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"THE NKR CAN NEVER ACCEPT THE MADRID PRINCIPLES AS A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS"
Vahe Sarukhanyan
hetq.am
14:51, September 2, 2011
An interview with Mher Harutyunyan, Director of the "Kajar"Analytical
Center of Shushi and Assistant Professor of Historical Sciences at
Artsakh State University.
The NKR seeks to garner international recognition. This first step
could be taken by the RoA. Armenian authorities argue that they
will not grant recognition in order to hinder negotiations and lead
the settlement process into a dead end. Recently, however, the RoA
Presidential Press Secretary stated that in the event of Azerbaijani
military aggression, Armenia might grant de jure recognition of the
NKR and sign a mutual assistance pact with it. How do you evaluate
the likelihood of such a development?
In my opinion, Armenia has dragged its feet regarding the recognition
of NKR independence. If Armenia is indeed trying to adjust the
recognition process into a more advantageous set of circumstances that
can indeed assist in the legal recognition of the NKR, then, I believe
that a mutual assistance pact must be signed immediately. This could
even take the form of clarifying the status of military personnel in
the RoA serving in the NKR. Such a pact is the imperative of the day
and would allow for the role of the RoA, as the guarantor of the NKR,
to be placed on a firm legal basis and would go a long way to entrench
Armenia as defending the interest of Karabakh on the world stage.
Secondly, I believe that such a pact would lead Azerbaijan to tone
down its military rhetoric and aspirations since it would realize that
RoA-NKR relations have been placed on a truly legal and binding basis.
This is very important. As a historian, I can state categorically
that we have often been late in legally codifying certain realities.
Let's assume that the RoA recognizes NKR independence tomorrow and
that relations between the two are given a legal basis. In that case,
wouldn't Azerbaijan and the international organizations involved in
the negotiations ask themselves what is actually being negotiated?
The context of the question is understandable. First, let's note that
Armenia has taken the road of negotiating with Azerbaijan since it
has an interest in preserving regional peace and stability. Let me
just say in passing that I would call the talks advisory sessions
and not negotiations since negotiations must be a total process in
which the representatives of the NKR must also participate. The main
concern of Armenia is to moderate Azeri policy leaning towards the
resumption of warfare and processes undermining regional stability.
But we see that Azerbaijan constantly attempts to create a negative
image of the NKR; as a source hindering regional cooperation and a
state that threatens regional peace. In truth, though, the reality
on the ground is exactly the opposite. It is Azerbaijan, with
its aggressive stance and destructive machinations, which poses a
real threat. From this viewpoint, the existence of the NKR and its
international recognition would increase the prospects for regional
security and serve as a stabilizing factor.
As to what should be negotiated, it is my firm conviction, that
at the core of the talks must be placed the issue of the continued
Azeri occupation of Armenian lands - that of Nakhijevan, the return of
lands formerly under the jurisdiction of the NKR, the preservation of
Armenian monuments on those lands, the halting of resettling those
lands by Azerbaijanis, the return of Artzvashen, compensation to
the 500,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, and all other related
issues facing the region due to the aggressive policies of Azerbaijan
and the war it started.
Azerbaijan, due to its aggressive and crafty public relations machine,
that disseminates disinformation, has been able to cover all this up
and direct attention away from these truths. In other words, the goal
of our foreign policy must be to present Azerbaijan as the real threat
to regional peace and a government sponsor of terrorism. As such,
we must present ourselves as seeking positive change in Azerbaijan
but never via the route of concessions. This is because historical
experience has shown that whenever Azerbaijan receives a pardon for
its crimes, it has used it in the name of greater evil and has become
more emboldened.
In the Karabakh conflict settlement negotiations, the NKR merely has
"observer" status. Do you believe that the RoA authorities made
a mistake when it conceded to Azeri demands regarding Karabakh
participation and assumed the role of representing the NKR?
People shouldn't find it somewhat contradictory when I state that I
prefer the current situation, when the NKR isn't a direct participant
in the negotiations. Why? I believe the negotiations process isn't
following the correct path. The reason for this can be laid at the
mistaken foreign policy adopted by the first leaders of the RoA. We
are reaping the fruits of those mistakes today. Thus, I consider it
to be a piece of good luck that the NKR isn't a part of that process
today. All that we must assert is that without the consent of the
NKR stemming from that process cannot be accepted or implemented.
Thankfully, even the RoA authorities and other political figures
have declared this on numerous occasions. All this is just a further
guarantee that, in the end, the final word rests with the people of
the NKR. And this is only natural. It is my opinion that the people of
the NKR and its elected leadership would never consent to any accords
that threaten our vital interests, that threaten our security and
contradict our constitution.
However, the Karabakh conflict settlement process is being conducted on
the basis of the Madrid Principles. The RoA authorities and President
Serzh Sargsyan have noted that one of the principles contained therein
deals with the return of the liberated territories or the "security
zone" to Azerbaijan, whereas the current territorial borders of the
NKR are safeguarded in the NKR Constitution. This point has also been
stressed by the NKR President. How would you explain this apparent
contradiction?
First we must take into account that after the passage of the
NKR Constitution in 2006, the concept of a "security zone" has
disappeared. Today, we have territories inextricably linked to
the Mountainous Republic of Artsakh and I don't understand what
negotiations are taking place regarding them. If discussions are about
territories outside the border of the NKR then, let me say somewhat
off-handedly, that I understand these to be lands neighboring on Iran,
the RoA and Azerbaijan. But let's get serious for a moment. We must
assert that the Madrid Principles are not acceptable for the NKR
given that the NKR did not participate in their formulation. That's
number one.
Secondly, I would like to hope that they are just principles and that
they will not be further developed through the course of righteous
diplomacy. I would especially hope that those points that directly
contradict our interests would never be put into practice. In my
view, the non-constructive policies of Azerbaijan even rule out any
agreement to be reached on these principles. One can only hope that
the mediators and regional powers sharing their interests will finally
realize that the time has come to come up with some truly realistic
principles. Naturally, this means that any new set of principles can
no longer be based on the concept of parity between the aggressor,
Azerbaijan, and those forced to defend themselves, Armenia and the
NKR. Such parity, emanating from the Soviet era, has only served to
embolden Azerbaijan, to make it more hard-line and bellicose.
In your opinion, are the talks leading towards a settlement or a
dead end given that the talks and meetings between the presidents
and foreign ministers are often described as consecutive, on-going,
but with little tangible results?
No matter how pessimistically we regard those advice sessions, they
do play a certain vital role in the sense that they mitigate the
possibility of a resumption of hostilities. I feel that meetings
are important just from this viewpoint alone. As to whether they
are leading to a resolution or not, I can only repeat that it's a
question for the future. But taking into account the past disruptive
policies of Azerbaijan, we come to the conclusion that Baku will see
to it that nothing comes out of the talks.
In your opinion what will the process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish
relations have on the Karabakh settlement?
As has been stated many times before, these are two different
processes. I would say that broadly defined there is no issue of
"normalizing" Armenian-Turkish relations. What should be on the agenda
is the Turkish blockade of Armenia. Ankara closed the border back in
1993 and today it should do the right thing by reopening it.
From: A. Papazian
Vahe Sarukhanyan
hetq.am
14:51, September 2, 2011
An interview with Mher Harutyunyan, Director of the "Kajar"Analytical
Center of Shushi and Assistant Professor of Historical Sciences at
Artsakh State University.
The NKR seeks to garner international recognition. This first step
could be taken by the RoA. Armenian authorities argue that they
will not grant recognition in order to hinder negotiations and lead
the settlement process into a dead end. Recently, however, the RoA
Presidential Press Secretary stated that in the event of Azerbaijani
military aggression, Armenia might grant de jure recognition of the
NKR and sign a mutual assistance pact with it. How do you evaluate
the likelihood of such a development?
In my opinion, Armenia has dragged its feet regarding the recognition
of NKR independence. If Armenia is indeed trying to adjust the
recognition process into a more advantageous set of circumstances that
can indeed assist in the legal recognition of the NKR, then, I believe
that a mutual assistance pact must be signed immediately. This could
even take the form of clarifying the status of military personnel in
the RoA serving in the NKR. Such a pact is the imperative of the day
and would allow for the role of the RoA, as the guarantor of the NKR,
to be placed on a firm legal basis and would go a long way to entrench
Armenia as defending the interest of Karabakh on the world stage.
Secondly, I believe that such a pact would lead Azerbaijan to tone
down its military rhetoric and aspirations since it would realize that
RoA-NKR relations have been placed on a truly legal and binding basis.
This is very important. As a historian, I can state categorically
that we have often been late in legally codifying certain realities.
Let's assume that the RoA recognizes NKR independence tomorrow and
that relations between the two are given a legal basis. In that case,
wouldn't Azerbaijan and the international organizations involved in
the negotiations ask themselves what is actually being negotiated?
The context of the question is understandable. First, let's note that
Armenia has taken the road of negotiating with Azerbaijan since it
has an interest in preserving regional peace and stability. Let me
just say in passing that I would call the talks advisory sessions
and not negotiations since negotiations must be a total process in
which the representatives of the NKR must also participate. The main
concern of Armenia is to moderate Azeri policy leaning towards the
resumption of warfare and processes undermining regional stability.
But we see that Azerbaijan constantly attempts to create a negative
image of the NKR; as a source hindering regional cooperation and a
state that threatens regional peace. In truth, though, the reality
on the ground is exactly the opposite. It is Azerbaijan, with
its aggressive stance and destructive machinations, which poses a
real threat. From this viewpoint, the existence of the NKR and its
international recognition would increase the prospects for regional
security and serve as a stabilizing factor.
As to what should be negotiated, it is my firm conviction, that
at the core of the talks must be placed the issue of the continued
Azeri occupation of Armenian lands - that of Nakhijevan, the return of
lands formerly under the jurisdiction of the NKR, the preservation of
Armenian monuments on those lands, the halting of resettling those
lands by Azerbaijanis, the return of Artzvashen, compensation to
the 500,000 Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, and all other related
issues facing the region due to the aggressive policies of Azerbaijan
and the war it started.
Azerbaijan, due to its aggressive and crafty public relations machine,
that disseminates disinformation, has been able to cover all this up
and direct attention away from these truths. In other words, the goal
of our foreign policy must be to present Azerbaijan as the real threat
to regional peace and a government sponsor of terrorism. As such,
we must present ourselves as seeking positive change in Azerbaijan
but never via the route of concessions. This is because historical
experience has shown that whenever Azerbaijan receives a pardon for
its crimes, it has used it in the name of greater evil and has become
more emboldened.
In the Karabakh conflict settlement negotiations, the NKR merely has
"observer" status. Do you believe that the RoA authorities made
a mistake when it conceded to Azeri demands regarding Karabakh
participation and assumed the role of representing the NKR?
People shouldn't find it somewhat contradictory when I state that I
prefer the current situation, when the NKR isn't a direct participant
in the negotiations. Why? I believe the negotiations process isn't
following the correct path. The reason for this can be laid at the
mistaken foreign policy adopted by the first leaders of the RoA. We
are reaping the fruits of those mistakes today. Thus, I consider it
to be a piece of good luck that the NKR isn't a part of that process
today. All that we must assert is that without the consent of the
NKR stemming from that process cannot be accepted or implemented.
Thankfully, even the RoA authorities and other political figures
have declared this on numerous occasions. All this is just a further
guarantee that, in the end, the final word rests with the people of
the NKR. And this is only natural. It is my opinion that the people of
the NKR and its elected leadership would never consent to any accords
that threaten our vital interests, that threaten our security and
contradict our constitution.
However, the Karabakh conflict settlement process is being conducted on
the basis of the Madrid Principles. The RoA authorities and President
Serzh Sargsyan have noted that one of the principles contained therein
deals with the return of the liberated territories or the "security
zone" to Azerbaijan, whereas the current territorial borders of the
NKR are safeguarded in the NKR Constitution. This point has also been
stressed by the NKR President. How would you explain this apparent
contradiction?
First we must take into account that after the passage of the
NKR Constitution in 2006, the concept of a "security zone" has
disappeared. Today, we have territories inextricably linked to
the Mountainous Republic of Artsakh and I don't understand what
negotiations are taking place regarding them. If discussions are about
territories outside the border of the NKR then, let me say somewhat
off-handedly, that I understand these to be lands neighboring on Iran,
the RoA and Azerbaijan. But let's get serious for a moment. We must
assert that the Madrid Principles are not acceptable for the NKR
given that the NKR did not participate in their formulation. That's
number one.
Secondly, I would like to hope that they are just principles and that
they will not be further developed through the course of righteous
diplomacy. I would especially hope that those points that directly
contradict our interests would never be put into practice. In my
view, the non-constructive policies of Azerbaijan even rule out any
agreement to be reached on these principles. One can only hope that
the mediators and regional powers sharing their interests will finally
realize that the time has come to come up with some truly realistic
principles. Naturally, this means that any new set of principles can
no longer be based on the concept of parity between the aggressor,
Azerbaijan, and those forced to defend themselves, Armenia and the
NKR. Such parity, emanating from the Soviet era, has only served to
embolden Azerbaijan, to make it more hard-line and bellicose.
In your opinion, are the talks leading towards a settlement or a
dead end given that the talks and meetings between the presidents
and foreign ministers are often described as consecutive, on-going,
but with little tangible results?
No matter how pessimistically we regard those advice sessions, they
do play a certain vital role in the sense that they mitigate the
possibility of a resumption of hostilities. I feel that meetings
are important just from this viewpoint alone. As to whether they
are leading to a resolution or not, I can only repeat that it's a
question for the future. But taking into account the past disruptive
policies of Azerbaijan, we come to the conclusion that Baku will see
to it that nothing comes out of the talks.
In your opinion what will the process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish
relations have on the Karabakh settlement?
As has been stated many times before, these are two different
processes. I would say that broadly defined there is no issue of
"normalizing" Armenian-Turkish relations. What should be on the agenda
is the Turkish blockade of Armenia. Ankara closed the border back in
1993 and today it should do the right thing by reopening it.
From: A. Papazian