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MILITARY HOLIDAY CAMP
by Ivan Sukhov, Artyom Kobzev
WPS Agency
Sept 22 2011
Russia
Source: Moscow News, No 124, September 22, 2011, p. 3
THE DUMA COUNTENANCES RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH
OSSETIA; Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
an asset or a liability?
On September 22, the Duma will ratify agreements with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia on Russian military presence on their territories. Will
Russian military bases in the self-proclaimed and non-recognized
republics be an asset or a liability?
Draft laws on ratification were submitted to the Duma on August 8,
anniversary of the conflict with Georgia. The agreements as such had
been signed in 2010, on February 17 with Abkhazia and April 7 with
South Ossetia.
Russia revised the format of its military presence in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia right after the conflict with Georgia in August 2008.
Before the war, Russian military presence in these republics had
been shaped by peacekeeping mandates backed by the CIS Council of
the Heads of States in Abkhazia and four-sided commission (Russia,
Georgia, North Ossetia, South Ossetia) in South Ossetia. The Five-Day
War untied Russia's hands and enabled it to make its own decisions in
the matter of military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia
recognized these territories as sovereign states in August 2008 and
pronounced readiness to deploy 3,800 servicemen in each republic.
Forthcoming ratification of the agreements on military bases will
legalize their existence. Russia has a naval base in Ochamchira
and airbase in Gudauta in Abkhazia, and several military objects in
Tskhinvali and Leningori district of South Ossetia.
"These military bases are of paramount importance for Russia since
they ensure its safety from the southern direction," said Academy of
Geopolitical Sciences Senior Vice President Konstantin Sivkov. "Loss
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will spell the loss of the Caucasus.
Establishing military bases there, we ensure political stability
in these republics and guarantee their security. And that in its
turn means security of Russia itself (Black Sea region, Stavropol,
Krasnodar) and order on its southern borders."
The widespread opinion in Tbilisi itself is that Russian military
bases in Abkhazia and particularly in South Ossetia (these latter are
several dozens kilometers from the Georgian capital) are needed for
the purpose of military control over Georgia. Sivkov questioned this
premise and said, "Distance between the military bases and Georgia
does not matter. What matters is that with the Russian military
posted there, Georgia is not going to try and overrun Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Had it been otherwise, these territories would have
been turned into a den of terrorism and a source of constant military
threats to Russia." Needless to say, Georgia refuses to perceive its
runaway regions as sovereign states and therefore regards Russian
military presence there as occupation.
Said Victor Litovkin of Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, "It
is Abkhazia and South Ossetia themselves that mostly need Russian
bases on their territories. They are seen in these republics as a
guarantee from Georgian aggression... But Russia needs these bases
too because they strengthen Russian military presence in the Black
Sea where NATO is represented by Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. They
say of course that NATO does not see Russia as an enemy, but the
Alliance never stopped being anti-Russian so that the possibility of
a conflict cannot be ruled out. After all, the Alliance does install
a ballistic missile defense system and it will expand eastward given
half a chance. Also importantly, military bases in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are integrated into a common system with the bases in Gyumri
(Armenia) and Gabala (Azerbaijan)."
Independent expert Andrei Soldatov disagreed with Litovkin. He said,
"There are no common systems there. The Gabala radar is ageing fast.
No way to regard it as a major contribution to the military
infrastructure anymore. Establishment of military bases in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia was a political decision, not military at all. On
the contrary, the Defense Ministry would like to diminish military
presence in the Caucasus."
As a matter of fact, agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
include certain clauses that tend to complicate their relations with
Russia to a certain extent. In Abkhazia, the Russian Defense Ministry
aspires to both military bases and R&R facilities in Sukhumi. The
Russian military shut them down for repairs this summer and laid off
1,300 locals. Considering that jobs in Abkhazia are at high premium,
this announcement caused a public outcry. Defense Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov personally visited Sukhumi in July to discuss the matter
with the local authorities. It did not help any.
by Ivan Sukhov, Artyom Kobzev
WPS Agency
Sept 22 2011
Russia
Source: Moscow News, No 124, September 22, 2011, p. 3
THE DUMA COUNTENANCES RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH
OSSETIA; Russian military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia:
an asset or a liability?
On September 22, the Duma will ratify agreements with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia on Russian military presence on their territories. Will
Russian military bases in the self-proclaimed and non-recognized
republics be an asset or a liability?
Draft laws on ratification were submitted to the Duma on August 8,
anniversary of the conflict with Georgia. The agreements as such had
been signed in 2010, on February 17 with Abkhazia and April 7 with
South Ossetia.
Russia revised the format of its military presence in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia right after the conflict with Georgia in August 2008.
Before the war, Russian military presence in these republics had
been shaped by peacekeeping mandates backed by the CIS Council of
the Heads of States in Abkhazia and four-sided commission (Russia,
Georgia, North Ossetia, South Ossetia) in South Ossetia. The Five-Day
War untied Russia's hands and enabled it to make its own decisions in
the matter of military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia
recognized these territories as sovereign states in August 2008 and
pronounced readiness to deploy 3,800 servicemen in each republic.
Forthcoming ratification of the agreements on military bases will
legalize their existence. Russia has a naval base in Ochamchira
and airbase in Gudauta in Abkhazia, and several military objects in
Tskhinvali and Leningori district of South Ossetia.
"These military bases are of paramount importance for Russia since
they ensure its safety from the southern direction," said Academy of
Geopolitical Sciences Senior Vice President Konstantin Sivkov. "Loss
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will spell the loss of the Caucasus.
Establishing military bases there, we ensure political stability
in these republics and guarantee their security. And that in its
turn means security of Russia itself (Black Sea region, Stavropol,
Krasnodar) and order on its southern borders."
The widespread opinion in Tbilisi itself is that Russian military
bases in Abkhazia and particularly in South Ossetia (these latter are
several dozens kilometers from the Georgian capital) are needed for
the purpose of military control over Georgia. Sivkov questioned this
premise and said, "Distance between the military bases and Georgia
does not matter. What matters is that with the Russian military
posted there, Georgia is not going to try and overrun Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. Had it been otherwise, these territories would have
been turned into a den of terrorism and a source of constant military
threats to Russia." Needless to say, Georgia refuses to perceive its
runaway regions as sovereign states and therefore regards Russian
military presence there as occupation.
Said Victor Litovkin of Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, "It
is Abkhazia and South Ossetia themselves that mostly need Russian
bases on their territories. They are seen in these republics as a
guarantee from Georgian aggression... But Russia needs these bases
too because they strengthen Russian military presence in the Black
Sea where NATO is represented by Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. They
say of course that NATO does not see Russia as an enemy, but the
Alliance never stopped being anti-Russian so that the possibility of
a conflict cannot be ruled out. After all, the Alliance does install
a ballistic missile defense system and it will expand eastward given
half a chance. Also importantly, military bases in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia are integrated into a common system with the bases in Gyumri
(Armenia) and Gabala (Azerbaijan)."
Independent expert Andrei Soldatov disagreed with Litovkin. He said,
"There are no common systems there. The Gabala radar is ageing fast.
No way to regard it as a major contribution to the military
infrastructure anymore. Establishment of military bases in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia was a political decision, not military at all. On
the contrary, the Defense Ministry would like to diminish military
presence in the Caucasus."
As a matter of fact, agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia
include certain clauses that tend to complicate their relations with
Russia to a certain extent. In Abkhazia, the Russian Defense Ministry
aspires to both military bases and R&R facilities in Sukhumi. The
Russian military shut them down for repairs this summer and laid off
1,300 locals. Considering that jobs in Abkhazia are at high premium,
this announcement caused a public outcry. Defense Minister Anatoly
Serdyukov personally visited Sukhumi in July to discuss the matter
with the local authorities. It did not help any.