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AZERBAIJAN AS ISRAEL'S ANTI-IRAN 'STAGING GROUND' A TOUGH SELL
By Michael Cecire
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11815/azerbaijan-as-israels-anti -iran-staging-ground-a-tough-sell
06 Apr 2012
As tensions over Iran's nuclear program rise, assertions that Israel's
increasing closeness to Azerbaijan, a predominantly Muslim state on
Iran's northern border, represents the emergence of an anti-Iran
"tag team" are gaining currency. But despite undoubtedly warming
ties between the two countries, there is no indication that Baku is
in any hurry to sacrifice its national interests by participating in
a conflict that could possibly drag it into a regional conflagration.
Though a recently signed $1.6 billion arms deal has put the
Israel-Azerbaijan relationship in the spotlight of late, an article on
the Foreign Policy website, vaulted the South Caucasus from ancillary
consideration to top billing in the latest Iran-related geopolitical
intrigue. The article, "Israel's Secret Staging Ground," which casts
Azerbaijan as Israel's willing accomplice in an impending strike
on Iran, is long on supposition and rumor, and fails to assemble
a cohesive narrative, while running up against a raft of logical
inconsistencies.
Mark Perry, the author of the March 28 piece, draws on a host of
unnamed informants and oblique quotes from WikiLeaks documents to
portray a grand theory of Israeli-Azerbaijani strategic collusion
against Iran, with the central component being some abandoned
Azerbaijani air bases that Baku has allegedly loaned to Israel for
use in a strike against Iran's nuclear program. And yet, besides the
assertions of anonymous officials, the article supplies no evidence
that the putative loan of the airfields is anything but creative
speculation.
Even generously assuming that the airfields have been transferred for
Israel's use still does not yield a satisfying narrative. The argument
primarily revolves around speculation that the airfields might be used
for basing or refueling Israeli air force jets, thereby facilitating
airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. But it remains unclear why
Azerbaijan would so willingly expose itself to retaliation from its
powerful southern neighbor and thereby risk sparking a regional war
that could easily spread beyond Iran and Israel to include Azerbaijan
and possibly Armenia, Turkey, Georgia and even Russia.
Even if lending the use of its bases and airspace to Israel doesn't
technically violate Azerbaijan's oft-stated pledge not to support a
war against Iran, it is unlikely Iran would see it that way.
Commenting on Perry's article, Caucasus and Central Asia watcher
Joshua Kucera expressed doubt that Tehran would take such a relaxed
view of intelligence indicating Baku's complicity in the event of an
Israeli strike.
"I'm not sure [providing basing and logistical assistance would afford
Azerbaijan the deniability they'd need to avoid a retaliatory attack
from Iran," cautioned Kucera. "Surely Iran would be able to see where
the Israeli jets were going after their attack."
In reality, Azerbaijan's national interests are overwhelmingly tilted
against the specter of an Iran war on its borders. While there is no
love lost between the secular regime in Baku and the fundamentalist
Shiite theocracy in Tehran, Azerbaijan surely does not relish the
prospect of millions of Iranian refugees -- many of them fellow
ethnic Azeris -- streaming across the border, to say nothing of
the likelihood that conflict would disrupt regional trade and the
stability of the hydrocarbons market upon which Azerbaijan's economy
depends. From this standpoint, it is no wonder that Azerbaijan has
been so publicly opposed to strikes on Iran.
But Baku's allergy to a conflict in Iran pales in comparison to
the risks that would come from active Azerbaijani participation in
one, which would invite retaliation from Azerbaijan's much larger
neighbor. And although Baku has used its oil riches to build a large,
credible military force, an armed confrontation with Iran would have
major material and human costs, leaving the country economically
depressed and, perhaps most important to Azerbaijani officials,
setting back its efforts to recapture the Armenia-backed separatist
region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In failing to answer these glaring questions, the narrative of
Azerbaijan as Israel's land-based aircraft carrier quickly unravels.
While there is a growing partnership and perhaps even ongoing
intelligence cooperation between the two countries -- pro forma for
any two states with healthy ties -- accusations of a joint effort to
attack Iran require suspending disbelief of local realities. Nargiz
Gurbanova, a counselor at the Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington,
echoed this sentiment in a reply to Perry's article, also published
by Foreign Policy.
"This unreasonable accusation makes no sense in terms of geography,"
protested Gurbanova, ". . . and contradicts the clearly stated policy
of Azerbaijan not to allow use of its territory against any neighbor."
In truth, accusations of secret Israeli deals with South Caucasus
states are nothing new. While today it is Azerbaijan in the spotlight,
only recently it was Georgia that was cast as Israel's malleable
junior partner and anti-Iran launch pad -- a proposition that grew
increasingly unlikely when it became obvious that Israel-Georgia
ties had rapidly degraded following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. In
such cases, the familiar canard of clandestine and omniscient Israeli
deal-making overcomes the constraints of local context and regional
politics.
But if Azerbaijan is not in on the conspiracy, then what of Perry's
informants? Alex Jackson, a political risk analyst blogging at
Caspian Intelligence, sees the article as speculation emanating
from Washington.
"The lack of input from either the Israelis or the Azeris means
that this is Washington-centric speculation," notes Jackson. "Quite
possibly the Israelis have been pushing for the use of an airbase
in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani officials have been encouraging this
in order to keep the Israelis happy, but nothing has been agreed,
in principle or in writing."
The South Caucasus is a place of many moving parts, even without the
added major variable of an Iran-Israel war. While signs of a warming
relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan are evident, claims of a
grand bargain run up against basic issues of politics, geography and
regional dynamics -- and ultimately fall short. Without the benefit of
powerful new evidence or attribution, the idea of Azerbaijan inviting
war to its doorstep remains a tough sell.
Michael Hikari Cecire is an independent analyst and Wikistrat
contributing analyst focusing on the South Caucasus and Black Sea
region. He blogs at Evolutsia.Net.
Photo: Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Baku, Azerbaijan, Nov. 10, 2010 (photo from the
website of the President of the Russian Federation, licenced under
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported licence).
By Michael Cecire
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11815/azerbaijan-as-israels-anti -iran-staging-ground-a-tough-sell
06 Apr 2012
As tensions over Iran's nuclear program rise, assertions that Israel's
increasing closeness to Azerbaijan, a predominantly Muslim state on
Iran's northern border, represents the emergence of an anti-Iran
"tag team" are gaining currency. But despite undoubtedly warming
ties between the two countries, there is no indication that Baku is
in any hurry to sacrifice its national interests by participating in
a conflict that could possibly drag it into a regional conflagration.
Though a recently signed $1.6 billion arms deal has put the
Israel-Azerbaijan relationship in the spotlight of late, an article on
the Foreign Policy website, vaulted the South Caucasus from ancillary
consideration to top billing in the latest Iran-related geopolitical
intrigue. The article, "Israel's Secret Staging Ground," which casts
Azerbaijan as Israel's willing accomplice in an impending strike
on Iran, is long on supposition and rumor, and fails to assemble
a cohesive narrative, while running up against a raft of logical
inconsistencies.
Mark Perry, the author of the March 28 piece, draws on a host of
unnamed informants and oblique quotes from WikiLeaks documents to
portray a grand theory of Israeli-Azerbaijani strategic collusion
against Iran, with the central component being some abandoned
Azerbaijani air bases that Baku has allegedly loaned to Israel for
use in a strike against Iran's nuclear program. And yet, besides the
assertions of anonymous officials, the article supplies no evidence
that the putative loan of the airfields is anything but creative
speculation.
Even generously assuming that the airfields have been transferred for
Israel's use still does not yield a satisfying narrative. The argument
primarily revolves around speculation that the airfields might be used
for basing or refueling Israeli air force jets, thereby facilitating
airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. But it remains unclear why
Azerbaijan would so willingly expose itself to retaliation from its
powerful southern neighbor and thereby risk sparking a regional war
that could easily spread beyond Iran and Israel to include Azerbaijan
and possibly Armenia, Turkey, Georgia and even Russia.
Even if lending the use of its bases and airspace to Israel doesn't
technically violate Azerbaijan's oft-stated pledge not to support a
war against Iran, it is unlikely Iran would see it that way.
Commenting on Perry's article, Caucasus and Central Asia watcher
Joshua Kucera expressed doubt that Tehran would take such a relaxed
view of intelligence indicating Baku's complicity in the event of an
Israeli strike.
"I'm not sure [providing basing and logistical assistance would afford
Azerbaijan the deniability they'd need to avoid a retaliatory attack
from Iran," cautioned Kucera. "Surely Iran would be able to see where
the Israeli jets were going after their attack."
In reality, Azerbaijan's national interests are overwhelmingly tilted
against the specter of an Iran war on its borders. While there is no
love lost between the secular regime in Baku and the fundamentalist
Shiite theocracy in Tehran, Azerbaijan surely does not relish the
prospect of millions of Iranian refugees -- many of them fellow
ethnic Azeris -- streaming across the border, to say nothing of
the likelihood that conflict would disrupt regional trade and the
stability of the hydrocarbons market upon which Azerbaijan's economy
depends. From this standpoint, it is no wonder that Azerbaijan has
been so publicly opposed to strikes on Iran.
But Baku's allergy to a conflict in Iran pales in comparison to
the risks that would come from active Azerbaijani participation in
one, which would invite retaliation from Azerbaijan's much larger
neighbor. And although Baku has used its oil riches to build a large,
credible military force, an armed confrontation with Iran would have
major material and human costs, leaving the country economically
depressed and, perhaps most important to Azerbaijani officials,
setting back its efforts to recapture the Armenia-backed separatist
region of Nagorno-Karabakh.
In failing to answer these glaring questions, the narrative of
Azerbaijan as Israel's land-based aircraft carrier quickly unravels.
While there is a growing partnership and perhaps even ongoing
intelligence cooperation between the two countries -- pro forma for
any two states with healthy ties -- accusations of a joint effort to
attack Iran require suspending disbelief of local realities. Nargiz
Gurbanova, a counselor at the Azerbaijani Embassy in Washington,
echoed this sentiment in a reply to Perry's article, also published
by Foreign Policy.
"This unreasonable accusation makes no sense in terms of geography,"
protested Gurbanova, ". . . and contradicts the clearly stated policy
of Azerbaijan not to allow use of its territory against any neighbor."
In truth, accusations of secret Israeli deals with South Caucasus
states are nothing new. While today it is Azerbaijan in the spotlight,
only recently it was Georgia that was cast as Israel's malleable
junior partner and anti-Iran launch pad -- a proposition that grew
increasingly unlikely when it became obvious that Israel-Georgia
ties had rapidly degraded following the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. In
such cases, the familiar canard of clandestine and omniscient Israeli
deal-making overcomes the constraints of local context and regional
politics.
But if Azerbaijan is not in on the conspiracy, then what of Perry's
informants? Alex Jackson, a political risk analyst blogging at
Caspian Intelligence, sees the article as speculation emanating
from Washington.
"The lack of input from either the Israelis or the Azeris means
that this is Washington-centric speculation," notes Jackson. "Quite
possibly the Israelis have been pushing for the use of an airbase
in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijani officials have been encouraging this
in order to keep the Israelis happy, but nothing has been agreed,
in principle or in writing."
The South Caucasus is a place of many moving parts, even without the
added major variable of an Iran-Israel war. While signs of a warming
relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan are evident, claims of a
grand bargain run up against basic issues of politics, geography and
regional dynamics -- and ultimately fall short. Without the benefit of
powerful new evidence or attribution, the idea of Azerbaijan inviting
war to its doorstep remains a tough sell.
Michael Hikari Cecire is an independent analyst and Wikistrat
contributing analyst focusing on the South Caucasus and Black Sea
region. He blogs at Evolutsia.Net.
Photo: Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, Baku, Azerbaijan, Nov. 10, 2010 (photo from the
website of the President of the Russian Federation, licenced under
the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported licence).