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Belarus Digest, Belarus
Sept 24 2011
Belarus Supports Azerbaijan in Liberating Territories Occupied by Armenia
Published: 24 September 2011
At a meeting last week, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka did his best
to persuade the Armenian foreign minister of Belarus' goodwill. But
this was hardly convincing - the halcyon days of close relations
between the two countries are long gone. Minsk may still be opposing
Russian policy in the southern Caucasus; yet it is clearly siding with
Azerbaijan, not Armenia.
This summer, Azerbaijan issued a US$ 300 m loan to Belarus, while
Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich visited Baku in July.
Azerbaijan has also become the largest buyer of weapons from Belarus.
These are just some of the signs of a growing partnership between
President Ilham Alyev and President Lukashenka.
New Friend
In the words of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
cooperation with Azerbaijan was only initiated `in recent years'.
Until the mid-2000s, relations were negligible and trade developed of
its own accord. One reason is that Lukashenka did not get along with
former President Heydar Alyev, a seasoned apparatchik of the Soviet
period who looked down on Lukashenka as a young maverick.
Another reason is that Minsk at the time tended to follow Moscow's
foreign policy line. As a result, it developed relations with
Azerbaijan's nemesis - Armenia. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
only Belarusian embassy in the region was based in Yerevan. In the
late 1990s, Minsk finally decided to establish a presence in Baku but
the embassy was opened only after a considerable delay in 2006.
However, over the past decade, relations have improved dramatically.
One set of factors is political. In Baku, Heydar Alyev handed over
power to his son Ilham in 2003. Already in 2004, the heads of state of
Belarus and Azerbaijan broke with precedent by conducting mutual
visits. This set the stage for four top-level visits since 2006.
At the same time, Belarus deviated from its stringent pro-Russian
political line. Lukashenka found new friends - among them not only
Yushchenko of Ukraine and Saakashvili of Georgia, but also Ilham
Alyev. In this process, the enhanced international stature of
Azerbaijan played an important role, especially after the country
launched a new Caspian oil pipeline. Belarus could hope for support
from Baku as a natural ally against Moscow in the post-Soviet area.
Azerbaijan had long bolstered Russia's opponents; in the past, it even
went so far as to establish the GUUAM - an alternative organization to
pro-Moscow integration initiatives - with Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Although this organization is now
moribund, Azerbaijan's attitude toward Moscow remains unchanged.
A second set of factors is economic. Between 2008 and 2010,
Belarus-Azerbaijan trade grew from US$ 100 m to US$ 146 m. More
important than this moderate increase is the fact that Belarus enjoys
a trade surplus, which helps to counteract its immense foreign trade
deficit.
Azerbaijan is also helping Belarus to acquire alternative oil sources.
Minsk recently began importing oil from Venezuela but direct shipments
to landlocked Belarus are difficult. Baku thus agreed to swap schemes
by which Minsk gains access to Azerbaijani oil in exchange for
Venezuelan oil.
Belarus Turned against Armenia
For Azerbaijan, an added incentive to work with Belarus is to garner
support for its territorial disputes with Armenia. Negotiations in the
OSCE Minsk group have rendered no results for years now. Meanwhile,
the Azerbaijan government has used its growing oil revenues to
perennially increase its military budget. But a stronger military will
not change the fact that Armenians have Russia behind them. Although
Russia wants to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally in the Caucasus,
Azerbaijan is eager to change the status quo balance of power. It may
only be a matter of time before armed conflict breaks out again
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
If such a war should ensue, Belarus will clearly side with Baku, the
principal buyer of its weapons. It is notable that no arms deals were
made prior to 2005 - there is thus an unquestionable link between a
stronger Azerbaijani military and the initiation of bilateral arms
deals. By contrast, Armenia bought a small number of weapons from
Belarus just once, in 2007.
>From Cooperation to Alliance
The development of Belarusian-Azerbaijani alliance is practically a
fait accompli. Azerbaijan is openly defending the Belarusian regime
from criticism in the West, as positions of Azerbaijani
representatives in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and EuroNest have
demonstrated. Alyev is also willing to help Lukashenka financially -
not so long ago, Minsk borrowed from Baku to pay Moscow for its
outstanding claims.
For Azerbaijan, the motives for working with Belarus are political and
economic. The Central Asian state needs all the support it can get if
it wants to confronting Armenia and Russia, not to speak of its tense
relations with Iran. It cannot be very hopeful about Western support,
given the influential Armenian lobby there (especially in the US and
France). This makes support from former Soviet states all the more
important. At the same time, the privatization of Belarusian
industries and development of non-Russian oil supply routes is vital -
Venezuela is a good example.
For Belarus, cooperation with Azerbaijan is important as a tool to put
pressure on Moscow, to obtain financing, and to develop trade. In
particular, Azerbaijan may allow Belarus to access non-Russian oil and
gas from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions (Iran and Northern
Iraq). The greatest hurdle for such a project would be neither
technical nor financial - the infrastructure is mostly already in
place. Rather, it is political: the Russians will stubbornly fight to
preserve their energy monopoly in Eastern and Central Europe, while
the United States will work to block any regional energy projects that
involve Iran.
SB
http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-supports-azerbaijan-liberating-territories-occupied-armenia-5857
From: Baghdasarian
Sept 24 2011
Belarus Supports Azerbaijan in Liberating Territories Occupied by Armenia
Published: 24 September 2011
At a meeting last week, President Alyaksandr Lukashenka did his best
to persuade the Armenian foreign minister of Belarus' goodwill. But
this was hardly convincing - the halcyon days of close relations
between the two countries are long gone. Minsk may still be opposing
Russian policy in the southern Caucasus; yet it is clearly siding with
Azerbaijan, not Armenia.
This summer, Azerbaijan issued a US$ 300 m loan to Belarus, while
Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich visited Baku in July.
Azerbaijan has also become the largest buyer of weapons from Belarus.
These are just some of the signs of a growing partnership between
President Ilham Alyev and President Lukashenka.
New Friend
In the words of the Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
cooperation with Azerbaijan was only initiated `in recent years'.
Until the mid-2000s, relations were negligible and trade developed of
its own accord. One reason is that Lukashenka did not get along with
former President Heydar Alyev, a seasoned apparatchik of the Soviet
period who looked down on Lukashenka as a young maverick.
Another reason is that Minsk at the time tended to follow Moscow's
foreign policy line. As a result, it developed relations with
Azerbaijan's nemesis - Armenia. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
only Belarusian embassy in the region was based in Yerevan. In the
late 1990s, Minsk finally decided to establish a presence in Baku but
the embassy was opened only after a considerable delay in 2006.
However, over the past decade, relations have improved dramatically.
One set of factors is political. In Baku, Heydar Alyev handed over
power to his son Ilham in 2003. Already in 2004, the heads of state of
Belarus and Azerbaijan broke with precedent by conducting mutual
visits. This set the stage for four top-level visits since 2006.
At the same time, Belarus deviated from its stringent pro-Russian
political line. Lukashenka found new friends - among them not only
Yushchenko of Ukraine and Saakashvili of Georgia, but also Ilham
Alyev. In this process, the enhanced international stature of
Azerbaijan played an important role, especially after the country
launched a new Caspian oil pipeline. Belarus could hope for support
from Baku as a natural ally against Moscow in the post-Soviet area.
Azerbaijan had long bolstered Russia's opponents; in the past, it even
went so far as to establish the GUUAM - an alternative organization to
pro-Moscow integration initiatives - with Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. Although this organization is now
moribund, Azerbaijan's attitude toward Moscow remains unchanged.
A second set of factors is economic. Between 2008 and 2010,
Belarus-Azerbaijan trade grew from US$ 100 m to US$ 146 m. More
important than this moderate increase is the fact that Belarus enjoys
a trade surplus, which helps to counteract its immense foreign trade
deficit.
Azerbaijan is also helping Belarus to acquire alternative oil sources.
Minsk recently began importing oil from Venezuela but direct shipments
to landlocked Belarus are difficult. Baku thus agreed to swap schemes
by which Minsk gains access to Azerbaijani oil in exchange for
Venezuelan oil.
Belarus Turned against Armenia
For Azerbaijan, an added incentive to work with Belarus is to garner
support for its territorial disputes with Armenia. Negotiations in the
OSCE Minsk group have rendered no results for years now. Meanwhile,
the Azerbaijan government has used its growing oil revenues to
perennially increase its military budget. But a stronger military will
not change the fact that Armenians have Russia behind them. Although
Russia wants to preserve Azerbaijan as an ally in the Caucasus,
Azerbaijan is eager to change the status quo balance of power. It may
only be a matter of time before armed conflict breaks out again
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
If such a war should ensue, Belarus will clearly side with Baku, the
principal buyer of its weapons. It is notable that no arms deals were
made prior to 2005 - there is thus an unquestionable link between a
stronger Azerbaijani military and the initiation of bilateral arms
deals. By contrast, Armenia bought a small number of weapons from
Belarus just once, in 2007.
>From Cooperation to Alliance
The development of Belarusian-Azerbaijani alliance is practically a
fait accompli. Azerbaijan is openly defending the Belarusian regime
from criticism in the West, as positions of Azerbaijani
representatives in the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and EuroNest have
demonstrated. Alyev is also willing to help Lukashenka financially -
not so long ago, Minsk borrowed from Baku to pay Moscow for its
outstanding claims.
For Azerbaijan, the motives for working with Belarus are political and
economic. The Central Asian state needs all the support it can get if
it wants to confronting Armenia and Russia, not to speak of its tense
relations with Iran. It cannot be very hopeful about Western support,
given the influential Armenian lobby there (especially in the US and
France). This makes support from former Soviet states all the more
important. At the same time, the privatization of Belarusian
industries and development of non-Russian oil supply routes is vital -
Venezuela is a good example.
For Belarus, cooperation with Azerbaijan is important as a tool to put
pressure on Moscow, to obtain financing, and to develop trade. In
particular, Azerbaijan may allow Belarus to access non-Russian oil and
gas from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions (Iran and Northern
Iraq). The greatest hurdle for such a project would be neither
technical nor financial - the infrastructure is mostly already in
place. Rather, it is political: the Russians will stubbornly fight to
preserve their energy monopoly in Eastern and Central Europe, while
the United States will work to block any regional energy projects that
involve Iran.
SB
http://belarusdigest.com/story/belarus-supports-azerbaijan-liberating-territories-occupied-armenia-5857
From: Baghdasarian