AN ERA OF CHANGE: TURKEY AGREES TO HOST US MISSILE DEFENSE ELEMENTS
by Stanislav Tarasov
WPS Agency
September 26, 2011 Monday
Russia
Turkey gives up on Iran, draws closer to NATO; It turns out that when
it comes to Syria, the interests of Turkey and Iran diverge radically.
Moreover, Iran has stopped concealing its geopolitical ambitions
in the region. So the "strategic alliance" between the two adjacent
Islamic states has not worked out.
Representatives of Ankara and Washington have signed an agreement on
deploying an American radar in Turkey, as part of the European missile
defense system being established by the United States and NATO. The
radar will be installed in the Malatia province in south-eastern
Turkey.
Right up until the last moment, Ankara had some doubts about hosting
the radar - because this missile defense system is primarily intended
to avert possible missile strikes coming from Iran, which maintains
friendly relations with Turkey. What's more, this breakthrough
in the Iranian direction - expressed as rapid growth of trade and
political contacts - was described in Turkey only recently as "one
of our greatest diplomatic achievements." Ankara refused to support
anti-Iranian sanctions; it did not freeze relations with Iran in
response to Iran's nuclear program; it offered to act as intermediary
in bridge-building between Tehran and the West.
But all these cards have been thrown into disarray by the Arab Spring.
It turns out that when it comes to Syria, the interests of Turkey
and Iran diverge radically. Moreover, Iran has stopped concealing
its geopolitical ambitions in the region. So the "strategic alliance"
between the two adjacent Islamic states has not worked out.
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that Turkey's
decision to host the radar "would significantly facilitate the
expansion of NATO's capability to defend Europe's territory,
population, and troops from growing threats associated with the use
of ballistic missiles." NATO makes no secret of the fact that Iran
is viewed as such a threat.
One of Azerbaijan's leading analysts, Rauf Radzhabov, suggests that
Tehran is responding with active foreign policy efforts in many
directions simultaneously. And all this has coincided with the launch
of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, built with Russia's assistance. So
Iran is now positioning itself as the one and only Mideast state
with access to civilian nuclear energy. In this context, a bilateral
government commission met in Tehran to discuss further expansion of
cooperation between the two countries in all kinds of areas.
The first practical sign of warmer relations between Tehran and
Moscow was Iran's support for Moscow's negative stance on the EU
Council's decision about the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, with the
European Union set to get involved in building this gas pipeline. The
question of the Caspian Sea's status remains open. The question of
Iran's relations with Azerbaijan, and problems in these relations, is
growing more urgent in the context of the situation of Iranian Azeris,
conflict resolution options for Nagorno-Karabakh, and evaluation of
the geopolitical prospects of Azeri-Turkish relations. This matrix is
topped off with Arab Spring issues, the situation in the Persian Gulf,
Palestinian-Israeli relations, Palestine's application for recognition,
deteriorating relations between Egypt and Israel, and the uncertain
future of Libya and the Mahgrib as a whole. If the West continues
playing the "nuclear weapons in Iran" card, access to America's
missile shield will be demanded by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
In our view, however, changes in the Trans-Caucasus will be more
intensive. Iran has become noticeably more active in Armenia, Georgia,
and Tajikistan. In short, the installation of an American radar in
Turkey may be regarded as a kind of "start button": by pressing it,
Turkey and the United States are setting off a domino effect. So the
region known as the Greater Middle East is definitely being drawn
into the political turbulence zone. An era of change is dawning.
by Stanislav Tarasov
WPS Agency
September 26, 2011 Monday
Russia
Turkey gives up on Iran, draws closer to NATO; It turns out that when
it comes to Syria, the interests of Turkey and Iran diverge radically.
Moreover, Iran has stopped concealing its geopolitical ambitions
in the region. So the "strategic alliance" between the two adjacent
Islamic states has not worked out.
Representatives of Ankara and Washington have signed an agreement on
deploying an American radar in Turkey, as part of the European missile
defense system being established by the United States and NATO. The
radar will be installed in the Malatia province in south-eastern
Turkey.
Right up until the last moment, Ankara had some doubts about hosting
the radar - because this missile defense system is primarily intended
to avert possible missile strikes coming from Iran, which maintains
friendly relations with Turkey. What's more, this breakthrough
in the Iranian direction - expressed as rapid growth of trade and
political contacts - was described in Turkey only recently as "one
of our greatest diplomatic achievements." Ankara refused to support
anti-Iranian sanctions; it did not freeze relations with Iran in
response to Iran's nuclear program; it offered to act as intermediary
in bridge-building between Tehran and the West.
But all these cards have been thrown into disarray by the Arab Spring.
It turns out that when it comes to Syria, the interests of Turkey
and Iran diverge radically. Moreover, Iran has stopped concealing
its geopolitical ambitions in the region. So the "strategic alliance"
between the two adjacent Islamic states has not worked out.
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that Turkey's
decision to host the radar "would significantly facilitate the
expansion of NATO's capability to defend Europe's territory,
population, and troops from growing threats associated with the use
of ballistic missiles." NATO makes no secret of the fact that Iran
is viewed as such a threat.
One of Azerbaijan's leading analysts, Rauf Radzhabov, suggests that
Tehran is responding with active foreign policy efforts in many
directions simultaneously. And all this has coincided with the launch
of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, built with Russia's assistance. So
Iran is now positioning itself as the one and only Mideast state
with access to civilian nuclear energy. In this context, a bilateral
government commission met in Tehran to discuss further expansion of
cooperation between the two countries in all kinds of areas.
The first practical sign of warmer relations between Tehran and
Moscow was Iran's support for Moscow's negative stance on the EU
Council's decision about the Trans-Caspian Pipeline project, with the
European Union set to get involved in building this gas pipeline. The
question of the Caspian Sea's status remains open. The question of
Iran's relations with Azerbaijan, and problems in these relations, is
growing more urgent in the context of the situation of Iranian Azeris,
conflict resolution options for Nagorno-Karabakh, and evaluation of
the geopolitical prospects of Azeri-Turkish relations. This matrix is
topped off with Arab Spring issues, the situation in the Persian Gulf,
Palestinian-Israeli relations, Palestine's application for recognition,
deteriorating relations between Egypt and Israel, and the uncertain
future of Libya and the Mahgrib as a whole. If the West continues
playing the "nuclear weapons in Iran" card, access to America's
missile shield will be demanded by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
In our view, however, changes in the Trans-Caucasus will be more
intensive. Iran has become noticeably more active in Armenia, Georgia,
and Tajikistan. In short, the installation of an American radar in
Turkey may be regarded as a kind of "start button": by pressing it,
Turkey and the United States are setting off a domino effect. So the
region known as the Greater Middle East is definitely being drawn
into the political turbulence zone. An era of change is dawning.