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AMERICAN ANALYST JEFF SAHADEO: I HAVE A DIFFICULT TIME SEEING AZERBAIJAN AS PART OF NATO, UNLESS...
Today
Sept 19 2011
Azerbaijan
Jeff Sahadeo, a Director of the Institute of European, Russian and
Eurasian Studies (EURUS) at the Carlton University, is worried that
the situation in the South Caucasus region remains unstable.
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to rise and military
spending continues to grow, he says, while talks over the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh have stalled.
Also, he adds, the appetite for further conflict over Ossetia
has cooled among the Georgian public, but the Putin/ Medvedev and
Saakashvili regimes continue to carry on a war of words to the extent
that some kind of minor violent border incident could flare into
something larger.
In an interview with APA's Washington DC correspondent, assistant
professor Sahadeo explains more.
What are the main differences between the Russian and Western
approaches to the independent republics created after the collapse
of the Soviet Union?
Russia still considers the region its "backyard" and, especially in
the 2000s, has become determined to use its economic wealth to act
as a regional hegemony. Cultural and political links from the Soviet
period endure with the elites of some of these states, and migration
to Russia from poorer republics plays a large role in the regional
economy. Russia also sees the region as a critical market for its
export goods, though it has trouble competing with China in this
respect. The western approach, which focused first on the extension
of NATO, has allowed the former Communist bloc states as well as the
Baltic republics of the USSR to leave the Russian/ Soviet orbit.
Western interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia focus primarily
on energy, and to some extent security in the post 9/11 world.
But efforts to engage the region politically have stalled: the 2005
massacre in Andijon spoiled relations between the Uzbek and American
governments, while the Bush administration efforts to admit Georgia
to NATO ended with the Russia-Georgia war, when most of Europe,
afraid to lose Russian energy resources, proved willing not to lend
support to the Saakashvili government, especially as it became known
the Georgians also shared responsibility for the war's outbreak.
What do you expect from the Karabakh negotiation process, how do
you see the future of it? What kind of role can the west play in
this process?
Both the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments have left themselves
little room for compromise in international negotiations. Proposals
over returns of refugees and referendum stall continuously as each side
only supports phrasing that is seen to aid their cause in retaining
or regaining Karabakh. The complete lack of trust between the two
governments, and their bellicose rhetoric towards the other, intended
to build support among nationalist publics, leaves me quite pessimistic
about progress. It is always better for dialogue to continue.
What needs to happen in South Caucasus countries so that they better
integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures? Where do you see the region
in 10 years?
Some type of resolution to these "frozen conflicts" will aid greatly
in integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. One major issue here is
Russia, and their desire not to "lose" this region as they felt that
they lost the Baltics. I doubt that the US and the West will risk
a major rupture with Russia, so integrating the South Caucasus into
Euro-Atlantic structures would require some degree of Russian assent.
I could see a scenario whereby, in several years, Turkey is admitted
to the EU and Georgia and perhaps the other Caucasus countries after
that, which may be one path. Russia sees the EU as less threatening
than NATO; and at this moment NATO has no strong incentive to expand.
Azerbaijan is actively cooperating with NATO, but still isn't its
member. When do you think it will become a member, and will this ever
happen, taking into consideration Russia's tough reaction?
I have a difficult time seeing Azerbaijan as part of NATO unless
relations between Russia and the west improve to the point that
Russia itself is given some status in the organization. That might
be possible in a post-Putin world. If the US and Europe consider
Azerbaijan's energy reserves to be durable, then that might become
a further motivation to expand. But in the short term, there is no
realistic way to see Azerbaijan becoming a member of NATO.
What is the possibility of cooperation between Russia and US in
the security sphere? What would be the role of Azerbaijan in that
cooperation? Do you think that Gabala Radio Location Station is still
on the countries' agenda in terms of security cooperation?
There is a possibility of superficial cooperation between the two,
but the level of trust is minimal. Now that the US feels it has the
upper hand on Al-Qaeda, there may be less desire to co-operate over
terrorist threats. Russia has chosen to take its own path on countries
like Iran and North Korea rather than co-operate with the US on these
dangerous states. With the sniping continuing between Russia and the
US over missile defense, I don't think Gabala or similar facilities
will be places where the two will seek to co-operate.
Today
Sept 19 2011
Azerbaijan
Jeff Sahadeo, a Director of the Institute of European, Russian and
Eurasian Studies (EURUS) at the Carlton University, is worried that
the situation in the South Caucasus region remains unstable.
Tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia continue to rise and military
spending continues to grow, he says, while talks over the status of
Nagorno-Karabakh have stalled.
Also, he adds, the appetite for further conflict over Ossetia
has cooled among the Georgian public, but the Putin/ Medvedev and
Saakashvili regimes continue to carry on a war of words to the extent
that some kind of minor violent border incident could flare into
something larger.
In an interview with APA's Washington DC correspondent, assistant
professor Sahadeo explains more.
What are the main differences between the Russian and Western
approaches to the independent republics created after the collapse
of the Soviet Union?
Russia still considers the region its "backyard" and, especially in
the 2000s, has become determined to use its economic wealth to act
as a regional hegemony. Cultural and political links from the Soviet
period endure with the elites of some of these states, and migration
to Russia from poorer republics plays a large role in the regional
economy. Russia also sees the region as a critical market for its
export goods, though it has trouble competing with China in this
respect. The western approach, which focused first on the extension
of NATO, has allowed the former Communist bloc states as well as the
Baltic republics of the USSR to leave the Russian/ Soviet orbit.
Western interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia focus primarily
on energy, and to some extent security in the post 9/11 world.
But efforts to engage the region politically have stalled: the 2005
massacre in Andijon spoiled relations between the Uzbek and American
governments, while the Bush administration efforts to admit Georgia
to NATO ended with the Russia-Georgia war, when most of Europe,
afraid to lose Russian energy resources, proved willing not to lend
support to the Saakashvili government, especially as it became known
the Georgians also shared responsibility for the war's outbreak.
What do you expect from the Karabakh negotiation process, how do
you see the future of it? What kind of role can the west play in
this process?
Both the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments have left themselves
little room for compromise in international negotiations. Proposals
over returns of refugees and referendum stall continuously as each side
only supports phrasing that is seen to aid their cause in retaining
or regaining Karabakh. The complete lack of trust between the two
governments, and their bellicose rhetoric towards the other, intended
to build support among nationalist publics, leaves me quite pessimistic
about progress. It is always better for dialogue to continue.
What needs to happen in South Caucasus countries so that they better
integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures? Where do you see the region
in 10 years?
Some type of resolution to these "frozen conflicts" will aid greatly
in integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. One major issue here is
Russia, and their desire not to "lose" this region as they felt that
they lost the Baltics. I doubt that the US and the West will risk
a major rupture with Russia, so integrating the South Caucasus into
Euro-Atlantic structures would require some degree of Russian assent.
I could see a scenario whereby, in several years, Turkey is admitted
to the EU and Georgia and perhaps the other Caucasus countries after
that, which may be one path. Russia sees the EU as less threatening
than NATO; and at this moment NATO has no strong incentive to expand.
Azerbaijan is actively cooperating with NATO, but still isn't its
member. When do you think it will become a member, and will this ever
happen, taking into consideration Russia's tough reaction?
I have a difficult time seeing Azerbaijan as part of NATO unless
relations between Russia and the west improve to the point that
Russia itself is given some status in the organization. That might
be possible in a post-Putin world. If the US and Europe consider
Azerbaijan's energy reserves to be durable, then that might become
a further motivation to expand. But in the short term, there is no
realistic way to see Azerbaijan becoming a member of NATO.
What is the possibility of cooperation between Russia and US in
the security sphere? What would be the role of Azerbaijan in that
cooperation? Do you think that Gabala Radio Location Station is still
on the countries' agenda in terms of security cooperation?
There is a possibility of superficial cooperation between the two,
but the level of trust is minimal. Now that the US feels it has the
upper hand on Al-Qaeda, there may be less desire to co-operate over
terrorist threats. Russia has chosen to take its own path on countries
like Iran and North Korea rather than co-operate with the US on these
dangerous states. With the sniping continuing between Russia and the
US over missile defense, I don't think Gabala or similar facilities
will be places where the two will seek to co-operate.