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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Aug 14 2012
Re-securitization of Turkish politics?
Ä°HSAN DAÄ?I
Surely without attaining security for individuals as well as for
states, it is not possible to build a civilized state of affairs. The
freedoms and welfare of the people requires a mechanism to protect
them. But in some cases, the very freedoms and welfare of the people
may be threatened by mechanisms supposed to protect them.
Concerns about security, when abused and exaggerated, may indeed
strangle rights and liberties. In a country where all civil and
political matters are somehow linked to security, it is impossible to
attain liberties and human rights. Once security gives way to supreme
and unquestioned authority, leaving no space for the social and
political autonomy of society, society itself would be endangered. I
remember for instance a particular decision of the National Security
Council during the days of the Feb. 28 process that wine production
should be supported in Bozcaada, a small island in the Aegean Sea, so
that the local Turks would not be tempted to sell their land to the
Greeks who were trying to takeover land on this island! It is absurd,
but this is how a `security mentality' works.
But there are more examples. A `security mentality' is not only a
paranoid mentality, but also an appropriate tool for governing. I call
it `rule by fear.' Through a security discourse, governments generate
authority and legitimacy, and become able to escape accountability.
Under `normal politics' it is very hard to sell the people an
authoritarian ruling machine. But if a situation is believed to
threaten the very existence of the society and the state, everything
may be justified.
In Turkey, the security of the regime has been the key instrument to
discipline the society at large and suppress the opposition right from
the beginning of the republic. It justified the establishment of the
single party rule in 1925 and the closure of the opposition party at
the time, the Progressive Republican Party. From then on, protecting
the regime and maintaining the secular character of it was used as a
pretext to deepen the Kemalist regime.
There was also the `security of the state' to look after. Countries
that had ambitions on its unique geography, they told us, surrounded
Turkey. The Russians, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Arabs as well as
the great powers, all conspired against Turkey.
Thus, people at home had to be united against immediate threats in the
neighborhood and even be aware of their internal extensions. Under
such a continuous existential threat, the idea of a fully functioning
liberal democracy, human right and pluralism were regarded as
luxurious and even risky.
Once the survival and the security of the state and the regime were
attained, the primary demand for democracy, rights and liberties could
be put off indefinitely. The emergence of the Kurdish question was
regarded a constant internal threat to the unity and integrity of
Turkey and added another justification for authoritarian forms of
politics.
This is how the Kemalist regime used in a dynamic way the `security
discourse' to eliminate its opponents and excuse its authoritarian
methods. In other words, Turkish authoritarianism was driven by a
securitization wherein all other values and objectives are
subordinated to security and it was taken to be the absolute priority.
Recently, it can be seen that the government is using this old
language of securitization in its domestic and foreign policies. With
increasing problems in the neighborhood, the old rhetoric of `Turkey
is surrounded by enemies' is being revived. As the Kurdish issue is
taking on a truly regional and international dimension, and thus
getting out of Turkey's control, attempts at `externalizing' the
problem have intensified. Unrelated events are increasingly explained
by references to a conspiracy orchestrated by a single center.
`Someone has pressed the button' is frequently used to devalue
critiques of the government.
If the AK Party does not want to become authoritarian it should avoid
using a language of securitization, the outcome of which is to silence
the media and discipline society. Silencing the opposition on security
grounds is possible, but it is fatal for democracy and pluralism.
Resolving the Kurdish question is the key to consolidating democracy
in Turkey. This is so because this question has the potential to
securitize Turkish politics and justify an authoritarian change which
would seriously limit the rights and liberties of all.
Establishing peaceful and cooperative relations with neighbors is
another key to consolidating democracy in Turkey. The perception that
Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries constructs a national psyche
that is inclined to sacrifice liberties, rights and democracy. So it
is important for Turkey to go back to the philosophy of `zero problems
with neighbors' policy. A Turkey that has tense and conflicting
relations with its neighbors cannot consolidate its democracy, deepen
its rule of law and expand its rights and freedoms.
Aug 14 2012
Re-securitization of Turkish politics?
Ä°HSAN DAÄ?I
Surely without attaining security for individuals as well as for
states, it is not possible to build a civilized state of affairs. The
freedoms and welfare of the people requires a mechanism to protect
them. But in some cases, the very freedoms and welfare of the people
may be threatened by mechanisms supposed to protect them.
Concerns about security, when abused and exaggerated, may indeed
strangle rights and liberties. In a country where all civil and
political matters are somehow linked to security, it is impossible to
attain liberties and human rights. Once security gives way to supreme
and unquestioned authority, leaving no space for the social and
political autonomy of society, society itself would be endangered. I
remember for instance a particular decision of the National Security
Council during the days of the Feb. 28 process that wine production
should be supported in Bozcaada, a small island in the Aegean Sea, so
that the local Turks would not be tempted to sell their land to the
Greeks who were trying to takeover land on this island! It is absurd,
but this is how a `security mentality' works.
But there are more examples. A `security mentality' is not only a
paranoid mentality, but also an appropriate tool for governing. I call
it `rule by fear.' Through a security discourse, governments generate
authority and legitimacy, and become able to escape accountability.
Under `normal politics' it is very hard to sell the people an
authoritarian ruling machine. But if a situation is believed to
threaten the very existence of the society and the state, everything
may be justified.
In Turkey, the security of the regime has been the key instrument to
discipline the society at large and suppress the opposition right from
the beginning of the republic. It justified the establishment of the
single party rule in 1925 and the closure of the opposition party at
the time, the Progressive Republican Party. From then on, protecting
the regime and maintaining the secular character of it was used as a
pretext to deepen the Kemalist regime.
There was also the `security of the state' to look after. Countries
that had ambitions on its unique geography, they told us, surrounded
Turkey. The Russians, the Greeks, the Armenians, the Arabs as well as
the great powers, all conspired against Turkey.
Thus, people at home had to be united against immediate threats in the
neighborhood and even be aware of their internal extensions. Under
such a continuous existential threat, the idea of a fully functioning
liberal democracy, human right and pluralism were regarded as
luxurious and even risky.
Once the survival and the security of the state and the regime were
attained, the primary demand for democracy, rights and liberties could
be put off indefinitely. The emergence of the Kurdish question was
regarded a constant internal threat to the unity and integrity of
Turkey and added another justification for authoritarian forms of
politics.
This is how the Kemalist regime used in a dynamic way the `security
discourse' to eliminate its opponents and excuse its authoritarian
methods. In other words, Turkish authoritarianism was driven by a
securitization wherein all other values and objectives are
subordinated to security and it was taken to be the absolute priority.
Recently, it can be seen that the government is using this old
language of securitization in its domestic and foreign policies. With
increasing problems in the neighborhood, the old rhetoric of `Turkey
is surrounded by enemies' is being revived. As the Kurdish issue is
taking on a truly regional and international dimension, and thus
getting out of Turkey's control, attempts at `externalizing' the
problem have intensified. Unrelated events are increasingly explained
by references to a conspiracy orchestrated by a single center.
`Someone has pressed the button' is frequently used to devalue
critiques of the government.
If the AK Party does not want to become authoritarian it should avoid
using a language of securitization, the outcome of which is to silence
the media and discipline society. Silencing the opposition on security
grounds is possible, but it is fatal for democracy and pluralism.
Resolving the Kurdish question is the key to consolidating democracy
in Turkey. This is so because this question has the potential to
securitize Turkish politics and justify an authoritarian change which
would seriously limit the rights and liberties of all.
Establishing peaceful and cooperative relations with neighbors is
another key to consolidating democracy in Turkey. The perception that
Turkey is surrounded by enemy countries constructs a national psyche
that is inclined to sacrifice liberties, rights and democracy. So it
is important for Turkey to go back to the philosophy of `zero problems
with neighbors' policy. A Turkey that has tense and conflicting
relations with its neighbors cannot consolidate its democracy, deepen
its rule of law and expand its rights and freedoms.