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A Foreign Perception of Foreign Policy: The EU through Armenian Eyes
HETQ
22:41, September 24, 2011
Hrant Kostanyan
Fellow, Policy Forum Armenia
The European Union's (EU) nature generally, and its `actorness' in the
Eastern neighborhood particularly, are often misunderstood by a large
proportion of Armenian policy makers, the expert community,
journalists and the general public. Both `traditional' and online
media further contribute to this misapprehension by interviewing
incompetent analysts in both Brussels and Yerevan. The scope of this
commentary does not permit the unveiling what the EU is or what it
might do in Armenia and in the region at large. Rather, I aim to
counter some existing myths about the EU that are circulating in
Armenia, while reaffirming that increased interest in the EU enhances
`socialization' and encourages the further `Europeanization' of
Armenian society.
The major source of confusion about the EU is related to the
distribution of formal and informal competences. To identify who is
responsible for what in the EU external action's conceptualization and
implementation is as complex as loosening `the Gordian Knot.' Who
holds the power of shaping and making decisions? Which decision-making
procedure is applicable? Who has the informational advantage or right
of (exclusive) initiative? To varying degrees, inter alia the European
Council, the Council of the EU, the Rotating Presidency, the European
External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission, and the
European Parliament are all involved in EU external action.
Moreover, with each issue area, e.g. the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), trade, migration, energy and aid, the distribution of
power within the EU shifts from one actor to another. Furthermore,
when faced with `cross-policy' issues, conducting the EU external
action becomes even more complex since it threatens to open up a
`Pandora's box' of various actors' competences. The competition or
`turf wars' among involved actors further complicate the analysis. In
addition, since the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and the
establishment of the EEAS (2010), the EU is undergoing unprecedented
transformation, which has led to further uncertainties in policy
making that are expected to continue for years to come.
I tend to think that the lack of knowledge about these important
dynamics accounts for why a resolution of the European Parliament
concerning the South Caucasus is interpreted in Armenian media as a
roadmap for the EU's foreign policy. Although any resolution coming
from the European Parliament is very important in terms of shining a
spotlight on an issue, the Parliament has very limited formal
competences in the CFSP. On the other hand, the European Parliament
has been successful in strengthening its voice and pressuring the EU
member states and institutions, inter alia through the use of
mechanisms such as budgetary power (subject to co-decision) or putting
questions to the EU foreign policy chief. Although the powers of the
European Parliament are expected to increase, its current influence
should not be overstated.
The roles of the European Commission in general, and of Åtefan Füle,
the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, in
particular, are also often misrepresented. The European Commission
remains a major actor in areas such as trade, aid and migration.
However, in the current EU institutional architecture, the European
Commission shares these responsibilities (except for trade) with the
EEAS at the EU level and with the member states at the national level.
For example, the European Commission currently does not have a
Director-General (DG) for neighbourhood policy, which includes
Armenia. Further, the Commissioner responsible for neighbourhood
policy is assisted by the EEAS in this area. Moreover, with the
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission delegations became EU
delegations, which has implications for the power distribution in the
EU that are yet to be understood.
The EEAS is the most recent EU institutional innovation and is very
much still in the making. Besides taking over several functions that
were formerly carried out by the European Commission and the General
Secretariat of the Council (GSC), and hosting national diplomats, the
EEAS has also assumed the role of EU external representation in CFSP
matters that was previously performed by the Rotating Presidency. This
allows the EU to formulate a long-term policy.
Although the EEAS is supposed to become the epicenter of the EU
foreign policy making, the service and its head, Catherine Ashton, are
facing serious challenges. It is widely known that she and the EEAS
act in the CFSP area after consulting the EU member state governments,
which closely monitor sensitive and politicized issues in particular.
EU foreign policy remains an intergovernmental affair, and decisions
are mainly taken by unanimity. This means that in this issue area, the
EU will act in Armenia, in the South Caucasus or elsewhere only when
there is a consensus among all 27 EU member states.
The misrepresentation in the press is also related to Armenia's
contractual relationship with the EU. The Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) is the basis for the EU's bilateral relationship with
Armenia and not the basis for the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
and the Eastern Partnership. These are mainly multilateral frameworks
of cooperation. This is why Belarus is included in both the ENP and
the Eastern Partnership without ratification of the PCA. Moreover, the
negotiations of the Association Agreement between the EU and Armenia
are ongoing and the negotiations for the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA) are set to follow that of the Association
Agreement. However, it will take years before Armenia meets the
preconditions to even begin the negotiations for DCFTA. Among all 6
Eastern Partnership countries, only Ukraine is close to signing the
agreements. The next in line for negotiations are Moldova and possibly
Georgia.
Those unjustifiably raising expectations among the Armenian public
should understand that the DG Trade of the European Commission, which
is responsible for negotiations, is trying to postpone starting DCFTA
negotiations with the rest of the Eastern Partnership countries. These
negotiations require a lot of time and resources, and countries like
Armenia are `insignificant' for the EU in terms of trade. Moreover,
for decades there has been tension between the EU institutions
responsible for the political side of external policies and trade.
These tensions are aggravated now by the recent institutional changes,
which are expected to further slow down the process.
More importantly, an analyst recently went so far as to suggest that
the OCSE Minsk Group will leave the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process
after the signing the Madrid Principles, adding that in the face of
Russia's failure to find a solution to the conflict, the EU will take
over the peace process. Those making such claims should understand
that Russia is there to stay and the Madrid Principles might not be
signed for years to come. Even suggestions that the EU might replace
France in the Minsk Group are not expected to materialize. Those
presenting the EU's `takeover' of peacekeeping operations in
Nagorno-Karabakh as a pragmatic option must also understand that the
EU does not have an army and that peacekeeping contributions are
voluntarily made by the EU member states. The member states have
limited resources, lack necessary interest, are reluctant to operate
in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework, and are
currently stretched thin due to other ongoing obligations.
A few weeks ago, I listened to an analyst on television who is
considered to be a leading expert in EU affairs in Armenia, describing
the capabilities of the EU `rapid reaction force' to the public and
why and how it can assume peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
I was amazed that the expert neglected to mention that the EU `rapid
reaction force,' both in the form of `Headline goals' or the
`Battlegroup concept,' have never actually been deployed, yet he
presented it as a feasible option for Nagorno-Karabakh.
The expectations of the Armenian public have also been unjustifiably
raised regarding the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit. Before the
summer holidays, I was present at the conference about preparations of
the summit where the panel included Åtefan Füle and RadosÅ?aw Sikorski.
Armenia was mentioned only once while naming the Eastern Partnership
countries. It is my understanding that the summit will focus mainly on
Ukraine, which is the only country that could be presented as a
success story, considering that it may sign an Association Agreement
with the DCFTA.
The majority of those analyzing EU policies towards Armenia should
certainly revisit their methodology. There is a large gap between
rhetoric and reality in EU foreign policy, and overreliance on EU
documents, statements or demarches often makes their assessments
incorrect. The EU is constantly upgrading the language of its external
policies, but the substance of these policies rarely changes
drastically, thus causing the `expectations-capability gap.'
Finally, the EU is currently preoccupied with the economic crisis and
the large debt of some member states; a crisis that threatens the very
existence of the monetary union. In the field of foreign policy, given
the turmoil in North Africa and the Arab world, it is expected that
the EU will continue to focus considerable resources and energy on its
Southern neighborhood for years to come. There will therefore be some
increase in the EU's activities in its Eastern neighborhood but one
should not expect a revolution.
Hrant Kostanyan is a visiting fellow at the Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS), an expert at the European Neighbourhood Policy
Instrument (ENPI) Info Centre and a PhD candidate in political science
(EU studies) at Ghent University, Belgium.
HETQ
22:41, September 24, 2011
Hrant Kostanyan
Fellow, Policy Forum Armenia
The European Union's (EU) nature generally, and its `actorness' in the
Eastern neighborhood particularly, are often misunderstood by a large
proportion of Armenian policy makers, the expert community,
journalists and the general public. Both `traditional' and online
media further contribute to this misapprehension by interviewing
incompetent analysts in both Brussels and Yerevan. The scope of this
commentary does not permit the unveiling what the EU is or what it
might do in Armenia and in the region at large. Rather, I aim to
counter some existing myths about the EU that are circulating in
Armenia, while reaffirming that increased interest in the EU enhances
`socialization' and encourages the further `Europeanization' of
Armenian society.
The major source of confusion about the EU is related to the
distribution of formal and informal competences. To identify who is
responsible for what in the EU external action's conceptualization and
implementation is as complex as loosening `the Gordian Knot.' Who
holds the power of shaping and making decisions? Which decision-making
procedure is applicable? Who has the informational advantage or right
of (exclusive) initiative? To varying degrees, inter alia the European
Council, the Council of the EU, the Rotating Presidency, the European
External Action Service (EEAS), the European Commission, and the
European Parliament are all involved in EU external action.
Moreover, with each issue area, e.g. the Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), trade, migration, energy and aid, the distribution of
power within the EU shifts from one actor to another. Furthermore,
when faced with `cross-policy' issues, conducting the EU external
action becomes even more complex since it threatens to open up a
`Pandora's box' of various actors' competences. The competition or
`turf wars' among involved actors further complicate the analysis. In
addition, since the enactment of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and the
establishment of the EEAS (2010), the EU is undergoing unprecedented
transformation, which has led to further uncertainties in policy
making that are expected to continue for years to come.
I tend to think that the lack of knowledge about these important
dynamics accounts for why a resolution of the European Parliament
concerning the South Caucasus is interpreted in Armenian media as a
roadmap for the EU's foreign policy. Although any resolution coming
from the European Parliament is very important in terms of shining a
spotlight on an issue, the Parliament has very limited formal
competences in the CFSP. On the other hand, the European Parliament
has been successful in strengthening its voice and pressuring the EU
member states and institutions, inter alia through the use of
mechanisms such as budgetary power (subject to co-decision) or putting
questions to the EU foreign policy chief. Although the powers of the
European Parliament are expected to increase, its current influence
should not be overstated.
The roles of the European Commission in general, and of Åtefan Füle,
the Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, in
particular, are also often misrepresented. The European Commission
remains a major actor in areas such as trade, aid and migration.
However, in the current EU institutional architecture, the European
Commission shares these responsibilities (except for trade) with the
EEAS at the EU level and with the member states at the national level.
For example, the European Commission currently does not have a
Director-General (DG) for neighbourhood policy, which includes
Armenia. Further, the Commissioner responsible for neighbourhood
policy is assisted by the EEAS in this area. Moreover, with the
enactment of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission delegations became EU
delegations, which has implications for the power distribution in the
EU that are yet to be understood.
The EEAS is the most recent EU institutional innovation and is very
much still in the making. Besides taking over several functions that
were formerly carried out by the European Commission and the General
Secretariat of the Council (GSC), and hosting national diplomats, the
EEAS has also assumed the role of EU external representation in CFSP
matters that was previously performed by the Rotating Presidency. This
allows the EU to formulate a long-term policy.
Although the EEAS is supposed to become the epicenter of the EU
foreign policy making, the service and its head, Catherine Ashton, are
facing serious challenges. It is widely known that she and the EEAS
act in the CFSP area after consulting the EU member state governments,
which closely monitor sensitive and politicized issues in particular.
EU foreign policy remains an intergovernmental affair, and decisions
are mainly taken by unanimity. This means that in this issue area, the
EU will act in Armenia, in the South Caucasus or elsewhere only when
there is a consensus among all 27 EU member states.
The misrepresentation in the press is also related to Armenia's
contractual relationship with the EU. The Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement (PCA) is the basis for the EU's bilateral relationship with
Armenia and not the basis for the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
and the Eastern Partnership. These are mainly multilateral frameworks
of cooperation. This is why Belarus is included in both the ENP and
the Eastern Partnership without ratification of the PCA. Moreover, the
negotiations of the Association Agreement between the EU and Armenia
are ongoing and the negotiations for the Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Area (DCFTA) are set to follow that of the Association
Agreement. However, it will take years before Armenia meets the
preconditions to even begin the negotiations for DCFTA. Among all 6
Eastern Partnership countries, only Ukraine is close to signing the
agreements. The next in line for negotiations are Moldova and possibly
Georgia.
Those unjustifiably raising expectations among the Armenian public
should understand that the DG Trade of the European Commission, which
is responsible for negotiations, is trying to postpone starting DCFTA
negotiations with the rest of the Eastern Partnership countries. These
negotiations require a lot of time and resources, and countries like
Armenia are `insignificant' for the EU in terms of trade. Moreover,
for decades there has been tension between the EU institutions
responsible for the political side of external policies and trade.
These tensions are aggravated now by the recent institutional changes,
which are expected to further slow down the process.
More importantly, an analyst recently went so far as to suggest that
the OCSE Minsk Group will leave the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process
after the signing the Madrid Principles, adding that in the face of
Russia's failure to find a solution to the conflict, the EU will take
over the peace process. Those making such claims should understand
that Russia is there to stay and the Madrid Principles might not be
signed for years to come. Even suggestions that the EU might replace
France in the Minsk Group are not expected to materialize. Those
presenting the EU's `takeover' of peacekeeping operations in
Nagorno-Karabakh as a pragmatic option must also understand that the
EU does not have an army and that peacekeeping contributions are
voluntarily made by the EU member states. The member states have
limited resources, lack necessary interest, are reluctant to operate
in the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework, and are
currently stretched thin due to other ongoing obligations.
A few weeks ago, I listened to an analyst on television who is
considered to be a leading expert in EU affairs in Armenia, describing
the capabilities of the EU `rapid reaction force' to the public and
why and how it can assume peacekeeping operations in Nagorno-Karabakh.
I was amazed that the expert neglected to mention that the EU `rapid
reaction force,' both in the form of `Headline goals' or the
`Battlegroup concept,' have never actually been deployed, yet he
presented it as a feasible option for Nagorno-Karabakh.
The expectations of the Armenian public have also been unjustifiably
raised regarding the upcoming Eastern Partnership Summit. Before the
summer holidays, I was present at the conference about preparations of
the summit where the panel included Åtefan Füle and RadosÅ?aw Sikorski.
Armenia was mentioned only once while naming the Eastern Partnership
countries. It is my understanding that the summit will focus mainly on
Ukraine, which is the only country that could be presented as a
success story, considering that it may sign an Association Agreement
with the DCFTA.
The majority of those analyzing EU policies towards Armenia should
certainly revisit their methodology. There is a large gap between
rhetoric and reality in EU foreign policy, and overreliance on EU
documents, statements or demarches often makes their assessments
incorrect. The EU is constantly upgrading the language of its external
policies, but the substance of these policies rarely changes
drastically, thus causing the `expectations-capability gap.'
Finally, the EU is currently preoccupied with the economic crisis and
the large debt of some member states; a crisis that threatens the very
existence of the monetary union. In the field of foreign policy, given
the turmoil in North Africa and the Arab world, it is expected that
the EU will continue to focus considerable resources and energy on its
Southern neighborhood for years to come. There will therefore be some
increase in the EU's activities in its Eastern neighborhood but one
should not expect a revolution.
Hrant Kostanyan is a visiting fellow at the Centre for European Policy
Studies (CEPS), an expert at the European Neighbourhood Policy
Instrument (ENPI) Info Centre and a PhD candidate in political science
(EU studies) at Ghent University, Belgium.