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ARMENIA: THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP'S UNREQUITED SUITOR - ANALYSIS
Eurasia Review
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15092011-armenia-the-eastern-partnerships-unrequited-suitor-analysis/
Sept 15 2011
By Nelli Babayan and Natalia Shapovalova for FRIDE
Armenia came to the EU's attention relatively late in comparison to
other Eastern European countries predominantly due to its lack of
energy resources. The EU's diplomatic efforts in the South Caucasus
have been mainly focused on revolutionary Georgia, energy-rich
Azerbaijan, and the fear that conflicts in the region may endanger
the EU's energy diversification plans. However, under the EU's all-
encompassing approach Armenia also appeared on the EU's radar, and in
2004 along with Georgia and Azerbaijan was included in the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Since a bloody political crisis in 2008,
democratisation has stalled and the country remains brittle.
While voicing its EU aspirations, Armenia has not been as outspoken
as its Western neighbours, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The conflict
with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the closed border with Turkey
and the negative economic effect of Georgia's conflicts have put
Armenia in a difficult geopolitical situation. These factors have
encouraged its Russian-oriented foreign and security policies.
Moscow's role as a security guarantor is evidenced by Armenia's
membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
Armenia Nevertheless, Armenia's interest in the EU has grown since
the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. Unlike other
EaP partner countries Armenia's government, opposition and civil
society have been more optimistic about the EaP's potential to generate
substantial benefits for their country. Ahead of the EaP summit at the
end of September, Armenia's government hopes its progress in reform
will be positively assessed and rewarded by greater EU assistance,
and that the issue of conflict resolution in the neighbourhood will
receive more attention.
ARMENIAN VIEWS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION At least publicly, the
government, opposition parties and society are united around
the idea of European integration. All main political parties in
Armenia support European integration, though they frame the issue
differently. The opposition parties are more outspoken in their
support. The Heritage party declared that accession to the EU should
become the principal orientation of Armenia's foreign and domestic
policies. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun claims
there is no alternative to EU integration as it is Armenia's path
to internal and economic development. Although the ruling coalition
parties do not mention full integration as an end goal, they agree
on the need to focus on deepening relations with the EU and getting
closer to EU standards. However, the constant floor-crossing of
Armenian political parties and the lack of comprehensive political
manifestos makes them unreliable partners in EU integration.
The government speaks of EU integration as an economic opportunity
in terms of trade, investment and aid, as well as improving Armenia's
position in the region. As one observer put it: the ruling elite wants
to belong to a good club. However, despite popular support for EU
integration, the government cautiously avoids talking of membership
so as to safeguard its relationship with its strategic Russian partner.
In addition, the membership goal is seen as unrealistic, and the
government does not want to raise people's expectations.
Armenia's foreign policy is based on the principle of complementarity,
which entails positive relations with all states in the region as well
as those with regional interests. As an Armenian diplomat put it,
Armenia has tried not to exploit the differences between Russia and
the West, a strategy unsuccessfully employed by Georgia.
The National Security Strategy of 2007 names the development of
Armenia's relations with the European structures and with the EU
as a foreign policy priority. Armenia's participation in European
integration, along with other post- Soviet states, is the focus of the
international component of the country's external security strategy.
Within this, European integration and the EU are mentioned in several
contexts: adoption of a European model of development, participation
in the regional transport and energy cooperation programmes supported
by the EU, reform of the education system, and the reform experience
of Eastern European countries.
In 2007, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on European Integration
was created to promote links with the EU and the Council of Europe
and to harmonise Armenian laws with European legislation. The national
programme for the approximation of Armenia's legislation with the EU
acquis was adopted in 2006, though never implemented. In addition,
the three parties forming the ruling coalition - the Republican Party,
Prosperous Armenia and Rule of Law - are seeking membership in the
European People's Party.
While the government focuses on the pragmatic gains of EU integration,
the opposition and civil society view EU integration as a process of
internal transformation based on the EU's democratic values. Thus,
the normative ideals often advocated by the EU seem to find greater
resonance with civil society than the govern- ment. For Armenia's
government European integration is only a political process, while for
civil society it means domestic recovery, a revival of moral values,
a change to people's mentality, the establishment of the rule of law
and democratisation.
The Armenian people expect European integration to bring about improved
living standards and ease travel procedures. In addition, opinion polls
emphasise the general expectation that the EU will be more active in
the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, economic development,
and the strengthening of democratic institutions. Despite reportedly
poor awareness about the EU's functioning, these expectations are
confirmed by a strong support for EU integration (86 per cent in the
capital Yerevan) and high confidence in EU institutions (2.5 times
higher than in the national ones).
FORM BEFORE SUBSTANCE Many observers in Yerevan say that though
the EaP is a continuation of the ENP it provides a new impetus for
reforms in Armenia. The inclusion of civil society in the EaP process
is one of the most frequently mentioned positive aspects of the
partnership. Despite differences between Armenian NGOs on a strategy
for civil society relations with the government (cooperation versus
opposition), many NGOs are actively involved in the work of the EaP
Civil Society Forum.
In addition, the Natio- nal Platform tries to establish contacts
with government ministries dealing with European integration and the
parliamentary delegation to EURONEST.
According to civil society representatives, most of the EaP's
achievements in Armenia are mainly procedural. These include quick
progress on the EU-Armenia Association Agreement (AA) talks that
started a year ago, preparation for free trade area negotiations,
a visa facilitation agreement and a mobility partnership. Meanwhile,
many note a lack of internal discussion about the consequences of
these agreements for Armenia. The talks are led by a narrow group
within the government without parliamentary or public scrutiny. This
raises fears within society, for instance about increased emigration
as visas become easier to obtain, even if the future agreement will
merely lessen the bureaucratic burden of the visa application process
and lower the visa fee.
The European Commission and World Bank reports note that Armenia
has improved customs administration, increased transparency of the
judiciary and conditions for doing business. However, Transparency
International's (TI) assessment of the ENP Action Plan imple-
mentation in judicial reform, the fight against corruption and
reform of public administration shows that compliance is far from
being achieved. Compliance is higher in judicial reform (46 out of
64 Action Plan objectives have been accomplished) and implementation
of the 'Group of States against Corruption' recommendations in the
fight against corruption (19 out 26 implemented). But it is still low
in civil service reform (25 out of 50 measures fulfilled). In fact,
according to Transparency International popular perception was that
corruption increased in Armenia in 2010, with the judiciary, police
and public service seen as the most corrupt institutions.
Much of civil society credits Western pressure on Armenia with the
amnesty offered to political prisoners in May 2011. Western funding
has also contributed to positive developments such as the creation of
the national ombudsperson institute, changes in the media legislation,
and dialogue between the government and opposition. Nevertheless,
according to Freedom House, Armenia has not improved its democratic
performance since the political crisis of 2008, in which ten
people were killed by state forces during the violent dispersal
of post-election protests. For many democratic elections remain a
failed test in Armenia and so will be a key indicator of the success
or failure of European integration.
The multilateral platform of the EaP is seen to have very
limited effectiveness in Armenia due to the unresolved conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, regional cooperation in the South Caucasus
takes bilateral forms. For example, the South Caucasus integrated
border management programme launched in 2010 focuses on cooperation
between Georgia and Armenia, and Georgia and Azerbaijan. There is
also a risk that parliamentary cooperation within EURONEST will be
threatened by politicisation of the conflict resolution issues.
EU RESPONSES Despite the apparent need for democratic reforms,
democracy promotion has not been high on the EU's agenda in
Armenia. Unlike in the case of Ukraine in 2004, there was no strong
reaction by the EU to the post-election political crisis in 2008, which
resulted in ten deaths and governmental harassment of oppositional
businesses and media. The EU limited itself to procedural steps
such as the establishment of human rights dialogue with the Armenian
authorities. Unlike in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, the EU started
the AA negotiations with Armenia as well as other South Caucasus
countries without a precondition of free and fair elections.
Furthermore, EU funding to Armenia does not prioritise the reform of
democratic institutions. In 2007-2010 Armenia received ~@98 million
from ENPI funds, most of which went to support vocational education
and training, justice reform, and to prepare Armenia for the AA and
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Smaller amounts
went to civil society and to support media freedom, human rights,
parliamentary practices and the electoral process. Though the ENPI
funding has increased to ~@157 million for 2011-2013, it has also
focused primarily on effective governance, trade liberalisation,
and border and migration control in the context of future AA and
DCFTA talks.
While EU-Armenia cooperation will proceed smoothly in areas of mutual
interest, such as trade and economic cooperation, an implementation
of DCFTA will depend on Yerevan's adoption of European standards
of governance. Here the EU's support cannot be limited to technical
issues. There will be no gain from DCFTA for Armenia if there is no
rule of law, respect for private property, free economic competition
and market.
These changes are seen as part of a broader political reform that would
dismantle the ruling regime's monopoly over the country's economy.
The EU still needs to offer more to Armenia in the field of energy.
Armenia's energy interests are generally overlooked by the EU. While
the EU focuses on nuclear safety, it does not make any offers to
enhance Armenia's energy security, which is dependent on Russian
fossil fuels and bypassed by projected pipelines promoted by the EU.
For example, the EU could assist state and non-state actors
(local communities, local governments) in introducing energy saving
technologies and help with attracting investment in renewable energy
production.
Unlike in the case of other post-Soviet conflicts, the EU is not
actively involved in the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the period 2003-2011, the EU
Special Representative (EUSR) was tasked to contribute to the conflict
settlement facilitated by other actors, namely the OSCE Minsk group.
His work was supported by several members of a border support team
based in Tbilisi with advisers from the EU Delegations in Yerevan and
Baku. Facing Baku's opposition to his every effort Peter Semneby, the
last EUSR, never visited the conflict region. In February 2011 the EUSR
mandate was discontinued, raising doubts over the importance of the
region for the EU. However, in late August 2011 Brussels appointed
a new EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, who
would also deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Since last year,
the EU has cautiously supported confidence-building efforts at civil
society level by funding a project of European NGOs in the region.
Armenia has not invited the EU to participate in the Minsk Group
settlement mechanism. However, the EU's long-term involvement in the
conflict's resolution is generally welcome in Armenia. Long term
resolution of the conflict is expected to rely on the EU's soft
power, assistance on environmental issues, civil society support,
and continuous encouragement of regional cooperation. In the short
term Armenia envisions the EU's involvement in conflict prevention
measures. The new EUSR should have more political support and
resources to fulfil this role. So far, the opposite is the case:
the budget of the new EUSR is about half what was available for the
two former special representatives to the region.
CONCLUSION Despite broad political support across party lines
and societal support for European integration, there is little
understanding of what European integration means in practice. Armenia's
government views it through a prism of economic cooperation that
improves the country's chances for prosperity and increases both its
and the country's international weight. Opposition and civil society
view European integration as an asymmetrical relationship with the EU
applying pressure on Armenia to promote democratic reform. Finally,
though Armenia's public is largely supportive of European integration,
it is poorly informed.
There is also a gap between the EU's desired and actual role in the
South Caucasus. While the EU is seen as a key player in Armenia's
democratisation, it is clear that its interest in the region is
primarily energy driven. If, in the public's perception, the EU fails
to deliver as a normative actor currently high public confidence in
EU institutions may wane.
The test posed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012
will be very important. Many in Armenia agree that the progress
of European integration can be measured by Armenia's willingness
to hold free and fair elections for the first time since the early
1990s. This is also an opportunity for the EU to take advantage of
its leverage over Armenia and make a difference through cooperation
with other Western actors. Armenia's progress in democratisation is
important for the success of the Eastern Partnership policy.
The EU needs to pay greater attention to the visibility of its
activities, which remain largely unknown to the general public. This
can be done through regular meetings with civil society organisations,
students, and civic activists. Building on its positive image among
Armenia's population as a soft power, the EU needs to invest more
into the development of a genuinely vibrant civil society, which
will finally assume its function as a watchdog. Straying slightly
away from its usual top-down approach, the EU should endeavour to
reconcile civil society with the political sphere.
While the EU has been more involved in conflict resolution in Georgia,
the new EUSR should pay equal attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Given the fact that Russia is perceived as a biased actor
in the region, the EU's increased involvement is likely to be welcomed
by local stakeholders.
Authors:
Nelli Babayan is a researcher at the University of Trento. She was
visiting researcher at FRIDE in 2010.
Natalia Shapovalova is a researcher at FRIDE.
Eurasia Review
http://www.eurasiareview.com/15092011-armenia-the-eastern-partnerships-unrequited-suitor-analysis/
Sept 15 2011
By Nelli Babayan and Natalia Shapovalova for FRIDE
Armenia came to the EU's attention relatively late in comparison to
other Eastern European countries predominantly due to its lack of
energy resources. The EU's diplomatic efforts in the South Caucasus
have been mainly focused on revolutionary Georgia, energy-rich
Azerbaijan, and the fear that conflicts in the region may endanger
the EU's energy diversification plans. However, under the EU's all-
encompassing approach Armenia also appeared on the EU's radar, and in
2004 along with Georgia and Azerbaijan was included in the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Since a bloody political crisis in 2008,
democratisation has stalled and the country remains brittle.
While voicing its EU aspirations, Armenia has not been as outspoken
as its Western neighbours, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The conflict
with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the closed border with Turkey
and the negative economic effect of Georgia's conflicts have put
Armenia in a difficult geopolitical situation. These factors have
encouraged its Russian-oriented foreign and security policies.
Moscow's role as a security guarantor is evidenced by Armenia's
membership in the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation.
Armenia Nevertheless, Armenia's interest in the EU has grown since
the launch of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2009. Unlike other
EaP partner countries Armenia's government, opposition and civil
society have been more optimistic about the EaP's potential to generate
substantial benefits for their country. Ahead of the EaP summit at the
end of September, Armenia's government hopes its progress in reform
will be positively assessed and rewarded by greater EU assistance,
and that the issue of conflict resolution in the neighbourhood will
receive more attention.
ARMENIAN VIEWS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION At least publicly, the
government, opposition parties and society are united around
the idea of European integration. All main political parties in
Armenia support European integration, though they frame the issue
differently. The opposition parties are more outspoken in their
support. The Heritage party declared that accession to the EU should
become the principal orientation of Armenia's foreign and domestic
policies. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun claims
there is no alternative to EU integration as it is Armenia's path
to internal and economic development. Although the ruling coalition
parties do not mention full integration as an end goal, they agree
on the need to focus on deepening relations with the EU and getting
closer to EU standards. However, the constant floor-crossing of
Armenian political parties and the lack of comprehensive political
manifestos makes them unreliable partners in EU integration.
The government speaks of EU integration as an economic opportunity
in terms of trade, investment and aid, as well as improving Armenia's
position in the region. As one observer put it: the ruling elite wants
to belong to a good club. However, despite popular support for EU
integration, the government cautiously avoids talking of membership
so as to safeguard its relationship with its strategic Russian partner.
In addition, the membership goal is seen as unrealistic, and the
government does not want to raise people's expectations.
Armenia's foreign policy is based on the principle of complementarity,
which entails positive relations with all states in the region as well
as those with regional interests. As an Armenian diplomat put it,
Armenia has tried not to exploit the differences between Russia and
the West, a strategy unsuccessfully employed by Georgia.
The National Security Strategy of 2007 names the development of
Armenia's relations with the European structures and with the EU
as a foreign policy priority. Armenia's participation in European
integration, along with other post- Soviet states, is the focus of the
international component of the country's external security strategy.
Within this, European integration and the EU are mentioned in several
contexts: adoption of a European model of development, participation
in the regional transport and energy cooperation programmes supported
by the EU, reform of the education system, and the reform experience
of Eastern European countries.
In 2007, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on European Integration
was created to promote links with the EU and the Council of Europe
and to harmonise Armenian laws with European legislation. The national
programme for the approximation of Armenia's legislation with the EU
acquis was adopted in 2006, though never implemented. In addition,
the three parties forming the ruling coalition - the Republican Party,
Prosperous Armenia and Rule of Law - are seeking membership in the
European People's Party.
While the government focuses on the pragmatic gains of EU integration,
the opposition and civil society view EU integration as a process of
internal transformation based on the EU's democratic values. Thus,
the normative ideals often advocated by the EU seem to find greater
resonance with civil society than the govern- ment. For Armenia's
government European integration is only a political process, while for
civil society it means domestic recovery, a revival of moral values,
a change to people's mentality, the establishment of the rule of law
and democratisation.
The Armenian people expect European integration to bring about improved
living standards and ease travel procedures. In addition, opinion polls
emphasise the general expectation that the EU will be more active in
the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, economic development,
and the strengthening of democratic institutions. Despite reportedly
poor awareness about the EU's functioning, these expectations are
confirmed by a strong support for EU integration (86 per cent in the
capital Yerevan) and high confidence in EU institutions (2.5 times
higher than in the national ones).
FORM BEFORE SUBSTANCE Many observers in Yerevan say that though
the EaP is a continuation of the ENP it provides a new impetus for
reforms in Armenia. The inclusion of civil society in the EaP process
is one of the most frequently mentioned positive aspects of the
partnership. Despite differences between Armenian NGOs on a strategy
for civil society relations with the government (cooperation versus
opposition), many NGOs are actively involved in the work of the EaP
Civil Society Forum.
In addition, the Natio- nal Platform tries to establish contacts
with government ministries dealing with European integration and the
parliamentary delegation to EURONEST.
According to civil society representatives, most of the EaP's
achievements in Armenia are mainly procedural. These include quick
progress on the EU-Armenia Association Agreement (AA) talks that
started a year ago, preparation for free trade area negotiations,
a visa facilitation agreement and a mobility partnership. Meanwhile,
many note a lack of internal discussion about the consequences of
these agreements for Armenia. The talks are led by a narrow group
within the government without parliamentary or public scrutiny. This
raises fears within society, for instance about increased emigration
as visas become easier to obtain, even if the future agreement will
merely lessen the bureaucratic burden of the visa application process
and lower the visa fee.
The European Commission and World Bank reports note that Armenia
has improved customs administration, increased transparency of the
judiciary and conditions for doing business. However, Transparency
International's (TI) assessment of the ENP Action Plan imple-
mentation in judicial reform, the fight against corruption and
reform of public administration shows that compliance is far from
being achieved. Compliance is higher in judicial reform (46 out of
64 Action Plan objectives have been accomplished) and implementation
of the 'Group of States against Corruption' recommendations in the
fight against corruption (19 out 26 implemented). But it is still low
in civil service reform (25 out of 50 measures fulfilled). In fact,
according to Transparency International popular perception was that
corruption increased in Armenia in 2010, with the judiciary, police
and public service seen as the most corrupt institutions.
Much of civil society credits Western pressure on Armenia with the
amnesty offered to political prisoners in May 2011. Western funding
has also contributed to positive developments such as the creation of
the national ombudsperson institute, changes in the media legislation,
and dialogue between the government and opposition. Nevertheless,
according to Freedom House, Armenia has not improved its democratic
performance since the political crisis of 2008, in which ten
people were killed by state forces during the violent dispersal
of post-election protests. For many democratic elections remain a
failed test in Armenia and so will be a key indicator of the success
or failure of European integration.
The multilateral platform of the EaP is seen to have very
limited effectiveness in Armenia due to the unresolved conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Thus, regional cooperation in the South Caucasus
takes bilateral forms. For example, the South Caucasus integrated
border management programme launched in 2010 focuses on cooperation
between Georgia and Armenia, and Georgia and Azerbaijan. There is
also a risk that parliamentary cooperation within EURONEST will be
threatened by politicisation of the conflict resolution issues.
EU RESPONSES Despite the apparent need for democratic reforms,
democracy promotion has not been high on the EU's agenda in
Armenia. Unlike in the case of Ukraine in 2004, there was no strong
reaction by the EU to the post-election political crisis in 2008, which
resulted in ten deaths and governmental harassment of oppositional
businesses and media. The EU limited itself to procedural steps
such as the establishment of human rights dialogue with the Armenian
authorities. Unlike in the case of Ukraine and Moldova, the EU started
the AA negotiations with Armenia as well as other South Caucasus
countries without a precondition of free and fair elections.
Furthermore, EU funding to Armenia does not prioritise the reform of
democratic institutions. In 2007-2010 Armenia received ~@98 million
from ENPI funds, most of which went to support vocational education
and training, justice reform, and to prepare Armenia for the AA and
a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Smaller amounts
went to civil society and to support media freedom, human rights,
parliamentary practices and the electoral process. Though the ENPI
funding has increased to ~@157 million for 2011-2013, it has also
focused primarily on effective governance, trade liberalisation,
and border and migration control in the context of future AA and
DCFTA talks.
While EU-Armenia cooperation will proceed smoothly in areas of mutual
interest, such as trade and economic cooperation, an implementation
of DCFTA will depend on Yerevan's adoption of European standards
of governance. Here the EU's support cannot be limited to technical
issues. There will be no gain from DCFTA for Armenia if there is no
rule of law, respect for private property, free economic competition
and market.
These changes are seen as part of a broader political reform that would
dismantle the ruling regime's monopoly over the country's economy.
The EU still needs to offer more to Armenia in the field of energy.
Armenia's energy interests are generally overlooked by the EU. While
the EU focuses on nuclear safety, it does not make any offers to
enhance Armenia's energy security, which is dependent on Russian
fossil fuels and bypassed by projected pipelines promoted by the EU.
For example, the EU could assist state and non-state actors
(local communities, local governments) in introducing energy saving
technologies and help with attracting investment in renewable energy
production.
Unlike in the case of other post-Soviet conflicts, the EU is not
actively involved in the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. In the period 2003-2011, the EU
Special Representative (EUSR) was tasked to contribute to the conflict
settlement facilitated by other actors, namely the OSCE Minsk group.
His work was supported by several members of a border support team
based in Tbilisi with advisers from the EU Delegations in Yerevan and
Baku. Facing Baku's opposition to his every effort Peter Semneby, the
last EUSR, never visited the conflict region. In February 2011 the EUSR
mandate was discontinued, raising doubts over the importance of the
region for the EU. However, in late August 2011 Brussels appointed
a new EUSR for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, who
would also deal with the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Since last year,
the EU has cautiously supported confidence-building efforts at civil
society level by funding a project of European NGOs in the region.
Armenia has not invited the EU to participate in the Minsk Group
settlement mechanism. However, the EU's long-term involvement in the
conflict's resolution is generally welcome in Armenia. Long term
resolution of the conflict is expected to rely on the EU's soft
power, assistance on environmental issues, civil society support,
and continuous encouragement of regional cooperation. In the short
term Armenia envisions the EU's involvement in conflict prevention
measures. The new EUSR should have more political support and
resources to fulfil this role. So far, the opposite is the case:
the budget of the new EUSR is about half what was available for the
two former special representatives to the region.
CONCLUSION Despite broad political support across party lines
and societal support for European integration, there is little
understanding of what European integration means in practice. Armenia's
government views it through a prism of economic cooperation that
improves the country's chances for prosperity and increases both its
and the country's international weight. Opposition and civil society
view European integration as an asymmetrical relationship with the EU
applying pressure on Armenia to promote democratic reform. Finally,
though Armenia's public is largely supportive of European integration,
it is poorly informed.
There is also a gap between the EU's desired and actual role in the
South Caucasus. While the EU is seen as a key player in Armenia's
democratisation, it is clear that its interest in the region is
primarily energy driven. If, in the public's perception, the EU fails
to deliver as a normative actor currently high public confidence in
EU institutions may wane.
The test posed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012
will be very important. Many in Armenia agree that the progress
of European integration can be measured by Armenia's willingness
to hold free and fair elections for the first time since the early
1990s. This is also an opportunity for the EU to take advantage of
its leverage over Armenia and make a difference through cooperation
with other Western actors. Armenia's progress in democratisation is
important for the success of the Eastern Partnership policy.
The EU needs to pay greater attention to the visibility of its
activities, which remain largely unknown to the general public. This
can be done through regular meetings with civil society organisations,
students, and civic activists. Building on its positive image among
Armenia's population as a soft power, the EU needs to invest more
into the development of a genuinely vibrant civil society, which
will finally assume its function as a watchdog. Straying slightly
away from its usual top-down approach, the EU should endeavour to
reconcile civil society with the political sphere.
While the EU has been more involved in conflict resolution in Georgia,
the new EUSR should pay equal attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. Given the fact that Russia is perceived as a biased actor
in the region, the EU's increased involvement is likely to be welcomed
by local stakeholders.
Authors:
Nelli Babayan is a researcher at the University of Trento. She was
visiting researcher at FRIDE in 2010.
Natalia Shapovalova is a researcher at FRIDE.