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Responsibility towards history
ETYEN MAHCUPYAN
Today's Zaman
April 26 2012
Turkey
The most concise statement with respect to understanding the political
and social transformation Turkey is currently undergoing was uttered
by the prime minister after he underwent a medical operation: "We have
a responsibility towards history." In general, politicians assume
responsibilities concerning the future, but the prime minister was
right, because in countries like Turkey, it is impossible to make
meaningful propositions about the future without clearing away the
traces of the past. Every meaningful proposition about the future
necessarily urges you to face the past.
>From this perspective, the judicial processes concerning Ergenekon,
a clandestine organization nested within the state trying to overthrow
or manipulate the democratically elected government, the Sledgehammer
(Balyoz) coup plan, the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, and the Feb. 28, 1997
coup have an aspect of revenge about them, but they have to. This is
because all coups nurture an implicit tendency to take revenge. The
"republican" regime in Turkey not only saw society in general,
and pious Muslims in particular, as a "backwards" mass and kept
them outside the public sphere, but also treated them with an open
contempt, without feeling the need to hide it. On the other hand,
Islamic groups both sought to accept the Kemalist elites that ensured
the country's independence and sovereignty, and closed themselves
to and resisted these elites' ongoing, systematic, authoritarian,
secularist practices. This led to a form of behavior that told
Islamic groups to side with the state with respect to "national"
issues, such as the Armenian issue, and to put up with the economic,
social and cultural isolation they faced.
If the military had not attempted to overthrow the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP), most probably, the tension between the state
and the Islamic community would have been covered up and the whole
matter would have been reduced to a "good soldiers and bad soldiers"
discourse and the assertion that the military would be respectful of
democracy from now on would sound melodious to Muslim ears. They would
assume that justice had been served by ensuring the reunification of
the military with the nation, a picture that would be reminiscent of
the Ottoman era.
Yet, for those who knew the true nature of the regime in Turkey,
it was just a fantasy. Indeed, after the AKP won the first election,
the military rolled up its sleeves to brainstorm and make plans about
how to overthrow it, and it continued to update these plans until 2010.
Even today there is no guarantee that a group of military officers do
not engage in similar activities. So, these developments ironically
didn't allow pious Muslims to be deceived. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan first learned about the Sledgehammer coup plan in 2004, yet,
at that time, the government did not want conflict with the military.
Rather, it was expecting that it would be considered as a "normal,"
ordinary government and tried to earn this consideration by showing
that it had adopted modernity. However, the military was aware of the
nearing "danger." Under a democratic regime, it was not legitimate
to overthrow the elected government or employ some legal tricks to
prevent the majority from ruling the country.
However, it was impossible to repeat the Feb. 28 coup as well, because
this coup was made possible by fabricating the perception that Islamic
groups were increasingly becoming "reactionary." The media networks
had lent support to it and they had become its voluntary tools.
Virtually all of the employers' and trade unions, even the judiciary
and academia chose to function as voluntary accomplices in the
military's manipulations. When a party that cannot be accused of being
"reactionary" was in office after 2002, the media started to diversify
and civil society gave rise to democratic formations. Therefore,
a coup could be made possible only if chaos could be created, and
this required "criminal" acts.
In early 2007, the AKP was maintaining its silent and passive
position, but the party management now knew in fine detail what
was happening. They were hesitant about launching a crackdown on
the coup attempts because they knew that this would trigger an
Islamists-want-to-seize-the-state campaign which would be readily
accepted by Western public opinion. The discovery of an arsenal in
Umraniye in the spring of 2007 and the politically motivated murders
pushed the government into action. The memorandum the military
issued on April 27, 2007 terminated the AKP's sure-footed approach
to the state.
The rest of the story is about how the government assumed a holistic
approach over time and realized its "responsibility towards history."
In countries like Turkey, the democracy-building process still needs
the courage to shoulder this responsibility. The intellectual ownership
of this process is still claimed by individuals in the secular groups,
but their social actors are inevitably pious Muslims.
From: Baghdasarian
ETYEN MAHCUPYAN
Today's Zaman
April 26 2012
Turkey
The most concise statement with respect to understanding the political
and social transformation Turkey is currently undergoing was uttered
by the prime minister after he underwent a medical operation: "We have
a responsibility towards history." In general, politicians assume
responsibilities concerning the future, but the prime minister was
right, because in countries like Turkey, it is impossible to make
meaningful propositions about the future without clearing away the
traces of the past. Every meaningful proposition about the future
necessarily urges you to face the past.
>From this perspective, the judicial processes concerning Ergenekon,
a clandestine organization nested within the state trying to overthrow
or manipulate the democratically elected government, the Sledgehammer
(Balyoz) coup plan, the Sept. 12, 1980 coup, and the Feb. 28, 1997
coup have an aspect of revenge about them, but they have to. This is
because all coups nurture an implicit tendency to take revenge. The
"republican" regime in Turkey not only saw society in general,
and pious Muslims in particular, as a "backwards" mass and kept
them outside the public sphere, but also treated them with an open
contempt, without feeling the need to hide it. On the other hand,
Islamic groups both sought to accept the Kemalist elites that ensured
the country's independence and sovereignty, and closed themselves
to and resisted these elites' ongoing, systematic, authoritarian,
secularist practices. This led to a form of behavior that told
Islamic groups to side with the state with respect to "national"
issues, such as the Armenian issue, and to put up with the economic,
social and cultural isolation they faced.
If the military had not attempted to overthrow the ruling Justice and
Development Party (AKP), most probably, the tension between the state
and the Islamic community would have been covered up and the whole
matter would have been reduced to a "good soldiers and bad soldiers"
discourse and the assertion that the military would be respectful of
democracy from now on would sound melodious to Muslim ears. They would
assume that justice had been served by ensuring the reunification of
the military with the nation, a picture that would be reminiscent of
the Ottoman era.
Yet, for those who knew the true nature of the regime in Turkey,
it was just a fantasy. Indeed, after the AKP won the first election,
the military rolled up its sleeves to brainstorm and make plans about
how to overthrow it, and it continued to update these plans until 2010.
Even today there is no guarantee that a group of military officers do
not engage in similar activities. So, these developments ironically
didn't allow pious Muslims to be deceived. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan first learned about the Sledgehammer coup plan in 2004, yet,
at that time, the government did not want conflict with the military.
Rather, it was expecting that it would be considered as a "normal,"
ordinary government and tried to earn this consideration by showing
that it had adopted modernity. However, the military was aware of the
nearing "danger." Under a democratic regime, it was not legitimate
to overthrow the elected government or employ some legal tricks to
prevent the majority from ruling the country.
However, it was impossible to repeat the Feb. 28 coup as well, because
this coup was made possible by fabricating the perception that Islamic
groups were increasingly becoming "reactionary." The media networks
had lent support to it and they had become its voluntary tools.
Virtually all of the employers' and trade unions, even the judiciary
and academia chose to function as voluntary accomplices in the
military's manipulations. When a party that cannot be accused of being
"reactionary" was in office after 2002, the media started to diversify
and civil society gave rise to democratic formations. Therefore,
a coup could be made possible only if chaos could be created, and
this required "criminal" acts.
In early 2007, the AKP was maintaining its silent and passive
position, but the party management now knew in fine detail what
was happening. They were hesitant about launching a crackdown on
the coup attempts because they knew that this would trigger an
Islamists-want-to-seize-the-state campaign which would be readily
accepted by Western public opinion. The discovery of an arsenal in
Umraniye in the spring of 2007 and the politically motivated murders
pushed the government into action. The memorandum the military
issued on April 27, 2007 terminated the AKP's sure-footed approach
to the state.
The rest of the story is about how the government assumed a holistic
approach over time and realized its "responsibility towards history."
In countries like Turkey, the democracy-building process still needs
the courage to shoulder this responsibility. The intellectual ownership
of this process is still claimed by individuals in the secular groups,
but their social actors are inevitably pious Muslims.
From: Baghdasarian