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THE AZERBAIJAN DILEMMA
Thomas de Waal
The National Interest
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/azerbaijan-dilemma-6714
April 2 2012
Who would be Azerbaijan? The Caucasian country has just joined the
UN Security Council, and it is wealthy as never before, its state
coffers overflowing with oil and gas revenues. But its position in
the world is barely easier than it was twenty years ago.
Relations with Western countries could be described as transactional,
dependent on energy supplies and the country's status as a transit
route to Afghanistan. The Azerbaijanis blame a fairly difficult
relationship with Washington on the success of the Armenian lobby
in Congress in blocking the reconfirmation of Matt Bryza as U.S.
ambassador, leaving the State Department again without an envoy in
Baku. American officials say that the relationship is not bad but will
not be better as long as Azerbaijan is so far from being a democracy.
Azerbaijan has tricky relationships with all of its neighbors. The
surrounding landscape offers suspended conflict with Armenia,
simmering tensions with Iran and Turkmenistan, friendship masking
perpetual suspicion with Russia and constant misunderstandings with
its supposedly close Turkic cousin Turkey.
Even the relationship with the closest neighbor, Georgia, is not
trouble free. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili talked up
Azerbaijani-Georgian friendship on a visit to Baku in early March and
even proposed that the two countries should make a joint bid to host
the 2016 European soccer championship. But Saakashvili caused his
hosts headaches in a speech to the Azerbaijani parliament, telling
his audience (in the Russian language) that Moscow's foreign policy
"has many names, but only one meaning for all of us, the neighbors of
the Russian Federation: the end of our freedom and our independence,
the end of the dream of Rasulzade and many others of our ancestors."
The speech raised the ire of some Azerbaijani parliamentarians. They
felt the Georgian president had offended protocol by using their
parliament to attack a neighboring state with whom they try to
maintain good relations. Saakashvili's many references to Mammad Amin
Rasulzade, whose famous phrase "The flag once raised will never fall"
he used to conclude his speech, also went down badly. Rasulzade was
the founder of the first Azerbaijani independent republic of 1918
and leader of the Musavat Party, now the leading opposition group
to the government. He is a historical figure the current Azerbaijani
governing elite prefers not to glorify in public.
Israel is another high-maintenance ally. The two countries have a
strong commercial and political partnership with both stressing their
pro-Western foreign-policy orientation and resistance to radical
Islam. But being Israel's best friend in this neighborhood comes
at a cost. Unhelpfully for the Azerbaijani government, the Israeli
media recently leaked the story of an arms deal worth $1.6 billion
between Israel and Azerbaijan. The relationship causes friction with
Turkey-the Turkish ambassador to Baku complained last year that the
Azerbaijanis should support Ankara in its row with Israel, just as
Turkey supported Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. And, of
course, it draws hostile attention from Iran.
Azerbaijan joined the UN Security Council in January. That is both
a mark of respect and a big responsibility. As one Western diplomat
in Baku put it to me, "You can hide in the UN General Assembly, you
can't hide in the Security Council." The Azerbaijanis now have to
take a line on issues such as Syria where they might have preferred
to keep silent before.
As Turkey is finding on an even larger scale, it is easier to
declare big foreign-policy ambitions than to realize them. Capacity
is stretched. There are plenty of people in the new Azerbaijan who
are good at making money and doing deals but a limited few who bear
the burden of making a coordinated foreign policy.
At the same time, the government in oil-rich Baku is increasingly
opaque. Foreign visitors and diplomats complain that they find it
harder to gain access to the government officials making decisions
and struggle to understand what government strategy is. This is
the context in which Azerbaijan faces what could be its biggest
foreign-policy test since the war with the Armenians ended in 1994:
how to handle a looming crisis with Iran, a near neighbor, fellow
Shiite state and strong ideological adversary.
The working presumption has always been that because both countries
have the ability to hurt each other badly, they refrain from doing
anything that drags them into full-scale confrontation. Iran has
influence over dozens of mosques and tens of thousands of Islamists in
Azerbaijan who could rattle the Azerbaijani state. It also provides
an economic and energy lifeline for the Azerbaijani exclave of
Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan has the capacity to stir up parts of Iran's
huge Azeri minority if it wanted to.
That presumption is now being tested. In January, the Azerbaijani
government said its websites had been attacked and defaced with
anti-Israeli messages, then announced it had foiled an Iranian
plot to assassinate a Jewish teacher and a rabbi in Baku. An
Azerbaijani parliamentarian took the opportunity to needle Tehran
with the suggestion that his country should be renamed "North
Azerbaijan"-implying that Iran's Azerbaijani provinces would thereby
become "South Azerbaijan."
Thankfully, the situation has quieted down again. The Azerbaijani
officials I talked to are focused on managing it. But if more trouble
strikes, Azerbaijan will need to keep its nerve and-an unaccustomed
predicament in recent times-find a way to ask for help.
Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Thomas de Waal
The National Interest
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/azerbaijan-dilemma-6714
April 2 2012
Who would be Azerbaijan? The Caucasian country has just joined the
UN Security Council, and it is wealthy as never before, its state
coffers overflowing with oil and gas revenues. But its position in
the world is barely easier than it was twenty years ago.
Relations with Western countries could be described as transactional,
dependent on energy supplies and the country's status as a transit
route to Afghanistan. The Azerbaijanis blame a fairly difficult
relationship with Washington on the success of the Armenian lobby
in Congress in blocking the reconfirmation of Matt Bryza as U.S.
ambassador, leaving the State Department again without an envoy in
Baku. American officials say that the relationship is not bad but will
not be better as long as Azerbaijan is so far from being a democracy.
Azerbaijan has tricky relationships with all of its neighbors. The
surrounding landscape offers suspended conflict with Armenia,
simmering tensions with Iran and Turkmenistan, friendship masking
perpetual suspicion with Russia and constant misunderstandings with
its supposedly close Turkic cousin Turkey.
Even the relationship with the closest neighbor, Georgia, is not
trouble free. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili talked up
Azerbaijani-Georgian friendship on a visit to Baku in early March and
even proposed that the two countries should make a joint bid to host
the 2016 European soccer championship. But Saakashvili caused his
hosts headaches in a speech to the Azerbaijani parliament, telling
his audience (in the Russian language) that Moscow's foreign policy
"has many names, but only one meaning for all of us, the neighbors of
the Russian Federation: the end of our freedom and our independence,
the end of the dream of Rasulzade and many others of our ancestors."
The speech raised the ire of some Azerbaijani parliamentarians. They
felt the Georgian president had offended protocol by using their
parliament to attack a neighboring state with whom they try to
maintain good relations. Saakashvili's many references to Mammad Amin
Rasulzade, whose famous phrase "The flag once raised will never fall"
he used to conclude his speech, also went down badly. Rasulzade was
the founder of the first Azerbaijani independent republic of 1918
and leader of the Musavat Party, now the leading opposition group
to the government. He is a historical figure the current Azerbaijani
governing elite prefers not to glorify in public.
Israel is another high-maintenance ally. The two countries have a
strong commercial and political partnership with both stressing their
pro-Western foreign-policy orientation and resistance to radical
Islam. But being Israel's best friend in this neighborhood comes
at a cost. Unhelpfully for the Azerbaijani government, the Israeli
media recently leaked the story of an arms deal worth $1.6 billion
between Israel and Azerbaijan. The relationship causes friction with
Turkey-the Turkish ambassador to Baku complained last year that the
Azerbaijanis should support Ankara in its row with Israel, just as
Turkey supported Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia. And, of
course, it draws hostile attention from Iran.
Azerbaijan joined the UN Security Council in January. That is both
a mark of respect and a big responsibility. As one Western diplomat
in Baku put it to me, "You can hide in the UN General Assembly, you
can't hide in the Security Council." The Azerbaijanis now have to
take a line on issues such as Syria where they might have preferred
to keep silent before.
As Turkey is finding on an even larger scale, it is easier to
declare big foreign-policy ambitions than to realize them. Capacity
is stretched. There are plenty of people in the new Azerbaijan who
are good at making money and doing deals but a limited few who bear
the burden of making a coordinated foreign policy.
At the same time, the government in oil-rich Baku is increasingly
opaque. Foreign visitors and diplomats complain that they find it
harder to gain access to the government officials making decisions
and struggle to understand what government strategy is. This is
the context in which Azerbaijan faces what could be its biggest
foreign-policy test since the war with the Armenians ended in 1994:
how to handle a looming crisis with Iran, a near neighbor, fellow
Shiite state and strong ideological adversary.
The working presumption has always been that because both countries
have the ability to hurt each other badly, they refrain from doing
anything that drags them into full-scale confrontation. Iran has
influence over dozens of mosques and tens of thousands of Islamists in
Azerbaijan who could rattle the Azerbaijani state. It also provides
an economic and energy lifeline for the Azerbaijani exclave of
Nakhichevan. Azerbaijan has the capacity to stir up parts of Iran's
huge Azeri minority if it wanted to.
That presumption is now being tested. In January, the Azerbaijani
government said its websites had been attacked and defaced with
anti-Israeli messages, then announced it had foiled an Iranian
plot to assassinate a Jewish teacher and a rabbi in Baku. An
Azerbaijani parliamentarian took the opportunity to needle Tehran
with the suggestion that his country should be renamed "North
Azerbaijan"-implying that Iran's Azerbaijani provinces would thereby
become "South Azerbaijan."
Thankfully, the situation has quieted down again. The Azerbaijani
officials I talked to are focused on managing it. But if more trouble
strikes, Azerbaijan will need to keep its nerve and-an unaccustomed
predicament in recent times-find a way to ask for help.
Thomas de Waal is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.