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WikiLeaks: Aliyev On Why He Didn't Support Georgia Publicly in 2008

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  • WikiLeaks: Aliyev On Why He Didn't Support Georgia Publicly in 2008

    WikiLeaks: Ilham Aliyev Talks On Why He Didn't Support Georgia
    Publicly in August 2008


    WASHINGTON DC. September 12, 2011: The new WikiLeaks report sheds
    light on Azerbaijan's position during the Russian invasion of Georgia.
    The diplomatic cable from the US Embassy in Baku to the US State
    Department dated August 22, 2008 shows that the government of Ilham
    Aliyev refrained from publicly supporting Georgia, but covertly
    supported that country to ensure its survival against the Russian
    attacks. The report quotes the president Aliyev telling the US
    diplomats that he had a series of tough negotiations with the Russian
    leadership in order to protect the BTC oil pipeline, and the areas of
    Marneuli region of Georgia which was home to significant number of
    ethnic Azeris. Below is the full text of the cable:

    C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAKU 000790

    SIPDIS

    E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2009

    TAGS: ENRG, ETRD, PREL, AJ, RU, TR

    SUBJECT: AZERBAIJANI PRESIDENT: I DIDN'T STAND BEHIND SAAKASHVILI
    BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE

    REF: ANKARA 1474

    Classified By: Charge Donald Lu, for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

    1. (C) SUMMARY: On August 19, President Aliyev told visiting British
    Petroleum CEO Inglis that Azerbaijan is taking quiet steps to support
    Georgia, although Aliyev himself did not publicly support the Georgian
    President. For example, Azerbaijanis are repairing a critical rail
    bridge destroyed by the Russians. Aliyev reconfirmed his western
    orientation for oil and gas exports, although he acknowledged that he
    would sell some gas to Russia and oil to Iran. Aliyev stressed that
    gas sales to Russia would be limited, maybe 2 bcm, and that the
    purpose would be to pressure Turkey to conclude gas transit talks; oil
    sales to Iran are a result of current pipeline constraints. Aliyev
    said that during the crisis he phoned Moscow to warn them against
    attacking Azeri interests in Georgia, including pipelines, the ethnic
    Azeri community and the Azeri-owned oil terminal at Kulevi. END
    SUMMARY.

    2. (C) On August 20, British Petroleum's Chief Executive Officer for
    Exploration and Production Andrew Inglis briefed the Charge on his
    one-hour one-on-one meeting with President Ilham Aliyev on the evening
    of August 19. Inglis was to meet Aliyev on August 20, but the
    President asked to see Inglis early before the President's meeting
    with visiting Turkish PM Erdogan. Inglis said that the President
    appeared "relaxed, convivial and warm."

    PRESIDENT'S REACTION TO GEORGIA CRISIS

    3. (C) The President told Inglis, "I didn't rush to stand behind
    Saakashvili because it would have made no difference." The President
    quickly added that Azerbaijan is quietly finding ways to support
    Georgia. He claimed that Azerbaijan is providing more aid than anyone
    by using its people within the country (Comment: a possible reference
    to ethnic Azeri Georgians) to do "real things." For example, he
    reported that Azerbaijanis are repairing the destroyed rail bridge
    link.

    4. (C) Aliyev emphasized that the events of the past few days
    "reinforce the journey (towards a western orientation) and not the
    need for a U-turn." He said that he is not in favor of changing his
    foreign policy in response to this conflict. His foreign policy has
    been to develop Azerbaijan's independence from Russia using its oil
    and gas resources. This engagement continues.

    5. (C) The President did probe Inglis about the timing of the Georgia
    invasion in relation to the PKK attack on the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
    (BTC) pipeline. He did not explicitly endorse the following conspiracy
    theory, but was interested in Inglis' reaction. Aliyev linked the
    following events: -- The PKK, formerly sponsored by the KGB, attacks
    the BTC. -- Three days later Russia invades Georgia. -- In a seemingly
    random act, the Russians blows up a key railway bridge halting rail
    export of oil. -- A stray bomb falls 10 meters from the Baku-Supsa oil
    pipeline. -- Transneft reports a technical fault along the
    Novorossiysk Line threatening one of the last remaining oil export
    route.

    PRESIDENT ALIYEV PHONES MOSCOW

    6. (C) President Aliyev noted that when he learned that a stray
    Russian bomb struck near the Baku-Supsa line, he rang Moscow (he
    inferred that he called Putin but did not specify). He said that he
    wanted to make clear that it would be considered a "major act" if
    Russia took actions against Azerbaijan's interests. He specifically
    complained about the bombing of a military airfield in the ethnic
    Azeri community of Marneuli, the stray bomb near the Baku-Supsa
    pipeline and reports of Russian troops entering the Azeri-owned oil
    terminal at Kulevi. Aliyev said that in response, the troops withdrew
    from Kulevi and there were no further bombings in these sensitive
    areas.

    GAS SALES TO RUSSIA A "SUBTERFUGE"

    7. (C) Inglis explained that limited future gas sales to Russia are
    for the purposes of enhancing Azerbaijan's position in the gas transit
    talks with Turkey. He emphasized that Aliyev told him that Azerbaijan
    still wants to sell Shah Deniz Phase Two gas west and not north. "It
    would be madness to do otherwise. The events have not changed the
    (political) rationale for exporting gas westward," the President
    added.

    8. (C) Inglis believes that Aliyev is in a much stronger position with
    Turkey than a month ago. Inglis added that Turkey must agree to
    transit rights and that Aliyev is not going to negotiate from a point
    of weakness. Aliyev said that he would be selling some gas to Russia
    and that "these sales to Russia must be credible." Inglis noted that,
    for Russia, some is not enough. There is not enough gas to go around
    and Russia wants it all. There's no compromise solution. The 2 bcm to
    Russia is not significant. It is "subterfuge" for the price
    negotiations, Inglis added.

    9. (C) The President also told Inglis that as a result of the pipeline
    closures, Azerbaijan will be forced to sell crude to Iran.

    ADDITIONAL DETAILS ABOUT THE PKK ATTACK ON BTC

    10. (C) Inglis confirmed reftel report that BP has evidence showing
    that the fire at the block valve along BTC in Turkey was the result of
    sabotage. "We are absolutely confident it was terrorism," he said. The
    evidence are photos showing a dent in the 8 inch bypass pressure line
    showing force from the outside as well as shrapnel holes. He passed
    copies of these photos to President Aliyev to show Turkish PM Erdogan
    in the event Erdogan denied that this was caused by terrorists.

    11. (C) Inglis added that the block valves are the most vulnerable
    points, while the 42 inch main line is buried and was not damaged. To
    attack the main line would require a two meter trench, and something
    to penetrate its thick alloy. There are ten most vulnerable block
    valves in Turkey. BP has asked that the Turkish security forces "camp
    out" at these valve stations, in addition to requesting that the
    Turkish State Oil Company Botas eventually harden the facilities
    around the valves. BP has raised this with the Ministry of Energy in
    Turkey, but believes it needs to be raised with the Turkish Army as
    well.

    12. (C) In Turkey, block valves are housed in "little green corrugated
    shacks," whereas in Azerbaijan and Georgia the block valves and
    actuators are in concrete buildings with intrusion detectors. In
    Borjomi, Georgia, BP has installed carbon fiber matting to defend the
    main line against an RPG attack and fiber optic lines above the main
    line to detect digging.

    AZERI CHARM OFFENSIVE WITH BP

    13. (C) Last year, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company (SOCAR) was
    threatening to have BP Azerbaijan's President arrested and tried for
    theft of state resources. In contrast, Inglis described the mood about
    BP in Azerbaijan as having come full circle. Aliyev made positive
    comments to the press about BP and SOCAR being friends in difficult
    times.

    14. (C) The President told Inglis that Azerbaijan still needs BP. He
    asked rhetorically, "If SOCAR owned BTC would it still be there?" The
    President said he knows that he needs to keep BP motivated and
    interested in Azerbaijan. There was good discussion about a Production
    Sharing Agreement (PSA) extension and the extraction of
    Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli (ACG) deep gas. Inglis believed the details will
    still move at a certain pace, for tactical reasons, but that these
    issues are headed in the right direction.

    15. (C) The President summoned the SOCAR President after the evening
    meeting with Inglis and made SOCAR available to Inglis the next day.
    "(SOCAR President) Rovnag (Abdullayev) was the nicest Rovnaq we've
    ever met." Inglis said that he had "real conversation" with Abdullayev
    about the Shah Deniz Phase One gas price. Inglis advised SOCAR to
    settle on a price now and not wait for a conclusion of transit talks
    as the price of gas is rising every day.

    COMMENT

    16. (C) Inglis believes that Aliyev is looking for a statement from
    the West (and particularly the U.S.) that parallels Aliyev's statement
    to Moscow: If you mess with the pipelines, you're messing with us. He
    noted that Aliyev was dismissive of high-level people turning up in
    Baku for a photo-op with him and lacking a substantive message.

    17. (C) On the sale of Azeri gas to Russia, Inglis clearly seemed to
    be spinning this to try to head off expected U.S. objection to such a
    sale. His analysis may yet be true about this sale being used to
    pressure Turkey over transit talks, but it is also doubtless motivated
    by BP's commercial interest in developing a market and routes to
    justify Shah Deniz Phase Two and ACG deep gas production. Likewise,
    Azerbaijan oil sales to Iran could be problematic, if continued over
    the longer-term. LU

    (Azerireport)




    From: A. Papazian
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