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Zerkalo, Azerbaijan
Aug 11 2012
Putin is being hurried to recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh
In order to be ready for the collapse of Iran
by Rauf Mirqadirov
The closer the outcome of the Syrian conflict is, the more experts are
beginning to wonder: everything is clear with Syria, but which option
will be chosen to solve the Iranian problem? That is to say, no-one
has any doubts that this problem still has to be solved one way or
another, although, a most likely scenario will be the use of force.
Disputes, in essence, are on tools to be used in this case that will
at the end predetermine a reformatted version of the geopolitical
balance of forces in the region.
Ethnic factor in Iran
Here it is necessary to bear in mind that the option of a "velvet
revolution", that is to say, attempts to transform the theocratic
regime into something acceptable for the West, above all, as they say,
has failed from within in the latest presidential election [in Iran].
Moreover, most experts believe that the failure was due to the fact
that ethnic Azerbaijanis, to be more precise, the southern Azerbaijan
refused to support the "velvet revolution". And this was despite the
fact that the presidential candidate, who tried to lead the "velvet
revolution", that is to say, Mirhoseyn Musavi, is an ethnic
Azerbaijani. And it is not that ethnic Azerbaijanis were against
democratic changes. The author of these lines happens to communicate
with representatives of the national movement of the southern
Azerbaijan in Ankara , moreover, with representatives of different
political trends. Despite their political differences, they all said
virtually the same: first, the Azerbaijanis consider neither Musavi,
nor the current Supreme Leader of the IRI Ali Khamene'i as "theirs".
Second, Azerbaijanis are not going to participate in the
"reproduction" process of the Persian state. To put it simply,
Azerbaijanis in Iran are not going to participate in projects that do
not take into account their interests. And as experience shows any
attempt to transform Iran from within without Azerbaijanis are doomed
to failure. There remains a military solution to the problem. Given
this, there remains another question: what is next? What future of
Iran is to the best interests of the West, moreover, taking into
account the need for the establishment of sustainable stability in the
region? Here emerges a project of collapsing the IRI as an empire and
the creation of new nation-states that in the end, as often our paper
writes, will allow solving several problems at once, precluding Iran
from the geopolitical balance of forces as a destabilising factor.
Russian prospect
Russian political analysts believe it is no coincidence that right now
in Washington, that is to say, ahead of resolving the Iranian issue,
they reminded of the need to consider the interests of ethnic Turks
(Azerbaijanis - ed.) living in southern Azerbaijan. Russian political
expert Boris Asarov in his article "The Karabakh conflict and
`rebalancing' of the South Caucasus" published by Regnum news agency,
notes that gradually changing international situation in the course of
the realization of a "Greater Middle East" project has brought about
preconditions for certain changes in the political situation in the
Caucasus. We can say that "a request for cooperation" from Washington
has become more intense, despite the fact that "formalities" that
accompany the intensification of the relations have become less
"burdensome" for the states whose democratic systems are not a model
in the observance of all norms and standards of democracy. According
to him, Baku did not fail to take this opportunity to get closer and
even more "gain the grace" of Washington , also hoping for the support
of the United States in the settlement of the Karabakh problem.
In its turn, this could not but affect the policy pursued by Yerevan.
"One of the main priorities of Armenia's foreign policy, that is to
say, friendly relations with Russia and membership of the CSTO [the
Collective Security Treaty Organization], is the settlement of the
Karabakh conflict through the recognition of the "NKR", and this
priority is a sort of "categorical imperative" of its foreign policy.
The important role that Russia plays in the Caucasus also implies the
presence of the certain political will while projecting its interests,
of course, taking into account the interests of the regional
countries. In this regard, the 9 July statement of the former head of
the Russian presidential administration, Sergey Naryshkin, who had
held this post under [former] Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, made
during his official visit to Baku in his capacity as the chairman of
the State Duma, is strange.
In particular, Naryshkin said: "We are opposed to the resolution of
the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict in line with ready recipes aside. We
firmly believe that this problem can be solved if interests of both
parties are met. If such a way is found to solve it, Russia is ready
to act as a guarantor of this agreement. But the responsibility for
resolving the conflict again lies with the peoples of Azerbaijan and
Armenia." In regard to the status of Karabakh, there can only be one
solution, which, if implemented at an appropriate level, will not
cause the resumption of the armed phase of the conflict, namely, the
recognition of the "NKR". And such a decision can take place on a
"recipe aside", as it is obvious that Baku independently does not have
a relevant incentive to adapt the change of the trend in the issue of
the Karabakh resolution and may do so subject only to the position of
the major international actors, of course, with the assurance of
obtaining appropriate "bonus compensation", says the author.
And "securing the interests of the parties", as mentioned by
Naryshkin, according to B. Asarov, can be realized for all by efforts
of influential international actors. The phrase: "If such a way is
found to solve it" does not at all differ with diplomatic elegance, as
it states the lack of understanding on how one can get to the final
settlement of the conflict by meeting the interests of all parties.
And the statement that looks like a formal justification that "the
responsibility for resolving the conflict again lies with the peoples
of Azerbaijan and Armenia" poorly fits into the scheme of public
presentation of the Russian interests, as this statement of Naryshkin
de facto states that Russia, they say, will not be actively engaged in
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and withdraws from the process
independently.
As the author notes, the Karabakh issue has a number of nuances, and
the main one is "how the `NKR' can be recognized internationally". "As
you know, as of now the `NKR' is not officially recognized by Armenia
, and this is not done because of Yerevan's reluctance to provoke an
armed conflict that could flare up after such a decision. Yes, there
is an option, under which Moscow, in exchange for the membership of
Armenia and the "NKR" of its patronized Eurasia structures, could
recognize the "NKR" after its recognition by Armenia and bring
peacekeeping forces to the territory of Karabakh to ensure the
security of the republic. However, this raises several questions: what
kind of "bonus compensation" is Moscow ready to give to Azerbaijan;
how Turkey's "tacit approval" and the qualitative international
recognition of the "NKR" will be achieved. Perhaps, exactly being not
ready for such a comprehensive approach in Naryshkin's presentation
became the basis for his statements about the "recipes aside", says B.
Asarov.
But such a state of affairs, when, on the one hand, Moscow does not
present a clearly defined comprehensive strategy to resolve the
conflict, on the other hand, Azerbaijan is increasingly moving closer
to the USA, forces Armenia to pay attention to Washington as the
guarantor of a possible resumption of the armed phase of the conflict.
It should be understood that for Washington it is far more important
to bring closer to itself Armenia than to return Karabakh to
Azerbaijan: "And, moreover, among the possible scenarios of
development of the events, Washington also cannot exclude the option
of recognition of the `NKR' in spite of close cooperation with Baku .
In the event of approval of such a decision from Washington, it may
follow, on the one hand, in the event of increasing trends of a
rapprochement between Armenia and the United States, and, on the other
hand, given Azerbaijan is presented with relevant "bonus
compensation".
As for the "bonus compensation", the author perceives southern
Azerbaijan. B. Asarov believes that there have recently emerged some
conditions that give reason to believe that Washington has a scenario
under which the "NKR" will get independence, and in exchange for
non-resistance to this, Azerbaijan will get a possibility to extend
its sovereignty over the territory of southern Azerbaijan, currently
part of Iran, when time is appropriate. The author believes that such
a scenario would imply a certain level of loyalty of Yerevan to
Washington and to its regional plans and the appropriate level of
complaisance by Baku. At the same time, such an option can be
implemented only after relevant transformation in Iran. Of course, the
topic of a future Iran requires special attention, but the emergence
of a situation when southern Azerbaijan is able to be incorporated
into Azerbaijan will become possible in case of the prevalence of
centrifugal tendencies in Iran caused by external and internal
factors.
"Time for Azeris in Iran to win their freedom"
It should be noted that the American political establishment has
already begun discussing the topic of southern Azerbaijan. For
example, US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher urged to support the struggle
of southern Azerbaijanis for their independence. In a letter to US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the congressman said about the
need to support the struggle for the independence of southern
Azerbaijan from Iran, in particular, noting that "now it is time for
the Azeris in Iran to win their freedom too".
If we relate the prospect of unification of northern and southern
Azerbaijan to the possible transformation of the region in the course
of implementation of the "Greater Middle East" plan, it will get a
more definite shape. But one should also understand that such
unification would lead to the creation of a strong Azerbaijan, which,
if the Karabakh issue is unresolved by that time, might pay attention
to the possibility of a military solution, and therefore, if
Washington intends to build such a configuration in the region, the
"NKR should get international recognition and relevant security
guarantees before the potential unification of Azerbaijan". The author
believes that US has already kicked out "preparations" for the
realization of such a possible scenario.
Against this background, B. Asarov believes that the 8 August
statement by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin, in
which, inter alia, he said: "I think we should focus, as before, all
our efforts on the [OSCE] Minsk Group. There is the Minsk Group, which
has co-chairs and representatives of France, the United States,
Russia, the OSCE, who work honestly and very rhythmically, go to the
region, meet with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and help them
to find acceptable wording for future documents. We fully support
these activities and hope that it will soon lead to concrete results."
Representatives of the United States, indeed, work very rhythmically,
as the development of the situation indicates, and Karasin's phrase
that "we fully support this activity and hope that it soon will lead
to concrete results" may indicate that part of the Kremlin elite is
not ready for the development and promotion of such an option for the
settlement of the Karabakh conflict, in which Russia would play a
leading role, thus, realizing not active but reactive policy in this
important region. As the Russian political scientist notes, the issue
of settlement of the Karabakh conflict is complex and multifaceted and
is linked, both directly and indirectly, with various events taking
place in international relations, and it may be noted that its
solution will lead in many respects to a qualitatively different South
Caucasus than now.
Let us turn to conclusions. So, first, as many Armenian political
experts recognize and is confirmed by analytical findings of Mr
Asarov, Russia needs Armenia as bait for reusable solutions to
regional problems of the Kremlin with Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
One can "recognize independence of the "NKR", dispatch "peacekeeping
troops" to the region and thus, try to neutralize a possible military
action on the part of Azerbaijan. But what is next? Russia, as Mr
Asarov recognizes, unlike the USA, has nothing to offer to Azerbaijan
as "bonus compensation".
Second, Russia is not interested in the collapse of Iran. The
appearance of at least 30m-strong Azerbaijan with huge resources,
besides with common borders with Turkey is certainly contrary to the
geopolitical interests of Russia. After all, the Azerbaijani-Turkish
tandem, comparable with Russia's geopolitical and huge human
resources, and taking into account the possible cooperation with the
Turkic-language states of Central Asia and materially, becomes a
reality. Russia cannot simply go this way.
Third, as our paper repeatedly noted, in case of independence of
southern Azerbaijan, the West will not just resolve a momentary and
specific problem for neutralizing the Iranian threat to their own
interests in the region, but also leaves Iran "out of the game" as a
powerful geopolitical force and creates a "sanitary belt" on Russia's
southern borders from Turkey to Central Asia. To put it simply, the
realization of this project will minimize the possibility of Russian
influence on developments in the Middle East.
Thus, Iran will no longer be a geopolitical force, although the
regional scale, able to influence the ongoing processes and Russia is
almost completely "cut off" from the Middle East.
Fourth, it is erroneous to think that once this project is realized,
the West in general, and the United States, in particular, will need
Armenia, and even more "the recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh's
independence".
In this case, the geopolitical importance of Armenia for the United
States will reduce to the fact that, if leave aside the Iranian
problem, namely the existence of the pro-Russian Armenia in the South
Caucasus will make it difficult to bring Russia's southern border
close, at least, to the Caspian Sea, the "security belt".
Moreover, this "security belt", which can in principle be made up of a
chain of Turkey-Armenia-Georgia-Azerbaijan, because of narrowness of
the breadth and the fact that it will be between the two hostile
geopolitical forces, that is to say, Russia and Iran, is rather
vulnerable that requires significant external security support. And
the realization of the above project, on the one hand, allows to
create such a "zone" without Armenia's participation, on the other
hand, completely eliminates the threat against it from the south, that
is to say, from Iran.
Europe backs Azerbaijan as stable energy supplier
Thus, the vital need to bring Armenia to this "belt" falls apart, and
as a result, granting it any "bonus compensation" in the form of the
"recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh's independence". It is no
coincidence that over recent years, Western politicians often make
"pro-Azerbaijani" statements, such as EU Energy Commissioner Guenther
Oettinger. "Azerbaijan is an important party involved in energy
issues, and an important ally for the European Union." As APA news
agency learnt from the European Azerbaijan Society, this statement was
made by EU Energy Commissioner G. Oettinger. In a pro-Azerbaijani
statement, Oettinger stressed that cooperation between the EU and
Azerbaijan is built on the solid grounds and on the basis of joint
interests.
According to him, Azerbaijan's participation in the EU Eastern
Partnership Programme is a historic milestone: "By signing the
Southern Corridor declaration, Azerbaijan has confirmed its important
role in transporting energy and a greater convergence of the
activities with the European Union. Situated on the western shore of
the Caspian Sea, the country with rich oil and gas fields is an
important base for Europe 's energy supply." At the same time, the EU
commissioner said that it is in the interest of the EU to further
support energy-producing countries, such as Azerbaijan. Guenther
Oettinger said that the resolution to the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict
is associated with it: "The task of the Europeans is to do more work
in this direction. Europe should pay more attention to Azerbaijan's
problems, which is an important energy partner for the EU countries.
Finally, the resolutions of the UN and many other international
organizations indicate that the Nagornyy Karabakh region is an
integral part of the Azerbaijani Republic."
But this does not mean that the West, in general, and the United
States, in particular, will throw Armenia on its own. Once Iran is
neutralized as a real regional geopolitical power, dependence of
Armenia from Azerbaijan and its allies will dramatically increase,
including due to the lack of transport and communication corridors
linking Armenia with the outside world. However, even in this
condition, the West, primarily the United States will insist on
mutually acceptable terms for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict,
simply in this case without addressing the possibility of manipulation
of Armenia by Russia, which has no common border with it.
Ethnicity as factor in regional stability
And finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that without resolution
of an ethnic issue, Iran will never be a factor contributing to the
regional stability. And the matter is not only in that Iran, like
Russia, is a continental empire in its classical form, although, this
is also an important factor. There are also other reasons, excluding
the "coexistence" of Azeris and Persians in a single state. And the
matter is not in the genetic and ethnic incompatibility of
Azerbaijanis-Turks and Persians.
First, the problem is that both Azerbaijanis and Persians consider
themselves constituent elements related to national development,
moreover, both in numbers and historically. It is sufficient to pay
attention to Iran's last few hundred years of history. That is, there
is, to put it mildly, a strong rivalry, moreover, in the sphere of
national-ethnic identification of the state. Under these conditions,
the constituent ethnic elements related to national development should
just be tuned to "suppression" of each other in the struggle for
power.
Second, even under most conservative calculations, the Azerbaijanis
make up about 25 per cents of Iran's population, although the leaders
of the national movement of southern Azerbaijan claim that
Azerbaijanis in Iran are much more. But let's proceed from the
parameters that are to some extent recognized by international
organizations. That is to say, we assume that the Azerbaijanis are an
ethnic minority, but their number is very large. Only the vast
majority does not fear the existence of ethnic minorities in small
masses, and is ready to provide them with all rights. And in case of
existence of a significant minority, even in developed democracies,
such as Canada, there crop up problems about self-determination. And
in Iran, taking into account the existing realities and the example of
independent Azerbaijan in any form of the state structure, the
majority will suppress basic civil rights of the minority, like the
Azerbaijanis.
Third, this unstable state in terms of national and ethnic
self-identity of the state simply requires a very aggressive
environment, moreover, both internally and externally, as observed in
Iran's example. The aggressive environment is the only factor that can
unite society. Inside the country, this is an extremely reactionary
and totalitarian and theocratic state system, depriving society of not
fragmented, for example, by means of existence of not threatening
small ethnic and religious communities, including Armenians, but
large-scale dissent and diversity. It is exactly connected with this
attempt to use Islam, in the first place, its Shi'i trend as a
unifying factor in society.
The creation of images of foreign enemies is actively cultivated not
only in the person of the "damned imperialists and Zionists", i.e.,
Western countries, primarily the USA and Israel, but also those in the
"service of the Satan", in this historical period of Turkey and other
Muslim states, including Azerbaijan, who do not agree with Iran's
foreign policy. Thus, Iran is a constant factor of instability in the
region and in the absence of real action to address the national
question within this state, it will remain so regardless of the
options for the resolution the current conflict between it and the
West.
At the same, time it should be noted that the solution to the Iranian
issue in line with the above scenario carries certain threats for
Azerbaijan, too. On many of them, especially on its outside aspects,
our newspaper wrote more than once. But there is one, moreover, of the
inner nature. The fact that the development of the processes under the
above scenario, regardless of the wishes of our ruling elite or not,
will lead to a sharp activation in society. It simply would be
impossible to avoid it.
The threat lies in the fact that because of the lack of real progress
in the development of democracy, respect for basic socio-economic,
political and other rights and freedoms of citizens, this activity
will not be aimed at neutralizing external threats but to the solution
of internal problems. And this can be simply fatal. It will not be
possible to avoid it and appeals to the manifestation of patriotism
will not help either. This problem must be solved today. It is
necessary today to achieve a minimum level of civil peace and
stability in society...
[Translated from Russian]
Aug 11 2012
Putin is being hurried to recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh
In order to be ready for the collapse of Iran
by Rauf Mirqadirov
The closer the outcome of the Syrian conflict is, the more experts are
beginning to wonder: everything is clear with Syria, but which option
will be chosen to solve the Iranian problem? That is to say, no-one
has any doubts that this problem still has to be solved one way or
another, although, a most likely scenario will be the use of force.
Disputes, in essence, are on tools to be used in this case that will
at the end predetermine a reformatted version of the geopolitical
balance of forces in the region.
Ethnic factor in Iran
Here it is necessary to bear in mind that the option of a "velvet
revolution", that is to say, attempts to transform the theocratic
regime into something acceptable for the West, above all, as they say,
has failed from within in the latest presidential election [in Iran].
Moreover, most experts believe that the failure was due to the fact
that ethnic Azerbaijanis, to be more precise, the southern Azerbaijan
refused to support the "velvet revolution". And this was despite the
fact that the presidential candidate, who tried to lead the "velvet
revolution", that is to say, Mirhoseyn Musavi, is an ethnic
Azerbaijani. And it is not that ethnic Azerbaijanis were against
democratic changes. The author of these lines happens to communicate
with representatives of the national movement of the southern
Azerbaijan in Ankara , moreover, with representatives of different
political trends. Despite their political differences, they all said
virtually the same: first, the Azerbaijanis consider neither Musavi,
nor the current Supreme Leader of the IRI Ali Khamene'i as "theirs".
Second, Azerbaijanis are not going to participate in the
"reproduction" process of the Persian state. To put it simply,
Azerbaijanis in Iran are not going to participate in projects that do
not take into account their interests. And as experience shows any
attempt to transform Iran from within without Azerbaijanis are doomed
to failure. There remains a military solution to the problem. Given
this, there remains another question: what is next? What future of
Iran is to the best interests of the West, moreover, taking into
account the need for the establishment of sustainable stability in the
region? Here emerges a project of collapsing the IRI as an empire and
the creation of new nation-states that in the end, as often our paper
writes, will allow solving several problems at once, precluding Iran
from the geopolitical balance of forces as a destabilising factor.
Russian prospect
Russian political analysts believe it is no coincidence that right now
in Washington, that is to say, ahead of resolving the Iranian issue,
they reminded of the need to consider the interests of ethnic Turks
(Azerbaijanis - ed.) living in southern Azerbaijan. Russian political
expert Boris Asarov in his article "The Karabakh conflict and
`rebalancing' of the South Caucasus" published by Regnum news agency,
notes that gradually changing international situation in the course of
the realization of a "Greater Middle East" project has brought about
preconditions for certain changes in the political situation in the
Caucasus. We can say that "a request for cooperation" from Washington
has become more intense, despite the fact that "formalities" that
accompany the intensification of the relations have become less
"burdensome" for the states whose democratic systems are not a model
in the observance of all norms and standards of democracy. According
to him, Baku did not fail to take this opportunity to get closer and
even more "gain the grace" of Washington , also hoping for the support
of the United States in the settlement of the Karabakh problem.
In its turn, this could not but affect the policy pursued by Yerevan.
"One of the main priorities of Armenia's foreign policy, that is to
say, friendly relations with Russia and membership of the CSTO [the
Collective Security Treaty Organization], is the settlement of the
Karabakh conflict through the recognition of the "NKR", and this
priority is a sort of "categorical imperative" of its foreign policy.
The important role that Russia plays in the Caucasus also implies the
presence of the certain political will while projecting its interests,
of course, taking into account the interests of the regional
countries. In this regard, the 9 July statement of the former head of
the Russian presidential administration, Sergey Naryshkin, who had
held this post under [former] Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev, made
during his official visit to Baku in his capacity as the chairman of
the State Duma, is strange.
In particular, Naryshkin said: "We are opposed to the resolution of
the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict in line with ready recipes aside. We
firmly believe that this problem can be solved if interests of both
parties are met. If such a way is found to solve it, Russia is ready
to act as a guarantor of this agreement. But the responsibility for
resolving the conflict again lies with the peoples of Azerbaijan and
Armenia." In regard to the status of Karabakh, there can only be one
solution, which, if implemented at an appropriate level, will not
cause the resumption of the armed phase of the conflict, namely, the
recognition of the "NKR". And such a decision can take place on a
"recipe aside", as it is obvious that Baku independently does not have
a relevant incentive to adapt the change of the trend in the issue of
the Karabakh resolution and may do so subject only to the position of
the major international actors, of course, with the assurance of
obtaining appropriate "bonus compensation", says the author.
And "securing the interests of the parties", as mentioned by
Naryshkin, according to B. Asarov, can be realized for all by efforts
of influential international actors. The phrase: "If such a way is
found to solve it" does not at all differ with diplomatic elegance, as
it states the lack of understanding on how one can get to the final
settlement of the conflict by meeting the interests of all parties.
And the statement that looks like a formal justification that "the
responsibility for resolving the conflict again lies with the peoples
of Azerbaijan and Armenia" poorly fits into the scheme of public
presentation of the Russian interests, as this statement of Naryshkin
de facto states that Russia, they say, will not be actively engaged in
the settlement of the Karabakh conflict and withdraws from the process
independently.
As the author notes, the Karabakh issue has a number of nuances, and
the main one is "how the `NKR' can be recognized internationally". "As
you know, as of now the `NKR' is not officially recognized by Armenia
, and this is not done because of Yerevan's reluctance to provoke an
armed conflict that could flare up after such a decision. Yes, there
is an option, under which Moscow, in exchange for the membership of
Armenia and the "NKR" of its patronized Eurasia structures, could
recognize the "NKR" after its recognition by Armenia and bring
peacekeeping forces to the territory of Karabakh to ensure the
security of the republic. However, this raises several questions: what
kind of "bonus compensation" is Moscow ready to give to Azerbaijan;
how Turkey's "tacit approval" and the qualitative international
recognition of the "NKR" will be achieved. Perhaps, exactly being not
ready for such a comprehensive approach in Naryshkin's presentation
became the basis for his statements about the "recipes aside", says B.
Asarov.
But such a state of affairs, when, on the one hand, Moscow does not
present a clearly defined comprehensive strategy to resolve the
conflict, on the other hand, Azerbaijan is increasingly moving closer
to the USA, forces Armenia to pay attention to Washington as the
guarantor of a possible resumption of the armed phase of the conflict.
It should be understood that for Washington it is far more important
to bring closer to itself Armenia than to return Karabakh to
Azerbaijan: "And, moreover, among the possible scenarios of
development of the events, Washington also cannot exclude the option
of recognition of the `NKR' in spite of close cooperation with Baku .
In the event of approval of such a decision from Washington, it may
follow, on the one hand, in the event of increasing trends of a
rapprochement between Armenia and the United States, and, on the other
hand, given Azerbaijan is presented with relevant "bonus
compensation".
As for the "bonus compensation", the author perceives southern
Azerbaijan. B. Asarov believes that there have recently emerged some
conditions that give reason to believe that Washington has a scenario
under which the "NKR" will get independence, and in exchange for
non-resistance to this, Azerbaijan will get a possibility to extend
its sovereignty over the territory of southern Azerbaijan, currently
part of Iran, when time is appropriate. The author believes that such
a scenario would imply a certain level of loyalty of Yerevan to
Washington and to its regional plans and the appropriate level of
complaisance by Baku. At the same time, such an option can be
implemented only after relevant transformation in Iran. Of course, the
topic of a future Iran requires special attention, but the emergence
of a situation when southern Azerbaijan is able to be incorporated
into Azerbaijan will become possible in case of the prevalence of
centrifugal tendencies in Iran caused by external and internal
factors.
"Time for Azeris in Iran to win their freedom"
It should be noted that the American political establishment has
already begun discussing the topic of southern Azerbaijan. For
example, US Congressman Dana Rohrabacher urged to support the struggle
of southern Azerbaijanis for their independence. In a letter to US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the congressman said about the
need to support the struggle for the independence of southern
Azerbaijan from Iran, in particular, noting that "now it is time for
the Azeris in Iran to win their freedom too".
If we relate the prospect of unification of northern and southern
Azerbaijan to the possible transformation of the region in the course
of implementation of the "Greater Middle East" plan, it will get a
more definite shape. But one should also understand that such
unification would lead to the creation of a strong Azerbaijan, which,
if the Karabakh issue is unresolved by that time, might pay attention
to the possibility of a military solution, and therefore, if
Washington intends to build such a configuration in the region, the
"NKR should get international recognition and relevant security
guarantees before the potential unification of Azerbaijan". The author
believes that US has already kicked out "preparations" for the
realization of such a possible scenario.
Against this background, B. Asarov believes that the 8 August
statement by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigoriy Karasin, in
which, inter alia, he said: "I think we should focus, as before, all
our efforts on the [OSCE] Minsk Group. There is the Minsk Group, which
has co-chairs and representatives of France, the United States,
Russia, the OSCE, who work honestly and very rhythmically, go to the
region, meet with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and help them
to find acceptable wording for future documents. We fully support
these activities and hope that it will soon lead to concrete results."
Representatives of the United States, indeed, work very rhythmically,
as the development of the situation indicates, and Karasin's phrase
that "we fully support this activity and hope that it soon will lead
to concrete results" may indicate that part of the Kremlin elite is
not ready for the development and promotion of such an option for the
settlement of the Karabakh conflict, in which Russia would play a
leading role, thus, realizing not active but reactive policy in this
important region. As the Russian political scientist notes, the issue
of settlement of the Karabakh conflict is complex and multifaceted and
is linked, both directly and indirectly, with various events taking
place in international relations, and it may be noted that its
solution will lead in many respects to a qualitatively different South
Caucasus than now.
Let us turn to conclusions. So, first, as many Armenian political
experts recognize and is confirmed by analytical findings of Mr
Asarov, Russia needs Armenia as bait for reusable solutions to
regional problems of the Kremlin with Georgia, Turkey and Azerbaijan.
One can "recognize independence of the "NKR", dispatch "peacekeeping
troops" to the region and thus, try to neutralize a possible military
action on the part of Azerbaijan. But what is next? Russia, as Mr
Asarov recognizes, unlike the USA, has nothing to offer to Azerbaijan
as "bonus compensation".
Second, Russia is not interested in the collapse of Iran. The
appearance of at least 30m-strong Azerbaijan with huge resources,
besides with common borders with Turkey is certainly contrary to the
geopolitical interests of Russia. After all, the Azerbaijani-Turkish
tandem, comparable with Russia's geopolitical and huge human
resources, and taking into account the possible cooperation with the
Turkic-language states of Central Asia and materially, becomes a
reality. Russia cannot simply go this way.
Third, as our paper repeatedly noted, in case of independence of
southern Azerbaijan, the West will not just resolve a momentary and
specific problem for neutralizing the Iranian threat to their own
interests in the region, but also leaves Iran "out of the game" as a
powerful geopolitical force and creates a "sanitary belt" on Russia's
southern borders from Turkey to Central Asia. To put it simply, the
realization of this project will minimize the possibility of Russian
influence on developments in the Middle East.
Thus, Iran will no longer be a geopolitical force, although the
regional scale, able to influence the ongoing processes and Russia is
almost completely "cut off" from the Middle East.
Fourth, it is erroneous to think that once this project is realized,
the West in general, and the United States, in particular, will need
Armenia, and even more "the recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh's
independence".
In this case, the geopolitical importance of Armenia for the United
States will reduce to the fact that, if leave aside the Iranian
problem, namely the existence of the pro-Russian Armenia in the South
Caucasus will make it difficult to bring Russia's southern border
close, at least, to the Caspian Sea, the "security belt".
Moreover, this "security belt", which can in principle be made up of a
chain of Turkey-Armenia-Georgia-Azerbaijan, because of narrowness of
the breadth and the fact that it will be between the two hostile
geopolitical forces, that is to say, Russia and Iran, is rather
vulnerable that requires significant external security support. And
the realization of the above project, on the one hand, allows to
create such a "zone" without Armenia's participation, on the other
hand, completely eliminates the threat against it from the south, that
is to say, from Iran.
Europe backs Azerbaijan as stable energy supplier
Thus, the vital need to bring Armenia to this "belt" falls apart, and
as a result, granting it any "bonus compensation" in the form of the
"recognition of Nagornyy Karabakh's independence". It is no
coincidence that over recent years, Western politicians often make
"pro-Azerbaijani" statements, such as EU Energy Commissioner Guenther
Oettinger. "Azerbaijan is an important party involved in energy
issues, and an important ally for the European Union." As APA news
agency learnt from the European Azerbaijan Society, this statement was
made by EU Energy Commissioner G. Oettinger. In a pro-Azerbaijani
statement, Oettinger stressed that cooperation between the EU and
Azerbaijan is built on the solid grounds and on the basis of joint
interests.
According to him, Azerbaijan's participation in the EU Eastern
Partnership Programme is a historic milestone: "By signing the
Southern Corridor declaration, Azerbaijan has confirmed its important
role in transporting energy and a greater convergence of the
activities with the European Union. Situated on the western shore of
the Caspian Sea, the country with rich oil and gas fields is an
important base for Europe 's energy supply." At the same time, the EU
commissioner said that it is in the interest of the EU to further
support energy-producing countries, such as Azerbaijan. Guenther
Oettinger said that the resolution to the Nagornyy Karabakh conflict
is associated with it: "The task of the Europeans is to do more work
in this direction. Europe should pay more attention to Azerbaijan's
problems, which is an important energy partner for the EU countries.
Finally, the resolutions of the UN and many other international
organizations indicate that the Nagornyy Karabakh region is an
integral part of the Azerbaijani Republic."
But this does not mean that the West, in general, and the United
States, in particular, will throw Armenia on its own. Once Iran is
neutralized as a real regional geopolitical power, dependence of
Armenia from Azerbaijan and its allies will dramatically increase,
including due to the lack of transport and communication corridors
linking Armenia with the outside world. However, even in this
condition, the West, primarily the United States will insist on
mutually acceptable terms for the settlement of the Karabakh conflict,
simply in this case without addressing the possibility of manipulation
of Armenia by Russia, which has no common border with it.
Ethnicity as factor in regional stability
And finally, it is necessary to bear in mind that without resolution
of an ethnic issue, Iran will never be a factor contributing to the
regional stability. And the matter is not only in that Iran, like
Russia, is a continental empire in its classical form, although, this
is also an important factor. There are also other reasons, excluding
the "coexistence" of Azeris and Persians in a single state. And the
matter is not in the genetic and ethnic incompatibility of
Azerbaijanis-Turks and Persians.
First, the problem is that both Azerbaijanis and Persians consider
themselves constituent elements related to national development,
moreover, both in numbers and historically. It is sufficient to pay
attention to Iran's last few hundred years of history. That is, there
is, to put it mildly, a strong rivalry, moreover, in the sphere of
national-ethnic identification of the state. Under these conditions,
the constituent ethnic elements related to national development should
just be tuned to "suppression" of each other in the struggle for
power.
Second, even under most conservative calculations, the Azerbaijanis
make up about 25 per cents of Iran's population, although the leaders
of the national movement of southern Azerbaijan claim that
Azerbaijanis in Iran are much more. But let's proceed from the
parameters that are to some extent recognized by international
organizations. That is to say, we assume that the Azerbaijanis are an
ethnic minority, but their number is very large. Only the vast
majority does not fear the existence of ethnic minorities in small
masses, and is ready to provide them with all rights. And in case of
existence of a significant minority, even in developed democracies,
such as Canada, there crop up problems about self-determination. And
in Iran, taking into account the existing realities and the example of
independent Azerbaijan in any form of the state structure, the
majority will suppress basic civil rights of the minority, like the
Azerbaijanis.
Third, this unstable state in terms of national and ethnic
self-identity of the state simply requires a very aggressive
environment, moreover, both internally and externally, as observed in
Iran's example. The aggressive environment is the only factor that can
unite society. Inside the country, this is an extremely reactionary
and totalitarian and theocratic state system, depriving society of not
fragmented, for example, by means of existence of not threatening
small ethnic and religious communities, including Armenians, but
large-scale dissent and diversity. It is exactly connected with this
attempt to use Islam, in the first place, its Shi'i trend as a
unifying factor in society.
The creation of images of foreign enemies is actively cultivated not
only in the person of the "damned imperialists and Zionists", i.e.,
Western countries, primarily the USA and Israel, but also those in the
"service of the Satan", in this historical period of Turkey and other
Muslim states, including Azerbaijan, who do not agree with Iran's
foreign policy. Thus, Iran is a constant factor of instability in the
region and in the absence of real action to address the national
question within this state, it will remain so regardless of the
options for the resolution the current conflict between it and the
West.
At the same, time it should be noted that the solution to the Iranian
issue in line with the above scenario carries certain threats for
Azerbaijan, too. On many of them, especially on its outside aspects,
our newspaper wrote more than once. But there is one, moreover, of the
inner nature. The fact that the development of the processes under the
above scenario, regardless of the wishes of our ruling elite or not,
will lead to a sharp activation in society. It simply would be
impossible to avoid it.
The threat lies in the fact that because of the lack of real progress
in the development of democracy, respect for basic socio-economic,
political and other rights and freedoms of citizens, this activity
will not be aimed at neutralizing external threats but to the solution
of internal problems. And this can be simply fatal. It will not be
possible to avoid it and appeals to the manifestation of patriotism
will not help either. This problem must be solved today. It is
necessary today to achieve a minimum level of civil peace and
stability in society...
[Translated from Russian]