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IRAN: DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
Sevak Sarukhanyan
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6015
26.09.2011
Deputy Director of ~SNoravank Foundation~T, Head of the Center for
Political Studies
The atmosphere in which the domestic political developments proceeded
in Iran during the summer months was not as tense as compared with
the first half of the 2011 though some rearrangements can be observed
in the domestic political life of the country. At the same time
Iran has been more involved in the regional processes thus taking
into consideration accumulation of the Kurdish threat and processes
in Syria.
Domestic political processes In August and September the spiritual
leader of Iran A. Khamenei began speaking more openly about the
failures of M. Ahmadinejad~Rs government. In particular, Khamenei
stated for several times that the government did not fulfill the
obligations it had undertaken and could not keep the promises about
improving the life of the people.
Though at the beginning of September Ali Khamanei pardoned about 100
arrested advocates of M. Ahmadinejad and they were let off, such a
decision by the spiritual leader cannot be conditioned by the possible
improvement of the relations with the president as all those who were
set free had turned to the authorities of the country with penitential
letters thus accepting that they had committed illegal actions.
Finally, the political claims (i.e. participation in the 2013
presidential elections) of the mayor of Tehran M. Ghalibaf have
taken a final form and this can be considered an important event
in the domestic policy, and it is broadly covered by the Iranian
press. The mayor of Tehran who is directly supported by the spiritual
authorities has rather high ratings among the reformists either,
as he is considered to be progressive and modern figure who has
taken important measures to improve system of management of Tehran,
to develop transport, social and cultural fields.
Though Ghalibaf has won the support of the spiritual and conservative
authorities of the country he is an eager supporter of the improvement
of the relations with the West. Back in 2008 during his official visit
to Tokyo he responded very positively to the statement of B. Obaman,
who was then a senator, about the readiness to improve the relations
with Iran. Ghalibaf mentioned that Iranian and American societies
can not live in the atmosphere of strained relations. Let us also
mention that according to different sources Ghalibaf who was voted
one of top 5 mayors in the world, has perfect personal relations with
the mayors of the western megalopolises which can be a great resource
for the rapprochement between Iran and the West.
Ghalibaf~Rs claims to the post of the president are also obvious for
Akhmadinejad~Rs team which realizes that the incumbent president can
hardly influence the course of the coming presidential elections,
taking into consideration growing political and information resources
of their competitors. And Ghalibaf is not short of information
resources. Thus, according to the sister of president Ahmadinejad, P.
Akhmadinejad (the member of the town council of Tehran) the mayor
has 82 mass media. It should also be mentioned that the mayor~Rs
personal web-site (http://www.ghalibaf.ir) has also demonstrated
activity recently.
However, making forecasts on Iran~Rs future is rather thankless
occupation (winning on the elections of presidents M. Khatami and M.
Ahmadinejad seemed rather unbelievable on the eve of the elections)
but even today it can be mentioned that M. Ghalibaf has rather big
chances to win the elections in 2013. And in case of possible early
reassignment of M. Ahmadinejad, Ghalibaf would be the only figure
with elaborated strategy and serious electoral resources to win early
elections. Let us also mention that M. Ghalibaf is closely connected
with the Armenian community in Tehran and he has spoken many times
about an important role of the Armenians in the Iranian history and
Iranian-Iraqi war.
Developments in Syria and Iranian-Turkish relations Mainly three
regional processes can be considered important for Iran: antigovernment
movement in Syria, deterioration of the Iranian-Turkish relations,
which is partially conditioned by the previous factor, and stirring
up of the Kurdish factor.
Today it can be mentioned that though ~SArab spring~T have not reached
Iran and have not caused stirring up of antigovernment movement,
its direct impact on Iran was obvious. If the revolutionary wave in
Syria overthrow B. Assad~Rs regime, Iran will lose its main partner
and ally in the Middle East. Besides, the stance of Iran~Rs ally
~SHezbollah~T will also weaken as the strength and possibilities of
that organization are directly connected with its collaboration and
partnership with Syria. That is why for Iran developments in Syria
are related to the issue of their own national security, and retaining
power of M. Assad is their key task.
It is remarkable that this is the point of view of the authorities of
the country and not of the president; back in August M. Ahmadinejad
called B. Assad ~Sto listen to the voice of his people~T and carry out
necessary reforms in the country and in response A. Khamenei sounded
opposite viewpoint: ~SThose who want to deliver strike on Syria in
reality deliver strike on Iran. Turkey should realize Iran will use
all its strength to oppose those who want to hit Syria.~T
A. Khamenei~Rs statement can be considered anti-Turkish and evaluated
as a direct threatening to Ankara and it differs from M. Ahmadinejad~Rs
policy directed to setting good relations and retaining cooperation
with Ankara. It was the Syrian issue, which is crucial for both
Iran and Turkey that has become the main reason for deterioration
of the relations between those two countries. Let us mention that
from clrealy economic point of view both Iran and Turkey have equal
influence on Syria; Turkey is the main economic partner of Syria with
more than $25 billion investments in Syrian economy. The amount of
the financial support and investments by Iran are about $20 billion
but unlike Turks, Iranians are represented in Syria either: in the
center of Damascus a special agency of the Army of the Guardians
of the Islamic Revolutions is situated with the staff consisting of
more than 400 officers, Iranian navy can freely use Syrian ports and
Iran also has 14 cultural centers in different parts of the country,
which, besides the issues regarding culture, also deal with issues
concerning politics, religion and security. It is obvious for Iran
that after overthrowing the authority of Assad, all their positions
in Syria may simply disappear and for Turkey such changes will have
no aftermaths ~V Ankara will remain the main economic partner of
the new authorities, besides new Syrian regime which will mainly
be of Sunnite religious and political orientation may become new
and important partner of Ankara, taking into consideration Islamic
eloquence of the Turks, which has been shifted to the real political
field in their relations with Israel. Let us also mention that in
Israel they began to describe Turkey as ~Ssecond Iran~T; a well-known
Israeli analyst M. Amir mentioned in this regard that Erdogan ~Shas
put on Iranian clothes~T and moved away from temporal society, thus
indulging in the mire of religious radicalism. But according to Amir
~SErdogan does not know what consequences this all will have for him~T.
No matter how strange it may sound but Amir is right in his
evaluations. Ankara~Rs new regional ideology and policy are close to
the Iranian, though, unlike Shiite Iran which does not have objective
possibilities to undertake the role of a leader in mainly Sunnite
region, Ankara posses it.
Due to that reason today Tehran grasps its only ally B. Assad and
does everything to retain his authority, meanwhile Ankara freely
supports opposition, thus realizing that it will loose nothing
after overthrowing Assad and accession to power of Islamists. Such a
deterioration of the Iranian-Turkish relations, which is accompanied by
numerous anti-Turkish publications in Iranian press and anti-Iranian
publications in Turkish press, is taking place against the background
of sticking to almost similar political ideology by both of those
states.
But there is still one item which keeps both Turkey and Iran in the
same camp ~V Kurdish issue.
Kurdish Issue Despite the fertile ground for the escalation of the
Kurdish issue in Iran, stirring up of the anti-Iranian activity by
the branch of the Kurdish Worker~Rs Party in Iraq (PJAK) is considered
to be unexpected.
While speaking about the Kurdish factor it should be mentioned that
discriminative policy carried out in regard to the Sunnite population
of the country during M. Ahmadinejad~Rs presidency caused serious
problems for Iran in Belujistan and Iranian Kurdistan. People, who
can make anti-Sunnite statements and support the idea of Shiitization
of the territories populated by Sunnites, were appointed as the heads
of the provinces. This process is characterized by the construction
of Shiite mosques and prohibitions on restoration and expansion of
the Sunnite ones.
Though, the fact that the PJAK (which, according to some analysts, is
directly connected with the United States) has initiated a new wave of
anti-Iranian activity at this moment may speak about the activization
of the actions directed against Iran by the Americans. However, it is
difficult to say definitely what the purpose of such an activization
is. But it is obvious that the military actions against Kurds and
bombing of Northern Iraq restrict the flexibility of Tehran in the
direction of preserving Assad~Rs authority. At the same Iranian
strikes on Northern Iraq may affect rather warm relations formed
between Tehran and Iraqi Kurdistan.
It is not excluded that the struggle against Kurdish factor will
force Ankara and Tehran to cooperate as this issue is topical for
both countries. But it is still not clear how Iran will react on
the desire of Turkey to establish a military base in the Qandil
Mountains in Northern Iraq under the pretext of fighting against
Kurds. Iran always opposed the presence of foreign military bases
in the proximity to its borders and possible consent of the Iranian
authorities to grand a territory to Turks for building a base may
cause aggravation of Iranian-Iraqi and Iranian-Turkish relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
~UPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN IRAN: IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE [21.07.2011]
~UPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN IRAN[27.06.2011] ~UDEVELOPMENTS IN
IRAN[13.06.2011] ~UIRAN, SHIITE FACTOR AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB
WORLD[12.05.2011] ~UDOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN[04.04.2011]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Sevak Sarukhanyan
http://noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=6015
26.09.2011
Deputy Director of ~SNoravank Foundation~T, Head of the Center for
Political Studies
The atmosphere in which the domestic political developments proceeded
in Iran during the summer months was not as tense as compared with
the first half of the 2011 though some rearrangements can be observed
in the domestic political life of the country. At the same time
Iran has been more involved in the regional processes thus taking
into consideration accumulation of the Kurdish threat and processes
in Syria.
Domestic political processes In August and September the spiritual
leader of Iran A. Khamenei began speaking more openly about the
failures of M. Ahmadinejad~Rs government. In particular, Khamenei
stated for several times that the government did not fulfill the
obligations it had undertaken and could not keep the promises about
improving the life of the people.
Though at the beginning of September Ali Khamanei pardoned about 100
arrested advocates of M. Ahmadinejad and they were let off, such a
decision by the spiritual leader cannot be conditioned by the possible
improvement of the relations with the president as all those who were
set free had turned to the authorities of the country with penitential
letters thus accepting that they had committed illegal actions.
Finally, the political claims (i.e. participation in the 2013
presidential elections) of the mayor of Tehran M. Ghalibaf have
taken a final form and this can be considered an important event
in the domestic policy, and it is broadly covered by the Iranian
press. The mayor of Tehran who is directly supported by the spiritual
authorities has rather high ratings among the reformists either,
as he is considered to be progressive and modern figure who has
taken important measures to improve system of management of Tehran,
to develop transport, social and cultural fields.
Though Ghalibaf has won the support of the spiritual and conservative
authorities of the country he is an eager supporter of the improvement
of the relations with the West. Back in 2008 during his official visit
to Tokyo he responded very positively to the statement of B. Obaman,
who was then a senator, about the readiness to improve the relations
with Iran. Ghalibaf mentioned that Iranian and American societies
can not live in the atmosphere of strained relations. Let us also
mention that according to different sources Ghalibaf who was voted
one of top 5 mayors in the world, has perfect personal relations with
the mayors of the western megalopolises which can be a great resource
for the rapprochement between Iran and the West.
Ghalibaf~Rs claims to the post of the president are also obvious for
Akhmadinejad~Rs team which realizes that the incumbent president can
hardly influence the course of the coming presidential elections,
taking into consideration growing political and information resources
of their competitors. And Ghalibaf is not short of information
resources. Thus, according to the sister of president Ahmadinejad, P.
Akhmadinejad (the member of the town council of Tehran) the mayor
has 82 mass media. It should also be mentioned that the mayor~Rs
personal web-site (http://www.ghalibaf.ir) has also demonstrated
activity recently.
However, making forecasts on Iran~Rs future is rather thankless
occupation (winning on the elections of presidents M. Khatami and M.
Ahmadinejad seemed rather unbelievable on the eve of the elections)
but even today it can be mentioned that M. Ghalibaf has rather big
chances to win the elections in 2013. And in case of possible early
reassignment of M. Ahmadinejad, Ghalibaf would be the only figure
with elaborated strategy and serious electoral resources to win early
elections. Let us also mention that M. Ghalibaf is closely connected
with the Armenian community in Tehran and he has spoken many times
about an important role of the Armenians in the Iranian history and
Iranian-Iraqi war.
Developments in Syria and Iranian-Turkish relations Mainly three
regional processes can be considered important for Iran: antigovernment
movement in Syria, deterioration of the Iranian-Turkish relations,
which is partially conditioned by the previous factor, and stirring
up of the Kurdish factor.
Today it can be mentioned that though ~SArab spring~T have not reached
Iran and have not caused stirring up of antigovernment movement,
its direct impact on Iran was obvious. If the revolutionary wave in
Syria overthrow B. Assad~Rs regime, Iran will lose its main partner
and ally in the Middle East. Besides, the stance of Iran~Rs ally
~SHezbollah~T will also weaken as the strength and possibilities of
that organization are directly connected with its collaboration and
partnership with Syria. That is why for Iran developments in Syria
are related to the issue of their own national security, and retaining
power of M. Assad is their key task.
It is remarkable that this is the point of view of the authorities of
the country and not of the president; back in August M. Ahmadinejad
called B. Assad ~Sto listen to the voice of his people~T and carry out
necessary reforms in the country and in response A. Khamenei sounded
opposite viewpoint: ~SThose who want to deliver strike on Syria in
reality deliver strike on Iran. Turkey should realize Iran will use
all its strength to oppose those who want to hit Syria.~T
A. Khamenei~Rs statement can be considered anti-Turkish and evaluated
as a direct threatening to Ankara and it differs from M. Ahmadinejad~Rs
policy directed to setting good relations and retaining cooperation
with Ankara. It was the Syrian issue, which is crucial for both
Iran and Turkey that has become the main reason for deterioration
of the relations between those two countries. Let us mention that
from clrealy economic point of view both Iran and Turkey have equal
influence on Syria; Turkey is the main economic partner of Syria with
more than $25 billion investments in Syrian economy. The amount of
the financial support and investments by Iran are about $20 billion
but unlike Turks, Iranians are represented in Syria either: in the
center of Damascus a special agency of the Army of the Guardians
of the Islamic Revolutions is situated with the staff consisting of
more than 400 officers, Iranian navy can freely use Syrian ports and
Iran also has 14 cultural centers in different parts of the country,
which, besides the issues regarding culture, also deal with issues
concerning politics, religion and security. It is obvious for Iran
that after overthrowing the authority of Assad, all their positions
in Syria may simply disappear and for Turkey such changes will have
no aftermaths ~V Ankara will remain the main economic partner of
the new authorities, besides new Syrian regime which will mainly
be of Sunnite religious and political orientation may become new
and important partner of Ankara, taking into consideration Islamic
eloquence of the Turks, which has been shifted to the real political
field in their relations with Israel. Let us also mention that in
Israel they began to describe Turkey as ~Ssecond Iran~T; a well-known
Israeli analyst M. Amir mentioned in this regard that Erdogan ~Shas
put on Iranian clothes~T and moved away from temporal society, thus
indulging in the mire of religious radicalism. But according to Amir
~SErdogan does not know what consequences this all will have for him~T.
No matter how strange it may sound but Amir is right in his
evaluations. Ankara~Rs new regional ideology and policy are close to
the Iranian, though, unlike Shiite Iran which does not have objective
possibilities to undertake the role of a leader in mainly Sunnite
region, Ankara posses it.
Due to that reason today Tehran grasps its only ally B. Assad and
does everything to retain his authority, meanwhile Ankara freely
supports opposition, thus realizing that it will loose nothing
after overthrowing Assad and accession to power of Islamists. Such a
deterioration of the Iranian-Turkish relations, which is accompanied by
numerous anti-Turkish publications in Iranian press and anti-Iranian
publications in Turkish press, is taking place against the background
of sticking to almost similar political ideology by both of those
states.
But there is still one item which keeps both Turkey and Iran in the
same camp ~V Kurdish issue.
Kurdish Issue Despite the fertile ground for the escalation of the
Kurdish issue in Iran, stirring up of the anti-Iranian activity by
the branch of the Kurdish Worker~Rs Party in Iraq (PJAK) is considered
to be unexpected.
While speaking about the Kurdish factor it should be mentioned that
discriminative policy carried out in regard to the Sunnite population
of the country during M. Ahmadinejad~Rs presidency caused serious
problems for Iran in Belujistan and Iranian Kurdistan. People, who
can make anti-Sunnite statements and support the idea of Shiitization
of the territories populated by Sunnites, were appointed as the heads
of the provinces. This process is characterized by the construction
of Shiite mosques and prohibitions on restoration and expansion of
the Sunnite ones.
Though, the fact that the PJAK (which, according to some analysts, is
directly connected with the United States) has initiated a new wave of
anti-Iranian activity at this moment may speak about the activization
of the actions directed against Iran by the Americans. However, it is
difficult to say definitely what the purpose of such an activization
is. But it is obvious that the military actions against Kurds and
bombing of Northern Iraq restrict the flexibility of Tehran in the
direction of preserving Assad~Rs authority. At the same Iranian
strikes on Northern Iraq may affect rather warm relations formed
between Tehran and Iraqi Kurdistan.
It is not excluded that the struggle against Kurdish factor will
force Ankara and Tehran to cooperate as this issue is topical for
both countries. But it is still not clear how Iran will react on
the desire of Turkey to establish a military base in the Qandil
Mountains in Northern Iraq under the pretext of fighting against
Kurds. Iran always opposed the presence of foreign military bases
in the proximity to its borders and possible consent of the Iranian
authorities to grand a territory to Turks for building a base may
cause aggravation of Iranian-Iraqi and Iranian-Turkish relations.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another materials of author
~UPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN IRAN: IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE [21.07.2011]
~UPOLITICAL PROCESSES IN IRAN[27.06.2011] ~UDEVELOPMENTS IN
IRAN[13.06.2011] ~UIRAN, SHIITE FACTOR AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB
WORLD[12.05.2011] ~UDOMESTIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAN[04.04.2011]
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress