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ZARAKOLU: THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE AS A CASE OF PREVENTING SELF-DETERMINATION
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/08/09/zarakolu-the-armenian-genocide-as-a-case-of-preventing-self-determination/
The official attitude on the Armenian Genocide and the systematic
practice of ethnic cleansing in Anatolia has reached a new stage with
the recent statement by Vecdi Gonul, the former Turkish minister of
national defense, to the effect that had these tragic events not
occurred, the present-day Republic of Turkey could not have come
into being. Repulsive as these words may be, we have to admit that
they are much more honest than pure "denial," and imply "admission"
of what has happened.
zarakolu111 Zarakolu: The Armenian Genocide as a Case of Preventing
Self Determination
Ragip Zarakolu
However, that these tragedies should be presented as necessary, even
indispensible, for the "building of a nation-state," accompanied by a
"take it or leave it" kind of challenge, also comprises an implicit
element of "threat": "We've done it before, so you'd better watch
out or we'll do it again!"
Were this "admission" to have been complemented with an apology, as
Ahmet Insel writes in the newspaper Radikal, it could have provided
a positive opening.
"Today, it is incumbent upon the Turkish state to extend an apology,"
he writes. "We who continue to live on this territory owe it as an
act of humanity to the Armenians [and to others-RZ] to apologize for
what has happened ("An Apology Is Now a Must," Radikal Iki, Nov. 16,
2008, p. 1).
In this context, I would like to draw attention to two books recently
published, both of which facilitate the study and comprehension of the
Armenian Genocide, one of the most tragic events in human history,
relating to the national question and the exercise of the right to
self-determination: Vahakn N. Dadrian's magnum opus The History of the
Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to
the Caucasus (published in Turkish under the title Ermeni Soykirimi
Tarihi/Balkanlardan Anadolu ve Kafkasya'ya Etnik Catisma by Belge
Uluslararasi Yayincilik in 2008) and The Turks and Us by Shahan
Natalie, famous for "Operation Nemesis" (the book was published in
Turkish under the title Biz Ermeniler ve Turkler by Peri Yayinlari,
again in 2008). These books provide an opportunity to understand not
1915 alone, but the period before and after as well.
Shahan Natalie's observation, "the Turks succeeded in building a
nation" is interesting, provided one pose the question, "at what cost?"
In studying the Armenian tragedy of 1915, it would be useful, if one
wishes to understand the question better, to look at the question
from the perspective of "nation building," "self-determination,"
and the fundamental articles of the Genocide Convention.
The "Armenian Question" is one of the most significant instances of
the method of leaving a problem to rot rather than solving it. In
a certain sense, it is one of the last in a long line of problems
created by the two-century-long dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
While the Balkan peoples stepped into the process of nation formation
earlier, that is, from the early 19th century onwards, partly under
the influence of the French revolution, this process came on the
order of the day much later for the Armenian people and the Turks
themselves. However, in the latter case, the success of one, in a way,
was achieved at the expense of the disappearance of the other.
Thus while the Armenian process of nation formation started earlier
relative to that of the Turks, it was a belated process when compared
with the Greeks, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians. On the other hand,
an important difficulty derived from the fact that the Armenian people
were torn between two despotic empires. This division had its impact
all the way down to language. The Armenian language was to develop
in two different branches, as Western and Eastern Armenian.
The model that was in front of Armenian nation building was that in
the Balkans, which was, in effect, to serve as a model for Turkish
nation building, as well. Hence, the tragic character of the relations
between the peoples of the Balkans would reach an apogee in Anatolian
territory and an ancient autochthonous people would be nearly wrested
forcibly from its living spaces and be subjected to purge. This
purge would not remain limited to ethnic cleansing, but would come
to include all cultural space.
The result desired was to prove that the Armenian people never lived
on this territory.
This, of course, forms a typical case of genocide cum ethnic cleansing.
In the wake of the 1908 revolution, an attempt at a democratic
revolution that nonetheless was going to stop halfway, the political
leaders and the organizations of the Armenian people opted for
"coexistence." They established political alliances with Ottoman
parties and ran in elections on common lists. However, the fragility
of projects for a common future in the Ottoman political arena and
the impossibility of making these a reality summoned once again the
old problems.
The efforts of Balkan socialists such as Benaroya to bring models
such as a "federation" on the order of the day so as to pave the way
to a common future and the defense of the idea of "decentralization"
(i.e., autonomy by certain groups) unfortunately did not create a
great echo in the country. This was the period of nation building,
of building unitary states whatever the cost may be.
Some Armenian intellectuals adopted a friendly attitude to the approach
of the Turk Ocaklari (the Turkish Homes) aiming at nation building. The
great musician Gomidas tried, for instance, to extend support in
these milieux to the search for a national identity through music,
for they believed that separate identities could coexist. Up until that
accursed year of 1914. Yet in a multinational empire where geographic
cohabitation was the rule, the formation of a unitary national state
could only be predicated upon campaigns of ethnic cleansing. And
for the defense of the right to self-determination and separation,
one had to have a certain proportion within the population, a majority.
The Russo-Ottoman and the Balkan wars resulted in waves of forcible
migration both from the Caucasus and the Balkans into Anatolia. The
newly formed Balkan states, in particular, were based on policies of
strengthening the national fabric by forcing the "others" to migration,
through policies of massacre and violence, and by assimilating the
remaining populations.
In Macedonia, no ethnic group had a decisive plurality. This was
a region coveted by three different nation states, the Serb, the
Bulgarian, and the Greek. The fact that the different ethnicities
each formed their own partisan group led to strife not only between
the Ottoman state and these groups, but also between themselves. In
the end, Macedonia came to be partitioned between these three states
and every group drove the others out, melting the remaining population
in the national crucible.
The utter lack of law and order in the Balkans forced the Ottomans
to accept European powers to assume the role of gendarmes on the
peninsula. A similar situation of lawlessness was to be seen in
eastern Anatolia from the point of view of Armenians.
In 1914, the Ottoman government acquiesced under the pressure of
the Great Powers, and in particular Russia, to start a reform program
similar to that implemented in Macedonia in eastern Anatolia, which was
densely populated by the Armenians. This created panic in the Ottoman
government that even Anatolia was being lost. On the other hand, there
was need for space for the great wave of migration from the Balkans.
The country was ravaged by an economic crisis as a result of the Balkan
wars and the government was bankrupt. For its part, the great Ottoman
Army, which had recently been modernized, had suffered humiliating
defeat at the hands of the newly formed Balkan states, which had taken
aback even the West. The fact that the Albanians, one of the most
loyal subjects of the sultan, had, for the first time, overcome their
religious division to rise in revolt, had given these small states
the possibility of joining forces and the courage to make a move.
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) entrusted the task of
reorganizing the devastated Ottoman Army to the Germans, and by
starting a ruthless policy of violence in the military tried to
establish a discipline akin to Prussian methods.
The Arabs, following in the footsteps of the Albanians, also started
to vociferously put forth their demands. The Kurds, for their part,
insisted in remaining loyal to the caliphate.
The CUP found the way out of this mesh of problems in entering
World War I under the command of German militarism. It is a fact
that Armenian leaders tried to talk the CUP leaders out of this
orientation simply because this was bound to put the Armenian people
in a difficult situation. In the meantime, the CUP leaders suspended
the Armenian reform using the excuse of the war effort. The Armenians,
so the argument went, could force the Muslim population to emigrate
and could then impose the right to self-determination.
On the other hand, significant forces of the Ottoman Army were
decimated under harsh winter conditions on the Allahuekber Mountains as
a result of a campaign under the command of none other than Enver Pasha
himself. The only method to prevent the formation of an Armenian state
was to cleanse this people from its historic territory. This meant
the deportation of an entire people, including women, the elderly,
and children, who were to be put on an exile journey headed towards the
Syrian desert. The excuse provided for this forced exile was "Armenian
revolutionaries"; in other words, it was the "revolutionaries" who
were held responsible for what happened to their own people. It is
of interest to note that the official explanation provided for the
entire world in 1916 has to this very day formed the overall substance
of how Turkey defends itself.
It is, of course, true that some Armenian organizations had their
partisan groups, and these did stage actions. But, contrary to what
the official view has claimed to this day, this can never legitimize
the wholesale annihilation of civilians. Today, even insurgent forces,
let alone civilians, have rights and a status within the framework
of the Geneva Conventions on war.
On the other hand, we know of the existence of Armenian soldiers
and officers who served in the Ottoman Army up to the end of the war
or died in Gallipoli or the Allahuekber Mountains. So much so that,
on his return to Istanbul after the debacle, Enver Pasha published
a statement praising the heroism of Armenian soldiers.
The accusation leveled at an entire people for "treason" on the basis
of the actions of certain groups and the forcible deportation of
this people in a manner that would necessarily destroy it cannot be
understood without the logic of ethnic cleansing that lies behind them.
To cite a simple example, using PKK actions as an excuse, the entire
Kurdish population has not been subjected to a kind of deportation
that would leave only a handful of survivors. Even this simple example
shows that holding Armenian revolutionaries responsible for the 1915
deportation is hardly convincing.
Nation building is the process that creates the highest number
of victims in this world. It is also the creation of a single
identity in a melting pot, a fictional thing. Benedict Anderson
analyzes nation-building processes particularly in the post-World
War II context and the prices paid. The suffering, the exile, and the
massacres experienced during the formation of the nation-states of the
Balkans are testimony to this. In a certain sense, it was the Armenian
people that paid dearly the cost of this whole process in the Balkans.
On the basis of a mechanical outlook on history, the leaders of Turkey
thought that the process in the Balkans was going to be followed by
Armenian nation building. Those in charge had come to terms with the
prospect of casualties and massacres, but no one imagined that this
was going to turn into a genocide.
The CUP leaders wished to rule out the possibility of the establishment
of Armenia in case the Ottoman state lost the war. But how could a
people that had been physically decimated found a state?
On the other hand, Armenia was seen as a "nuisance" in the midst of
the coveted empire called Turan. The Sevres Peace Treaty signed after
the war stipulated a greater Armenia alongside a small Kurdistan.
But how to establish a state without a people? This indeed was the
real reason the Sevres Treaty was stillborn.
Hence, the CUP method of solving the Armenian Question was, within the
confines of its own logic, successful. And it also paved the way for
the foundation of the Turkish nation-state. To an ambassador who was
still talking about the Armenian Question in 1916, Talat Pasha's answer
was "no longer does there exist such a question" (Cf. Taner Akcam,
Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmustur, Iletisim Yayinlari, 2008). One wonders
whether this was a method based on intuition against the right to
self-determination, or if the lessons of the Balkans and the massacres
practiced by German imperialism in West Africa served as a model.
>From the military point of view, the Armenian Deportation can only
be characterized as an "excellent" operation. When you look at the
maps displaying the routes of forcible migration, you can sense
the contribution of Prussian militarism in the preparation of these
plans. Given their debacle in the Balkans, it seems hardly credible
that the CUP adventurers would be able to execute such an operation
all on their own.
One really wonders to what extent the experience of the atrocities
perpetrated by the German colonial army in West Africa had its impact
on all this. Is it pure coincidence that many German officers who
were commanders in the Ottoman Army later took part in the early
organization drive of fascism in Germany and participated in the
1923 Beer Hall Putsch of Hitler? The German military could have
stopped the deportation, had they so willed. On the contrary, in the
military operations in Zeytun, Urfa, and Van, where the Armenians
put up a partial resistance, German soldiers actively participated,
let alone prevented what was happening.
But the depopulation of this territory was in line with the wishes of
many colonial powers. The German right wanted Anatolia to be opened
up for German settlement in the future (Cf. Lothar Rathmann, Alman
Emperyalizminin Turkiye'ye Girisi, trans. Ragip Zarakolu, 2nd ed.,
Belge Yayinlari, 1992).
For its part, when in 1916 the Russian tsar took hold of eastern
Anatolia, he decided to settle Cossacks in the region to replace
surviving Armenians, which of course created great consternation
among Armenian intellectuals.
Had there been no Soviet Revolution, Armenia would not have come into
existence. Just as it would have been very difficult for a state like
Turkey to come into being. It is not the slightest irony of history
that it was the same revolution of 1917 and the new international
balance of forces that it brought in its wake that made it possible
for these two states, which do not recognize each other officially,
to exist.
To sum up, if you look into the UN Genocide Convention, you are
bound to see that all the fundamental elements find their place in
the Armenian case. The policies of the CUP, on the other hand, were
reminiscent of those of a proto-fascist party. In other words, this
was a case of fascism avant la lettre. Precisely in the same way as
the de facto occurrence of genocide in 1915, even before the concept
"genocide" itself had come into circulation.
The end result is that the Anatolian region has lost its Armenian
sons and daughters. The ethnic cleansing operation later reached out
towards the eradication of historic buildings and even cemeteries.
How could a people that did not exist, that even left no trace behind
it, reclaim its rights?
In the final analysis, the material basis for the exercise of the
right to self-determination for the Armenian people was destroyed. It
was not for nothing that Hitler, on the eve of the attack on Poland
in 1939, asked at a meeting the question, "Who remembers the Armenian
people nowadays?" (Cf. Kevork Bardakciyan, Hitler ve Ermeni Soykirimi,
editor: Ragip Zarakolu, Istanbul, 2006).
Translated from Turkish by Sungur Savran.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2012/08/09/zarakolu-the-armenian-genocide-as-a-case-of-preventing-self-determination/
The official attitude on the Armenian Genocide and the systematic
practice of ethnic cleansing in Anatolia has reached a new stage with
the recent statement by Vecdi Gonul, the former Turkish minister of
national defense, to the effect that had these tragic events not
occurred, the present-day Republic of Turkey could not have come
into being. Repulsive as these words may be, we have to admit that
they are much more honest than pure "denial," and imply "admission"
of what has happened.
zarakolu111 Zarakolu: The Armenian Genocide as a Case of Preventing
Self Determination
Ragip Zarakolu
However, that these tragedies should be presented as necessary, even
indispensible, for the "building of a nation-state," accompanied by a
"take it or leave it" kind of challenge, also comprises an implicit
element of "threat": "We've done it before, so you'd better watch
out or we'll do it again!"
Were this "admission" to have been complemented with an apology, as
Ahmet Insel writes in the newspaper Radikal, it could have provided
a positive opening.
"Today, it is incumbent upon the Turkish state to extend an apology,"
he writes. "We who continue to live on this territory owe it as an
act of humanity to the Armenians [and to others-RZ] to apologize for
what has happened ("An Apology Is Now a Must," Radikal Iki, Nov. 16,
2008, p. 1).
In this context, I would like to draw attention to two books recently
published, both of which facilitate the study and comprehension of the
Armenian Genocide, one of the most tragic events in human history,
relating to the national question and the exercise of the right to
self-determination: Vahakn N. Dadrian's magnum opus The History of the
Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to
the Caucasus (published in Turkish under the title Ermeni Soykirimi
Tarihi/Balkanlardan Anadolu ve Kafkasya'ya Etnik Catisma by Belge
Uluslararasi Yayincilik in 2008) and The Turks and Us by Shahan
Natalie, famous for "Operation Nemesis" (the book was published in
Turkish under the title Biz Ermeniler ve Turkler by Peri Yayinlari,
again in 2008). These books provide an opportunity to understand not
1915 alone, but the period before and after as well.
Shahan Natalie's observation, "the Turks succeeded in building a
nation" is interesting, provided one pose the question, "at what cost?"
In studying the Armenian tragedy of 1915, it would be useful, if one
wishes to understand the question better, to look at the question
from the perspective of "nation building," "self-determination,"
and the fundamental articles of the Genocide Convention.
The "Armenian Question" is one of the most significant instances of
the method of leaving a problem to rot rather than solving it. In
a certain sense, it is one of the last in a long line of problems
created by the two-century-long dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
While the Balkan peoples stepped into the process of nation formation
earlier, that is, from the early 19th century onwards, partly under
the influence of the French revolution, this process came on the
order of the day much later for the Armenian people and the Turks
themselves. However, in the latter case, the success of one, in a way,
was achieved at the expense of the disappearance of the other.
Thus while the Armenian process of nation formation started earlier
relative to that of the Turks, it was a belated process when compared
with the Greeks, the Serbs, and the Bulgarians. On the other hand,
an important difficulty derived from the fact that the Armenian people
were torn between two despotic empires. This division had its impact
all the way down to language. The Armenian language was to develop
in two different branches, as Western and Eastern Armenian.
The model that was in front of Armenian nation building was that in
the Balkans, which was, in effect, to serve as a model for Turkish
nation building, as well. Hence, the tragic character of the relations
between the peoples of the Balkans would reach an apogee in Anatolian
territory and an ancient autochthonous people would be nearly wrested
forcibly from its living spaces and be subjected to purge. This
purge would not remain limited to ethnic cleansing, but would come
to include all cultural space.
The result desired was to prove that the Armenian people never lived
on this territory.
This, of course, forms a typical case of genocide cum ethnic cleansing.
In the wake of the 1908 revolution, an attempt at a democratic
revolution that nonetheless was going to stop halfway, the political
leaders and the organizations of the Armenian people opted for
"coexistence." They established political alliances with Ottoman
parties and ran in elections on common lists. However, the fragility
of projects for a common future in the Ottoman political arena and
the impossibility of making these a reality summoned once again the
old problems.
The efforts of Balkan socialists such as Benaroya to bring models
such as a "federation" on the order of the day so as to pave the way
to a common future and the defense of the idea of "decentralization"
(i.e., autonomy by certain groups) unfortunately did not create a
great echo in the country. This was the period of nation building,
of building unitary states whatever the cost may be.
Some Armenian intellectuals adopted a friendly attitude to the approach
of the Turk Ocaklari (the Turkish Homes) aiming at nation building. The
great musician Gomidas tried, for instance, to extend support in
these milieux to the search for a national identity through music,
for they believed that separate identities could coexist. Up until that
accursed year of 1914. Yet in a multinational empire where geographic
cohabitation was the rule, the formation of a unitary national state
could only be predicated upon campaigns of ethnic cleansing. And
for the defense of the right to self-determination and separation,
one had to have a certain proportion within the population, a majority.
The Russo-Ottoman and the Balkan wars resulted in waves of forcible
migration both from the Caucasus and the Balkans into Anatolia. The
newly formed Balkan states, in particular, were based on policies of
strengthening the national fabric by forcing the "others" to migration,
through policies of massacre and violence, and by assimilating the
remaining populations.
In Macedonia, no ethnic group had a decisive plurality. This was
a region coveted by three different nation states, the Serb, the
Bulgarian, and the Greek. The fact that the different ethnicities
each formed their own partisan group led to strife not only between
the Ottoman state and these groups, but also between themselves. In
the end, Macedonia came to be partitioned between these three states
and every group drove the others out, melting the remaining population
in the national crucible.
The utter lack of law and order in the Balkans forced the Ottomans
to accept European powers to assume the role of gendarmes on the
peninsula. A similar situation of lawlessness was to be seen in
eastern Anatolia from the point of view of Armenians.
In 1914, the Ottoman government acquiesced under the pressure of
the Great Powers, and in particular Russia, to start a reform program
similar to that implemented in Macedonia in eastern Anatolia, which was
densely populated by the Armenians. This created panic in the Ottoman
government that even Anatolia was being lost. On the other hand, there
was need for space for the great wave of migration from the Balkans.
The country was ravaged by an economic crisis as a result of the Balkan
wars and the government was bankrupt. For its part, the great Ottoman
Army, which had recently been modernized, had suffered humiliating
defeat at the hands of the newly formed Balkan states, which had taken
aback even the West. The fact that the Albanians, one of the most
loyal subjects of the sultan, had, for the first time, overcome their
religious division to rise in revolt, had given these small states
the possibility of joining forces and the courage to make a move.
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) entrusted the task of
reorganizing the devastated Ottoman Army to the Germans, and by
starting a ruthless policy of violence in the military tried to
establish a discipline akin to Prussian methods.
The Arabs, following in the footsteps of the Albanians, also started
to vociferously put forth their demands. The Kurds, for their part,
insisted in remaining loyal to the caliphate.
The CUP found the way out of this mesh of problems in entering
World War I under the command of German militarism. It is a fact
that Armenian leaders tried to talk the CUP leaders out of this
orientation simply because this was bound to put the Armenian people
in a difficult situation. In the meantime, the CUP leaders suspended
the Armenian reform using the excuse of the war effort. The Armenians,
so the argument went, could force the Muslim population to emigrate
and could then impose the right to self-determination.
On the other hand, significant forces of the Ottoman Army were
decimated under harsh winter conditions on the Allahuekber Mountains as
a result of a campaign under the command of none other than Enver Pasha
himself. The only method to prevent the formation of an Armenian state
was to cleanse this people from its historic territory. This meant
the deportation of an entire people, including women, the elderly,
and children, who were to be put on an exile journey headed towards the
Syrian desert. The excuse provided for this forced exile was "Armenian
revolutionaries"; in other words, it was the "revolutionaries" who
were held responsible for what happened to their own people. It is
of interest to note that the official explanation provided for the
entire world in 1916 has to this very day formed the overall substance
of how Turkey defends itself.
It is, of course, true that some Armenian organizations had their
partisan groups, and these did stage actions. But, contrary to what
the official view has claimed to this day, this can never legitimize
the wholesale annihilation of civilians. Today, even insurgent forces,
let alone civilians, have rights and a status within the framework
of the Geneva Conventions on war.
On the other hand, we know of the existence of Armenian soldiers
and officers who served in the Ottoman Army up to the end of the war
or died in Gallipoli or the Allahuekber Mountains. So much so that,
on his return to Istanbul after the debacle, Enver Pasha published
a statement praising the heroism of Armenian soldiers.
The accusation leveled at an entire people for "treason" on the basis
of the actions of certain groups and the forcible deportation of
this people in a manner that would necessarily destroy it cannot be
understood without the logic of ethnic cleansing that lies behind them.
To cite a simple example, using PKK actions as an excuse, the entire
Kurdish population has not been subjected to a kind of deportation
that would leave only a handful of survivors. Even this simple example
shows that holding Armenian revolutionaries responsible for the 1915
deportation is hardly convincing.
Nation building is the process that creates the highest number
of victims in this world. It is also the creation of a single
identity in a melting pot, a fictional thing. Benedict Anderson
analyzes nation-building processes particularly in the post-World
War II context and the prices paid. The suffering, the exile, and the
massacres experienced during the formation of the nation-states of the
Balkans are testimony to this. In a certain sense, it was the Armenian
people that paid dearly the cost of this whole process in the Balkans.
On the basis of a mechanical outlook on history, the leaders of Turkey
thought that the process in the Balkans was going to be followed by
Armenian nation building. Those in charge had come to terms with the
prospect of casualties and massacres, but no one imagined that this
was going to turn into a genocide.
The CUP leaders wished to rule out the possibility of the establishment
of Armenia in case the Ottoman state lost the war. But how could a
people that had been physically decimated found a state?
On the other hand, Armenia was seen as a "nuisance" in the midst of
the coveted empire called Turan. The Sevres Peace Treaty signed after
the war stipulated a greater Armenia alongside a small Kurdistan.
But how to establish a state without a people? This indeed was the
real reason the Sevres Treaty was stillborn.
Hence, the CUP method of solving the Armenian Question was, within the
confines of its own logic, successful. And it also paved the way for
the foundation of the Turkish nation-state. To an ambassador who was
still talking about the Armenian Question in 1916, Talat Pasha's answer
was "no longer does there exist such a question" (Cf. Taner Akcam,
Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmustur, Iletisim Yayinlari, 2008). One wonders
whether this was a method based on intuition against the right to
self-determination, or if the lessons of the Balkans and the massacres
practiced by German imperialism in West Africa served as a model.
>From the military point of view, the Armenian Deportation can only
be characterized as an "excellent" operation. When you look at the
maps displaying the routes of forcible migration, you can sense
the contribution of Prussian militarism in the preparation of these
plans. Given their debacle in the Balkans, it seems hardly credible
that the CUP adventurers would be able to execute such an operation
all on their own.
One really wonders to what extent the experience of the atrocities
perpetrated by the German colonial army in West Africa had its impact
on all this. Is it pure coincidence that many German officers who
were commanders in the Ottoman Army later took part in the early
organization drive of fascism in Germany and participated in the
1923 Beer Hall Putsch of Hitler? The German military could have
stopped the deportation, had they so willed. On the contrary, in the
military operations in Zeytun, Urfa, and Van, where the Armenians
put up a partial resistance, German soldiers actively participated,
let alone prevented what was happening.
But the depopulation of this territory was in line with the wishes of
many colonial powers. The German right wanted Anatolia to be opened
up for German settlement in the future (Cf. Lothar Rathmann, Alman
Emperyalizminin Turkiye'ye Girisi, trans. Ragip Zarakolu, 2nd ed.,
Belge Yayinlari, 1992).
For its part, when in 1916 the Russian tsar took hold of eastern
Anatolia, he decided to settle Cossacks in the region to replace
surviving Armenians, which of course created great consternation
among Armenian intellectuals.
Had there been no Soviet Revolution, Armenia would not have come into
existence. Just as it would have been very difficult for a state like
Turkey to come into being. It is not the slightest irony of history
that it was the same revolution of 1917 and the new international
balance of forces that it brought in its wake that made it possible
for these two states, which do not recognize each other officially,
to exist.
To sum up, if you look into the UN Genocide Convention, you are
bound to see that all the fundamental elements find their place in
the Armenian case. The policies of the CUP, on the other hand, were
reminiscent of those of a proto-fascist party. In other words, this
was a case of fascism avant la lettre. Precisely in the same way as
the de facto occurrence of genocide in 1915, even before the concept
"genocide" itself had come into circulation.
The end result is that the Anatolian region has lost its Armenian
sons and daughters. The ethnic cleansing operation later reached out
towards the eradication of historic buildings and even cemeteries.
How could a people that did not exist, that even left no trace behind
it, reclaim its rights?
In the final analysis, the material basis for the exercise of the
right to self-determination for the Armenian people was destroyed. It
was not for nothing that Hitler, on the eve of the attack on Poland
in 1939, asked at a meeting the question, "Who remembers the Armenian
people nowadays?" (Cf. Kevork Bardakciyan, Hitler ve Ermeni Soykirimi,
editor: Ragip Zarakolu, Istanbul, 2006).
Translated from Turkish by Sungur Savran.