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Milliyet, Turkey
Aug 8 2012
Coordination With the United States on Syria
by Semih Idiz
After even the Prime Minister [Riyad Farid al-Hijab] left the regime
and fled to Jordan, the number of those convinced that the process of
political dissolution in Syria will accelerate has increased. It
appears that this process is also going to create new problems for
Ankara, which has pursued a "one-dimensional" policy indexed only to
[President Bashar] Al-Asad's departure.
It was in fact none other than Bashar al-Asad himself who was the
first to say that, if Syria falls, the balances in the region will be
seriously upset. Developments are now taking place that show that his
warning, accepted at that time as a "bluff," was not all that empty.
Syria is already shaking the global balances in a serious way just as
much as the regional ones. And it cannot be predicted just how far the
ethnic, religious, and sectarian dynamics that will emerge might cause
the tension in the Middle East to escalate.
That Turkey is unexpectedly facing a "Northern Syria issue," which
seems to have arisen suddenly but actually should have been able to be
predicted, is only one dimension of the problem.
The developments indicate that Turkey is going to encounter other
problems as well, deriving both from the ethnic, religious, and
sectarian differences in the region as well as from the regional
calculations of the United States and Russia, which are in a rivalry
with one another.
As for whether or not Ankara is going to be able henceforth to
influence in the way it wants the regional dynamics, which it has not
much been able to influence to date, comes at the head of the most
crucial questions standing before us.
Washington May Put On the Brakes
The fact that Turkey has in the recent period been in very close
contact, and at the highest level, with the United States on the Syria
issue makes it clear that the government favours handling the matter
in coordination with Washington.
But it is evident that while Ankara has been seeking "coordination,"
Washington, based on signals that it has already given, is going to
seek to put the brakes on Turkey on some crucial issues.
For instance, US State Department Spokesman Patrick Ventrell, in a
briefing held on 1 August, when responding to a question regarding
Turkey's reinforcing its military presence along the Syrian border,
said that they want Ankara "to avoid militarizing the region any
further."
It is noteworthy that this statement came after Prime Minister [Recep
Tayyip] Erdogan, in the context of northern Syria, said that "we will
not merely look on at developments, and if need be we will intervene."
Ventrell's words can be taken as an early signal that even if they are
agreed in terms of Al-Asad's departure, Ankara and Washington are not
going to be able to agree on every issue in terms of Syria.
The fact that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at a time when
developments in Syria have come to a critical point, is going to visit
Turkey in a few days, is noteworthy in this connection.
During this visit, which has taken on a particular importance due to
the fact that it will be made immediately after the telephone call
that Prime Minister Erdogan made to [US President Barack] Obama, it is
expected that Turkey and the United States will try to arrive at some
agreements in principle regarding post-Al-Asad Syria.
US Public Would Revolt
The formation of this type of a political underpinning will in fact be
very important, because situations could arise in the Syrian context
that would have the potential to bring about bad feelings between the
two sides.
For instance, bloody retaliation attacks from the Syrian
oppositionists against not only the Alawites, but at the same time
against pro-Al-Asad Christians, would bring the public in the United
States to revolt.
For Ankara during this time frame to appear to be giving support to
radical Sunni elements, in particular, just as occurred in terms of
the support it provided to HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement], would,
with contributions from the Armenian and Greek lobbies as well, turn
US public opinion against Turkey.
Meanwhile, for Turkey to take a stand not only against the terrorist
elements in Northern Syria, but also against peaceful Kurdish
political formations seeking regional autonomy, would also, just as at
one time happened in Northern Iraq, cause a new coolness to be
experienced between Ankara and Washington.
And while these things take place, for Turkey to exhibit failure in
terms of influencing developments would cause the Turkish public,
which already has serious concerns regarding the government's Syria
policy, to revolt as well.
In short, Turkey's problems will not come to an end with the departure
of Al-Asad. The developments are making this evident.
[translated from Turkish]
Aug 8 2012
Coordination With the United States on Syria
by Semih Idiz
After even the Prime Minister [Riyad Farid al-Hijab] left the regime
and fled to Jordan, the number of those convinced that the process of
political dissolution in Syria will accelerate has increased. It
appears that this process is also going to create new problems for
Ankara, which has pursued a "one-dimensional" policy indexed only to
[President Bashar] Al-Asad's departure.
It was in fact none other than Bashar al-Asad himself who was the
first to say that, if Syria falls, the balances in the region will be
seriously upset. Developments are now taking place that show that his
warning, accepted at that time as a "bluff," was not all that empty.
Syria is already shaking the global balances in a serious way just as
much as the regional ones. And it cannot be predicted just how far the
ethnic, religious, and sectarian dynamics that will emerge might cause
the tension in the Middle East to escalate.
That Turkey is unexpectedly facing a "Northern Syria issue," which
seems to have arisen suddenly but actually should have been able to be
predicted, is only one dimension of the problem.
The developments indicate that Turkey is going to encounter other
problems as well, deriving both from the ethnic, religious, and
sectarian differences in the region as well as from the regional
calculations of the United States and Russia, which are in a rivalry
with one another.
As for whether or not Ankara is going to be able henceforth to
influence in the way it wants the regional dynamics, which it has not
much been able to influence to date, comes at the head of the most
crucial questions standing before us.
Washington May Put On the Brakes
The fact that Turkey has in the recent period been in very close
contact, and at the highest level, with the United States on the Syria
issue makes it clear that the government favours handling the matter
in coordination with Washington.
But it is evident that while Ankara has been seeking "coordination,"
Washington, based on signals that it has already given, is going to
seek to put the brakes on Turkey on some crucial issues.
For instance, US State Department Spokesman Patrick Ventrell, in a
briefing held on 1 August, when responding to a question regarding
Turkey's reinforcing its military presence along the Syrian border,
said that they want Ankara "to avoid militarizing the region any
further."
It is noteworthy that this statement came after Prime Minister [Recep
Tayyip] Erdogan, in the context of northern Syria, said that "we will
not merely look on at developments, and if need be we will intervene."
Ventrell's words can be taken as an early signal that even if they are
agreed in terms of Al-Asad's departure, Ankara and Washington are not
going to be able to agree on every issue in terms of Syria.
The fact that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, at a time when
developments in Syria have come to a critical point, is going to visit
Turkey in a few days, is noteworthy in this connection.
During this visit, which has taken on a particular importance due to
the fact that it will be made immediately after the telephone call
that Prime Minister Erdogan made to [US President Barack] Obama, it is
expected that Turkey and the United States will try to arrive at some
agreements in principle regarding post-Al-Asad Syria.
US Public Would Revolt
The formation of this type of a political underpinning will in fact be
very important, because situations could arise in the Syrian context
that would have the potential to bring about bad feelings between the
two sides.
For instance, bloody retaliation attacks from the Syrian
oppositionists against not only the Alawites, but at the same time
against pro-Al-Asad Christians, would bring the public in the United
States to revolt.
For Ankara during this time frame to appear to be giving support to
radical Sunni elements, in particular, just as occurred in terms of
the support it provided to HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement], would,
with contributions from the Armenian and Greek lobbies as well, turn
US public opinion against Turkey.
Meanwhile, for Turkey to take a stand not only against the terrorist
elements in Northern Syria, but also against peaceful Kurdish
political formations seeking regional autonomy, would also, just as at
one time happened in Northern Iraq, cause a new coolness to be
experienced between Ankara and Washington.
And while these things take place, for Turkey to exhibit failure in
terms of influencing developments would cause the Turkish public,
which already has serious concerns regarding the government's Syria
policy, to revolt as well.
In short, Turkey's problems will not come to an end with the departure
of Al-Asad. The developments are making this evident.
[translated from Turkish]