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Turkey's Misguided Foreign Policy
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/373165/20120813/turkey-foreign-policy-erdogan-syria-israel.htm
By Micah N. Levinson:
August 13, 2012 3:24 PM EDT
A century ago, President Theodore Roosevelt's "speak softly and carry
a big stick" foreign policy enhanced American power and prestige
around the world. Today, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan imperils
his country's chances of regional preponderance by pursuing a policy
of speak pugnaciously and carry no stick.
In the last three years, Ankara has engineered diplomatic conflicts
with Israel, Cyprus and her Greek patron, and most recently Syria.
And, Turkey has warned each country that their disputes might
culminate in a military confrontation. Nevertheless, none of the
threatened countries have altered their behavior, even cosmetically,
to mollify Turkey, thereby calling Ankara's credibility into question.
When Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in
2002, it sought to bolster Turkey's international influence through a
"zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy, which entailed
resolving outstanding disputes with all surrounding countries and
increasing Turkish security and economic cooperation with all of its
neighbors, especially the Arab world and Iran. To this end, in 2004,
Erdogan became the first Turkish Prime Minister in fifty years to
visit Greece, Turkey's traditional rival. Then in July 2005, Erdogan
and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis laid the foundation of a
pipeline to transport Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe. Turkey also
sought increased security cooperation with Greece, with the two
countries agreeing in 2007 to create a joint Operational Unit within
the framework of NATO with the aim of participating in Peace Support
Operations along with a joint Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Aid Task
Force.
Erdogan also attempted to maintain simultaneous working relations with
Hamas, Israel, and Syria. After Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian
legislative election, Ankara invited Khaled Mashal, chairman of
Hamas's politburo, to Turkey despite Israeli protests. Yet, from May
to December 2008, Israel trusted Turkey to mediate peace negotiations
between Jerusalem and Damascus. The greatest turnaround was in
Turkish-Syrian relations. On the brink of war in 1998 over Syrian
sponsorship of the Kurdish PKK terrorist group, by 2009 the countries
had lifted mutual visa requirements, established the Syrian-Turkish
High Cooperation Council to enhance economic and military cooperation,
and held large-scale joint military exercises.
In 2009, however, an increasingly confident Turkey traded its good
neighbor policy for an aggressive neo-ottoman one. First, Erdogan
contrived to reinvent himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause
after Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 to halt
rocket attacks from Gaza. Erdogan has since hailed Hamas militants as
"freedom fighters struggling to protect their land." And, perhaps
reasoning that Israel would never board a Turkish-owned ship, the AKP
government offered logistical support to the Mavi Marmara, a vessel
participating in a 2010 flotilla aiming to break the Israeli blockade
of Hamas-controlled Gaza, to establish Turkey as the one Muslim
country that can command Israeli compliance. Israel demanded to
inspect the cargo for contraband and promised to deliver the
humanitarian aid to Gaza. When the flotilla refused, Jerusalem called
Turkey's bluff and Israeli forces raided the ship and killed nine
Turkish activists who violently resisted. A humiliated Erdogan
threatened to send Turkish warships to break the blockade and urged
the international community to impose sanctions on Israel. However,
Turkey never made good on its threat and a UN investigative committee
confirmed the blockade's legality, further eroding Turkey's prestige.
Soon after, Ankara threatened to dispatch warships to Cypriot waters
to dissuade Nicosia from unilaterally exploring for natural gas and
developing the fields recently discovered off her southern coast. In
2010, Cyprus and Israel signed a maritime border delimitation
agreement. But, Turkey has rejected the agreement, since Ankara does
not recognize Cyprus and insists that Nicosia include authorities from
Northern Cyprus (which it supports) in the making of all gas-related
policy, even concerning gas fields that do not border the north. When
Nicosia ignored Ankara's threats, Turkey conducted live fire naval
exercises near the disputed natural gas fields. But Turkey's
belligerence has had the opposite of its intended effect, prompting
increased military cooperation among Israel, Cyprus, and her Greek
patron, including joint naval exercises and a Greek-Israeli security
pact. So far, Turkey's ultimatum to Cyprus has fallen on deaf ears.
Finally, Erdogan has abandoned Turkey's newfound alliance with
Damascus in the wake of the Syrian Uprising, calling on Assad to
resign and hosting in Turkey the Syrian National Council and members
of the Free Syrian Army. Yet, Turkey looks increasingly impotent as
its threats of military intervention lose their credibility. In March
2012, Erdogan proclaimed that Turkey might establish a buffer zone in
Syria to protect refugees if Assad continued to suppress the uprising.
Erdogan's threat proved empty. And when Syrian forces shot down a
Turkish F-4 Phantom jet in June and Erdogan threatened Syria not to
risk Turkey's wrath, the threat sounded equally hollow.
So, if Erdogan wants Turkey to achieve regional influence commensurate
with its size (75 million) and economy (16th largest in the world),
and do so without using force, he must reign in his bluster. That is
not to say that Ankara should never express moral outrage. Jarring
images of massacred Syrian civilians have genuinely disturbed Turkish
leaders. However, repeated empty threats of military intervention
undermine Turkish diplomatic influence over Damascus without scaring
Assad into changing course.
Roosevelt's axiom remains the operative one: Ankara should threaten
sparingly -- but back up its words with concrete action when it does.
Erdogan would do well to take note of it.
Micah Levinson is a Junior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy
Council in Washington, DC.
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/373165/20120813/turkey-foreign-policy-erdogan-syria-israel.htm
By Micah N. Levinson:
August 13, 2012 3:24 PM EDT
A century ago, President Theodore Roosevelt's "speak softly and carry
a big stick" foreign policy enhanced American power and prestige
around the world. Today, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan imperils
his country's chances of regional preponderance by pursuing a policy
of speak pugnaciously and carry no stick.
In the last three years, Ankara has engineered diplomatic conflicts
with Israel, Cyprus and her Greek patron, and most recently Syria.
And, Turkey has warned each country that their disputes might
culminate in a military confrontation. Nevertheless, none of the
threatened countries have altered their behavior, even cosmetically,
to mollify Turkey, thereby calling Ankara's credibility into question.
When Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) assumed power in
2002, it sought to bolster Turkey's international influence through a
"zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy, which entailed
resolving outstanding disputes with all surrounding countries and
increasing Turkish security and economic cooperation with all of its
neighbors, especially the Arab world and Iran. To this end, in 2004,
Erdogan became the first Turkish Prime Minister in fifty years to
visit Greece, Turkey's traditional rival. Then in July 2005, Erdogan
and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis laid the foundation of a
pipeline to transport Azerbaijani natural gas to Europe. Turkey also
sought increased security cooperation with Greece, with the two
countries agreeing in 2007 to create a joint Operational Unit within
the framework of NATO with the aim of participating in Peace Support
Operations along with a joint Disaster Relief/Humanitarian Aid Task
Force.
Erdogan also attempted to maintain simultaneous working relations with
Hamas, Israel, and Syria. After Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian
legislative election, Ankara invited Khaled Mashal, chairman of
Hamas's politburo, to Turkey despite Israeli protests. Yet, from May
to December 2008, Israel trusted Turkey to mediate peace negotiations
between Jerusalem and Damascus. The greatest turnaround was in
Turkish-Syrian relations. On the brink of war in 1998 over Syrian
sponsorship of the Kurdish PKK terrorist group, by 2009 the countries
had lifted mutual visa requirements, established the Syrian-Turkish
High Cooperation Council to enhance economic and military cooperation,
and held large-scale joint military exercises.
In 2009, however, an increasingly confident Turkey traded its good
neighbor policy for an aggressive neo-ottoman one. First, Erdogan
contrived to reinvent himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause
after Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 to halt
rocket attacks from Gaza. Erdogan has since hailed Hamas militants as
"freedom fighters struggling to protect their land." And, perhaps
reasoning that Israel would never board a Turkish-owned ship, the AKP
government offered logistical support to the Mavi Marmara, a vessel
participating in a 2010 flotilla aiming to break the Israeli blockade
of Hamas-controlled Gaza, to establish Turkey as the one Muslim
country that can command Israeli compliance. Israel demanded to
inspect the cargo for contraband and promised to deliver the
humanitarian aid to Gaza. When the flotilla refused, Jerusalem called
Turkey's bluff and Israeli forces raided the ship and killed nine
Turkish activists who violently resisted. A humiliated Erdogan
threatened to send Turkish warships to break the blockade and urged
the international community to impose sanctions on Israel. However,
Turkey never made good on its threat and a UN investigative committee
confirmed the blockade's legality, further eroding Turkey's prestige.
Soon after, Ankara threatened to dispatch warships to Cypriot waters
to dissuade Nicosia from unilaterally exploring for natural gas and
developing the fields recently discovered off her southern coast. In
2010, Cyprus and Israel signed a maritime border delimitation
agreement. But, Turkey has rejected the agreement, since Ankara does
not recognize Cyprus and insists that Nicosia include authorities from
Northern Cyprus (which it supports) in the making of all gas-related
policy, even concerning gas fields that do not border the north. When
Nicosia ignored Ankara's threats, Turkey conducted live fire naval
exercises near the disputed natural gas fields. But Turkey's
belligerence has had the opposite of its intended effect, prompting
increased military cooperation among Israel, Cyprus, and her Greek
patron, including joint naval exercises and a Greek-Israeli security
pact. So far, Turkey's ultimatum to Cyprus has fallen on deaf ears.
Finally, Erdogan has abandoned Turkey's newfound alliance with
Damascus in the wake of the Syrian Uprising, calling on Assad to
resign and hosting in Turkey the Syrian National Council and members
of the Free Syrian Army. Yet, Turkey looks increasingly impotent as
its threats of military intervention lose their credibility. In March
2012, Erdogan proclaimed that Turkey might establish a buffer zone in
Syria to protect refugees if Assad continued to suppress the uprising.
Erdogan's threat proved empty. And when Syrian forces shot down a
Turkish F-4 Phantom jet in June and Erdogan threatened Syria not to
risk Turkey's wrath, the threat sounded equally hollow.
So, if Erdogan wants Turkey to achieve regional influence commensurate
with its size (75 million) and economy (16th largest in the world),
and do so without using force, he must reign in his bluster. That is
not to say that Ankara should never express moral outrage. Jarring
images of massacred Syrian civilians have genuinely disturbed Turkish
leaders. However, repeated empty threats of military intervention
undermine Turkish diplomatic influence over Damascus without scaring
Assad into changing course.
Roosevelt's axiom remains the operative one: Ankara should threaten
sparingly -- but back up its words with concrete action when it does.
Erdogan would do well to take note of it.
Micah Levinson is a Junior Fellow at the American Foreign Policy
Council in Washington, DC.