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The Day Weekly Digest, Ukraine
Aug 21 2012
Iran's base ingratitude
Moscow threatens to stop supporting Tehran
By Yurii RAIKHEL
Relations between Russia and Iran are strained after Tehran lawsuit
over Moscow's refusal to deliver S-300 long-range surface-to-air
missile systems.
Under a contract made toward the end of 2007, Russia was to deliver to
Iran five S-300 PMU-1 battalions worth some 800 million dollars. On
September 22, 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev signed the edict `On
Measures to Implement UN Security Council Resolution No. 1929, of June
9, 2010.' This resolution imposes a `ban on all countries providing
military vehicles, aircraft or warships and missiles or missile
systems and related materiel to Iran.' Russia returned the
167-million-dollar advance to Iran, but this did not satisfy Tehran.
The Iranian defense ministry and [the state-run company] Aerospace
Industries Organization filed a lawsuit with the International Court
of Arbitration, claiming 4 billion dollars in damages.
In court, Russia will reiterate that it simply had to comply with the
UN SC resolution enforcing sanctions on Iran. When proved that the UN
ban extends to the kind of weapons systems Russia was to deliver to
Iran, its Rusoboronexport government-run arms-dealing company's
refusal to deliver would be recognized as legally valid, contract
notwithstanding.
Iran wants to argue precisely this clause in court, saying Dmitry
Medvedev's edict inflicted more rigid sanctions on that country than
those provided for by the UN resolution.
Legally speaking, neither side argues a clear-cut case. Russia is
doing its utmost to persuade Iran to retract the lawsuit, as evidenced
by the talks in Tehran and Moscow, exchanges of views, and careful
pressure being applied on all levels.
Four billion isn't the point, of course. Although a hefty sum, Moscow
can afford it. The conflict would have been settled somehow or other,
had money been the only point at issue. There are politics, status,
and reputation involved. According to Rajab Safarov, director of the
Center for Modern Iranian Studies (Moscow), what Tehran wants from
Moscow is not money but a renewal of arms exports: `Iran claims the
status of a regional superpower; Russia's refusal to deliver the SAM
systems, so badly needed by Iran, was regarded as a slap in the face,
in full public view.'
Dr. Vladimir Sazhin, senior research fellow with the Russian Academy
of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, believes that Russia is
interested in Geneva arbitration hearings: `What we have now is talks
being held between Moscow and Tehran, kept away from the public eye as
much as reasonably possible, aimed at convincing Iran to retract the
lawsuit. One can also hear about Moscow counting on this arbitration
to make the S-300 deliveries to Iran possible afterward, quiet and
effective.'
An option that shouldn't be shrugged off, even if rated low as
practical. To begin with, Russia is the world's number-two arms
exporter. Without arbitration hearings, Moscow would sustain a heavy
blow on the international arms market. Both sides know this only too
well. Second, no one in the Kremlin will succumb to psychological
pressure because this is simply impossible, regardless of the source,
be it domestic opposition or foreign forces at play. What causes sour
faces there is the fact that Moscow has always backed up Tehran, using
every opportunity to torpedo international attempts to combat Iran's
nuclear program. Naturally, the Kremlin regards Tehran's S-300
delivery lawsuit as base ingratitude.
Kommersant, Russia's government-run periodical, quotes an
administration source as saying: `We have already made it clear to
Iran that lawsuits are not helping the development of our relations...
but our requests to retract these documents from court went
unnoticed.' This source also says the Iranian opposition is forcing
the Russian leadership to take countermeasures; that Moscow is
prepared to stop supporting Tehran's nuclear program: `Prior to the
next session of the six international mediators, we will try to make
our position heard once again by sending a government delegation to
Tehran... And if Iran once again refuses to do so, it will have to sort
out its nuclear issues in the international arena on its own.'
Russia's Foreign Ministry is said to have instructed the diplomats to
maintain this stand.
In fact, Iran's leadership appears to have taken a rather strange,
illogical position. Why irritate Moscow, given Iran's current
diplomatic isolation, with no neutral sides, let alone allies? This
ought to have persuaded Tehran to maintain some relationships with a
powerful Caspian neighbor.
The ayatollahs appear to have their own goals in mind. They seem to
believe that Russia just can't side with any of Iran's enemies without
losing face; that Russia's relationships with the United States, the
West in general, are getting increasingly confrontational, so that, by
confronting Russia, Iran stands a fair chance of emerging as an
independent contestant in this global power play; that Iran will have
to be reckoned with before too long.
There is also the Caspian Sea factor. Moscow and Tehran basically
agree on the Caspian partition idea - and this is rather important for
the Kremlin, considering the area's strategic significance.
Iran has played into Russia's hands by supporting Armenia, wrecking
its blockade during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Something the Kremlin
can't shrug off.
Tehran is well aware that, if and when Iran joins in the blockade of
Armenia, Moscow will be hard put to support its ally in the South
Caucasus. Should the Moscow-Tehran relationships go from bad to worse,
with the worst consequences surfacing in Armenia, there would be
enough politicians in Yerevan prepared to chart a new political
course, in which case Russia would have no room left in the Caucasus.
The Kremlin is in a very difficult situation, with any rash decision
resulting in disastrous consequences for the kind of policy Moscow has
been waging in regard to this part of the globe. Russia planted the
dragon's teeth during the armed conflict with Georgia, also during the
Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Both sides are supposed to realize the grim consequences of this
scandal, that they have crossed the line, indeed.
The Iranian Ambassador to Russia told Izvestia that Tehran is looking
to recover 900 million dollars from Russia, not 4 billion dollars as
reported. Ambassador Sajjadi explained the extra 3 billion dollars was
a `punishment for Russia' that was added by the Geneva Court of
Arbitration `without the knowledge of the Iranian side and against its
will.' Any lawyer will tell you this could have never happened
legally.
Denis Arkhipov, chief legal consultant with Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev
& Partners, told Kommersant (Moscow) that the judges involved in
arbitration lawsuits are not permitted to make any statements before
the final ruling. Most likely, the Iranian ambassador's statement was
a kind of diplomatic maneuver, probably the first attempt to find a
way out of what had evolved into as a perfect diplomatic cul-de-sac.
Whatever the outcome of the Moscow-Tehran-S-300-delivery talks, this
will not make the relations between Russia and Iran better.
Who is to blame? The Kremlin, to be sure. They had it coming.
http://www.day.kiev.ua/233624
Aug 21 2012
Iran's base ingratitude
Moscow threatens to stop supporting Tehran
By Yurii RAIKHEL
Relations between Russia and Iran are strained after Tehran lawsuit
over Moscow's refusal to deliver S-300 long-range surface-to-air
missile systems.
Under a contract made toward the end of 2007, Russia was to deliver to
Iran five S-300 PMU-1 battalions worth some 800 million dollars. On
September 22, 2010, President Dmitry Medvedev signed the edict `On
Measures to Implement UN Security Council Resolution No. 1929, of June
9, 2010.' This resolution imposes a `ban on all countries providing
military vehicles, aircraft or warships and missiles or missile
systems and related materiel to Iran.' Russia returned the
167-million-dollar advance to Iran, but this did not satisfy Tehran.
The Iranian defense ministry and [the state-run company] Aerospace
Industries Organization filed a lawsuit with the International Court
of Arbitration, claiming 4 billion dollars in damages.
In court, Russia will reiterate that it simply had to comply with the
UN SC resolution enforcing sanctions on Iran. When proved that the UN
ban extends to the kind of weapons systems Russia was to deliver to
Iran, its Rusoboronexport government-run arms-dealing company's
refusal to deliver would be recognized as legally valid, contract
notwithstanding.
Iran wants to argue precisely this clause in court, saying Dmitry
Medvedev's edict inflicted more rigid sanctions on that country than
those provided for by the UN resolution.
Legally speaking, neither side argues a clear-cut case. Russia is
doing its utmost to persuade Iran to retract the lawsuit, as evidenced
by the talks in Tehran and Moscow, exchanges of views, and careful
pressure being applied on all levels.
Four billion isn't the point, of course. Although a hefty sum, Moscow
can afford it. The conflict would have been settled somehow or other,
had money been the only point at issue. There are politics, status,
and reputation involved. According to Rajab Safarov, director of the
Center for Modern Iranian Studies (Moscow), what Tehran wants from
Moscow is not money but a renewal of arms exports: `Iran claims the
status of a regional superpower; Russia's refusal to deliver the SAM
systems, so badly needed by Iran, was regarded as a slap in the face,
in full public view.'
Dr. Vladimir Sazhin, senior research fellow with the Russian Academy
of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, believes that Russia is
interested in Geneva arbitration hearings: `What we have now is talks
being held between Moscow and Tehran, kept away from the public eye as
much as reasonably possible, aimed at convincing Iran to retract the
lawsuit. One can also hear about Moscow counting on this arbitration
to make the S-300 deliveries to Iran possible afterward, quiet and
effective.'
An option that shouldn't be shrugged off, even if rated low as
practical. To begin with, Russia is the world's number-two arms
exporter. Without arbitration hearings, Moscow would sustain a heavy
blow on the international arms market. Both sides know this only too
well. Second, no one in the Kremlin will succumb to psychological
pressure because this is simply impossible, regardless of the source,
be it domestic opposition or foreign forces at play. What causes sour
faces there is the fact that Moscow has always backed up Tehran, using
every opportunity to torpedo international attempts to combat Iran's
nuclear program. Naturally, the Kremlin regards Tehran's S-300
delivery lawsuit as base ingratitude.
Kommersant, Russia's government-run periodical, quotes an
administration source as saying: `We have already made it clear to
Iran that lawsuits are not helping the development of our relations...
but our requests to retract these documents from court went
unnoticed.' This source also says the Iranian opposition is forcing
the Russian leadership to take countermeasures; that Moscow is
prepared to stop supporting Tehran's nuclear program: `Prior to the
next session of the six international mediators, we will try to make
our position heard once again by sending a government delegation to
Tehran... And if Iran once again refuses to do so, it will have to sort
out its nuclear issues in the international arena on its own.'
Russia's Foreign Ministry is said to have instructed the diplomats to
maintain this stand.
In fact, Iran's leadership appears to have taken a rather strange,
illogical position. Why irritate Moscow, given Iran's current
diplomatic isolation, with no neutral sides, let alone allies? This
ought to have persuaded Tehran to maintain some relationships with a
powerful Caspian neighbor.
The ayatollahs appear to have their own goals in mind. They seem to
believe that Russia just can't side with any of Iran's enemies without
losing face; that Russia's relationships with the United States, the
West in general, are getting increasingly confrontational, so that, by
confronting Russia, Iran stands a fair chance of emerging as an
independent contestant in this global power play; that Iran will have
to be reckoned with before too long.
There is also the Caspian Sea factor. Moscow and Tehran basically
agree on the Caspian partition idea - and this is rather important for
the Kremlin, considering the area's strategic significance.
Iran has played into Russia's hands by supporting Armenia, wrecking
its blockade during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Something the Kremlin
can't shrug off.
Tehran is well aware that, if and when Iran joins in the blockade of
Armenia, Moscow will be hard put to support its ally in the South
Caucasus. Should the Moscow-Tehran relationships go from bad to worse,
with the worst consequences surfacing in Armenia, there would be
enough politicians in Yerevan prepared to chart a new political
course, in which case Russia would have no room left in the Caucasus.
The Kremlin is in a very difficult situation, with any rash decision
resulting in disastrous consequences for the kind of policy Moscow has
been waging in regard to this part of the globe. Russia planted the
dragon's teeth during the armed conflict with Georgia, also during the
Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Both sides are supposed to realize the grim consequences of this
scandal, that they have crossed the line, indeed.
The Iranian Ambassador to Russia told Izvestia that Tehran is looking
to recover 900 million dollars from Russia, not 4 billion dollars as
reported. Ambassador Sajjadi explained the extra 3 billion dollars was
a `punishment for Russia' that was added by the Geneva Court of
Arbitration `without the knowledge of the Iranian side and against its
will.' Any lawyer will tell you this could have never happened
legally.
Denis Arkhipov, chief legal consultant with Egorov Puginsky Afanasiev
& Partners, told Kommersant (Moscow) that the judges involved in
arbitration lawsuits are not permitted to make any statements before
the final ruling. Most likely, the Iranian ambassador's statement was
a kind of diplomatic maneuver, probably the first attempt to find a
way out of what had evolved into as a perfect diplomatic cul-de-sac.
Whatever the outcome of the Moscow-Tehran-S-300-delivery talks, this
will not make the relations between Russia and Iran better.
Who is to blame? The Kremlin, to be sure. They had it coming.
http://www.day.kiev.ua/233624