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THE FUTURE OF TURKISH-ISRAELI RELATIONS
Cihan News Agency (CNA)
July 30, 2012 Monday
Turkey
ISTANBUL (CIHAN)- It is still not clear how long the fall of the Assad
regime will take. But the battle in Aleppo is certainly part of a
bloody last phase. Sooner or later a post-Assad Syria will emerge. The
unraveling of Syria has major implications for the balance of power
in the Middle East. Turkey's position in Syria and the tension this
position implies in Ankara's relations with Teheran is part of this
new configuration. Given these dramatic dynamics reshaping the region,
it is quite disturbing that Turkey and Israel have been unable to
put their differences behind them in order to look at the big picture
emerging in the Arab world. After all, these two democratic countries
still share common interests and have a lot at stake in the post-Assad
dynamics of Syria.
The inability of Israel to apologize to Turkey because of the Mavi
Marmara incident shows that the divergence between Israel and Turkey
is becoming chronic and structural. There is no sense of urgency and
priority in Turkey and Israel for attempts at normalization. More than
the flotilla incident of May 2010, the origins of the crisis between
Turkey and Israel go back to the Israeli army's Operation Cast Lead
in Gaza, which started in late December 2008. Operation Cast Lead
put a halt to Turkey's intense mediation efforts between Israel
and Syria and led to strong Turkish condemnation of Israel. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took the Gaza offensive as a personal
affront. It is very telling that Erdogan and many high-level Turkish
officials have numerous times repeated that only a couple days before
the Gaza operation, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was in Ankara,
where he was negotiating intensely and getting closer to a major
breakthrough with Damascus, thanks to Turkish mediation.
But the way Turkish officials continue to react to the timing of
Operation Cast Lead -- by taking it as a betrayal of Turkey's mediation
efforts -- also shows that Ankara has a very poor understanding of
Israeli strategic culture. In many ways, Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu
considered that nothing could be more important for Israel than a peace
treaty with Syria and Turkey's friendly mediation in achieving that
result. They misjudged Israel's threat perception and the priority
attached to the defense of Israeli homeland against various attacks
emanating from Gaza. In the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, Erdogan's
clash with Shimon Peres at Davos in January 2009, where he walked
off the stage in anger symbolized a new stage in the crisis. Davos
clearly illustrated Turkey's willingness to see the Palestinian
issue and the Gaza offensive as a deal breaker in relations with
Israel. A few months later, the media sensation was further fuelled
by the public humiliation of the Turkish ambassador in Israel by
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon in an attempt to protest an
anti-Israeli TV series that was aired in Turkey. It is important to
place the May 2010 flotilla incident in this broader context of an
already rapidly deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relationship. Once the
flotilla incident happened, it overshadowed other pending issues,
and things went from bad to worse.
It is also important to put the current divergence between Turkey
and Israel in a historical context. To be sure, the situation today
stands in sharp contrast to where relations were in the 1990s --
the so-called golden age of the partnership. Yet, let's not forget
that this partnership was never a strategic alliance, but at best a
relationship of convenience, for which, at least in Turkey, there never
was much popular support. It was rooted in Turkey's need for better
relations with the United States, support for Turkey's positions in
Congress, especially regarding the Armenian genocide question, access
to weapons, balancing Syria when the latter harbored in Damascus the
leader of the long-running Kurdish insurgency. Both countries also
benefited from the economic cooperation, which continues to this day.
Finally one more observation about today: The fact that Netanyahu did
not replace his foreign minister after Kadima joined the coalition
in May 2012 was perceived by Turkey as a clear sign that he is not
interested in normalization with Ankara. Netanyahu's decision to
keep Avigdor Lieberman in place reflects the ascending power of
the religious right in Israeli political demography as well as the
importance of co-opting the far right for the Likud Party. Given
similar dynamics in Turkey -- with a Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government that follows populist and nationalist policies that
seem in line with the societal inclinations of the country -- it is
clear that it will take the better part of a decade for both sides
to overcome their differences.
Cihan News Agency (CNA)
July 30, 2012 Monday
Turkey
ISTANBUL (CIHAN)- It is still not clear how long the fall of the Assad
regime will take. But the battle in Aleppo is certainly part of a
bloody last phase. Sooner or later a post-Assad Syria will emerge. The
unraveling of Syria has major implications for the balance of power
in the Middle East. Turkey's position in Syria and the tension this
position implies in Ankara's relations with Teheran is part of this
new configuration. Given these dramatic dynamics reshaping the region,
it is quite disturbing that Turkey and Israel have been unable to
put their differences behind them in order to look at the big picture
emerging in the Arab world. After all, these two democratic countries
still share common interests and have a lot at stake in the post-Assad
dynamics of Syria.
The inability of Israel to apologize to Turkey because of the Mavi
Marmara incident shows that the divergence between Israel and Turkey
is becoming chronic and structural. There is no sense of urgency and
priority in Turkey and Israel for attempts at normalization. More than
the flotilla incident of May 2010, the origins of the crisis between
Turkey and Israel go back to the Israeli army's Operation Cast Lead
in Gaza, which started in late December 2008. Operation Cast Lead
put a halt to Turkey's intense mediation efforts between Israel
and Syria and led to strong Turkish condemnation of Israel. Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan took the Gaza offensive as a personal
affront. It is very telling that Erdogan and many high-level Turkish
officials have numerous times repeated that only a couple days before
the Gaza operation, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was in Ankara,
where he was negotiating intensely and getting closer to a major
breakthrough with Damascus, thanks to Turkish mediation.
But the way Turkish officials continue to react to the timing of
Operation Cast Lead -- by taking it as a betrayal of Turkey's mediation
efforts -- also shows that Ankara has a very poor understanding of
Israeli strategic culture. In many ways, Erdogan and Ahmet Davutoglu
considered that nothing could be more important for Israel than a peace
treaty with Syria and Turkey's friendly mediation in achieving that
result. They misjudged Israel's threat perception and the priority
attached to the defense of Israeli homeland against various attacks
emanating from Gaza. In the aftermath of Operation Cast Lead, Erdogan's
clash with Shimon Peres at Davos in January 2009, where he walked
off the stage in anger symbolized a new stage in the crisis. Davos
clearly illustrated Turkey's willingness to see the Palestinian
issue and the Gaza offensive as a deal breaker in relations with
Israel. A few months later, the media sensation was further fuelled
by the public humiliation of the Turkish ambassador in Israel by
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon in an attempt to protest an
anti-Israeli TV series that was aired in Turkey. It is important to
place the May 2010 flotilla incident in this broader context of an
already rapidly deteriorating Turkish-Israeli relationship. Once the
flotilla incident happened, it overshadowed other pending issues,
and things went from bad to worse.
It is also important to put the current divergence between Turkey
and Israel in a historical context. To be sure, the situation today
stands in sharp contrast to where relations were in the 1990s --
the so-called golden age of the partnership. Yet, let's not forget
that this partnership was never a strategic alliance, but at best a
relationship of convenience, for which, at least in Turkey, there never
was much popular support. It was rooted in Turkey's need for better
relations with the United States, support for Turkey's positions in
Congress, especially regarding the Armenian genocide question, access
to weapons, balancing Syria when the latter harbored in Damascus the
leader of the long-running Kurdish insurgency. Both countries also
benefited from the economic cooperation, which continues to this day.
Finally one more observation about today: The fact that Netanyahu did
not replace his foreign minister after Kadima joined the coalition
in May 2012 was perceived by Turkey as a clear sign that he is not
interested in normalization with Ankara. Netanyahu's decision to
keep Avigdor Lieberman in place reflects the ascending power of
the religious right in Israeli political demography as well as the
importance of co-opting the far right for the Likud Party. Given
similar dynamics in Turkey -- with a Justice and Development Party
(AKP) government that follows populist and nationalist policies that
seem in line with the societal inclinations of the country -- it is
clear that it will take the better part of a decade for both sides
to overcome their differences.