Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Aug 24 2012
Metsamor - The Fukushima of the Caucasus?
Friday, 24 August 2012
by Rafiga Gurbanzade, Contributor
Last year's catastrophic earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Japan
and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown highlighted the
importance of a diligent assessment of nuclear power plants (NPP) to
endure ground shakings or possible displacements [1]. According to the
USGS, around 90 to 95 percent of the world's earthquakes occur on the
boundaries of the tectonic plates as a way of releasing energy that
builds up through the plate interaction [2]. While the knowledge about
interaction of tectonic plates helps to identify seismically active
regions, predicting an exact place and time of an earthquake remains
impossible. This diminishes the chances of a proper warning and
evacuation of populations ahead of a catastrophe. The problem is even
more severe in countries with economic hardships [3].
Similar to Japan, the South Caucasus region of Eurasia is a zone of
high seismic activity. The Arabian and Eurasian tectonic plates
collide here generating regular destructive earthquakes across the
Caucasus, eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran[4]. On December 7,
1988, two ground shocks with three seconds apart left at least 25,000
people dead, 19,000 injured and 500,000 homeless in the
Leninakan-Spitak-Kirovakan area of northern Armenia, then a Soviet
republic.The magnitude of the earthquake was estimated at 6.8, while
the damage was estimated at about 16.2 billion U.S. dollars. The
disaster severely damaged infrastructure within the affected areas of
Armenia and the neighboring Kelbajar region of Azerbaijan. The shocks
were felt in Armenia's capital, Yerevan, in neighboring Georgia and as
far as the Russian North Caucasus [5].Following the catastrophe,
concerns intensified over the only NPP built by the Soviet government
in the Caucasus region - the Metsamor (also known as Oktemberyan) NPP
in Armenia.Built in 1976 with two VVER-440 Model V230 nuclear
reactors, the structures of the plant resembled those of the Chernobyl
NPP [6].
In the former Soviet Union, the most commonly constructed reactors
were the RBMK and VVER. The RBMK reactor, which was utilized in
Chernobyl and exploded in April 1986, was a water-cooled and
graphite-moderated reactor. In this type of reactors, the fuel
elements can be exchanged while the reactors are powered. Such
reactors are considered to be the world's most dangerous because of
the risk of a fire in the graphite moderator and the absence of safety
containment [7]. The VVERs are known as pressurized water reactors
that utilize light water as both the moderator and the coolant [8].
These reactors were developed in three generations. The first
generation was developed in 1960s (reactor 440/230), the second, in
early 1980s (reactor 440/213), and the third in late 1980s
(reactor1000). The first two generations of VVER-440 are thought by
the international experts to be the unsafe of all three because the
reactors had no safety containment. Also, the cooling systems were
considered to be unsafe [9].
Similar to Chernobyl's RBMK, the VVER-440 reactors of Metsamor lack
safety containment structures and are single-walled. The function of a
single-walled containment is to carry the pressure load preventing it
from rising above the designed pressure limit [10].Compared to the
single-wall containment, the double-wall containment better controls
any possible leakage through the inner containment by collecting it in
`the annulus between inner and outer shell' [11]. Therefore, in case
of an accident, a double-walled containment would maintain the leakage
under a negative pressure, which would facilitate the collection,
filtering and rejection of the radioactive leakages. Hence, lacking
key safety features, single-walled RBMK and VVER type reactors present
a high risk of radioactive release during an accident [12].
After the 1988 earthquake, in fear of Chernobyl-like disasters, the
Metsamor NPP was shut down. But the urge to reopen it arose during the
1991-94 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the
Armenian forces occupied parts of Azerbaijan, the latter blocked
energy supplies, leaving Armenia's population without electricity
during the harsh winter seasons. Subsequently, Armenian authorities
were forced to reopen the two Metsamor reactors in 1993 and 1995 [13].
Since 2003, the NPP has been operated by the Russian Inter RAO UES,
owned by Russia's State Nuclear Energy Corporation (RosAtom), in
return for repaying Armenia's $40 million debt to the Russian
nuclear-fuel suppliers [14].
Located in a highly active seismic zone and built according to the
outdated Soviet standards, the Metsamor became a subject of severe
safety concerns from Armenia's neighbors - Turkey, whose border is
only 10 miles away from the NPP, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Numerous
requests by these countries to permit their specialists for examining
the plant were declined [15]. In 2011, Azerbaijan moved for a
resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
stating that Armenia had refused `the EU's call for Metsamor to be
shut down by 2011 at the latest and its offer of 100 million euros to
help meet the country's energy needs' [16]. Further, the motion noted
that in case of an accident at the Metsamor NPP, destructive
consequences in Armenia, the South Caucasus, the Middle East and
Europe would be inevitable.
Armenian government asserts that the shutdown of the old reactors is
expected in 2016 after a new facility will be built. Nevertheless, a
risk of an accident during the coming four years continues to put
Armenia under pressure [17]. In response to renewed concerns after the
Fukushima Daiichi disaster, the Armenian government invited inspectors
from the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). The IAEA assembled
and sent an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of 11 experts. In
its June 2011 report, the OSART noted `good plant practices' at the
Metsamor and highlighted that `during the last number of years,
several important safety systems have been updated using resources of
the plant's staff' (IAEA Press Release). However, the OSART report
also found a number of deficiencies and the head of OSART mission,
Gabor Vamos, claimed that identifying deficiencies in need of an
urgent repair is a challenge to the Metsamor technicians. He also
suggested that a more meticulous mechanism is needed to keep the plant
in an ideal state [18].
Despite the inspection, the EU continues still insist `on the earliest
possible closure of the Metsamor NPP and on the adoption of a detailed
decommissioning plan based on the [OSART] tests.' As stated further in
the European Neighborhood Policy Package, Country Progress Report (for
Armenia) of May 2012, the Metsamor NPP `cannot be upgraded to meet the
internationally recognized nuclear safety standard' [19]. According to
the All-Armenian Association of Power Specialists, Slavik Sargsian,
`if a hazardous situation emerges at our plant, we have neither the
capabilities nor the specialists to fight back' [20].
In 2010, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the EU
strategy for the South Caucasus [2009/221([INI)], in which it
encouraged the Armenian authorities `to seek viable alternative
solutions for energy supplies.' However, Russia now advances plans for
a new NPP at the same location as the Metsamor and intends to
generously invest in its construction. Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of
RosAtom, recently said that his agency is ready to commit 20-25% of
investments and more options could be discussed [21].
Despite the mounting international pressure, Armenia is unlikely to
shutdown the Metsamor NPP in a visible future. Firstly, the plant
remains a critical source supplying some 40% of Armenia's energy
demand amidst the ongoing conflict with neighboring energy-rich
Azerbaijan. Secondly, the Metsamor NPP is owned and operated by
Russia, which, in turn, is interested in using the plant as a trump
card for defending its remaining strategic positions in the Caucasus.
The closure of the Metsamor NPP is only possible if Armenia resolves
its conflicts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, hence opening the country to
the East-West Energy Corridor architected by the United States. This
would deal a major blow to Russia's classical divide-and-conquer
policy in the Caucasus, removing the last obstacle to region's
economic integration with the West. As shown by its 2008 invasion of
Georgia, Russia is ready to prevent this scenario at any cost. Based
on the same logic, Russian government will spare no effort to keep the
Metsamor NPP running for as long as possible even if the plant poses
the gravest environmental threat to the region.
References
1. Kanaori, Y. (1997). Earthquake Proof Design and Active Faults.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
2. Historic Earthquakes. Earthquake Hazards Program. U.S. Department
of the Interior. (23 July 2012).
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1988_12_07_ev.php
3. Balassanian, S., Cisternas A., & Melkumyan M. (2000). Earthquake
Hazard and Seismic Risk Reduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 169.
4. Tan, O. & Taymaz, T. (2005). Active Tectonics of the Caucasus:
Earthquake Source Mechanisms and Rupture Histories Obtained From
Inversion of Teleseismic Body Waveforms. Geological Society of America
Special Papers, 409, 531-578.
http://specialpapers.gsapubs.org/content/409/531.abstract
5. Historic Earthquakes. Earthquake Hazards Program. U.S. Department
of the Interior. (23 July 2012).
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1988_12_07.php
6. Aloise G. & Jones G. L. (2000). Nuclear Safety: Concerns With the
Continuing Operation of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Reactors. Report
to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: United
States General Accounting Office, 80.
7. Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries
(Algeria-Germany).Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook. (2011).
Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication, 49.
8. Technology & Soviet Energy Availability. (1979). Congress of the
United States: Technology Assessment. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 116.
9. Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries
(Algeria-Germany). Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook. (2011).
Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication, 49.
10. Sehgal, B. R. (2012). Nuclear Safety in Light Water Reactors:
Severe Accident Phenomenology. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 283.
11. Nuclear Containments: State-of-art Report. (2001). Lausanne,
Switzerland: International Federation for Structural Concrete, 21.
12. Environment in the Transition to a Market Economy: Progress in
Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States.
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (1999). Paris:
OECD, 241.
13. Armenia: A Country Study. Library of Congress. Federal Research
Division. (2004). Whitefish, M.T.: Kessinger, 124.
14. Armenian President Signals New Delay in Nuclear Plant Closure.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (7 December 2011).
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia_president_signals_new_delay_in_nuclear_pla nt_closure/24414196.html
15. Daly, John C.K. (03 Oct. 2011). Armenia's Aging Metsamor Nuclear
Power Plant Alarms Caucasian Neighbors. Oil Prices & Energy News:
Crude Oil Price Charts, Investment Advice.
http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Armenias-Aging-Metsamor-Nuclear-Power-Plant-Alarms-Caucasian-Neighbors.html
16. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Motion for a Resolution.
Doc. 12580 [Metsamor nuclear power station - a vital threat to Europe
in the present and the future]. (April 2011)
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc11/EDOC12580.htm
17. Grigoryan, M. (4 May 2011). Armenia: Metsamor Awaits IAEA
Inspection. Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63418
18. Danielyan, E. (25 July 2011). Armenia Passes International Nuclear
Safety Test. Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38223
19. The European Commission (15 May 2012). European Neighborhood
Policy Package: Country Progress Report - Armenia. Press Release
MEMO/12/330. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/330&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
20. Grigoryan M. & Hayrapetyan A. (June 2011). Armenia: Fight Brews
Over IAEA's Thumbs-Up Appraisal of Metsamor. Central Eurasia Project
of the Open Society Institute. http://dev.eurasianet.org/node/63638
21. Ulrich P. (February 2012). Russia Ready to Increase Investments
for Armenian Nuclear Power Plant Construction. Partnership for Global
Security. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/29201293322AM.html#4E
*Rafiga Gurbanzade is a student at the Department of Criminology Law
and Society, University of California Irvine. She is also a member of
the Pax Turcica Institute.
Friday, 24 August 2012
Journal of Turkish Weekly
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/140825/metsamor-the-fukushima-of-the-caucasus.html
Aug 24 2012
Metsamor - The Fukushima of the Caucasus?
Friday, 24 August 2012
by Rafiga Gurbanzade, Contributor
Last year's catastrophic earthquake and tsunami off the coast of Japan
and the subsequent Fukushima Daiichi nuclear meltdown highlighted the
importance of a diligent assessment of nuclear power plants (NPP) to
endure ground shakings or possible displacements [1]. According to the
USGS, around 90 to 95 percent of the world's earthquakes occur on the
boundaries of the tectonic plates as a way of releasing energy that
builds up through the plate interaction [2]. While the knowledge about
interaction of tectonic plates helps to identify seismically active
regions, predicting an exact place and time of an earthquake remains
impossible. This diminishes the chances of a proper warning and
evacuation of populations ahead of a catastrophe. The problem is even
more severe in countries with economic hardships [3].
Similar to Japan, the South Caucasus region of Eurasia is a zone of
high seismic activity. The Arabian and Eurasian tectonic plates
collide here generating regular destructive earthquakes across the
Caucasus, eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran[4]. On December 7,
1988, two ground shocks with three seconds apart left at least 25,000
people dead, 19,000 injured and 500,000 homeless in the
Leninakan-Spitak-Kirovakan area of northern Armenia, then a Soviet
republic.The magnitude of the earthquake was estimated at 6.8, while
the damage was estimated at about 16.2 billion U.S. dollars. The
disaster severely damaged infrastructure within the affected areas of
Armenia and the neighboring Kelbajar region of Azerbaijan. The shocks
were felt in Armenia's capital, Yerevan, in neighboring Georgia and as
far as the Russian North Caucasus [5].Following the catastrophe,
concerns intensified over the only NPP built by the Soviet government
in the Caucasus region - the Metsamor (also known as Oktemberyan) NPP
in Armenia.Built in 1976 with two VVER-440 Model V230 nuclear
reactors, the structures of the plant resembled those of the Chernobyl
NPP [6].
In the former Soviet Union, the most commonly constructed reactors
were the RBMK and VVER. The RBMK reactor, which was utilized in
Chernobyl and exploded in April 1986, was a water-cooled and
graphite-moderated reactor. In this type of reactors, the fuel
elements can be exchanged while the reactors are powered. Such
reactors are considered to be the world's most dangerous because of
the risk of a fire in the graphite moderator and the absence of safety
containment [7]. The VVERs are known as pressurized water reactors
that utilize light water as both the moderator and the coolant [8].
These reactors were developed in three generations. The first
generation was developed in 1960s (reactor 440/230), the second, in
early 1980s (reactor 440/213), and the third in late 1980s
(reactor1000). The first two generations of VVER-440 are thought by
the international experts to be the unsafe of all three because the
reactors had no safety containment. Also, the cooling systems were
considered to be unsafe [9].
Similar to Chernobyl's RBMK, the VVER-440 reactors of Metsamor lack
safety containment structures and are single-walled. The function of a
single-walled containment is to carry the pressure load preventing it
from rising above the designed pressure limit [10].Compared to the
single-wall containment, the double-wall containment better controls
any possible leakage through the inner containment by collecting it in
`the annulus between inner and outer shell' [11]. Therefore, in case
of an accident, a double-walled containment would maintain the leakage
under a negative pressure, which would facilitate the collection,
filtering and rejection of the radioactive leakages. Hence, lacking
key safety features, single-walled RBMK and VVER type reactors present
a high risk of radioactive release during an accident [12].
After the 1988 earthquake, in fear of Chernobyl-like disasters, the
Metsamor NPP was shut down. But the urge to reopen it arose during the
1991-94 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As the
Armenian forces occupied parts of Azerbaijan, the latter blocked
energy supplies, leaving Armenia's population without electricity
during the harsh winter seasons. Subsequently, Armenian authorities
were forced to reopen the two Metsamor reactors in 1993 and 1995 [13].
Since 2003, the NPP has been operated by the Russian Inter RAO UES,
owned by Russia's State Nuclear Energy Corporation (RosAtom), in
return for repaying Armenia's $40 million debt to the Russian
nuclear-fuel suppliers [14].
Located in a highly active seismic zone and built according to the
outdated Soviet standards, the Metsamor became a subject of severe
safety concerns from Armenia's neighbors - Turkey, whose border is
only 10 miles away from the NPP, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Numerous
requests by these countries to permit their specialists for examining
the plant were declined [15]. In 2011, Azerbaijan moved for a
resolution in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
stating that Armenia had refused `the EU's call for Metsamor to be
shut down by 2011 at the latest and its offer of 100 million euros to
help meet the country's energy needs' [16]. Further, the motion noted
that in case of an accident at the Metsamor NPP, destructive
consequences in Armenia, the South Caucasus, the Middle East and
Europe would be inevitable.
Armenian government asserts that the shutdown of the old reactors is
expected in 2016 after a new facility will be built. Nevertheless, a
risk of an accident during the coming four years continues to put
Armenia under pressure [17]. In response to renewed concerns after the
Fukushima Daiichi disaster, the Armenian government invited inspectors
from the International Atomic Energy Agency(IAEA). The IAEA assembled
and sent an Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) of 11 experts. In
its June 2011 report, the OSART noted `good plant practices' at the
Metsamor and highlighted that `during the last number of years,
several important safety systems have been updated using resources of
the plant's staff' (IAEA Press Release). However, the OSART report
also found a number of deficiencies and the head of OSART mission,
Gabor Vamos, claimed that identifying deficiencies in need of an
urgent repair is a challenge to the Metsamor technicians. He also
suggested that a more meticulous mechanism is needed to keep the plant
in an ideal state [18].
Despite the inspection, the EU continues still insist `on the earliest
possible closure of the Metsamor NPP and on the adoption of a detailed
decommissioning plan based on the [OSART] tests.' As stated further in
the European Neighborhood Policy Package, Country Progress Report (for
Armenia) of May 2012, the Metsamor NPP `cannot be upgraded to meet the
internationally recognized nuclear safety standard' [19]. According to
the All-Armenian Association of Power Specialists, Slavik Sargsian,
`if a hazardous situation emerges at our plant, we have neither the
capabilities nor the specialists to fight back' [20].
In 2010, the European Parliament passed a resolution on the EU
strategy for the South Caucasus [2009/221([INI)], in which it
encouraged the Armenian authorities `to seek viable alternative
solutions for energy supplies.' However, Russia now advances plans for
a new NPP at the same location as the Metsamor and intends to
generously invest in its construction. Sergei Kiriyenko, the head of
RosAtom, recently said that his agency is ready to commit 20-25% of
investments and more options could be discussed [21].
Despite the mounting international pressure, Armenia is unlikely to
shutdown the Metsamor NPP in a visible future. Firstly, the plant
remains a critical source supplying some 40% of Armenia's energy
demand amidst the ongoing conflict with neighboring energy-rich
Azerbaijan. Secondly, the Metsamor NPP is owned and operated by
Russia, which, in turn, is interested in using the plant as a trump
card for defending its remaining strategic positions in the Caucasus.
The closure of the Metsamor NPP is only possible if Armenia resolves
its conflicts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, hence opening the country to
the East-West Energy Corridor architected by the United States. This
would deal a major blow to Russia's classical divide-and-conquer
policy in the Caucasus, removing the last obstacle to region's
economic integration with the West. As shown by its 2008 invasion of
Georgia, Russia is ready to prevent this scenario at any cost. Based
on the same logic, Russian government will spare no effort to keep the
Metsamor NPP running for as long as possible even if the plant poses
the gravest environmental threat to the region.
References
1. Kanaori, Y. (1997). Earthquake Proof Design and Active Faults.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
2. Historic Earthquakes. Earthquake Hazards Program. U.S. Department
of the Interior. (23 July 2012).
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1988_12_07_ev.php
3. Balassanian, S., Cisternas A., & Melkumyan M. (2000). Earthquake
Hazard and Seismic Risk Reduction. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 169.
4. Tan, O. & Taymaz, T. (2005). Active Tectonics of the Caucasus:
Earthquake Source Mechanisms and Rupture Histories Obtained From
Inversion of Teleseismic Body Waveforms. Geological Society of America
Special Papers, 409, 531-578.
http://specialpapers.gsapubs.org/content/409/531.abstract
5. Historic Earthquakes. Earthquake Hazards Program. U.S. Department
of the Interior. (23 July 2012).
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1988_12_07.php
6. Aloise G. & Jones G. L. (2000). Nuclear Safety: Concerns With the
Continuing Operation of Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Reactors. Report
to the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.: United
States General Accounting Office, 80.
7. Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries
(Algeria-Germany).Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook. (2011).
Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication, 49.
8. Technology & Soviet Energy Availability. (1979). Congress of the
United States: Technology Assessment. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 116.
9. Strategic Information and Nuclear Reactors in Selected Countries
(Algeria-Germany). Global Research Nuclear Reactors Handbook. (2011).
Washington, D.C.: International Business Publication, 49.
10. Sehgal, B. R. (2012). Nuclear Safety in Light Water Reactors:
Severe Accident Phenomenology. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 283.
11. Nuclear Containments: State-of-art Report. (2001). Lausanne,
Switzerland: International Federation for Structural Concrete, 21.
12. Environment in the Transition to a Market Economy: Progress in
Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States.
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. (1999). Paris:
OECD, 241.
13. Armenia: A Country Study. Library of Congress. Federal Research
Division. (2004). Whitefish, M.T.: Kessinger, 124.
14. Armenian President Signals New Delay in Nuclear Plant Closure.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. (7 December 2011).
http://www.rferl.org/content/armenia_president_signals_new_delay_in_nuclear_pla nt_closure/24414196.html
15. Daly, John C.K. (03 Oct. 2011). Armenia's Aging Metsamor Nuclear
Power Plant Alarms Caucasian Neighbors. Oil Prices & Energy News:
Crude Oil Price Charts, Investment Advice.
http://oilprice.com/Alternative-Energy/Nuclear-Power/Armenias-Aging-Metsamor-Nuclear-Power-Plant-Alarms-Caucasian-Neighbors.html
16. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Motion for a Resolution.
Doc. 12580 [Metsamor nuclear power station - a vital threat to Europe
in the present and the future]. (April 2011)
http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/WorkingDocs/Doc11/EDOC12580.htm
17. Grigoryan, M. (4 May 2011). Armenia: Metsamor Awaits IAEA
Inspection. Central Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/63418
18. Danielyan, E. (25 July 2011). Armenia Passes International Nuclear
Safety Test. Jamestown Foundation.
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=38223
19. The European Commission (15 May 2012). European Neighborhood
Policy Package: Country Progress Report - Armenia. Press Release
MEMO/12/330. http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/330&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
20. Grigoryan M. & Hayrapetyan A. (June 2011). Armenia: Fight Brews
Over IAEA's Thumbs-Up Appraisal of Metsamor. Central Eurasia Project
of the Open Society Institute. http://dev.eurasianet.org/node/63638
21. Ulrich P. (February 2012). Russia Ready to Increase Investments
for Armenian Nuclear Power Plant Construction. Partnership for Global
Security. http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/Projects%20and%20Publications/News/Nuclear%20News/29201293322AM.html#4E
*Rafiga Gurbanzade is a student at the Department of Criminology Law
and Society, University of California Irvine. She is also a member of
the Pax Turcica Institute.
Friday, 24 August 2012
Journal of Turkish Weekly
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/140825/metsamor-the-fukushima-of-the-caucasus.html