Radikal, Turkey
Aug 13 2012
This Regime Reminds Us of Something
by Yervant Danzikyan
By now, everyone knows that the AKP [Justice and Development Party]
has reverted to the classical "suppression" methods of the Turkish
Republic against all dissident social groups, especially those that
comment on the Kurdish problem.This trend has gained momentum in the
past one year in particular. This view - or more correctly truth - is
steadily gaining wider acceptance. Groups that supported the AKP in
the past have already distanced themselves from it by noting that "it
has morphed into the state." However, the AKP has gone beyond
dissident social groups and has adopted a provocative policy against
those who object to the Turkish and Sunni "core" of the Turkish
Republic. In addition, when publications serving as "hatchet men"
target journalists/writers who have criticized the reversion to the
classical state policies with regard to the Kurdish problem, the
government does not oppose them.
These postures suggest that we face a new situation. Similarly, when
the CHP [Republican People's Party] called on the National Assembly to
convene in the face of escalating PKK [Kurdistan People's Congress,
KGK] attacks, both the AKP and the MHP [Nationalist Action Party]
described it as a "toady" of the terrorist organization. This makes us
think that a new "Nationalist Front" has formed for the 2010's.
Furthermore, in the current circumstances, this front does not have a
"precarious" numerical superiority in parliament. Today, it has a
comfortable majority. Consequently, we have a serious problem.
Let us rewind the tape a little. As will be recalled, [Yeni Safak
columnist] Ali Bayramoglu, who has criticized the steadily
intensifying "right-wing and statist" policies of the AKP, was accused
of being a "crypto-Armenian" by the website habervaktim.com[1], which
is known to be closely associated with the daily Akit. There was much
curiosity about what the government would do to this publication.
There were rumours that certain people [in the government] did not
condone the publication of this story - though only behind the scenes.
However, because no indignation was expressed openly, it was obvious
that [Akit ] would grow bolder. That is precisely what happened. The
newspaper put virtually everyone who criticized the classical state
(now AKP) policies on the Kurdish issue on a target practice board.
Even then, the government did not distance itself from this newspaper.
We need to digress a little at this point. There was another
interesting development at just about this time. Akit reopened the
discussion of the Sivas massacre [in 1993] and alleged that the
victims of that incident were in reality killed by guns. According to
the newspaper, this suggested that the massacre was only a provocation
- an Alevi provocation. It was subsequently shown that most of the
evidence they cited was untrue but the story gave another excuse to
right-wing groups to avoid coming to terms with Sivas. This was a
critical step and we hoped that the religious sector - chiefly the AKP
- would condemn this view. That did not happen either.
Just about that time, the AKP was trying to force the Alevis into a
corner with all of its might. Someone from the government bloc made
discriminatory remarks the Alevis virtually every day. This process
reached a climax when Erdogan called the Alevi worship house in
Karacaahmet a "monstrosity" - supposedly because it was built without
a permit. That message was the most distinct sign that the
Sunni-centric policies pursued by the AKP in the Middle East
(especially in Syria) would have an echo inside Turkey. We were
witnessing the practice of sectarianism by the government or the
state. At this critical juncture, the prime minister had another
outburst that did not generate much discussion. Referring to the Sivas
massacre in an address at a collective Ramazan fast-breaking dinner,
he said: "As you can see, these days, truths a re being brought to
light one by one." It was more than obvious that he was referring to
the stories of Akit and that he was condoning these stories.
It was no coincidence that Akit started a new campaign a few days
after Prime Minister Erdogan implied his support for its stories about
the Sivas massacre. Once again, it put on the target practice board a
long list of government critics, including Hasan Cemal, Ahmet Altan,
and Cengiz Candar - it was important that Aysel Tugluk was also on
this list. Supposedly Semdin Sakik had sent a letter to the newspaper
and had "confessed" that these writers aided [the KGK] at different
times. Sakik - more correctlyAkit - also alleged that the Alevis were
influential in the PKK. It was obvious that the targets were as much
the Alevis as the dissident journalists and the Kurds. We face a
dangerous game that is more than a revamped "memorandum."
It is impossible to be indifferent to these stories when we consider
Akit's performance, which I have been trying to summarize, combined
with the posture of the government. We see that individuals and groups
that refuse to back the "suppression" policies of the AKP on the
Kurdish issue are, in some way or another, put on the target board and
intimidated. We see the government and the state forcing the Alevis
into a corner. These are sufficiently disturbing but, as I pointed out
at the beginning of this article, we see that even the CHP may be
pushed into a corner by leveraging the PKK's attacks.
You might or might not have thought that the CHP's call on the
National Assembly to convene after the most recent PKK attacks was
useful. Regardless, the AKP responded by criminalizing the CHP.
Erdogan described the CHP's call as "tagging behind" the terrorist
organization and sharply criticized the proposal. Because the issue
was related to convening the Assembly, the MHP's position was
important. At this critical juncture, the MHP chose to stand with the
AKP and to censure the CHP. [MHP General Chairman Devlet] Bahceli's
written statement deserves particular attention:
"The CHP has jumped on and stood up for the proposal by the BDP [Peace
and Democracy Party], which is the political representative of
separatism. Neither this nor the CHP attempt to redirect the treachery
the PKK is trying perpetrate in Semdinli to the Assembly will be
accepted. Furthermore, the explanation for the motion submitted to the
Assembly by the main opposition party for a general floor debate says
that earlier proposals made to solve the problems remain in force.
That alone suggests that the CHP remains behind the absurd
acknowledgments it has voiced with regard to the Kurdish problem and
that it is trying to make the Assembly a negotiating partner of the
PKK. The effort this time is to revive the Oslo talks through the CHP
and using more sinister and different methods. If the CHP comes to the
Assembly accompanied by the BDP and if these two parties start
discussing PKK proposals for a peace board after garnering enough
deputies to have a quorum, then this is their business."
In sum, we have entered a period in the Kurdish problem when voices
rising against "suppression" policies are choked and fingered as
targets, when Alevis are denounced at every opportunity, and when even
the CHP may be forced into a corner by the Sunni-Turkish front if
necessary. This suggests a very critical juncture. In other words, it
suggests that we have entered a Nationalist Front period with strong
voter support for the front. The - for now - psychological pressure
exerted on the Alevis in a manner that is reminiscent of those days is
ominous. Obviously, it was unthinkable that the Armenians would not
get their share of [denouncement] when the Kurds and Alevis are
getting theirs.
As is known, last week, new principles were promulgated with regard to
conditions that apply to the purchase of real estate by foreigners in
Turkey. According to the new rules, citizens of 129 countries will be
able to buy property in Turkey without any conditions. The permission
of the Ministry of the Interior will be required for the citizens of
52 countries. According to newspaper reports, citizens of Syria,
Armenia, North Korea, and Cuba will not be able to buy any property in
Turkey. Yes, this is the phrase widely used by the newspapers: "will
not be able to buy." Initially, we thought that perhaps there was a
reciprocity requirement (although even this would be discrimination if
the same requirement did not apply to other countries). However, the
language used in most newspapers (see Hurriyet and Haberturk)
suggested full "prohibition." Here is what the AKP government is
saying in effect: "Most of you, Armenian citizens, may have migrated
there from Anatolia. You may have migrated before, in, or after 1915.
That does not matter. You are prohibited from coming and buying
property from lands where you were born."
This is the summary of the government's recent performance. We try to
be as courteous as we can. We make comments such as "this regime
reminds of something in the past." Let us remain courteous for now and
let the readers fill in the blanks.
Note: We learned in the evening hours that the PKK has abducted CHP
Tunceli Deputy Huseyin Aygun. What the PKK is trying to do with this
act is beyond the subject of this discussion. The release of everyone,
including Huseyin Akgul, by the PKK is essential for ending the
climate of conflict.
[Translated from Turkish]
From: A. Papazian
Aug 13 2012
This Regime Reminds Us of Something
by Yervant Danzikyan
By now, everyone knows that the AKP [Justice and Development Party]
has reverted to the classical "suppression" methods of the Turkish
Republic against all dissident social groups, especially those that
comment on the Kurdish problem.This trend has gained momentum in the
past one year in particular. This view - or more correctly truth - is
steadily gaining wider acceptance. Groups that supported the AKP in
the past have already distanced themselves from it by noting that "it
has morphed into the state." However, the AKP has gone beyond
dissident social groups and has adopted a provocative policy against
those who object to the Turkish and Sunni "core" of the Turkish
Republic. In addition, when publications serving as "hatchet men"
target journalists/writers who have criticized the reversion to the
classical state policies with regard to the Kurdish problem, the
government does not oppose them.
These postures suggest that we face a new situation. Similarly, when
the CHP [Republican People's Party] called on the National Assembly to
convene in the face of escalating PKK [Kurdistan People's Congress,
KGK] attacks, both the AKP and the MHP [Nationalist Action Party]
described it as a "toady" of the terrorist organization. This makes us
think that a new "Nationalist Front" has formed for the 2010's.
Furthermore, in the current circumstances, this front does not have a
"precarious" numerical superiority in parliament. Today, it has a
comfortable majority. Consequently, we have a serious problem.
Let us rewind the tape a little. As will be recalled, [Yeni Safak
columnist] Ali Bayramoglu, who has criticized the steadily
intensifying "right-wing and statist" policies of the AKP, was accused
of being a "crypto-Armenian" by the website habervaktim.com[1], which
is known to be closely associated with the daily Akit. There was much
curiosity about what the government would do to this publication.
There were rumours that certain people [in the government] did not
condone the publication of this story - though only behind the scenes.
However, because no indignation was expressed openly, it was obvious
that [Akit ] would grow bolder. That is precisely what happened. The
newspaper put virtually everyone who criticized the classical state
(now AKP) policies on the Kurdish issue on a target practice board.
Even then, the government did not distance itself from this newspaper.
We need to digress a little at this point. There was another
interesting development at just about this time. Akit reopened the
discussion of the Sivas massacre [in 1993] and alleged that the
victims of that incident were in reality killed by guns. According to
the newspaper, this suggested that the massacre was only a provocation
- an Alevi provocation. It was subsequently shown that most of the
evidence they cited was untrue but the story gave another excuse to
right-wing groups to avoid coming to terms with Sivas. This was a
critical step and we hoped that the religious sector - chiefly the AKP
- would condemn this view. That did not happen either.
Just about that time, the AKP was trying to force the Alevis into a
corner with all of its might. Someone from the government bloc made
discriminatory remarks the Alevis virtually every day. This process
reached a climax when Erdogan called the Alevi worship house in
Karacaahmet a "monstrosity" - supposedly because it was built without
a permit. That message was the most distinct sign that the
Sunni-centric policies pursued by the AKP in the Middle East
(especially in Syria) would have an echo inside Turkey. We were
witnessing the practice of sectarianism by the government or the
state. At this critical juncture, the prime minister had another
outburst that did not generate much discussion. Referring to the Sivas
massacre in an address at a collective Ramazan fast-breaking dinner,
he said: "As you can see, these days, truths a re being brought to
light one by one." It was more than obvious that he was referring to
the stories of Akit and that he was condoning these stories.
It was no coincidence that Akit started a new campaign a few days
after Prime Minister Erdogan implied his support for its stories about
the Sivas massacre. Once again, it put on the target practice board a
long list of government critics, including Hasan Cemal, Ahmet Altan,
and Cengiz Candar - it was important that Aysel Tugluk was also on
this list. Supposedly Semdin Sakik had sent a letter to the newspaper
and had "confessed" that these writers aided [the KGK] at different
times. Sakik - more correctlyAkit - also alleged that the Alevis were
influential in the PKK. It was obvious that the targets were as much
the Alevis as the dissident journalists and the Kurds. We face a
dangerous game that is more than a revamped "memorandum."
It is impossible to be indifferent to these stories when we consider
Akit's performance, which I have been trying to summarize, combined
with the posture of the government. We see that individuals and groups
that refuse to back the "suppression" policies of the AKP on the
Kurdish issue are, in some way or another, put on the target board and
intimidated. We see the government and the state forcing the Alevis
into a corner. These are sufficiently disturbing but, as I pointed out
at the beginning of this article, we see that even the CHP may be
pushed into a corner by leveraging the PKK's attacks.
You might or might not have thought that the CHP's call on the
National Assembly to convene after the most recent PKK attacks was
useful. Regardless, the AKP responded by criminalizing the CHP.
Erdogan described the CHP's call as "tagging behind" the terrorist
organization and sharply criticized the proposal. Because the issue
was related to convening the Assembly, the MHP's position was
important. At this critical juncture, the MHP chose to stand with the
AKP and to censure the CHP. [MHP General Chairman Devlet] Bahceli's
written statement deserves particular attention:
"The CHP has jumped on and stood up for the proposal by the BDP [Peace
and Democracy Party], which is the political representative of
separatism. Neither this nor the CHP attempt to redirect the treachery
the PKK is trying perpetrate in Semdinli to the Assembly will be
accepted. Furthermore, the explanation for the motion submitted to the
Assembly by the main opposition party for a general floor debate says
that earlier proposals made to solve the problems remain in force.
That alone suggests that the CHP remains behind the absurd
acknowledgments it has voiced with regard to the Kurdish problem and
that it is trying to make the Assembly a negotiating partner of the
PKK. The effort this time is to revive the Oslo talks through the CHP
and using more sinister and different methods. If the CHP comes to the
Assembly accompanied by the BDP and if these two parties start
discussing PKK proposals for a peace board after garnering enough
deputies to have a quorum, then this is their business."
In sum, we have entered a period in the Kurdish problem when voices
rising against "suppression" policies are choked and fingered as
targets, when Alevis are denounced at every opportunity, and when even
the CHP may be forced into a corner by the Sunni-Turkish front if
necessary. This suggests a very critical juncture. In other words, it
suggests that we have entered a Nationalist Front period with strong
voter support for the front. The - for now - psychological pressure
exerted on the Alevis in a manner that is reminiscent of those days is
ominous. Obviously, it was unthinkable that the Armenians would not
get their share of [denouncement] when the Kurds and Alevis are
getting theirs.
As is known, last week, new principles were promulgated with regard to
conditions that apply to the purchase of real estate by foreigners in
Turkey. According to the new rules, citizens of 129 countries will be
able to buy property in Turkey without any conditions. The permission
of the Ministry of the Interior will be required for the citizens of
52 countries. According to newspaper reports, citizens of Syria,
Armenia, North Korea, and Cuba will not be able to buy any property in
Turkey. Yes, this is the phrase widely used by the newspapers: "will
not be able to buy." Initially, we thought that perhaps there was a
reciprocity requirement (although even this would be discrimination if
the same requirement did not apply to other countries). However, the
language used in most newspapers (see Hurriyet and Haberturk)
suggested full "prohibition." Here is what the AKP government is
saying in effect: "Most of you, Armenian citizens, may have migrated
there from Anatolia. You may have migrated before, in, or after 1915.
That does not matter. You are prohibited from coming and buying
property from lands where you were born."
This is the summary of the government's recent performance. We try to
be as courteous as we can. We make comments such as "this regime
reminds of something in the past." Let us remain courteous for now and
let the readers fill in the blanks.
Note: We learned in the evening hours that the PKK has abducted CHP
Tunceli Deputy Huseyin Aygun. What the PKK is trying to do with this
act is beyond the subject of this discussion. The release of everyone,
including Huseyin Akgul, by the PKK is essential for ending the
climate of conflict.
[Translated from Turkish]
From: A. Papazian