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Today's Zaman, Turkey
Aug 17 2012
AK Party and Turkey's near future
MARKAR ESAYAN
[email protected]
I have observed a recent surge in the emails I receive from my readers
who support the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The
majority of them are considerably disappointed in the party.
There are several common characteristics shared by those who send me
these emails: They not only voted for the party -- they seriously
support it and have been working on a volunteer basis or within the
party organization for at least 10 years. In a sense, they are the
unknown heroes who have made the AK Party what it is. If the AK Party
has managed to established organic ties with the public so
successfully, it is because of such people who interact with the
public on an individual basis. These people have worked,
self-sacrificially, everywhere in Anatolia and all across the country.
They have enjoyed no personal benefits from their ties to the party,
but they do have certainly expectations of it.
What were/are those expectations?
These people, the `others' of this country, wanted the AK Party to
create a clean, democratic state. Indeed, seeing them as the others,
the state had previously used its power to crush these religious
people, women with headscarves, Kurds, Armenians and anyone labeled as
dissidents. They wrapped this repression in a
secular-modern-democratic-Turkey package. And, for a long time, they
managed to deceive part of the public and the world that they were
actually secular, modern and democratic. Thus, they argued, if coups
were being staged and the deep state was committing murders, it was
because the secular republic was in danger. They had used this as a
convincing argument to suggest there was a serious reactionary danger
in the country.
Many people will remember what happened during the postmodern coup of
Feb. 28, 1997. Strange people and groups emerged out of the blue and
engaged in scandals that would make the blood of religious people run
cold. Yet, the propaganda suggested that these people were
representing religious groups. The military-guided, neo-nationalist
(ulusalcı) media outlets published these scandals, including intimate
images, of so-called leaders of religious orders. In the company of
these grotesque images and the shocking remarks from these people, the
argument that a reactionary threat was very close was pumped into the
public consciousness and subconsciousness. One of the coalition
partners was a religious party and, since it had come to power, the
secular republic had been imperiled. This was their thesis.
Indeed, they managed to overthrow a democratically elected government
with a military intervention. The media's unrelenting support of the
coup prevented democratic opposition or any objections to it. Many
people -- who we could refer to as the voter base of the main
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) -- even applauded the coup.
This was because they believed the secular republic was in danger. So,
it was a legitimate act for the military to stage a coup to secure the
regime. They conceded that a coup was not favorable, but, in the
favorite slogan of those days, they would say, `It is better to go
back 10 years with a coup than to go back 1,000 years with
reactionaryism.'
Today, we know from the investigation into the Feb. 28 coup and the
media's reports about it that everything done to lay the groundwork
for the military takeover was false. Instead, it represented a joint
effort by the military and pro-military media networks, businesses and
bureaucrats.
As a result, when the AK Party came to power despite all the
obstructions it faced in the first elections it entered in 2002,
religious and liberal groups against whom the Feb. 28 coup had dealt
the biggest blow welcomed the AK Party with enthusiasm. Unlike its
predecessors, this party was not monolithic nor self-isolationist.
They didn't see the US as the devil or the members to the European
Union as a nightmare. They perceived the country as a whole and were
working hard to make reforms. And, as a result, a big democratic
coalition was created in the country. This was the coalition of the
`weeping children of the Republic.' The main component of this
coalition consisted of religious people, but liberals, non-Muslim
religious minorities, liberal leftists, Kurds and some Alevis also
supported them.
At that time, the junta planned continuously to overthrow the AK
Party. To justify the coup, they portrayed the AK Party as an evil
community with a secret agenda to pretend it was a democratic center
party and turn the country into Iran when the time was ripe. However,
democrats, liberals, liberal leftists and intellectuals representing
non-Muslim religious minorities backed the AK Party, and this did not
quite fall into place in the usual way, helping to protect the AK
Party from this propaganda.
It would be better if I spoke on my own behalf. During that time, I
wrote articles for the Agos daily newspaper, established by dear Hrant
Dink, who would be killed a few years later. We, the non-Muslim
religious minorities, had been frequently victimized by the Kemalist
neo-nationalists who would pose as modern people but who were actually
fascists and, therefore, we had developed a serious reaction to being
`otherified.' For me, a headscarved woman not allowed to become a
deputy or judge is no different than an Armenian not allowed to become
a police officer, let alone a high-ranking bureaucrat. If a Kurd is
tortured or jailed for speaking his/her mother tongue or if an Alevi
is discriminated against because of his/her sect or if a woman or a
poor man or a homosexual faces discrimination, then no one can claim
this country is democratic. In other words, there is a systemic
problem in that country, not problems specific to Armenians or
headscarved women.
In sum, I know well the roots of this discrimination. This evil system
had to change and be reformed. During the first 80 years of the
republic, there were so many violations, and the state had turned into
such a criminal machine that no one save a happy minority could live
happily if this system did not change. And the public was not willing
to let this system go on without change. Indeed, the world has seen a
revolution in information technology. A segment of the religious group
called the Anatolian Tigers was opened up to the outside world. In
other words, a bourgeoisie class that was needed for a revolution but
that had been destroyed by the coup of Sept. 12, 1980, was being
formed among religious groups. In other words, things had gotten
started.
Such an historical background can be found behind the success of the
AK Party, created by these dynamic groups in the elections of Nov. 3,
2002. The party managed to act as the political, legitimate and
peaceful embodiment of this strong demand from the bottom. Serious
reforms have been implemented. For the first time, legal proceedings
have been launched against the deep state and junta members. The
public defended the AK Party against the anti-democratic efforts of
the still-strong coup supporters. 2007 and 2010 were landmark years.
For the first time, the government harshly reacted to a military
memorandum, that of April 27, 2007. And, in 2010, the constitutional
provisions that gave the tutelage its power were amended in a
referendum. Judicial bodies were made more democratic and
constitutional and legal obstacles to the adjudication of members of
the military and bureaucracy were abolished.
In the last elections, the AK Party came to power for a third time,
with over 50 percent of the national vote. This was how the public
rewarded a party that met their expectations to a great extent. The
reforms had not completed and the deep state had not been fully
revealed, but a serious advantage had been earned. It would be easier
and less dangerous to maintain the reforms with this advantage. This
was the public's expectation.
But this didn't happen. In particular, the Uludere tragedy -- in which
34 civilians were mistaken for terrorists and killed by military
airstrikes in Å?ırnak's Uludere district due to false intelligence --
and the AK Party's cold attitude toward the tragedy came as a shock
not only to religious Kurds, but to all supporters of the AK Party.
The AK Party acted not as their old party, but as the old state. The
AK Party's supporters were also disappointed when the match-fixing law
was amended and the prime minister openly opposed the investigation
into the Feb. 28 coup.
Lack of political movement that can gain public trust
Here are some points that must be emphasized. First of all, and as a
general rule in life, a lack of competition, alternatives and rivals
has made the party overly self-confident. Indeed, neither the CHP nor
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) exhibits the dynamism needed to
come to power without a miracle or the AK Party making a serious
error. For a long time to come, it seems, no political movement will
emerge in Turkey that will earn the public's trust and send the AK
Party packing.
The second is exhaustion. We are talking about 10 years of conflicts
and adventures that must have exhausted the prime minister and the
party's senior executives. If we were a Western democracy, the party's
leader would change and the problem would be automatically solved, but
Turkey is still a country in which the political arena is dominated
with the cult of the leader.
Third, the AK Party falsely believes that it has dominated the state
and the bureaucracy with its undeniable successes. That is, the AK
Party has evolved into an Ankara party, paying heed to the excuses of
bureaucrats rather than the demands of the public.
The fourth is the lack of democratic maturity of the AK Party and its
senior executives. The majority of the AK Party's senior executives,
including the prime minister, do not have the democratic heritage
needed to take the country's democratic progress further. That's why
they cannot cope with the public's democratic demands and fall short
of being on par with the public's democratic maturity. They don't have
sufficient democratic capital. To accumulate this capital, they need
time and experience, but Turkey has no time to lose.
In conclusion, we are going through expected developments. It may be
possible to mechanically solve in eight years the problems that have
accumulated over 80 years, but we need more time to overcome
mentality-related problems.
Aug 17 2012
AK Party and Turkey's near future
MARKAR ESAYAN
[email protected]
I have observed a recent surge in the emails I receive from my readers
who support the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party). The
majority of them are considerably disappointed in the party.
There are several common characteristics shared by those who send me
these emails: They not only voted for the party -- they seriously
support it and have been working on a volunteer basis or within the
party organization for at least 10 years. In a sense, they are the
unknown heroes who have made the AK Party what it is. If the AK Party
has managed to established organic ties with the public so
successfully, it is because of such people who interact with the
public on an individual basis. These people have worked,
self-sacrificially, everywhere in Anatolia and all across the country.
They have enjoyed no personal benefits from their ties to the party,
but they do have certainly expectations of it.
What were/are those expectations?
These people, the `others' of this country, wanted the AK Party to
create a clean, democratic state. Indeed, seeing them as the others,
the state had previously used its power to crush these religious
people, women with headscarves, Kurds, Armenians and anyone labeled as
dissidents. They wrapped this repression in a
secular-modern-democratic-Turkey package. And, for a long time, they
managed to deceive part of the public and the world that they were
actually secular, modern and democratic. Thus, they argued, if coups
were being staged and the deep state was committing murders, it was
because the secular republic was in danger. They had used this as a
convincing argument to suggest there was a serious reactionary danger
in the country.
Many people will remember what happened during the postmodern coup of
Feb. 28, 1997. Strange people and groups emerged out of the blue and
engaged in scandals that would make the blood of religious people run
cold. Yet, the propaganda suggested that these people were
representing religious groups. The military-guided, neo-nationalist
(ulusalcı) media outlets published these scandals, including intimate
images, of so-called leaders of religious orders. In the company of
these grotesque images and the shocking remarks from these people, the
argument that a reactionary threat was very close was pumped into the
public consciousness and subconsciousness. One of the coalition
partners was a religious party and, since it had come to power, the
secular republic had been imperiled. This was their thesis.
Indeed, they managed to overthrow a democratically elected government
with a military intervention. The media's unrelenting support of the
coup prevented democratic opposition or any objections to it. Many
people -- who we could refer to as the voter base of the main
opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) -- even applauded the coup.
This was because they believed the secular republic was in danger. So,
it was a legitimate act for the military to stage a coup to secure the
regime. They conceded that a coup was not favorable, but, in the
favorite slogan of those days, they would say, `It is better to go
back 10 years with a coup than to go back 1,000 years with
reactionaryism.'
Today, we know from the investigation into the Feb. 28 coup and the
media's reports about it that everything done to lay the groundwork
for the military takeover was false. Instead, it represented a joint
effort by the military and pro-military media networks, businesses and
bureaucrats.
As a result, when the AK Party came to power despite all the
obstructions it faced in the first elections it entered in 2002,
religious and liberal groups against whom the Feb. 28 coup had dealt
the biggest blow welcomed the AK Party with enthusiasm. Unlike its
predecessors, this party was not monolithic nor self-isolationist.
They didn't see the US as the devil or the members to the European
Union as a nightmare. They perceived the country as a whole and were
working hard to make reforms. And, as a result, a big democratic
coalition was created in the country. This was the coalition of the
`weeping children of the Republic.' The main component of this
coalition consisted of religious people, but liberals, non-Muslim
religious minorities, liberal leftists, Kurds and some Alevis also
supported them.
At that time, the junta planned continuously to overthrow the AK
Party. To justify the coup, they portrayed the AK Party as an evil
community with a secret agenda to pretend it was a democratic center
party and turn the country into Iran when the time was ripe. However,
democrats, liberals, liberal leftists and intellectuals representing
non-Muslim religious minorities backed the AK Party, and this did not
quite fall into place in the usual way, helping to protect the AK
Party from this propaganda.
It would be better if I spoke on my own behalf. During that time, I
wrote articles for the Agos daily newspaper, established by dear Hrant
Dink, who would be killed a few years later. We, the non-Muslim
religious minorities, had been frequently victimized by the Kemalist
neo-nationalists who would pose as modern people but who were actually
fascists and, therefore, we had developed a serious reaction to being
`otherified.' For me, a headscarved woman not allowed to become a
deputy or judge is no different than an Armenian not allowed to become
a police officer, let alone a high-ranking bureaucrat. If a Kurd is
tortured or jailed for speaking his/her mother tongue or if an Alevi
is discriminated against because of his/her sect or if a woman or a
poor man or a homosexual faces discrimination, then no one can claim
this country is democratic. In other words, there is a systemic
problem in that country, not problems specific to Armenians or
headscarved women.
In sum, I know well the roots of this discrimination. This evil system
had to change and be reformed. During the first 80 years of the
republic, there were so many violations, and the state had turned into
such a criminal machine that no one save a happy minority could live
happily if this system did not change. And the public was not willing
to let this system go on without change. Indeed, the world has seen a
revolution in information technology. A segment of the religious group
called the Anatolian Tigers was opened up to the outside world. In
other words, a bourgeoisie class that was needed for a revolution but
that had been destroyed by the coup of Sept. 12, 1980, was being
formed among religious groups. In other words, things had gotten
started.
Such an historical background can be found behind the success of the
AK Party, created by these dynamic groups in the elections of Nov. 3,
2002. The party managed to act as the political, legitimate and
peaceful embodiment of this strong demand from the bottom. Serious
reforms have been implemented. For the first time, legal proceedings
have been launched against the deep state and junta members. The
public defended the AK Party against the anti-democratic efforts of
the still-strong coup supporters. 2007 and 2010 were landmark years.
For the first time, the government harshly reacted to a military
memorandum, that of April 27, 2007. And, in 2010, the constitutional
provisions that gave the tutelage its power were amended in a
referendum. Judicial bodies were made more democratic and
constitutional and legal obstacles to the adjudication of members of
the military and bureaucracy were abolished.
In the last elections, the AK Party came to power for a third time,
with over 50 percent of the national vote. This was how the public
rewarded a party that met their expectations to a great extent. The
reforms had not completed and the deep state had not been fully
revealed, but a serious advantage had been earned. It would be easier
and less dangerous to maintain the reforms with this advantage. This
was the public's expectation.
But this didn't happen. In particular, the Uludere tragedy -- in which
34 civilians were mistaken for terrorists and killed by military
airstrikes in Å?ırnak's Uludere district due to false intelligence --
and the AK Party's cold attitude toward the tragedy came as a shock
not only to religious Kurds, but to all supporters of the AK Party.
The AK Party acted not as their old party, but as the old state. The
AK Party's supporters were also disappointed when the match-fixing law
was amended and the prime minister openly opposed the investigation
into the Feb. 28 coup.
Lack of political movement that can gain public trust
Here are some points that must be emphasized. First of all, and as a
general rule in life, a lack of competition, alternatives and rivals
has made the party overly self-confident. Indeed, neither the CHP nor
the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) exhibits the dynamism needed to
come to power without a miracle or the AK Party making a serious
error. For a long time to come, it seems, no political movement will
emerge in Turkey that will earn the public's trust and send the AK
Party packing.
The second is exhaustion. We are talking about 10 years of conflicts
and adventures that must have exhausted the prime minister and the
party's senior executives. If we were a Western democracy, the party's
leader would change and the problem would be automatically solved, but
Turkey is still a country in which the political arena is dominated
with the cult of the leader.
Third, the AK Party falsely believes that it has dominated the state
and the bureaucracy with its undeniable successes. That is, the AK
Party has evolved into an Ankara party, paying heed to the excuses of
bureaucrats rather than the demands of the public.
The fourth is the lack of democratic maturity of the AK Party and its
senior executives. The majority of the AK Party's senior executives,
including the prime minister, do not have the democratic heritage
needed to take the country's democratic progress further. That's why
they cannot cope with the public's democratic demands and fall short
of being on par with the public's democratic maturity. They don't have
sufficient democratic capital. To accumulate this capital, they need
time and experience, but Turkey has no time to lose.
In conclusion, we are going through expected developments. It may be
possible to mechanically solve in eight years the problems that have
accumulated over 80 years, but we need more time to overcome
mentality-related problems.