and not a day earlier!
In 2011 pressure on president Smirnov was called "a loss" and "a
defeat." But if we put emotions aside, recent events have hardly
revealed anything new. Did Moscow really ever make public promises to
recognize a de-jure Transdnestrian state? The celebrated Kozak Plan
of 2003, which failed following the decisive participation of the
Moldovan elite together with Western diplomats, by no means suggested
secession. It was based on a suggestion to create a federative Moldovan
state (officially Chisinau prefers the autonomy of Transdnestr in a
unitary formation), but this did not encompass self-determination
of the disputed territory. The same is true of all the preceding
documents linked to the peace process that were prepared with Russian
participation.
Where is such alarmism coming from? Russia itself has certainly played
a role, with its policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Three years
ago Russia recognized their independence and today it is increasing
its military-political and economic presence in the two previously
autonomous Georgian states. But this move was necessary - it is not
the consequence of implementing an imperial plan, but a reaction to
the process of frozen conflicts thawing, which began in Tbilisi in
that year. Within the narrow corridor of possibilities Moscow took a
decision that created many potential political risks. But this does
not mean that the main aim of Russian politics in the post-Soviet
space should be direct clashes with all of the former republics of
the Soviet Union and their Western partners. Is this a priority for
Russian foreign policy? Hardly. Conducting a narrow diplomatic game,
maintaining its strong position in both Chisinau and Tiraspol is much
more promising. The rupture between Russia and Georgia only happened
when room for maneuver in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian
conflicts had been exhausted.
But such possibilities do remain on the Dnestr! It's also important to
remember that Russia is not the only player in the Moldova-Transdnestr
peace process. And if Chisinau fails to understand Russia's moves,
or they spur an inadequate action from the Moldovan government, there
is always the option to freeze this or that diplomatic activity,
particularly as Moscow has shown more than once that it is ready for
one-sided concessions, which are not in its interests (such as the
rapid withdrawal of its troops from the area or agreeing to a Unitarian
Moldova, without taking into account Transdnestr's interests.)
Therefore it is unreasonable to push Russian diplomacy toward a tough
choice: revisionism or maintaining the status-quo. It will be much more
productive for Russia to act based on the situation and not sticking
to one plan, maintaining the status quo where it is convenient and
breaking it where there is no alternative.
Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D., is a political analyst and a visiting fellow
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
http://russiaprofile.org/comments/45317.html
Russia Profile
Sept 14 2011
Once again Transdnestr has become the focus of attention among
specialists across the post-Soviet space. On September 9, under the
auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OECD), an international conference was held during which the Moldovan
Prime Minister Vlad Filat met the President of the Unrecognized
Transdnestr Moldovan Republic Igor Smirnov.
Contact between representatives of Tiraspol and Chisinau over the past
ten years has been fitful. In 2001 Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin
was reelected on a ticket of reintegrating the country. He criticized
his predecessors harshly for provincial nationalism and a lack of
flexibility. The Voronin of 2001 was even ready to legally acknowledge
aggression from Chisinau against the left bank of the Dnestr. However,
slogans and real politics do not always coincide. Rejecting a Russian
plan (known as the Dmitry Kozak Plan) to reunite the country on federal
principles, Moldovan leaders in 2003 gave up talks with Transdnestr's
de-facto leadership as lost. It was only at the end of 2008 that the
conflicting sides made timid steps toward each other once again.
But the long-awaited meeting of the leaders of Moldova and Transdnestr
did not make the negotiating process irreversible, especially since
in 2009 the Moldovan political system suffered a crisis. A series of
parliamentary campaigns failed to result in the election of a head
of state (Moldova is a parliamentary republic). In this context, the
peace process was relegated to secondary importance. Since this time
there has been no official attempt to renew the "5 + 2" format, which
envisaged a resolution between the two conflicting sides and five other
interested parties - two guarantor-states - Ukraine and Russia, an
OECD mediator and two observer states - the United States and the EU.
At the latest meeting in Germany, the sides agreed to meet in
Moscow on September 22, 2011, to make provisions for a return to
fully-fledged talks. However, the very fact that Igor Smirnov agreed to
be drawn into the negotiating process (albeit half-heartedly) already
means a lot. Firstly, for many years he was forbidden to travel in
Europe. In September of 2011, this ban was lifted in the hopes that
the Transdnestr leader would take up constructive positions. Secondly,
in December 2011 presidential elections are set to take place in
Transdnestr, and Smirnov is expected to take part in what will be
his fifth election campaign. It is not hard to understand that for
a politician who has counted on separation from Moldova, taking part
in negotiations with Chisinau is not a simple choice.
And as often happens in such cases, experts are looking for "Moscow's
footprint." In reality, not long before the September conference
in Germany, Russian law enforcement agencies showed interest in the
business of certain members of Smirnov's family. And the fact that
Russia is not interested in prolonging the leader's time in power is
no secret. Recent announcements from representatives of the Russian
Consulate have also caused a stir: they have said that inhabitants
of Transdnestr applying for Russian citizenship can no longer do so
in Tiraspol and now have to go to the Moldovan capital. Those who do
not have Moldovan citizenship are also obliged to apply for a Moldovan
residence permit.
It has to be noted, however, that the meeting of Filat and Smirnov,
as well as pressure from Moscow, can be interpreted as an attempt by
Russia to act to resolve an old conflict by diplomatic means. It is
not the first year that Russia has taken part in either relations with
Transdnestr (for example the March 18, 2009 meeting of the presidents
of Russia, Moldova and Transdnestr) or the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process (three-way meetings between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia
have already become a regular occurrence). And although there have
been no obvious breakthroughs, the negotiating process in itself
can be seen as positive. But in the case of Transdnestr, in contrast
with Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow's diplomacy is frequently taken as a
sign of weakness. Recent events led to critical media response in
both Russia and Transdnestr. It is not the first time that this kind
of alarmism has emerged. Two years ago criticism was directed at the
joint statement issued on March 18, 2009, which stated that Russia was
ready to transform the current peace process to a "peace-guaranteeing
process." This position was then described as a practical defeat for
Russian diplomacy, although Moscow only started talking about such a
transformation after achieving a compromise between the conflicting
factions, and not a day earlier!
In 2011 pressure on president Smirnov was called "a loss" and "a
defeat." But if we put emotions aside, recent events have hardly
revealed anything new. Did Moscow really ever make public promises to
recognize a de-jure Transdnestrian state? The celebrated Kozak Plan
of 2003, which failed following the decisive participation of the
Moldovan elite together with Western diplomats, by no means suggested
secession. It was based on a suggestion to create a federative Moldovan
state (officially Chisinau prefers the autonomy of Transdnestr in a
unitary formation), but this did not encompass self-determination
of the disputed territory. The same is true of all the preceding
documents linked to the peace process that were prepared with Russian
participation.
Where is such alarmism coming from? Russia itself has certainly played
a role, with its policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Three years
ago Russia recognized their independence and today it is increasing
its military-political and economic presence in the two previously
autonomous Georgian states. But this move was necessary - it is not
the consequence of implementing an imperial plan, but a reaction to
the process of frozen conflicts thawing, which began in Tbilisi in
that year. Within the narrow corridor of possibilities Moscow took a
decision that created many potential political risks. But this does
not mean that the main aim of Russian politics in the post-Soviet
space should be direct clashes with all of the former republics of
the Soviet Union and their Western partners. Is this a priority for
Russian foreign policy? Hardly. Conducting a narrow diplomatic game,
maintaining its strong position in both Chisinau and Tiraspol is much
more promising. The rupture between Russia and Georgia only happened
when room for maneuver in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian
conflicts had been exhausted.
But such possibilities do remain on the Dnestr! It's also important to
remember that Russia is not the only player in the Moldova-Transdnestr
peace process. And if Chisinau fails to understand Russia's moves,
or they spur an inadequate action from the Moldovan government, there
is always the option to freeze this or that diplomatic activity,
particularly as Moscow has shown more than once that it is ready for
one-sided concessions, which are not in its interests (such as the
rapid withdrawal of its troops from the area or agreeing to a Unitarian
Moldova, without taking into account Transdnestr's interests.)
Therefore it is unreasonable to push Russian diplomacy toward a tough
choice: revisionism or maintaining the status-quo. It will be much more
productive for Russia to act based on the situation and not sticking
to one plan, maintaining the status quo where it is convenient and
breaking it where there is no alternative.
Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D., is a political analyst and a visiting fellow
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
http://russiaprofile.org/comments/45317.html