Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

Armenia Survives!

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Armenia Survives!

    The New York Review of Books




    Armenia Survives!
    May 10, 2012
    Tim Judah


    The Caucasus: An Introduction
    by Thomas de Waal

    Tim Judah


    Statue of Alexander Tamanian, the architect of Republic Square and the
    opera house, in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, with the city's
    Cascade staircase in the background Depending on which figures you
    look at, Armenia's population hovers around three million people. That
    is some half a million less than it was twenty years ago, when the
    state gained independence as the Soviet Union collapsed. But some
    believe that the true figure is even less than that. If there are few
    jobs, and if Armenia remains isolated, it is hardly surprising that so
    many of its people go abroad.

    Just look at the map to understand the fundamental geographic problems
    facing Armenia. To the west is Turkey, the historic nemesis of the
    Armenians, which angrily objects to claims that up to 1.5 million
    Armenians were killed by the Ottomans in 1915. Turkey closed its
    borders with Armenia in 1993. To the east is Turkey's ally, Muslim
    Azerbaijan, also formerly part
    of the USSR, with which Armenia fought a war in the early 1990s. The border between the two states has been closed since, because of the dispute over
    the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, which, until the Armenians conquered a land bridge to it, was surrounded on all sides by Azerbaijan.


    Mike King
    To the south is Iran. The Armenians are an ancient Christian people but their relations with the Iranians are good. It helps that Iran is deeply suspicious of Azerbaijan, which has good relations with both the US and Israel and has suppressed a pro-Iranian party, the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan.
    To the north is Georgia. Georgians are also predominantly Christian, but the country's relations with Armenia are cool rather than friendly. In August 2008, Georgia fought and lost a war with Russia. Armenia, by contrast, relies on Russian troops for its security. Still, apart from Iran, the route through Georgia is Armenia's only way out by land. To borrow a phrase much heard from Israelis, Armenians live in a rough neighborhood.



    GA_googleFillSlot("300x250-ArticleP1");


    1.
    You only have to spend a day or two walking around the capital city of
    Yerevan to understand just how much the past shapes Armenian thinking
    about the present and the future.
    The capital is full of sculptures and monuments to musicians, poets,
    and national heroes. In recent years there has been a considerable
    building boom in the city's center. I started to walk from Republic
    Square, with its vaulting pink stone and arched monumental buildings,
    which date from the 1920s. In 1918, after the collapse of the Russian
    Empire, a short-lived independent Armenian state was declared that
    survived only until the Bolshevik conquest of 1920. The new Soviet
    republic of Armenia, which would eventually emerge, was far smaller
    than its people had hoped for and was full of refugees. Many had come
    from regions now in Turkey-which Armenians still, optimistically, call
    Western Armenia-but which were lost to the Turks in those chaotic
    years, and many of the refugees were survivors of the genocide of
    1915.
    Following the Soviet conquest, Armenians were divided. Some saw Soviet
    Armenia as the end of a dream of independence, but others saw it as
    the only way the Armenian nation, with its own distinctive language,
    history, and culture, which historically had been preserved by its
    church, could survive. After all, the areas where Armenians had once
    lived in eastern Anatolia had just been lost to the Turks. This is why
    Republic Square is important. Its arches, for example, are decorated
    with motifs of fruit and flowers and animals. Arev Samuelyan,
    Armenia's deputy minister of culture and an architect, explained to me
    that in this period, architects such as Alexander Tamanian, who
    designed the square and the nearby opera house, were trying to create
    a modern secular style to symbolize the new Armenian
    republic. Historically the only distinctive Armenian architecture had
    been pointy-roofed churches-not the ideal source of inspiration in
    Stalin's state.

    Until then, and even today, church and nation had always been
    intertwined. Armenians are proud of the fact that theirs was the
    first nation to adopt Christianity as its official religion, as far
    back as the year 301 AD; and the church, with its own rituals and
    sacred texts in Armenian, is independent of the Vatican and is not a
    strand of Orthodoxy like the Russian, Greek, or Georgian
    churches. Today, its members make up over 90 percent of the Armenian
    population. Across town, I walked up a massive staircase, called the
    Cascade, which has some five hundred steps. It was begun in the 1970s
    but only completed after the Soviet state collapsed. Sitting on the
    steps, basking in the sun, young couples were kissing. Behind the
    steps, inside the hill they are built on, is a modern art museum
    funded by Gerard Cafesjian, an Armenian-American who made his fortune
    in publishing. The Armenian diaspora is perhaps seven million
    strong. There are no exact figures, but 1.2 million are believed to
    live in the US, 2.2 million in Russia, and half a million in France,
    with the rest scattered everywhere from Georgia to Syria and
    Argentina. The relationship between Armenia and the diaspora is often
    compared to that of diaspora Jews and Israel-a kinship that depends on
    family and religious ties and a sense of nationhood that requires
    Armenians to help one another.

    For the Armenian state the diaspora is an important source of money:
    some 10 percent of Armenia's GDP derives from it. Of that, between 70
    to

    80 percent comes from Armenians in Russia, and not only from newly
    minted billionaires, of whom there are several. While the forebears of
    much of the diaspora in the West came from Anatolia following the
    genocide of 1915, Armenians have been in Russia for centuries; they
    continued to emigrate there during the Soviet era and in the two
    decades since.

    At the top of the Cascade is the Maison Charles Aznavour, which
    contains the apartment of the veteran French-Armenian
    crooner. Aznavour has long been a leading figure of the diaspora,
    helping mobilize it to raise money for everything from schools and
    hospitals to roads and irrigation schemes in both Armenia and
    Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2009, he was appointed Armenian ambassador to
    Switzerland. This is the second reason why the Armenians of the
    diaspora are so important. They are organized and lobby for Armenian
    causes. The most important of these relates to the genocide, but they
    also include, in the US for example, blocking the confirmation of
    Matthew Bryza as American ambassador to Azerbaijan this past December,
    which led to his recall from Baku after a year. Armenian groups in the
    US had lobbied against him, accusing Bryza-who was appointed by the
    White House in December 2010 during a congressional recess and never
    confirmed by the Senate-of pro-Azerbaijani and pro-Turkish views, and
    even of denying that a genocide of Armenians had taken place in 1915.
    However, Armenians often told me that Armenians in Armenia and those
    in the diaspora don't always agree. For many Armenians in the West,
    the primary goal has been to convince parliaments around the world to
    pass resolutions recognizing the events of 1915 as a genocide. On
    December 22, for example, the French National Assembly passed a bill
    making denial of the Armenian genocide a crime. In response, Turkey
    announced that it was recalling its ambassador to France and freezing
    all bilateral relations in protest. The bill was confirmed by the
    French Senate on January 23, and President Nicolas Sarkozy said he
    would sign it into law within fourteen days. On January 31, however,
    Turkey welcomed the fact that the law had been suspended pending its
    referral to the Constitutional Court. This decision by the
    =80=9Cwise' French would `preserve' Franco-Turkish relations, said
    Ahmet DavutoÄ=9Flu, the Turkish foreign minister. The issue of the
    genocide is important in Armenia too; but opening the border with
    Turkey to boost trade and create jobs seems more urgent if you live
    here, not in Paris or California. The French bill might be emotionally
    satisfying, in other words, but it won't help Armenian farmers keen to
    sell pomegranates just over the border in a Turkish market rather than
    shipping them all the way to Russia at great cost. Just above the
    Cascade steps is a stele and a sort of secular black temple, erected
    in 1970 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Soviet rule. Cross the
    street and walk through the park and you soon arrive at the huge
    Soviet Mother Armenia statue, which replaced one of Stalin in 1962. In
    front of it is an eternal flame for the Armenian soldiers who died
    fighting in the Soviet army in World War II. Inside the Mother Armenia
    pedestal, an exhibition commemorates the casualties of the war against
    Azerbaijan in the 1990s. Nearby is another, newer, war memorial, for
    those who died between 1979 and 1989 fighting with the Soviet forces
    in Afghanistan. Important though all these are, the single most
    important memorial in the country is the one to the genocide and its
    museum. It commemorates the Armenians who died in 1915 and earlier, in
    various pogroms. The memorial is centered around another eternal
    flame. This is surrounded by twelve massive, inward-curving, black
    petal-like walls, representing the twelve `lost provinces' of Western
    Armenia, which is to say the regions now in Turkey where Armenians
    once lived. When I was there, children were laying flowers around the
    flame. As I entered the museum, I ran into a group of journalists
    waiting for Bertrand Delanoë, the visiting mayor of Paris. (Two weeks
    earlier, Sarkozy had also visited.) Delanoë spoke about the need to
    remember the genocide, and then, outside, he shoveled earth onto a fir
    tree sapling, which he watered for the cameras. The other firs there
    all displayed little plaques indicating that they had been planted by
    a visiting politician, many of whom were Americans. Like visiting
    American politicians, Delanoë would want to make sure that his voters
    of Armenian origin back home were aware that he had
    spoken out in Yerevan.
    2.
    A few hours later I walked past the grand opera house in the center of
    town. It performs the works of famous Armenian composers such as Aram
    Khachaturian; in December you could hear Pergolesi's Stabat Mater and
    Bizet's Carmen is scheduled for 2012.
    Filmed by the police, a small group outside the opera was protesting
    the arrest of a young political activist. Armenian politics has been
    turbulent and even violent these last twenty years. It is a
    parliamentary democracy with a strong president and weak
    institutions. On paper, Armenian politics looks like an alphabet soup
    of parties, coalitions, and alliances. However, in reality, much of
    contemporary political life is dominated by the current president,
    Serzh Sargsyan, head of the conservative Republican Party of Armenia,
    and his two predecessors, Robert Kocharian and Levon
    Ter-Petrossian. As in many post-Communist countries, who is in and who
    is out tends to be connected to whom one owes one's allegiance to,
    rather than ideological or policy differences.
    In February 2008 the opposition, led by former president
    Ter-Petrossian, claimed that Sargsyan had stolen the elections. After
    that the police clashed with demonstrators and ten died. Dozens were
    jailed. The opposition claimed they were political prisoners. For
    twenty days Armenia was put under a state of emergency. Since then,
    all the prisoners from 2008 have been released, and in 2011 the main
    opposition alliance, made up of thirteen parties and led by
    Ter-Petrossian, was allowed, after a three-year ban, to hold rallies
    in a central square in Yerevan. Several were held, but this time,
    instead of violence, the government offered talks with Ter-Petrossian,
    and he accepted. I asked the protesters how many political prisoners
    there were in Armenia today. They replied `one'-the young man they
    were protesting about-although just what he had done to be arrested no
    one could say.


    Tim Judah
    The Granny and Grandpa memorial just outside Stepanakert in
    Nagorno-Karabakh, which has become an unofficial symbol of the enclave
    Later that day I met Salpi Ghazarian, who was born in Aleppo, Syria,
    and then lived in the US. Now she is the director of the Civilitas
    Foundation, which works to encourage the development of a liberal and
    democratic modern Armenia, as well as reconciliation with
    Turkey. Armenia's transition to democracy has been harder than anyone
    expected, she said. But then, Armenians had no experience of
    democracy. Either they had lived in former Ottoman lands or under the
    tsars and then the Soviet empire. As for freedom of
    the press, hardly anyone reads newspapers anymore. But the government
    firmly controls the main television stations, from which most people
    get their news, though this, and thus political control of the media,
    is changing, since people increasingly get their news from the
    Internet. Things are far from perfect in Armenia, Ghazarian said, but
    still she was optimistic because
    the progress that has been made, she said, is `irreversible.'
    Ghazarian's office is full of educated and enthusiastic young
    people. But how many will stay in Armenia, where average salaries are
    $300 a month? (By contrast, in Russia monthly salaries are more than
    twice that amount.) As Ghazarian pointed out, in this globalized
    world, increasing numbers
    of Armenians either from Armenia or from the diaspora come and go,
    though no one could say how many. This includes many unskilled
    Armenians, who go to Russia as construction or seasonal workers. I saw
    some at the airport when I boarded a flight to Moscow. They were
    carrying local food, including jars of pickles in bulging bags. The
    lady who sat next to me on the plane told me that her uncle had left
    Armenia during the early 1990s. Now he had a successful private clinic
    in Moscow, although he could not afford to come home to work even if
    he wanted to. There are just not enough people with enough money to
    pay for his services in Armenia. Moscow alone has a population
    at least three times greater than Armenia's, and there are more
    wealthy people in Moscow than in all of Armenia.
    Armenia is primarily an agricultural country but also has minerals,
    including diamonds, and produces pig iron and some finished industrial
    goods. It exports fruit and vegetables, dairy products, and wine, and
    it is famous for its brandy. In 1988, the country was hit by an
    earthquake that claimed 25,000 lives. Then came the political turmoil
    at the end of the Soviet era and the war with Azerbaijan. Between 1988
    and 1994, maybe a million or more Azeris fled from Armenia and
    Nagorno-Karabakh and some 500,000 Armenians from Azerbaijan. It was
    then that the Turks sealed the frontier. The country was plunged into
    darkness as all of its main sources of energy were cut.
    Today, Armenia is a long way from those years. It is poor, but its
    economy
    is five times bigger than it was a decade ago, thanks to remittances,
    a construction boom, and the emergence of private businesses. But it
    is also an
    economy that is highly vulnerable to what happens in the rest of the
    world. For most of the last decade it grew by double digits, only to
    contract by
    14.4 percent in 2009, although this was followed by modest growth in
    2010 and projected 4.6 percent growth for 2011. If Armenia could make
    peace with Azerbaijan it might even flourish-a big if.
    3.
    Driving southeast from Yerevan to Nagorno-Karabakh, one passes the
    twin peaks of Mount Ararat. (`Nagorno' is Russian for `mountainous'
    and `Karabakh' means `black garden' in Turkish.) From the main road,
    the base of Ararat, hard on the
    Turkish frontier, is only a few miles away, yet today the mountain
    long revered by Armenians as their national symbol is in Turkey. In
    1918, with the
    declaration of an independent Armenia, the mountain was placed in the
    middle of the country's coat of arms. There it has remained ever
    since, although with the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 the once
    again independent state added a tiny Noah's Ark to the top of the
    mountain, in the center of the crest.
    Turkey's borders with what is now Armenia were fixed in 1921. Since
    the border is closed, today Armenians can only look at Ararat-unless
    they go around, through Georgia, to get there. Arev Samuelyan showed
    me a photo of a ruined Armenian church, which lies a stone's throw
    away on the other side of the frontier, in Turkish territory, where
    there were once many Armenians; none live there now.
    In 1923, after years of conflict between Azeris and Armenians, Stalin
    decided to turn the mostly Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh into
    an autonomous part of Soviet Azerbaijan. Throughout the Soviet period
    there were protests about this from Armenians-they wanted the enclave
    to be officially part of Armenia-something described by Thomas de Waal
    in his excellent recent book, The Caucasus: An
    Introduction. Nevertheless, the area became `a backwater,' de Waal
    writes, and `rumblings of Armenian discontent were audible only to
    those listening very carefully'; in any case, such `resentments were
    more or less managed by the Soviet system.'
    In 1988, as the USSR began to buckle, the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh
    began to dominate the politics of the region. Conflict broke out
    between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and with the end of the Soviet Union,
    Nagorno-Karabakh declared itself independent in 1991; the fighting
    turned into an international conflict. Soviet Karabakh was a region of
    4,400 square kilometers but by the end of the war in 1994 the
    Armenians controlled 7,600 square kilometers more. Not a single Azeri,
    according to everyone I spoke to there, remains inKarabakh and the
    territories it now occupies around the old autonomous
    enclave. (According to a recent report by the International Crisis
    Group, 600,000 Azeris from the Nagorno-Karabakh region remain
    displaced within Azerbaijan.)
    Stepanakert, the capital of Nagorno-Karabakh, is small but orderly. It
    is full of banners celebrating twenty years of independence. Yet no
    country recognizes it. Although it has all the trappings of statehood
    for its 140,000 people, an official from Armenia told me that his
    ministry regarded it as just another province of Armenia. His opposite
    number in the government in Stepanakert, he said, signed off on any
    decisions made in Yerevan. Economically, Nagorno-Karabakh is supported
    by Armenia and the diaspora. Hayk Khanumyan, a local journalist, told
    me that in this way the administration could give jobs to large
    numbers of people, even if they did not have much to do. I went to
    Aghdam, a town that used to be populated mostly by Azeris. It sits
    outside the boundaries of the old autonomous region. After the
    Armenians captured the town in 1993, it was as good as leveled. No one
    lives there. The place looks like a sort of overgrown Caucasian
    Pompeii without frescoes or postcards. For the past few years, Armenia
    and Azerbaijan have been discussing a draft peace plan, by which much,
    but not all, of the region around the old autonomous area would be
    given back to Azerbaijan. In return, and for an indefinable period,
    Nagorno-Karabakh would have an interim status before a referendum
    decided its fate. In Nagorno-Karabakh no one seemed much interested in
    the talks. After all, they told me, no one was asking them, since the
    negotiations were between Armenia and Azerbaijan; and there had been
    many false dawns in the past few years.
    All this should matter in the West. Azerbaijan is an increasingly
    important oil and gas supplier. In 2005 oil began flowing along a
    1,768-kilometer pipeline from Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, via
    Tbilisi, Georgia, to the port of Ceyhan, in Turkey, where it is
    shipped out. A major natural gas pipeline also runs along part of this
    route, and there is talk of future pipeline projects to carry gas from
    Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan to the West (avoiding
    Russia). Since the existing oil pipeline to Ceyhan runs a mere
    thirteen kilometers from territory controlled by Nagorno-Karabakh, in
    the event of a new war, which today seems possible if not probable,
    the pipeline could be cut by the Armenians within hours. Azerbaijani
    oil platforms in the Caspian Sea could be hit by Armenian missiles.
    The consequences of a new war in the region could be truly
    catastrophic. Israel has close military relations with Azerbaijan (in
    February it signed a deal to sell $1.6 billion in arms to Baku) and
    gets more than 30 percent of its oil via Ceyhan. If it goes to war
    with Iran over the nuclear issue, it would make sense to have
    Azerbaijan on its side. But conflicts tend to have unforeseen
    consequences, and both Azerbaijan and Iran must wonder how Iran's
    millions of potentially restive Azeris might respond. (There are more
    Azeris in Iran than in Azerbaijan itself.) A senior Western diplomat
    told me that the fact that Azerbaijan is a secular Shiite state is a
    more important factor now in thinking about the region's geopolitics
    than the fact that it is a major source of energy.
    nnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnn nnIn 2009, amid much
    optimism, Turkey and Armenia came close to an agreement that would
    have led to a reopening of the border between them and a resumption of
    formal diplomatic relations. Then Azerbaijan protested and the deal
    was called off. The Turks linked any future deal to progress in
    negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh. There
    has been none, and it seems unlikely that progress will be made
    anytime soon. Azerbaijan's energy resources partly explain why. In
    October, Azerbaijan and Turkey signed a major deal by which the Azeris
    will both supply natural gas to Turkey and use Turkish territory to
    export it to Europe. Such deals are making the Azeris, who have said
    that they will never formally surrender any territory to Armenians,
    increasingly self-confident. Meanwhile, Armenia relies on Russia for
    its security and Russian troops continue to help guard the Armenian
    borders with Turkey and Iran. If there were a new war over
    Nagorno-Karabakh and Turkish troops moved across that border, they
    could cut the main road from Yerevan to Nagorno-Karabakh within
    hours. The likelihood of this happening with the Russians there is
    low; but if you understand that Armenians grew up listening to tales
    of the genocide and lost lands, you can also understand why their
    leaders are reluctant to trade the security they have now for open
    borders and a peace deal without firm guarantees. Azerbaijan, for its
    part, poured over $3.3 billion into its military forces in 2011, more
    than Armenia's entire state budget. No wonder Thomas de Waal calls
    Nagorno-Karabakh `a sleeping volcano.'

Working...
X